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Preview 
 
Imagine an atmospheric scientist, a journalist, an NGO worker, a donor, a herbalist, a farmer, a fisherman, 
an activist, a religious leader, a government official, a traditional leader, two Maasai pastoralists, a 
filmmaker and an anthropologist engaged in a conversation. Most of the interlocutors speak English, 
some speak Swahili, and only two speak Maa. The tone is somewhat urgent. The story that has brought 
them together is about a world at risk. Indeed, it is the highly complex story and observation of an altered 
climate - which scientists have come to subsume under the denominator of climate change or global 
warming - that made all these people convene. These two Maasai men have travelled from afar and appear 
somewhat puzzled. There is no word for this pending catastrophe in their language yet. It is a story that 
needs to bridge not only linguistic barriers but also cultural ones. It was at that particular day in Dar es 
Salaam where I witnessed for the first time the unfolding of a climate-change spectacle. It was also the day 
on which the contours of “my field” most notably crystallized, and after which I began to have an idea of 
which trails to track.  
And so I followed the two Maasai men to their village Terrat, where I spent many hours walking and 
herding cattle, trying to understand what climate change means to the pastoral Maasai of this particular 
locality. I also followed Joseph - the NGO worker who seemed the embodiment of a “development 
broker” - to Arusha. He illuminated the historical complexities between the irreconcilable worlds of the 
Tanzanian government and Maasai realities. And there was Eric, a representative of the civil society in 
Tanzania who had pushed the climate change agenda in Tanzania further. I visited him in Dar es Salaam, 
but our paths also crossed on many other occasions such as the international climate change conferences 
in Durban and Doha. I also followed climate scientists like Madumi to the University of Dar es Salaam, 
and the filmmaker to his studio where he edited his own version of the story. And I tried to follow 
government officials such as Paul, but very often to no avail, for they did not have time for researchers. 
Yet I received documents: draft policies, official policies, development policies, climate change strategies, 
adaptation plans, mitigation plans, poverty reduction plans, communication plans, assessment reports, 
evaluation reports, workshop reports and so on. And there were conferences, meetings, workshops, 
sensitization events, public hearings, and seminars – all revolving around the question of how to adapt to 
a changing climate. A great part of my following this climate-change spectacle thus consisted of following 
the actors and their script, that they performed again and again in a different setting and on a different 
stage. This thesis tells the story of a travelling story and all the varying lifeworlds that it has entangled and 
brought to life along its way. Following this trajectory provides insight into how climate change, as a 
statistical description, becomes an agentive force and imaginative resource that is inexhaustible in 
meaning; a power that operates well beyond its atmospheric properties.     
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Prelude 
 
Since the “discovery” of Easter Island in 1772 – the most remote inhabited island in the world – 
until today researchers have been occupied with unravelling the great mystery of how a 
flourishing civilization came to an abrupt end. Located in the South of the Pacific Ocean, the 
island (also called Rapa Nui) became famous for the gigantic and spectacular stone statues that 
were built by the inhabitants. The generally accepted story goes that when Admiral Roggeveen 
arrived as the first European, he encountered a society that was in an extremely primitive state, 
engaged in continuous warfare and resorting to cannibalism as a desperate attempt to supplement 
the meagre food supplies available on the island (Ponting 1991, in: Boersema 2011: 16). Scientists 
were left with a conundrum: how did the inhabitants get there in the first place? Where did the 
people come from? What drove them to make those colossal statues? What do they signify? And 
how did they transport these massive stones? But the most debated issue has been the enigmatic 
societal collapse of this remarkable culture. In the attempt to reconstruct the civilization’s history, 
several researchers came to conclude that it was the inhabitants’ unsustainable relationship with 
the natural environment that caused its destruction.1 According to this theory, for the transport 
of the statues (or moai) – of which hundreds have been found scattered around the island – the 
population needed to cut down an extensive amount of trees. Moreover, as the population grew 
they started to clear the land in order to grow crops. When they had cut down the last tree they 
lacked the timber to make ocean-going canoes, which they had formerly used for fishing. The 
deforestation of the island also led to erosion and a decline in the overall food supply, and 
ultimately the Easter Islanders had outstripped the land’s capacity to feed them all.2 Put another 
way, the irresponsible relationship with their environment had bereaved the inhabitants of Rapa 
Nui of their own home. 
In the course of the modern environmental era that began around the 1970s, the story of Rapa 
Nui has turned into an icon of catastrophic warning for the international community, leaving an 
indelible mark upon man’s (green) consciousness. An inevitable question that emerged during 
this time was whether humanity is about to face a similar scenario if we continue to deplete the 
environment and the ozone layer at the same ongoing pace. Til today the island is still seen as a 
microcosm in order to demonstrate that a society’s unsustainable use of the natural environment 
                                                             
1 See for example A Green History of the World (Clive Ponting 1991); or Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or 
Succeed (Jared Diamond 1995). For a more popular account see for example the documentary: The Mystery 
of Easter Island: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5DBTtC4J0OY&feature=related.  
2 Documentary The Lost Gods of Easter Island (David Attenborough, BBC 2005). 
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can entail an apocalyptic ending. This conclusion triggered the writing of several doomsday 
scenarios and the development of so-called collapse theories (Ponting 1991; Tainter 1988; 
Diamond 2005). Other academics compared the situation of Easter Island with the Club of 
Rome’s 1972 “Limits to Growth” model, and a striking comparison was made between the 
causality of the depletion of natural resources, population growth, and finally the rather abrupt 
breakdown of a human system (Bahn and Flenley in, Boersema 2011: 18). The influential 
economist William Nordhaus also examined the “ecological limits” or “levels of tolerance” of a 
system before it would collapse. This approach gave further impetus to thinking about the 
(im)possibilities of human adaptation to a changing natural system – a concern that takes centre 
stage in current climate-change debates. Even though both human and ecological systems were 
considered, Nordhaus’s examination was essentially an ecological approach (Nordhaus 1975 in, 
Schipper 2009: 366). 
Thus Easter Island’s unfortunate fate has in the first place predominantly been attributed to 
human practices. In fact, the deforestation of the landscape was seen as a result of the cultural 
“needs”, since both the moai statues and agricultural practices required the extensive felling of 
trees. Secondly – and now we touch upon an interesting paradox – it is the same “highly 
civilized” and remarkable culture that did so many stupid things to the environment, and was 
allegedly incapable of adapting to a changing natural environment. So the popular story goes that 
when the islanders cut down the last tree, the moai culture could no longer be sustained. 
Notwithstanding the fact that abovementioned theories address the relationship between the 
human and natural systems, this line of reasoning can be characterized as environmental determinism. 
This theory assumes a mono-causal explanation for human and cultural change, and sees the 
environment as the prime (if not sole) driver for change. According to this view it is thus 
basically stated that humans are – at least ultimately – determined by their natural environment. 
As we shall see below, environmental or ecological deterministic thinking not only coloured the 
historiography of Easter Island, but also left its traces on the conceptualizing of adaptation in 
relation to broader environmental issues like climate change.  
A similar story that has come to serve as a silent testimony for the alleged devastating 
consequences of climate change was the discovery in 1903 of the remains of a former prosperous 
Neolithic farming society, the oasis site of Anau, in the arid lands of Turkmenistan in Central 
Asia (dating around 4500 BC). Geologist-archaeologist Raphael Pumpelly, leading an 
archeological expedition, joined by American geographer Elsworth Huntington, were confronted 
in their expedition with the enigma of a deserted region that had once been a thriving town 
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(Pumpelly 1908, in Rosen 2007: 1). This finding led Pumpelly to formulate the foundations of the 
so-called “Oasis Theory”, which referred to the origins of agriculture and assumed that in drier 
periods humans, animals and plants converged in oasis-like, rich localities elsewhere. This 
fieldwork experience also profoundly influenced Huntington, who then wrote his landmark book 
Civilization and Climate (Huntington 1915/ 1924), which consequently formulated the position that 
since then has come to be known as “climate determinism” (Rosen 2007: 1). Both iconic 
discoveries came to support the idea that changes in the climate and environment were the sole 
root cause that brought these flourishing civilizations to an end. The difference however between 
the latter example and the former is that the Easter Islanders were considered to be culpable 
themselves for environmental degradation, while the Neolithic farmers were supposedly hit by 
climatic changes that pushed their adaptive capacity to its limits. These exemplary expeditions 
have thus exerted considerable influence on intellectual orientations that deal with human-
environment relations. As environmental archaeologist Arlene Miller Rosen explains, it was only 
in the 1960s that archaeologists began to realize that these mono-causal explanations for major 
social changes were far too simplistic, a realiziation that led to an appreciation of in-depth 
research into the interaction between many segments of society that are at least as complex as the 
changing environment. Archaeologists now understand that people’s perception of nature is 
crucial – along with other intricate stressors as laid out in political and historical ecology – in the 
ways people relate and adjust to environmental change (Rosen 2007: 2). But before elaborating 
on this point the case of Easter Island deserves further attention for reasons that will be 
explicated below. 
In the beginning of 2011 biologist and environmental scientist Jan Boersema published a fairly 
controversial book called Beelden van Paaseiland (Images of Easter Island) in which he radically 
opposes the existing collapse theories about Easter Island’s fate. For his re-examination of the 
ecological and cultural history of the island, Boersema began to delve into the original journals of 
the first explorers. Little did he know that a startling and revealing journey awaited him. Soon he 
stumbled upon remarkable details that countered all the former assumptions about the islanders’ 
deplorable condition at the time when the first Europeans arrived (Boersema 2011: 18-21). 
According to the written sources the first Europeans found a fertile island, with no obvious 
traces of erosion, and a population that was strong and in good health. Moreover, the variety of 
fruits and vegetables available on the island enabled the inhabitants to trade with the foreigners 
(Mulert 1911: 125, in: Boersema 2011: 20). The mystery deepened. The explorers indeed found 
an island that had been stripped of trees, and a statue culture that appeared to be no longer part 
and parcel of daily life. However, archaeological and archival evidence show that the moai culture 
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gradually gave way to a sustainable “birdmen culture” that suited the changed ecological 
circumstances better, and that the real collapse should be attributed to a different source. Every 
year around September seabirds visited the island to breed, announcing the spring. The seabirds’ 
eggs were initially embraced as a welcome culinary product, and later became identified with the 
creator spirit Make Make, with fertility and (pro)creation. With the arrival of the new season a 
new religious leader – the birdman – was chosen to represent Make Make on Earth (Boersema 
2011: 131- 137), which thus became engrained in the religious and political culture of the 
islanders. 
In addition to this, statistical recalculations based on pre-modern societies’ population growth 
rates have indicated that never have more than four or five thousand people dwelled on Easter 
Island (ibid: 157); a great contrast with the ten thousand people (or even more) that were 
formerly assumed to have lived there in the heyday of the civilization. Thus when the Europeans 
“discovered” Rapa Nui, they encountered a population growth rate that was in line with historical 
trends. Botanic evidence has furthermore demonstrated that the Polynesian rat made it 
impossible for the forest to regenerate, which underpins the conclusion that the cultural practices 
were not the root cause of the massive deforestation. The argument is thus turned around: the 
moai culture itself did not bring the forest to an end, but it was the unforeseen deforestation of 
the island that meant the end of the statue culture (ibid: 234). What this alternative explanation 
points out is that the end of the moai culture did not mean the end of a civilization, but that along 
with a gradually changing ecosystem an alternative socio-cultural, political and religious 
development took place that enabled the islanders to adapt to the new circumstances.  
Against this background it can be said that a crucial element that is overlooked in former collapse 
narratives is that this cult around the birdmen was not the reminiscence of what once used to be 
a great civilization, but rather a continuation of it that enabled the islanders to attain a new 
balance. Hence, Boersema concludes that the history of Easter Island can better be characterized 
by the terms continuity and change, rather than collapse and loss (Boersema 2011: 138). It is 
worth mentioning that a “real” collapse did take place on Easter Island, but the author 
demonstrates that this did not happen prior to, but after the arrival of the Europeans. The serious 
decline of the population began in the second half of the nineteenth century, which coincided 
with the arrival of the Peruvians in 1862, who needed labourers to work on their plantations. 
This resulted in the recruitment of slaves, and within less than six months more than a third of 
the population was captured and deported to South America. In their “new world” the Easter 
Islanders were exposed to the smallpox virus. Due to international pressure some of the slaves 
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were repatriated, which enabled the virus to spread around the whole island. This sequence of 
tragedies inaugurated the darkest period of the history of the island. Finally in 1877, of the 
approximately four thousand inhabitants that were present before the Peruvians arrived, the 
number of people who survived counted 111. As Boersema rightfully points out, this can be 
characterized as a “real” collapse, since within less than a decade a society lost its political and 
religious leaders, its traditional knowledge and rituals. In brief, the social and cultural system 
disappeared, and consequently the inhabitants lost the resilience to adapt (ibid: 178-186). 
The story of Rapa Nui has to be understood as a teaser to the thesis that follows. It forms a 
telling microcosm of the broader politics of knowledge revolving around human-environment 
relations in general, and adaptation in particular. It is an example that can be characterized as a 
“rupture” in the historiography of Easter Island. It is indicative of how competing (and 
erroneous) narratives about a culture’s adaptive capacities and unsustainable relationship with 
nature have been reproduced and developed over time. It appeared that the former “collapse 
authors” (Diamond, Ponting and others) did not carefully ground their theories upon scientific 
sources. It shows us that they reproduced existing assumptions – highly informed by alarmist 
imaginations – that led to misrepresentations of the ecological history of the island instead. It is 
most probably not a coincidence that the collapse theories emerged in a time of worldwide 
growing environmental concern, in which an increasingly prophesied ecological apocalypse 
became part of the popular global imagination. It is (at least partly) within this ideological 
framework that we should understand how thinking about adaptation has been informed and has 
evolved over time. Furthermore, in the chapters that follow it will be argued that, due to the 
increasing sense of urgency sparked by the notion of climate change, climate determinism has re-
emerged within the research agenda as an explanatory framework (cf. Hulme 2011a) and thus will 
be subject to critical scrutiny in this research. 
 
 6 
Introduction 
 
A positioning, or: what this thesis is not about 
 
“Climate change is not “a problem” waiting for “a solution”. It is an environmental, 
cultural and political phenomenon which is re-shaping the way we think about ourselves, 
about our societies and about humanity’s place on earth.”  
Mike Hulme 2010a: 171 
 
It is perhaps somewhat unusual to begin a thesis about what it is not. But considering the vast 
amount of literature dealing with the notions “adaptation” and “climate change” – and the 
encompassing theoretical scope - I deem it easier to begin by leaving some things behind. If we 
were to pick a foundational story that characterizes the way we view and narrate the dawn of the 
twenty-first century, few people would disagree that this can be justifiably be captured by telling a 
tale about crisis. In his inaugural address in 2009 President Barack Obama defined contemporary 
American history by declaring: “we are in the midst of crisis” (Roitman 2014: 1). Six years later in 
a similar attempt to characterize the moment’s historicity during the State of the Union Speech, 
Obama voiced a more positive note: “The shadow of crisis has passed” (Obama, State of the 
Union Speech 2015).3 In his speech President Obama continued to list the manifold crises that 
his administration has surmounted, and mentioned the major challenges and missions that are 
still ahead: 
And no challenge, no challenge poses a greater threat to future generations than climate 
change. 2014 was the planet’s warmest year on record. And one year doesn’t make a 
trend, but this does: fourteen of the fifteen warmest years on record have all fallen in the 
first fifteen years of this century. I have heard some folks trying to dodge the evidence by 
saying they are not scientists, and we don’t have enough information to act. Well, I am 
not a scientist either. But you know what; I know a lot of really good scientists at NASA 
and NOAA and at our major universities. And the best scientists in the world are all 
telling us that our activities are changing the climate. And if we don’t act forcefully, we’ll 
continue to see rising oceans, longer and hotter heat waves; dangerous droughts and 
floods and massive disruptions that can trigger greater migration and conflict and hunger 
around the globe (Obama 2015, State of the Union Speech). 
                                                             
3 President Barack Obama during the State of the Union Speech 2015: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sotu  
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If not a metanarrative, climate change has certainly come to occupy the role of a Big Story. It has 
become an all-embracing narrative that engulfs geo-political, intellectual, economic, spiritual and 
socio-cultural spheres of life. As a journalist recently exclaimed on the radio: “Climate change is 
the biggest story ever!” If we take a look at the dominant framing of climate change – both in 
popular accounts and in scientific predictions – a picture of doom and decay emerges. It has 
become a story that very well deserves the label of being the biggest crisis facing humanity today. 
Let us consider only a few of the high-profile climate change “whistleblowers” (Hamblyn 2009). 
For instance, Tim Flannery cautioned, “If humans pursue a business-as-usual course for the first 
half century, I believe the collapse of civilization due to climate change becomes inevitable” 
(Flannery 2005: 209). Al Gore warned, “We have to act together to save this global crisis. Our 
ability to live is what is at stake!” (Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth). Also well-known doomsday 
thinker James Lovelock has forcefully argued that “global heating” is threatening civilization itself 
(Lovelock 2006). And recently political activist Naomi Klein wrote in a bestselling book: “Faced 
with a crisis that threatens our survival as a species, our entire culture is continuing to do the very 
thing that caused the crisis, only with an extra dose of elbow behind it” (Klein 2014: 2).4 And 
indeed, science unequivocally shows that there are reasons abound to be worried. 
Before embarking upon a somewhat constructivist journey, let me first attempt to foreclose 
realist critique by embracing it: there is no doubt that climate change is real, that it is happening, 
and that some parts of the world (notably the poorest countries in the world) are likely to suffer 
more than others. Another reason to be troubled is that on the completely opposite side of the 
“alarmist’ spectrum” there continues to be ground for sceptics to deny the existence of 
anthropogenic climate change altogether. A sharper contrast between President’s Obama’s tone 
and that of President-elect Donal Trump, who has dismissed it as a hoax, could hardly be 
imagined.5 What is worrisome about this situation, as Obama also noted, is that influential groups 
of people, such as policy-makers and high-profile scientists, are using or manipulating “matters of 
fact” to meet their own political ends (which holds also true for the alarmists).6 Approximately 
                                                             
4 For an overview of dominant climate-change framing engrained with an apocalyptic aura, see Crist 2007.   
5 Donald Trump has called global warming a “hoax” and claimed that the Chinese fabricated it. Even 
though he later said that this was just a joke, he has emphasized that he is not a big fan of the Paris 
Climate Accord, by Erica Goode, 20 May 2016, New York Times. 
6 Remarkable in this context is the event that took place in 1998 when some of the major fossil fuel 
companies in the world joined forces with conservative think tanks, industry groups and public relation 
experts to draft a plan. The so-called Global Climate Science Communications Plan was given birth in 
order to prevent global climate action, and to convince the American public and Senate that climate 
change is based on “shaky science”.6 The primary aim has been from the outset to disseminate as much 
doubt as possible. With a budget of two million dollars the campaign has been successful not only in 
spreading the “skeptics’ gospel” but also in preventing appropriate political action from being taken. See: 
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half of American citizens (and also elected officials) are climate-change deniers and have now 
embraced this “pseudo-science”, which rejects the fact that humans have caused global warming. 
In a similar vein, and at least as astonishing is the fact that this “faith of sceptics” has travelled 
around the world, to countries like The Netherlands, where it is embraced by an even larger 
percentage of the population than in the United States, which makes the Dutch population 
relatively the biggest group of deniers in the world (interview with van Soest, Trouw April 18 
2014).7 Considering the fact that The Netherlands lies partly below sea level and is extremely risk-
prone to long-term climatic changes, this lack of trust in “conventional” science is astounding. 
According to author and environmentalist van Soest, the major drivers behind scepticism are 
first, a dogmatic religious view that is irreconcilable with the idea that humans have had the 
power to intervene in God’s creation; and second, the fact that most deniers are engulfed by an 
extreme libertarian ideology in which the “holiness” of the free market takes centre stage. 
Theories related to climate change are seen as an attack on this conviction and thus unacceptable, 
and the only way out is to reject it (ibid). As a reaction to this worldwide growing climate 
scepticism a group of leading climate scientists have joined forces in an attempt to understand 
this “faith” of the deniers as well to debunk the climate-science myths that underpin it. In a 
massive online course offered by the University of Queensland called “Making Sense of Climate 
Science Denial”, lectures are offered in climate science and psychology, driven by the hope that 
people will better understand anthropogenic climate change when they are cognizant about where 
these myths originated from (The Guardian 21 April 2015). 
So there appears to be a paradoxical aspect to the ways in which climate change narratives are 
advancing in public and scientific discourse, with an acceleration of its rejection on the one hand, 
and continuing eschatological anxieties that it sparks on the other.8 This is more or less the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1676446-global-climate-science-communications-plan-
1998.html 
7 Jan Paul van Soest has written a book about the climate change deniers in The Netherlands called De 
Twijfelbrigade (2014), which means something like the “division of doubt”. For a similar account on this 
phenomenon about a cadre of scientists who have clouded public understanding related to scientific facts 
in order to advance a political and economic agenda, see the book written by Naomi Oreskes and Erik 
Conway, Merchants of Doubt (2010). 
8 Geographer Erik Swyngedouw (2010) speaks about another paradoxical aspect of the way the climate-
change debate is evolving, between on the one hand the idea that climate change with its consensually 
apocalyptic framing is seemingly politicized as never before (i.e. urgent action is needed), while on the 
other hand political philosophers speak about the consolidation of a post-political condition of the public 
sphere over the past two decades (entwined with neoliberalization). This post-political situation can be 
characterized by the evacuation of proper political dimensions from the public terrain by technocratic 
management and consensual policy-making. As such, he insists that hegemonic climate-change policies 
reinforce processes of de-politicization and the socio-political status quo rather than contributing to more 
egalitarian transformations (Swyngedouw 2010). 
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polarized condition within which the Big Story of climate change is being played out. It is a 
telling case in point of the intertwining of science and politics in our contemporary world. 
Following Latour, this mixing up of facts and values is another, perhaps more fundamental, 
reason for concern. It is in the context of the enduring truth struggle between climate scientists 
vis-à-vis climate sceptics that Bruno Latour (2013) in his book An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. 
An Anthropology of the Moderns wonders: “Has the controversy really degenerated to the point 
where people can talk about the fate of the planet as if they were on stage of a televised jousting 
match, pretending that the two opposing positions are of equal merit?” (Latour 2013: 2-3). 
Latour sees this conflict, in part, as a testimony to what he has termed the “end of 
modernization”; a time in which the mixing up of Facts and Values is increasing as a result of an 
accelerated intermixing of humans and nonhumans, and the multiplication of “hybrids” between 
science and society. He observes a powerful tension between the value of objectivity and the 
account that is needed to define this value; or a confusion between the appeal to (scientific) 
Certainty on the one hand and to Trust (in the institution of science) on the other (Latour 2013: 
6-7). This situation raises new questions for the social sciences and humanities, as Latour laments 
in an earlier article:  
Wars. So many wars. Wars outside and wars inside. Cultural wars, science wars, and wars 
against terrorism. Wars against poverty and wars against the poor. Wars against ignorance 
and wars out of ignorance. […] Should we be at war, too, we, the scholars, the 
intellectuals? […] Is it really the task of the humanities to add more deconstruction to 
destruction? (Latour 2004: 225). 
Latour’s point is directed at the sceptics and the manifold ways in which facts are obscured and 
manipulated to argue against the scientific basis of climate change, as briefly described above. It is 
a concern that stems partly from his pioneering work in science studies in which he – and many 
others – pointed at the many uncertainties inherent in the enterprise of science and in the 
construction of facts. He argues that the irony of this situation is that the constructivist weapons 
of the Enlightenment project, which were necessary descriptive tools to debunk the excessive 
trust in ideological arguments that were posited and accepted as matters of fact, are now turning 
back against us. The situation seems to have reversed, and now the danger is rather coming from 
“[…] an excessive distrust of good matters of fact [is] disguised as bad ideological biases!” (Latour 
2004: 227). In other words, he laments that the critical mind has taken the wrong path and has 
begun to fight the wrong battle. His answer to this situation – which can succinctly be put as a 
“crisis of critique” – is the cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude; yet one that deals not with 
matters of fact but rather with matters of concern (ibid).  
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It goes beyond the aims of this section to elaborate on this renewed form of realism; but for now 
it suffices as the background against which I can proceed to develop my own thesis. Latour’s 
concern is well taken. Yet as I hope to make clear throughout the follow pages, for the very same 
reasons that the deniers need to be targeted with renewed weapons of realism, the critical eye of 
constructivism remains necessary to inquire about what happens at the other extreme of the 
continuum, specifically there where the apocalypse looms. This is particularly important 
considering North-South relations and the new configurations of power that are entailed by 
positing climate change as the epitome of crisis for sub-Saharan Africa and the Global South. In 
a very basic sense therefore, by critically scrutinizing the claims to climate change-as-crisis my 
thesis seeks to draw attention away from crisis. That being said, I wish to foreclose the “realism” 
versus “constructivism” debate by emphasizing the idea that “nature is simultaneously real, 
collective, and discursive – fact, power, and discourse – and needs to be naturalized, sociologized, 
and deconstructed accordingly (Latour 1993 in Escobar 1999: 2). The final issue that I wish to 
suspend from the outset, and which runs prominently through the climate change literature, is a 
problem-solution-inclined orientation. In other words, whether we deny or accept it – instead of 
being merely “a problem waiting for a solution”, as Hulme also reminds us – climate change has 
become an imaginative force that has threaded its way through the most elementary and 
existential modes of being and living in this world. 
What this thesis is about: 
 Adaptation to Climate Change as a travelling idea 
There is one remarkable feature of the way in which the story of global warming is advancing, at 
least as far as sub-Saharan Africa is concerned: we cease to treat it as a story. In its simplest sense, 
this thesis addresses this blind spot. The global political preoccupation with climate change 
evolves, roughly speaking, around two basic foci: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation primarily 
refers to reducing the causes of climate change, and thus to preventing it from getting worse.9 
Adaptation, on the other hand, deals with the alleviation of the negative consequences by 
enhancing societies’ adaptive capacities in order to deal with a changing climate. In essence, 
whereas mitigation addresses the source of the problem, adaptation focuses on the consequences 
(Huq & Reid 2009: 313). The causal relationship between the two is that the more mitigation 
takes place, the less adaptation is needed, and vice versa (Schipper 2009: 361). The development 
version of climate change revolves around adaptation. In 2001 adaptation became officially 
                                                             
9 Strategies related to mitigation revolve around the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the 
development of alternative modes of production, and enhancing potential sinks. These attempts involve 
both geo-engineering techniques and changing social policy to alter human behavior (Pielke 1998: 161). 
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recognized as a key principle of the international climate change policy at the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since its inception it has become one of 
the essential pillars of intervention in the Global South in the fight against climate change.10 
Meanwhile the idea has mobilized an array of transnational, national and local actors, funds, and 
institutional reforms, to the extent that adaptation has become one of the major development 
issues of our time (Tanner and Allouche 2011, in: Arnall et al. 2014). Due to its urgency and 
global magnitude the story or idea of adaptation to climate change is travelling all around the 
world. As a narrative about our basic human existence climate change is translated in an array of 
different forms because it shapes and it is shaped by the gamut of the world’s cultures in its own 
contingent, distinctive and highly complex ways. 
This idea is currently also “travelling” to the Global South with pronounced force. Due to this 
“planetary emergence” powerful actors in both the Global North and South are mobilized and 
assemble around this threat, an action which all assume to be indispensable in tackling this global 
problem. The adaptation paradigm is conveyed as a “new prophecy” for the Global South, as it is 
strongly imbued with the idea that adaptation to climate change is the sine qua non for survival. 
The securitization of climate change and its “apocalyptic aura” pertain particularly to sub-Saharan 
Africa and the small island developing states. The assumption that Africa is very likely to be at 
the dawn of facing an intense reshaping of how people (should) relate and adapt to a rapidly 
changing climate forms an inherent, and one of the most salient, elements of this discourse. 
Hence, this research takes as a basic premise that in this increasingly interconnected and mediated 
world people do not solely adapt to a changing climate, but also adapt to a changing discourse 
about the climate.11 Put in the words of Rudiak-Gould, whose work followed a very similar 
course, “This study focuses on a different sort of climate change adaptation to climate prediction; 
                                                             
10 The importance of adaptation has for a long time been sidelined for various political reasons. It took 
almost two decades before adaptation became officially adopted as a major pillar within the UNFCCC 
policy (Schipper 2009: 369). The reasons for this long trajectory have political, economic and conceptual 
root causes. The so-called limitationist view played an important political role here. The main reason behind 
this perspective, which focuses on preventive action (thus mitigation), has been the fear that a shift toward 
adaptation measures would weaken the social will to undertake greenhouse gas reductions (Kates 2000; 
Thornton & Manasfi 2010; Schipper 2009; Burton 2009; Pielke 1998; Pielke et al. 2007). Also, 
“adaptationists” saw no need to study adaptation in a special way, because they simply trusted natural 
selection or the forces of the market to encourage adaptation (Kates 2000; Schipper 2009). Finally, the 
realist view became widely accepted due to growing scientific consensus that acknowledged that adaptation 
to human-induced climate change constitutes new challenges for humanity: “[…] climate change is 
pushing us beyond the limits of existing coping strategies in many places, an additional adaptation, 
autonomous or otherwise induced, will be necessary” (Schipper & Burton 2009: 2).  
11 In this thesis I use the terms discourse, idea, narrative, story or paradigm somewhat interchangeably, but 
always depending on the context. The notion of adaptation as “an idea” stems for a body of theory that 
deals with travelling ideas and models. Whenever I use the term discourse I refer to more general talk that 
circulates widely in society; paradigm is used more often in the context of a “development paradigm”.   
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not societal resilience to a present threat, but ideological resilience to a looming one” (Rudiak-
Gould 2013b: 14). 
Research related to climate-change adaptation in the developing world in general, and sub-
Saharan Africa in particular, has until now been guided by positivist approaches in which the bio-
physical manifestations of climate change have been taken as a focal point of analysis, and how 
human populations in different socio-ecological systems are adapting or should be adapting to 
climate change (IPCC 2007; Adger et al. 2003; Yanda et al. 2011; Downing et al. 1997; Seo & 
Mendelsohn 2007; Conway & Schipper 2011; Leal Filho 2015). Broadly speaking, a great number 
of studies have followed a problem-solving-oriented approach, by for instance describing general 
policy strategies (Lwasa 2015), which inevitably bring into focus specific technological 
interventions or socio-economic aspects of adaptation (Frank et al. 2011). Moreover, adaptation 
research is still largely dominated by studies that locate the source of vulnerability predominantly 
in the impacts that are brought about by climate change (Basset & Fogelman 2013).12 This 
tendency to focus solely on climate change has rightly been criticised by Hulme (2011) for being 
some sort of neo-determinism or reductionism. Within the logic of reductionism one is seeking 
to predict a climate-shaped future, and so adopt a methodology and form of analysis that first 
extracts the climate from the matrix of complex interdependencies that shape human life, and 
consequently elevates it to being the dominant predictor variable. And so the future is reduced to 
the climate (Hulme 2011a). 
Only recently have some scholars challenged the notion that adaptations to climate change in the 
Global South can be assessed without taking other vectors of social change into account, such as 
shifting power ideologies and discursive formations (Sheridan 2012; Arnall et al. 2014), or 
landscape and institutional changes (Goldman & Riosmena 2013) and more structural problems 
related to the global political economy (De Wit 2014b). Furthermore, very little concern has been 
expressed for a critical assessment of the power dynamics within which the social construction of 
adaptation to climate change takes place in concrete places (Pettenger 2007; for notable 
exceptions see: Weisser et al. 2014; Eguavoen et al. 2013; Smucker et al. 2015; Gebauer & 
Doevenspeck 2014). This void in the research agenda might prove a necessary and welcoming 
novel space of inquiry, particularly if we take into consideration the widespread appeal of climate 
                                                             
12 In a content analysis of the adaptation literature of the four IPCC reports and four leading scholarly 
journals, Bassett and Fogelman (2013) have shown that 70% of the adaptation literature takes a so-called 
“adjustment adaptation” approach, in which climate change impacts are seen as the main source of 
vulnerability. Only 3% of the articles in their review take the social roots of vulnerability into account, and 
thus the need for political-economic change for “transformative adaptation”. The remaining 27% locate 
risk in both biophysical hazards and society (Bassett & Fogelman 2013). 
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change adaptation discourses pertaining particularly to Africa and the small island developing 
states that increasingly shape the “climate landscapes” on the ground (cf. Farbotko & Lazrus 
2012). Considering the vast number of adaptation projects, reports, government communiqués, 
strategies, policies, programs, funding and actors that are mobilized, I believe that 
complementing objectivist and technical studies with more interpretative accounts is a timely 
exercise. This research is therefore in line with the recent call to enrich the idea of climate change 
as a cultural concept (Hulme 2015). While the social sciences and humanities have been silent 
voices in the climate change research agenda for a long time, more and more recognition for the 
relevance of these disciplines can be witnessed in international policy-making circles as well as in 
the IPCC13 reports (see also below). 
Nevertheless, the majority of research about adaptation to climate change in Africa deals with the 
question “what does it take to adapt to climate change?” This research is rather concerned with 
asking what happens in the process of translating the idea of adaptation. Therefore this study 
proposes an alternative ontology of adaptation by exploring it as a travelling idea (cf. Weisser et al. 
2014; Hulme 2008b; de Wit 2014a, 2015). In this thesis I trace the manifold ways in which 
Adaptation to Climate Change travels to northern Tanzania. For an idea to travel it needs to be 
translated. The concept of translation, as used in science and technology studies, is a 
comprehensive notion that basically refers to the process in which things are brought together 
that were separate before (see chapter three). I have focused on these processes of translating 
Adaptation. To be more precise, based on fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork this thesis 
seeks to explore the ways in which Adaptation is played out in the so-called “interstitial spaces” 
of northern Tanzania, as well as how it is translated in a rural village of Terrat, Maasailand. 
This ontological shift from viewing adaptation as a reaction to a biophysical process, to 
adaptation as (and to) a “travelling idea”, similarly calls for an epistemological turn in the climate-
change research agenda. Therefore this research is intended to contribute to developing 
theoretical and methodological tools that show the power-laden processes of translating 
adaptation. It will do so by arguing for an ethnography of connectivity, combined with a detailed 
ethnographic account of the “local” context where the global idea is ultimately supposed to be 
implemented. Central questions to be addressed in this manuscript are: how is adaptation to 
climate change translated and negotiated in northern Tanzania, and what are the consequences 
for different social groups? Who can benefit from these emerging discourses and who cannot? 
                                                             
13 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading scientific body that reviews 
worldwide climate-change research. 
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What makes the idea of Adaptation travel, or, in the case of Maasailand, what are the conditions 
under which the idea does not travel, or is by and large rejected? How do different “truth 
regimes” fuse in their mutual encounter? And, who holds power in translations of the epistemics 
of climate change, and who does not? In order to understand the relevance of this study we first 
need to know what the dominant framings of Adaptation to Climate Change are all about.14 
The “Adaptation Imperative” 
“Mitigate we might, adapt we must.”  
William Nordhaus 1994, in: Pielke 1998: 160 
Under Kyoto’s motto “Think Globally, Act Locally” the idea that the effects of climate change 
are a common concern of humankind (UNFCCC 1992: 1) has become a worldwide mantra. The 
sheer tragedy is that climate change is not only mirroring the profound historical inequalities 
between the Global North and South, it is expected to exacerbate them. It can be stated that the 
per capita emissions roughly reflect the global lines of wealth and power (Moore 2010: 78). 
Furthermore, the essence of the story is that the poorest nations are suffering the most, while 
having contributed the least to this environmental disaster. It is against the background of this 
ethical dilemma that the current climate-change adaptation crisis is played out through the 
international legal framework of the UNFCCC. In accordance with the principle of “common yet 
differentiated responsibilities” as stated in the Convention (UNFCCC 1992), the industrialized 
countries are supposed to help the most vulnerable countries to adapt. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has defined adaptation: 
 “The adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate 
stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 
2007). 
 
Considering the ethical dimensions, both technological as well as financial support for adaptation 
are urged to flow from North to South. To be more precise, in the language of the UNFCCC 
(hereafter the Convention), Annex II and Annex I countries that are able to do so are responsible 
for providing financial assistance to developing countries.15 Studies conducted by the World 
                                                             
14 Whenever Adaptation to Climate Change is capitalized it refers to the framing and representation of it 
as a discourse or idea that is translated widely, as opposed to adaptation as a process by which humans or 
organisms adapt to their changing environment. 
15 To respond to the challenges of equity and to allocate responsibilities between groups, the Convention 
has differentiated among parties, such as between “developed”, “developing” and “least developed 
countries”. But also a differentiation exists between “vulnerable” and “particularly vulnerable”; among 
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Bank, the UNDP and Oxfam have estimated that the required costs for adaptation in developing 
countries will be $10-86 billion per year (Moore 2010: 67). While the climate-change paradigm 
bears parallels to earlier narratives on the precariousness of society-environment relations in 
Africa (e.g. desiccation narrative of the 1920s, the tragedy of the commons of the 1960s, and the 
expansion of the Sahel narrative of the 1970s and 1980s) it can be said that the very size of global 
funds that are made available for adaptation, marks the beginning of a new era of global 
environmental governance. In recent years the need for adaptation to climate change is 
recognized by an increasing number of global actors, and an unprecedented level of financial 
commitment through the Green Climate Fund and other bi- and multilateral actors can be 
witnessed (Berrang-Ford et al. 2015: 755). The UNFCCC has estimated that the current Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) is insufficient to cover the adaptation needs of the Least 
Developed Countries (UNFCCC 2010: 3).16 Moreover, due to the fact that the climate-change 
problematic embraces all aspects of human life and human security, a green paradigm shift has 
made its way into development thinking. In a recent global report, due to the sheer urgency of 
climate change particularly for the developing countries, the notion of an “Adaptation 
Imperative” has been coined (WRI 2010-2011; cf. Ki-moon 2009).17 However, considering the 
alarmism with which this notion is imbued, instead of taking the “Adaptation Imperative” as a 
normative concept at face value, I will argue that a much more careful appraisal is needed of what 
the notion of adaptation entails for North-South configurations in general, and sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular (cf. Wisner et al. 2012; Orlove 2009; Gesing et al. 2014; De Wit 2014a). To 
give just one example, by critically evaluating adaptation Ben Orlove has demonstrated, on the 
basis of his work in Peru, that “the term serves the international and intermediary organizations 
far better than the local communities who feel the impacts most directly” (Orlove 2009: 131-
132). Also, Robert Kates has offered cautionary tales about how the process of adaptation is only 
beneficial for some while bringing about new inequities for the poor (Kates 2000).  
Over the past years a rapid increase in scholarly interest in adaptation can be witnessed, and 
adaptation strategies have begun to emerge in order to deal with the known and anticipated long-
term impacts of climate change (Lwasa 2015). For instance, the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) in the Convention have been supported in drafting National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). 
Also National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), which provide a rigorous assessment 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
“Annex I” and “Annex II” parties, and “economies in transition”. Finally, a distinction is made between 
different physical characteristics of different countries (Mace 2006). 
16 UNFCCC “Fact Sheet” 2010: http://unfccc.int/files/press/application/pdf/adaptation_fact_sheet.pdf.  
17 Jointly produced by the UNEP, UNDP, the World Bank and the World Resources Institute (2010-
2011). 
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of the urgent adaptation needs for LDCs, have been drafted.18 In other words, Adaptation has 
entailed the expansion and reshaping of institutional frameworks at the national level, as well as 
projects at the local level – and thus the setting of new norms and standards about how to deal 
with the environment. The worldwide recognition of climate change as a major challenge facing 
households and communities in the developing world has led to a “mainstreaming” of 
Adaptation into development policies, which inevitably will result in an intense reshaping of 
environment-society relations in Africa and other parts of the developing world (Cannon & 
Müller-Mahn 2010: 3). An increasing number of scholars are pondering over the relationship 
between adaptation and development, and acknowledge the fact that there are clear linkages 
between the two, while critically questioning whether the one can be subsumed under the other 
(Ayers & Dodman 2010; Cannon & Müller-Mahn 2010; Huq & Reid 2006). While these are very 
important questions, my research accepts that adaptation is already travelling as a new 
development paradigm and therefore is rather concerned with the question what happens when 
adaptation is translated as such.  
Africa’s “Adaptation Deficit” 
For sub-Saharan Africa climate change carries all the more a notion of urgency, because it is 
considered to be already highly vulnerable with low adaptive capacity. It is said that Africa is the 
most vulnerable continent to climate change, as it lacks the appropriate financial means and 
technologies to adapt. Moreover, in many parts of Africa the effects are already happening, and 
being experienced on the ground. The latest assessment report of the IPCC has concluded that: 
“for many in Africa adaptation is not an option but a necessity” (IPCC 2014a). If the world finds 
itself in a global climate change crisis, and if we look at the scientific predictions and the ways in 
which expert discourses for sub-Saharan Africa are advancing, it can be said that the continent is 
perceived to be in a super-crisis. Also, Tanzania is perceived to be highly vulnerable to predicted 
climate change impacts, because income levels are among the lowest in the world and livelihoods 
depend on modes of primary production that are inherently risky. Vulnerability is increased by 
lack of access to technologies and human capital. Furthermore, the state is lacking in capacity and 
suffers from corruption (Paavola 2006: 202). Taking this line of crisis reasoning one step further, 
we zoom in on the (agro)pastoralist Maasai in Tanzania – who are perceived to be the country’s 
“most vulnerable community to the effects of climate change” (ibid; URT 2007) – we touch upon 
an iconic emblem, a people who find themselves in an omni-crisis. The climate crisis in sub-
Saharan Africa speaks even more lamentably to the industrialized world’s historical and moral 
                                                             
18 In 2010 467 adaptation projects in the NAPAs have been identified with aggregate costs of 1.7 billion 
USD. 
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consciousness, for Africa never contributed to the problem, but finds itself faced with the most 
severe consequences. But crucially, and this is often sidelined, this reasoning also provides new 
ground for intervention. 
The IPCC states in the latest Assessment Report (AR5) that “African ecosystems are already 
being affected by climate change, and future impacts are expected to be substantial. […] Climate 
change will amplify existing stress on water availability in Africa (high confidence)” (IPCC, AR5: 
1202). Moreover, the assessment report stipulates that “climate change and climate variability 
have the potential to exacerbate or multiply existing threats to human security including food, 
health and economic insecurity, all being of particular concern for Africa (medium confidence)”. 
Finally, there is increasing evidence that Africa faces an “adaptation deficit” and is in need of 
financial resources, technological support and investment in institutional and capacity 
development in order to address climate risk, build adaptive capacity and implement robust 
adaptation strategies (high confidence) (ibid: 1204). An Adaptation deficit is defined as: “The gap 
between the current state of a system and a state that minimizes adverse impacts from existing 
climate conditions and variability” (IPCC 2014a, WGII: 172). Put differently, expert discourses 
convey that Africa’s future, as far as climate change is concerned, does not look very bright. 
Hence the only pathway to salvation is by welcoming the expertise, money and technologies of 
the developed nations. Such crisis narratives about Africa are nothing new, and we clearly hear 
the echoes of time of the “dark continent”. In the context of development narratives Emery Roe 
(1999) has argued that the two dominant crisis narratives about Africa cry out for challenging 
counter narratives. The first is the “everything works … except in Africa” narrative, which refers 
to the ongoing idea throughout the world that development is taking place (decline of poverty 
etc.) everywhere except in Africa. The second leading narrative, related to the first, speaks about a 
“Doomsday Scenario” for any country in Africa: resources are overutilized, birth rates are 
skyrocketing, political unrest is becoming widespread, and so on (Roe 1999: 5).19 It will be argued 
in this work that what follows from this all-too-familiar and repetitive story about Africa’s 
“crisis” echoes historically produced discourses, which in the context of my research in Tanzania 
leads to a reproduction of certain questions, development paradigms, power hierarchies and 
dependency dynamics. The role of crisis narratives will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Alternatives to crisis narratives do exist, but are rarely heard. For instance, the African delegates 
who are part of the climate negotiations certainly do not always share the vulnerability discourse. 
                                                             
19 Roe’s work was published more than fifteen years ago, and even though many of these crisis narratives 
are still predominant, it should be noted that recently also a more hopeful and promising tendency of 
narrating and imagining Africa’s future can be observed, such as the “Africa rising” discourse. 
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During an international conference I had an interesting encounter with David Lesolle, a 
climatologist by training who has worked for the Botswana government for 28 years at the 
ministry of environment, and who has been a leading negotiator for the African Group in the 
climate change negotiations. After elaborating on the structural problems inherent in the 
international negotiation processes for the African delegates (under capacity, many delegates 
leave after a few years, so new experts need to be trained and learn the rules of the game); he 
explicitly emphasized that there is a need to tell a different tale about Africa regarding adaptation 
to climate variability: 
I have been in this process literally when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed on in COP3. 
Although science tells us that we are the most vulnerable, it is usually because the 
measure of vulnerability is based on infrastructural development and development at 
large. But at the same time, we haven’t actually talked about how resilient we are to 
climate variability. I think Africans tend to be very resilient to climate variability! I tell my 
counterparts in Europe that in a lot of African countries, particularly in the Savannah, 
people are used to staying 6 months without rain, 8 months without rain. They probably 
only have about between 40 and 100 days of rain a year. That shows a level of resilience 
to me, we know a lot of droughts, climate shocks that we go through. And because of all 
of that I think we should be blowing our trumpet in terms of resilience! Can we improve 
on the resilience? Yes. Would it take a lot of effort? I don’t believe so. I believe a lot of 
people know what to do; they just need a little resource to stimulate the adaptation 
programs. 
Remarkably enough, David’s account resonates with many voices in northern Tanzania who 
spoke for the Maasai communities – such as researchers and CSO workers who explicitly 
countered the vulnerability discourse – yet whose voices were often silenced in public meetings. 
The problem of this particular positioning of “Africa” (and hence “Africans”), which is largely 
perpetuated within the regime of the international negotiations, forms an important focus of 
analysis throughout this work. 
Climate Change & Anthropology 
On the Hegemony of the Natural Sciences 
Voices from the humanities and social sciences have been raised lamenting the absence of the 
social sciences in the debate and the hegemony of a “science first” transformation in 
understanding global climate change (Szerszynski & Urry 2010: 3). Indeed, within the current 
research agenda a tendency can be observed that envisions adaptation to climate change as a 
highly technical response to biophysical conditions, for which a toolbox of programmatic “best 
practices” and “cookie-cutter” solutions are needed that should enable people to adapt in 
thoroughly planned and predictive ways to future climates. Despite the increasing recognition of 
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the value of social and cultural dimensions, technocratic approaches and managerial solutions 
continue to dominate adaptation research and policymaking (for a typical managerial analysis and 
solution, see e.g. Giddens 2009). In the latest IPCC report it is put forward that: “Engineered and 
technological options are commonly implemented adaptive responses” (IPCC 2014b: 8). This 
widespread assumption that underpin such approaches is a testimony to the influence and 
dominance of the natural sciences in climate change research. This technocratic, model-based 
discourse with a “God’s eye” view on the climate finds expression in the way the Adaptation to 
Climate Change paradigm currently is manifested both in international politics and in social 
sciences – at the expense of more contingent, interpretative and imaginative accounts of social 
life (Hulme 2009, 2010a, 2011b; Crane et al. 2011; Rudiak-Gould 2011; Strauss & Orlove 2003). 
Without discarding the relevance and importance of developing predictive instruments and 
forecasting models, it will be argued here that isolating “Nature” from “Culture” – an inherent 
assumption of deterministic thinking that offer technocratic solutions – fails to understand (1) 
the socio-cultural embedded practices through which adaptation is locally valued and enacted; (2) 
the political struggles that are exacerbated by the travelling idea of Adaptation. 
In the pioneering book Weather, Climate, Culture anthropologists Sarah Strauss & Ben Orlove et al. 
(2003) make a striking analogy between the development of the study of the human body and the 
study of the natural world. If we take a closer look at how the understanding of the human body 
evolved within anthropology and other related disciplines, from something that was perceived to 
be “natural” and detached from any social or cultural meaning, to becoming a key object for 
cultural analysis, a fertile ground for comparison emerges. As the authors point out, as recently as 
the 1970s the human body hardly received any attention from anthropologists until Mary 
Douglas’ detailed work on the notion of the physical and social bodies opened up the field for 
further interest (Strauss & Orlove 2003: 5). By making a distinction between two bodily types, 
Douglas argued that the experience of the physical or individual body functions as a microcosm 
within a broader social system. Hence, the way people perceive their body and act upon bodily 
images is intimately linked to a broader symbolic system to which they belong, which acts upon it 
through pre-coded stimuli and responses (Douglas 1970: 164). She stated that: 
“The social body constrains the way the physical body is perceived. The physical 
experience of the body, always modified through the categories through which it is 
known, sustains a particular view of society. There is a continual exchange of meanings 
between the two kinds of bodily experience so that each reinforces the categories of the 
other” (Douglas 1970: 69). 
It is particularly this dialectical relationship between these two discernable, but inseparable, 
notions that I find relevant in the comparison between the study of the human body and the 
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study of the natural environment (and the climate). The way humans shape and interact with their 
environment is embedded within – and in a continuous dialectical interaction with – the socio-
cultural and political organization of a society. Moreover, the existential and symbolic role that 
the natural environment fulfills in many societies is often intricately interwoven with peoples’ 
symbolic categories and belief systems. Put otherwise, as much as the physical environment 
impinges upon human societies across the world and has the ability to shape them in divergent 
ways, in turn, cultural frameworks have an influence on the way people experience, perceive and 
talk about it, and consequently act upon it. The natural and cultural environments are related in 
such a way that the one contains and shapes the other. It is somewhere in between these two 
mutually constitutive positions – i.e. nature being both real and constructed – that the idea of 
climate change is continuously translated during its travels. As Mike Hulme (2015) has also 
argued, both the weather and humans have agency, and the idea of climate change mediates 
between these two forms of agency: 
It is not the case that climate determines any particular human outcome. It is rather that 
human outcomes – with respect to landscape, design, technology, character, mobility, etc. 
– emerge from the interplay between atmospheric materiality and actions of the human 
mind (Hulme 2015). 
 
While at first sight this mutually dependent relationship might appear rather evident, in academia 
it took several decades before a more holistic approach towards human-society relations 
developed. In climate-change research this division becomes all the more apparent along 
disciplinary lines. For a long time climate change was predominantly studied by the natural 
sciences like climatology and meteorology. It is only during the last two decades that the social 
sciences and humanities have become increasingly involved in studying the climate’s impact upon 
human populations, and how societies over time have adapted to their environment and climate. 
Now it is widely recognized by researchers and decision-makers that the problems related to 
climate change cannot be properly understood and analysed without the vital contribution of the 
social sciences (Agrawal et al. 2012). And indeed, social scientists and anthropologists have 
become engaged with climate change research to an unprecedented degree (Roncoli et al. 2009). 
One of the explanations for this initial exclusion is convincingly put forward by Hulme, as 
mentioned earlier, who has argued that the new climate reductionism is driven by the hegemony 
exercised by the predictive natural sciences, which lends disproportionate power to model-based 
descriptions of future climates (Hulme 2011a: 245-247). Evidence of the disciplinary division and 
of the hegemony of the physical sciences can be found in the scientific literature that underpins 
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the assessments reports of the IPCC, which has received considerable criticism from several 
scholars.  
For example, in her groundbreaking article “A New Climate for Society”, Sheila Jasanoff 
criticizes the ways in which scientific assessments like the ones produced by the IPCC have 
helped to establish climate change as a global phenomenon, and as such has detached knowledge 
– as an abstraction of reality that arises from impersonal observations – from meanings that 
always emerge from embedded experience. Jasanoff points out that science’s erasures of local 
specificity – inherent to the general scientific enterprise – are an important source of the conflicts 
that emerge around climate change. In her exploration of “the tensions that arise when the 
impersonal, apolitical and universal imaginary of climate change projected by science comes into 
conflict with the subjective, situated and normative imaginations of human actors engaging with 
nature”, the author sees a vital role for the interpretative social sciences as they can contribute to 
more complex understandings, if not a resolution, of humanity’s climate predicament (Jasanoff 
2010: 233-235). We shall see in chapter five how Jasanoff’s point resonates with Maasai 
pastoralists, who find themselves confronted with highly abstract representations and 
visualizations produced by science about their own environments.    
The IPCC has also been criticized for its fundamental quest for globalizing knowledge – which is 
driven by the general aim to reach consensus – and also for being highly biased in prioritizing 
positivist science at the expense of more interpretative accounts of social life, as mentioned 
earlier (Hulme 2010a, 2011a, 2011b). In a literature study that was carried out in 2011, the 
disciplinary sources that were used by the three working groups of the Third Assessment Report 
(TAR) of the IPCC reports were analyzed. It appeared that the cited literature was strongly 
dominated by the natural science disciplines in general, and by the Earth Sciences in particular. 
Moreover, the minority of cited social science literature was heavily dominated by economics 
(Bjurström & Polk 2011). Partly grounded on the findings of this study, Hulme argued in a 
commentary, “Meet the Humanities” that: “Nature and Culture are deeply entangled, and 
researchers must examine how each is shaping the other. But they are largely failing to do so” 
(Hulme 2011b: 177). It should be noted however, that in the last two assessment reports of the 
contributions of the IPCC Working Group II (WII), there has been a growing recognition of the 
human dimensions of climate change, as the social sciences and the humanities have been given a 
more prominent role (Ford et al. 2012: 202). Yet, I fully share the concern that the hegemony of 
the biophysical sciences matters profoundly and therefore is in need of critical reflection. Due to 
its status as the authoritative voice of climate science, these assessments play a decisive role in 
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framing the problem and in giving direction to its envisaged solutions (Hulme 2011b), hence set 
the tone for both policies as well as public and academic discourse.  
Furthermore, critique has been expressed about the ubiquitous “epistemic power” that is 
exercised by climate-change models which generally carry the presumption that they are value-
free, and are based on “purely objectivist” science. For example, Silke Beck has demonstrated 
how the IPCC’s linear model of expertise prioritizes “value-free” science and stimulates the 
separation of problem from response. This linear model envisages the interaction between 
science and politics as a unidimensional and one-way: from science to policy, in such a way that 
truth speaks to power (Beck 2011: 298). In other words, the dominance of the (natural) sciences 
and the underlying belief in their objective foundations presupposes that they are detached and 
independent from any political value. The paradox lies in the fact that this presumed neutrality 
places science at the center of political debate. Since science is thought to motivate political 
action, winning a scientific debate means attaining a privileged position in the political arena (ibid: 
299).  
In line with Latour – who argues that although scientific knowledge is only one amongst many 
modes of existence, an unrealistic vision of science has become the supreme arbiter of reality and 
“truth” – it will be demonstrated in chapter two that the expectation of, and faith in, science 
within the climate-change debate has come to play a peculiar and problematic role. Latour’s 
critique is rightfully directed to the tendency that we are being seduced into judging all values 
according to the single standard of science (Latour 2013). Hulme has also argued that the burden 
that is placed on climate science – despite its inherent struggle with contingency and uncertainty 
– of finding a single-minded reality that is supposed to give insight into what the future holds has 
become much too great, and will inevitably lead to a political battlefield (Hulme 2009, see chapter 
three).20 Furthermore, the problem with globalized knowledge and its universalizing instincts is 
that geographical and cultural differences are erased (Hulme 2010b). Hence the renewed 
significance that is given to the “reculturing” and “particularizing” of climate-change discourses 
(Endfield 2011), to which this work also seeks to contribute.  
In this regard anthropology has played an important role in laying bare the possible discrepancies 
that exist between global climate-change discourses and climate-change experiences that are 
shaped locally “on the ground” (e.g. Jurt et al. 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus 2012; de Wit 2014b; 
                                                             
20 The Wall Street Journal, 2 December 2009: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704107104574571613215771336. Accessed January 5 
2017. 
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Greschke & Tischler 2014). Thus one of the basic merits that can be attributed to anthropology 
is the rich collection of ethnographic accounts on the local implications, perceptions of and 
adaptations to short- and long-term climatic changes in different localities all over the world 
(Crate & Nuttall 2009; Casimir 2008; Strauss & Orlove 2003). Great emphasis is being placed on 
how human societies – through cultural repertoires – give meaning to environmental changes 
such as climate change (Roncoli et al. 2003; Cruikshank 2001). This broad field of inquiry has 
recently been named “observation studies”, and has by and large contributed to supporting 
scientific claims that climate change is real and already happening on the ground. In other words, 
accounts of local communities all over the world are predominantly taken as a testimony to the 
dangerous consequences of climate change. Whereas these local accounts might be well grounded 
and reveal the inequities inherent in the geographical distribution of the consequences of global 
warming, I contend that the reproduction of climate crisis scenarios similarly hides a tendency to 
nourish alarmism, foreground vulnerability and legitimize external (expert) interventions (cf. 
Bravo 2009). 
Moreover, on a methodological level another challenge emerges. Only very few studies have 
taken into account the possibility that these perceptions are also increasingly being shaped by the 
worldwide dissemination of and exposure to climate change discourses (Rudiak-Gould 2011, 
2012, 2013a, 2013b; De Wit 2015; Bravo 2009). A pioneering anthropologist in this regard is 
Peter Rudiak-Gould, who has coined the term “reception studies”, which refers to the specific 
field of research that explores the uptake of scientific information. In his work that is based on 
long-term fieldwork carried out in the Marshall Islands (Micronesia), he has convincingly 
demonstrated that observation studies alone cannot account for the ways in which people make 
sense of climate change. While the majority of contributions from anthropology have engaged 
with observation studies, a minority have taken reception dimensions into account, while virtually 
no study has combined the two. By employing the notion of translation, my study seeks to be 
attentive to this observation-reception nexus. In chapters 6 and 7, by following a Maasai herder 
across different scales, I wish to demonstrate how the shifting positioning of this informant 
should remind us of how the flow of new sources of information intersect with local 
epistemologies. It should also make us attentive to the active role that we as anthropologists (and 
other interlocutors such as NGO workers, journalists, experts etc.) play in the ongoing process of 
knowledge production. These epistemological and ontological concerns will be addressed in 
chapters six, seven and eight. 
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The isolated focus on the physical environment on the one hand, and on socio-cultural 
understandings of the weather and the climate on the other, resonates, as Strauss and Orlove 
argue, with the fact that within anthropology over the past thirty years knowledge has been 
generated from within two different camps: the materially grounded ecologists, and the meaning-
centered symbolic anthropologists (Strauss & Orlove 2003: 4). In line with the authors, who 
propose a more extended anthropology of the climate and the weather that integrates the two 
perspectives, this research seeks to embrace both sides, and takes materiality and semiotics as 
mutually constitutive. As briefly sketched above, climate change is not merely a biophysical 
phenomenon that exists outside our ontological horizons and epistemological framings of it, but 
it is also a mediated reality that comes into being through our discursive practices, actions or “life 
processes” (cf. Ingold 2000) and the stories that we tell about it. As such, climate change has 
travelled well beyond the realm of the physical sciences, because it not only shapes our physical 
realities, but is a powerful idea that is increasingly altering our social worlds (cf. Hulme 2008b; 
2009; 2010a). 
Moving beyond existing approaches that understand climate-change adaptation mainly in terms 
of technocratic and “rational” solutions that occur in reaction to bio-physical stimuli, this work 
explores alternative perspectives in which contested orders of knowledge production, confusing 
epistemological encounters, and political struggles take centre stage that are entailed by the 
travelling idea of adaptation to climate change. By bringing into view the friction that occurs in 
the process of translating Adaptation to Climate Change between different actors, the politics 
behind this concept begin to dawn upon us. The following chapters focus on how a global 
discourse on climate-change adaptation finds its way through different “translation zones” (Apter 
2006) in Tanzania; on how it takes off, gains a foothold again, and along its itinerary is 
appropriated, embraced, accepted, reinvigorated, and at times also refuted. By analyzing the 
translation chain my research seeks to understand how these discursive practices possibly lead to 
a (re)production or change of power hierarchies, and shape the policy prescriptions that emanate 
from them. A discourse, referring to the intertwining of knowledge and power (Foucault 1980), is 
here very basically understood as the way we understand and talk about the world.21 Moreover, a 
political ecology lens is employed that traces the genealogy of narratives concerning the 
environment and the power relationships that are supported by them (Stott and Sullivan 2000: 2), 
                                                             
21 Foucault defined discourse: “We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to 
the same discursive formation. [..Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a 
group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal timeless form [..] it 
is from beginning to end historical – a fragment of history [..] posing its own limits, its divisions, its 
transformation, the specific modes of its temporality” (Foucault 1972: 117). 
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which enables us to explore the “multi-level connection between global and local phenomena” 
(cf. Adger et al. 2001: 682). 
Organization of this book 
The following chapters can be read as a travelogue that tells the story of a travelling story. The 
journey begins with an exploration of transnational climate-change discourses (as already 
addressed in this introductory chapter) and shall describe and interrogate whatever happens on its 
long and manifold trajectories up until it reaches Maasailand. Before embarking on the trip, 
chapter one offers a historical reflection of the notion of crisis, and critiques the ways in which it 
has shaped much of our contemporary epistemologies. Based on an empirical episode of my 
fieldwork, chapter two sets the stage for the consequent chapters. By bringing all the actors as 
described in the preview into a conversation, we gain an insight into the basic contours of the 
storyline and into the conflicting ways it unfolds. Chapter three is more a reflection on how to 
follow a travelling idea, rather than a classic methodology chapter. Yet, much of my methodology 
is woven into the text as a whole. Chapters four and five bring us to Arusha, where most NGOs 
and CSOs are located. A view from this “translation zone” tells us a lot about how Adaptation is 
translated in between the “global” and the “local”. Finally, chapters six, seven and eight are fully 
devoted to the village of Terrat in Simanjiro, where the idea of climate change is only marginally 
present, and a whole different ontological politics can be observed.    
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Crisis in and as History 
Before introducing the heart of this work in the next chapter, a detour will be made around the 
generic notion of crisis. It may be clear by now that I am not interested in the question of what it 
means to live in crisis, nor in how one can overcome it, which much of the climate-change 
literature is infused with. Instead, inspired by the work of anthropologist Janet Roitman (2014), 
who draws in part on the work of historian Reinhart Koselleck, I focus on the questions of what 
it takes and what are the effects of making claims to crisis in the first place? After that I will explore 
the analytical value of treating Adaptation to Climate Change as a development narrative that is 
continuously enacted by being performed and dramatized at different “stages”. In a similar vein 
to that of Roitman, Emery Roe (1999) has raised the following meta-questions regarding crisis in 
development narratives: “What is going on when experts put forward these crisis narratives?” 
And, “What is the role of these expert narratives in decision making based on them?” (Roe 1999: 
6). While Roe’s positioning can be understood as a way to counter crisis narrations in 
development thinking, and thus to come up with alternative (or more suitable) policy-relevant 
answers, Roitman’s take is rather a historical philosophical excavation of the very concept of 
crisis itself. I will first consider her work before addressing Roe’s approach in the second part of 
this chapter. 
What does it entail to envisage living in, and speaking of, a global climate crisis? Apocalyptic 
imaginations are nothing new. Turbulent times apparently spark visions of degradation. 
Eschatological anxieties have been part and parcel of several cultural and religious traditions 
worldwide, notably Christianity, but also new forms of (secular) millennialism have sprung from 
the rapid technological advancements brought about by modernity’s “risk society” (Beck 1992, 
2009; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). The influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition on 
contemporary thinking about the future can hardly be ignored, for both a linear conception of 
time as well as the notion of an abrupt ending stem directly from the Bible. Moreover, this idea 
of time has profoundly influenced the whole development of Western thought, even the most 
profane realms (David et al. 1999).22 However, the ways in which the apocalypse resurfaces or the 
form in which it is recast, the proliferation and appeal of fear-invoking climate change rhetoric 
(and any end-of-time tales as well as crisis narrations) have to be located in a particular time and 
place. For instance, in chapter eight it will become clear that the Maasai have a radically different 
                                                             
22 Umberto Eco has argued that nowadays the idea of an end of time is more characterstic of the non-
Christian than of the Christian world. According to Eco, for the Christian world this idea has become a 
subject of contemplation and meditation; whereas the non-Christian world claims to ignore it, but is in 
fact obsessed with it (Eco & Martini 1987, in: Eco 1999: 20). 
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way of envisaging the future, because God (Eng’ai) is understood as the Supreme and 
unknowable figure of Providence (Spencer 2003). The acceptance of an “unknown” future clearly 
informs the ways in which the Maasai translate the new prophecy of climate change. In this 
chapter I wish to demonstrate that the truth effects of climate change crisis narrations and 
imaginations are never politically free. For instance, according to geographer Erik Swyngedouw 
(2010), one of the negative consequences of apocalyptic climate change imaginations and their 
presentation as a global humanitarian cause is that they generate a deeply depoliticized imaginary, 
which instead of directing us toward a different trajectory fuels the maintenance of the status 
quo. In other words, he laments that we are told to pursue radical techno-managerial and socio-
ecological transformations, but all organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is 
beyond dispute (Swyngedouw 2010). In brief, climate change as a tale that foretells a negative 
future inevitably says something about the society and times we live in. Let us consider the crisis 
of environmentalism briefly. 
In his highly influential book Why We Disagree About Climate Change Mike Hulme (2009) explores 
the long history of humans and their relationship to the climate in pathological terms, and argues 
that a prospective of a change in climate that is not fully predictable offers a fertile ground for the 
heightening of these fears (Hulme 2009: 180). The anxieties are principally about the 
unpredictability of climate-related risks, and about traversing the determined limits that might 
lead to a so-called irreversible “tipping point”, a dangerous threshold that speaks to our 
imagination as a point of no return. The eschatological fears explain in part where 
environmentalism in general, and climate change in particular, derive their discursive power. One 
convincing explanation for what drives environmentalism is that our relationship to the planet 
touches upon the very essence of the human condition (Arendt 1958, in: Lee 1995). Furthermore, 
according to Lee, a common ground shared by all forms of environmentalism – and why it is 
unsurprising that it even permeates traditional left- right dichotomies – is that:  
“In all its forms, environmentalism is – at least marginally – apocalyptic. It is the wellbeing 
of this planet that most fundamentally supports human life; threats to the health of the 
earth are therefore threats to human life itself. It is the power of that connection that drives 
environmentalism. Confronting pollution and extinction is in a very real way confronting 
the source and limits of power” (Lee 1995: ix). 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, not only are these crisis-driven accounts bound to popular 
discourse, but anthropology too is not exempt from the same tendencies. As Dove and Carpenter 
argue in the historical reader on Environmental Anthropology, much of anthropology’s recently 
revived interest and engagement with the environment is by and large crisis-driven and 
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preoccupied with perceived threats to the environment, and is thus focused on the here and now. 
Whereas there have been several distinct periods of interest in environmental concerns within 
anthropology, they argue that in recent work on environmental issues a deeper perspective on the 
historical, political and theoretical context within which this work has been carried out is often 
missing (Dove and Carpenter 2008: xiv). This holds all the more true for climate-change-related 
research. The basic problem with such a single-minded focus on crisis is that it inevitably draws 
our attention away from other, perhaps more fundamental or structural concerns. Moreover, also 
essential is that crisis evokes such a sense of urgency that it tends to mask the politics inscribed in 
this discursive act itself. 
In her innovative book “Anti-Crisis” anthropologist Janet Roitman (2014) explores the kinds of 
works the term “crisis” is or is not doing in the construction of narrative forms, and how we 
have come to narrate history in terms of crises. In her philosophical excavation the vital question 
is addressed how crisis is constituted as a (privileged) object of knowledge, for indeed: “crisis is 
an omnipresent sign in almost all forms of narrative today; it is mobilized as the defining category 
of historical situations, past and present. […] Crisis is mobilized in narrative constructions to 
mark out or to designate “moments of truth”; it is taken to be a means to access historical truth, 
and even a means to think “history” itself” (Roitman 2104: 3). If we take into consideration the 
current media apparatus and all the narrative forms that define, represent and qualify the world in 
terms of crisis, it seems that the term expresses a deep lack of confidence in the future, and it 
speaks of a community’s anxieties and ethical failures, and hence largely constitutes a basic need 
for fundamental change. In this respect, to define something as a crisis, or to be in crisis always 
occurs within a comparative horizon. Crisis is constantly judged against how we wish things to be 
or how they ought to be, and measured in relation to other places and people, and perhaps 
against how it was in the past and hopefully will be in the future. Ideas about crisis are thus 
always constructed in spatial and historical analogy (Vigh 2008: 11).  
An insight into the Practice of Conceptual History by Koselleck (2002), on the semantic power and 
development of the notion of crisis, teaches us that the concept underwent an inflationary usage 
– it became freestanding in the eighteenth century – which has come to cover almost all aspects 
of life. Koselleck states that the ever-accumulating word usage of “crisis” attests more to a 
diffuse manner of speaking than it contributes to the diagnosis of our situation (Koselleck 2002: 
236). When reading an ordinary newspaper or watching the news one easily get the impression 
that the world is indeed enmeshed in a constant crisis, which seems to be an oxymoron 
considering its temporal connotation. The etymology of the term crisis suggests a temporal 
 30 
condition (from Greek krinô which means to cut, to select, to decide, to judge), and it designated 
a crucial moment in which a definitive decision or judgment needed to be made. The concept 
implied a strict and irrevocable choice between alternatives like success or failure, right or wrong, 
life and death, and, finally, salvation or damnation (Koselleck 2002: 237).  
In its medical history it signified the critical stage of a disease in which an important development 
or change would take place: a turning point, leading either to recovery or to death (Oxford 
English Dictionary). Crucially, crisis did not refer to the illness itself, but to the condition that 
required a decisive judgment between alternatives (Roitman 2014: 15-16). Making claims to crisis 
is a way of judging the world, as it always engenders certain forms of critique (Koselleck 1988; 
2002), which politicizes interest groups. It also leads to the articulation of some questions while 
foreclosing others. And crisis, which is necessarily a second-order observation, engenders the 
production of “blind spots” (Roitman 2014). For example, the statement “the temperatures are 
rising” is a first-order observation, but the statement “we are in a climate change crisis” is 
necessarily a second-order observation; a form of critique that produces meaning. Furthermore, 
speaking about crisis gives birth to the production of alternative future horizons. Its 
manifestations unfold and are imagined as a global spectacle with an unhappy ending if we follow 
the current climatic trend as predicted to us by science. It has become a choice between salvation 
and damnation speaking to the industrialized society’s moral consciousness, and appealing to 
modes of being in and relating to the (natural) world and to the limits of our existence. Indeed, 
the epitome of crisis. 
Turning back to the notion of crisis as interrogated by Roitman, a certain teleology can be 
observed, as the moments of truth are often defined as historical “turning points” at which 
normativity is revealed, knowledge claims contested and vital decisions made. Thus crisis is 
posited as a sort of “epistemological impasse”, which lays the foundation for alternative historical 
trajectories, and even for a new future (Roitman 2014: 4). If we follow Roitman in her claim that 
crisis marks out a “moment of truth”, the question arises: what does climate change as a global 
crisis signify and entail as a moment in which truth and normativity are laid bare? There are of 
course more profound sociological “moments of truth” encapsulated than in the alarming figures 
(and futures) as presented to us by science, which are of a highly moral nature. Like mentioned 
above, climate change is not merely narrated as a crisis of the Earth, but undoubtedly understood 
as a crisis of morality. According to some observers climate change has induced the end of 
capitalism, for nature has turned against us as a fervent anti-capitalist. In her international 
bestselling book This Changes Everything. Capitalism vs. the Climate (Klein 2014) well-known author 
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and activist Naomi Klein warns us that all we have to do is nothing in order for this full-blown 
crisis to change everything. According to Klein, the reason for not taking enough action by 
lowering our emissions is because those actions fundamentally conflict with the reigning ideology 
of deregulated capitalism. She laments:  
“ […] Living with this kind of cognitive dissonance is simply part of being alive in this 
jarring moment in history, when a crisis we have been seriously ignoring is hitting us in 
the face- and yet we are doubling down on the stuff that is causing the crisis in the first 
place” (Klein 2-4).   
In a similar manner, Latour (1991) stated somewhat dramatically: “[…] nature, over which we 
were supposed to gain absolute mastery, dominates us in an equally global fashion, and threatens 
us all. It is a strange dialectic that turns the slave into man’s owner and master, and that suddenly 
informs us that we have invented ecocides as well as large-scale famine” (Latour 1993: 8). The 
cognitive dissonance paired with this “jarring moment in history” that Klein mentions, and 
Latour’s allusion to an inverted natural order both touch upon the source of crisis: a temporal 
differentiation between experience of the (known) past on the one hand, and expectations of an 
unknown future and the utopian hope of fulfillment on the other (Koselleck in Roitman 2014: 
17). In other words, the climate is not just seen as a neutral arbiter, but as a corrective and 
galvanizing force that speaks to us and calls upon us to repent our excessive over-consumption 
and our unlimited greediness. The idea that is implied here is that our future lies in our own 
readiness for redemption. The climate crisis is our moment in history in which humanity is faced 
with the decisive choice between the manmade apocalypse and a “green”, fairer and more 
sustainable future. That crisis could be understood as a final decision has been proposed by 
Koselleck as one of the three semantic options in his conceptual history. He argued that “[…] the 
crisis in which one currently finds oneself could be the last, great and unique decision after which 
history would look entirely different in the future” – that it is a semantic option that is expected 
of world-immanent of history itself. In Koselleck’s view this option is taken up more frequently 
the less the absolute end of history is believed to be approaching with the Last Judgment. It thus 
becomes a matter of recasting a theological principle of belief (Koselleck 2002: 243). 
How the “Secular” and the “Sacred” Fuse and Confuse 
Although climate change as a global crisis is grounded upon the assumption of its being a secular 
discourse – driven by scientific analysis and “objective” observation – a sharp reader might have 
noticed that the language which has accompanied this brief outline of climate change narrations 
has been religiously inclined. It is remarkable that at some point in history the term crisis acquired 
a predominantly theological meaning. According to Koselleck, who interrogated the development 
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and semantic power of the concept, a decisive shift in the semantics of the term took place in 
between the Hippocratic medical grammar and Christian exegesis. The one did not replace the 
other but, in theology, krisis and judicium both gained a new meaning taken up from legal 
language: the judgment before God. It might be that crisis meant the Last Judgment at the end of 
time (Koselleck 2002: 236). Furthermore, what we learn from Koselleck is that crisis is a concept 
that has always posited a temporal dimension, and in modern times began to imply a theory of 
time in the sense that the right point in time must be met for successful action. In theology 
(according to John) the acceptance of God’s message was seen as the way to escape damnation, 
“despite the still pending Last Judgment toward which the cosmos moved and whose arrival still 
remained veiled in darkness” (Koselleck 2002: 238). It will be demonstrated in chapter eight how 
climate-change discourses and their reception seamlessly conflate with the Maasai’s existing 
religious convictions in which rain is generally understood as a blessing, while drought is a sign of 
moral failure that requires a society’s contemplation and redemption. In this way God is 
mediating His message through tangible signs of the environment (see chapter six). 
The theological interpretation of climate change and its religious, spiritual and ethical dimensions 
might appear far-fetched, but there are manifold cases that confirm an increasing acceptance of 
their signification, and move towards the rapprochement between the alleged dichotomy between 
the “secular” and the “religious”. More and more religious organizations and spiritual leaders see 
an important role in tackling the issue of climate change through a reevaluation of religious 
values. In June 2015 Pope Saint Francis of Assisi, in an elaborate Encyclical Letter “On care for 
Our Common Home”, has delivered an unprecedented call for worldwide action against climate 
change. The Pope reminded the worldwide community of Catholics and “every person living on 
this planet” that our common home is like “a sister with whom we share our life, and a beautiful 
mother who opens her arms to embrace us”. He furthermore appealed to our sinful behavior, 
which can be characterized by humanity’s hubris:  
This sister now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her by our 
irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her. We have 
come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at will. The 
violence present in our hearts, wounded by sin, is also reflected in the symptoms of 
sickness evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life. […] We have 
forgotten that we ourselves are dust of the earth (cf. Gen 2:7); our very bodies are made 
up of her elements, we breathe her air and we receive life and refreshment from her 
waters (Pope Saint Francis of Assisi 2015: 1).  
Remarkably enough, it is not only faith-based organizations and spiritual leaders are making an 
appeal to strengthening our morality and taking care of God’s creation. Also in science, 
particularly (but not only) within the social sciences and the humanities, some influential voices 
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have been heard that explicitly seek to depart from technocratic and programmatic approaches 
that dominate the climate-change research agenda, and allow for more ethically inclined and 
value-oriented epistemologies. For example, after having followed a remarkable trajectory in 
climate change research – moving from climate science and modelling to an engagement with 
how the idea of climate works culturally – in his latest work Mike Hulme emphatically pleas for a 
reacquaintance with the ancient and religious ideas of virtue as an appropriate response to the 
challenges of climate change. In this work Hulme is in part inspired by the earth scientist Tim 
Flannery (2011), who arrived at a similarly noteworthy conclusion in his influential book Here on 
Earth: A New Beginning, which gives a comprehensive historical account of the state of the planet. 
He argues that we do not need more knowledge – more striving for science and technology – but 
what we need instead is a valorization of love for our planet as much as we love ourselves 
(Flannery, in Hulme 2014: 299-300).  
This elaboration on religious virtues and environmental ethics is not intended as a call for 
religious revival per se. Nonetheless, as we shall see the case of the Maasai attests to the 
ubiquitous epistemic power of climate change as a scientific and secular story, which appears to 
be blind to the invaluable role that religion can play in uniting morality and the environment. 
Moreover, it is similary an attempt to de-dichotomize this alleged mutually exclusive division 
between the secular and the religious. Secondly, this brief exploration of the term crisis serves as a 
theoretical and methodological background to open up to an in-depth understanding of 
trajectories of being and believing that are the heart of how climate change epistemologies and 
responses are shaped. The things we believe in and talk about – together with our practices and 
experiential realities – are foundational for the modes of being in this world, but also to the ways 
we relate to nature and to each other; and hence form the lifeblood of how we understand, and 
adapt and respond to climate change. “Living in times of climate change” is a judgment that 
produces a contemporary consciousness and it defines our historical condition, even to the extent 
that Earth Scientists have proposed a new name for the era that we live in: “The Anthropocene”, 
or the Age of Mankind.  
Not only in the media and public discourses, but also in contemporary social sciences the “event” 
is privileged as an object of knowledge and analysis, and has thus become the ground for critical 
theory (Koselleck 1988). The French philosopher Daniel Parrochia has argued that the last 
quarter of the century perhaps cannot so much be characterized by the “end of History”, but 
rather by the end of philosophies of history, if by that we mean messianic belief systems that 
entail an unyielding confidence in a teleology of time (e.g. Christian eschatology, Enlightenment 
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idea of progress, Communist ideal of a classless society). And what remains of these (secular or 
religious) collective imaginaries of “becoming” seems to be – indeed – an attention to events 
(Parrochia in Roitman 2014: 86-87). It is in this light that we have to understand crisis as a 
narrative device that has the capacity to produce meaning, and to (re)shape our epistemological 
and ontological orientations. Furthermore, this narrative device, or “second-order observation”, 
often leads to the creation of blind spots in our knowledge production and is thus inherently 
political. As Roitman’s work has illuminated, while judgments of crisis are posited as a priori they 
are necessarily post-hoc, which often leads to the fact that the ground for knowledge are not 
questioned, nor made explicit: 
In [these] explorations of the politics of crisis, it is typically assumed that, while contested 
and an object of various forms of politics, crisis is an object of empirical knowledge. The 
grounds for such knowledge are usually left unexamined: crisis is a condition of human 
history and human affairs. Crises happen and crises are propagated; they then become sites 
of contestation. Crisis – be it disputed, contested, authored – has a particular status in 
history (Roitman 2014: 87). 
Finally, it is not my intention to argue that the climate is not in crisis and that there are no real 
crises in this world, nor that the crisis narrations are false or inappropriate. Instead, based on my 
fieldwork in northern Tanzania I wish to bring into view some of the questions that are either 
overpoliticized or obscured by focusing on Africa’s “Adaptation Deficit”. The securitization of 
certain issues, such as that “sub-Saharan Africa is in an adaptation crisis”, inevitably has social 
and political consequences for it legitimizes radical interventions that would otherwise not have 
been possible or accepted. The perceived urgency of matters often obscures alternative and more 
nuanced approaches. Since we know we live in a “World Risk Society” (Beck 2009) – which is 
entailed by the triumphs of modernization – Ulrich Beck has stated that the distinction between 
risk and catastrophe (or between risk and culturally varying assessments of risk) is gaining more 
prominence in the era of increasing globalization. The distinction lies in the following: “Risk 
means the anticipation of the catastrophe. Risks concern the possibility of future occurrences and 
developments; they make present a state of the world that does not (yet) exist. […] Risks are 
always future events that may occur, that threaten us. But because this constant danger shapes our 
expectations, lodges in our heads and guides our actions, it becomes a political force that 
transforms the world” (Beck 2009: 9-10). 
It will be argued that the strength of the social sciences and humanities lies, at least in part, in 
detecting the “blind spots” in our knowledge formations; to keep on questioning the most 
commonly accepted paradigms and views of the world instead of taking them for granted. As 
outlined above, all claims to crisis – and climate change is no exception – take as a point of 
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departure the same question: what went wrong? These narratives are directed to finding the roots 
and source of crisis; none hesitate over the matter of positing the term crisis itself (Roitman 2014: 
42). My research has addressed the stakes involved in positing adaptation to climate change as 
crisis, and what happens in its journey to northern Tanzania. Particularly climate change research 
with a focus on vulnerable areas largely seeks to address the questions: what are the biophysical 
consequences; how can it be solved, mitigated or prevented; or how can one adapt to it? In other 
words, the obsession with crisis as “the eventful” tends to circumvent the fact that it is the very 
claim to crisis that is never neutral, and is always a political act in its own right. This work seeks 
to bring to light some of these blind spots that are entailed by climate-change crisis narration 
about sub-Saharan Africa, and proposes to ask alternative questions. 
Adaptation as a development narrative  
If we consider the term crisis in the context of development thinking we learn that it has been at 
the very heart of the project of development itself. As mentioned earlier, it is crises that make 
outside intervention appear to be the only and indispensable way forward. In his foundational 
work “Except Africa” on development and power, Roe (1999) has argued that “what-do-we-do-
about-crisis” questions are misleading for they pull us into the direction of techno-managerial 
elites whose very existence depends on these questions to begin with (Roe 1999: 11). This point 
will be addressed in the next chapter. Considering the velocity with which Adaptation to Climate 
Change is travelling to the Global South, it is a legitimate exercise to look into the issue as a 
development narrative. Roe has defined development narratives as:  
[…] the rules of thumb, arguments, “war stories” and other scenarios about rural 
development that enable decision makers to take decisions, be the decision makers 
farmers, bureaucrats, outside experts, or others (Roe 1999: 1). 
I have already touched upon two dominant crisis narratives about Africa in the introduction. 
Here I consider more specifically crisis narration within development thinking. An important 
point raised by Roe is why some development narratives have such pervasive power, despite all 
the counter-claims that do not warrant their conclusions; in fact even contradict them (a well-
known scenario is the “tragedy of the commons”). The author argues that the main function of 
these development stories is that they underwrite and stabilize assumptions for decision-making 
in highly complex situations. In other words, they simplify complexity by crafting a scenario that 
is deployed to stabilize decision-making. He demonstrates how complexity and simplicity are 
deeply reciprocal. Put otherwise, the more complex a local problem appears to be at the macro 
level, the greater the demand for standardized approaches or blueprints becomes (Roe 1991; 
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1999). A common tendency to change the course of development by scholars and other experts 
in the field of development is to “denarrativize” the widely spread narrative, which is then 
commonly conceived of as a “myth” after it has been debunked. Here a problem arises, as the 
author argues, namely that each attempt to “denarrativize” creates more uncertainty, because it 
does nothing more than undermine the existing development narrative without providing an 
alternative. In short, a denarrativization does not dispel the chief virtue of a powerful narrative 
(which is its staying power). And because critique alone does not tell its own story, he proposes 
that the wiser course is to first examine how these narratives can be superseded or improved. So 
what is needed, according to Roe, is a similarly straightforward counternarrative that tells a better 
story (Roe 1999: 21; Roe 1991).  
While Roe is probably right that the pervasive power of some development blueprints is due to 
their simplicity, which is relevant for policy making, I believe that there is also a political 
argument to make. Some development blueprints just tend to serve some interest groups better 
than others. Such has been the case with varying development narratives (embedded in scientific 
claims) relating to the pastoral rangelands of the world, so too in the case of Maasailand in 
northern Tanzania. The practice of development aid is in many ways substantiated through the 
continuous practice of making claims and counterclaims. However, unlike Roe my goal is not to 
come up with yet another counternarrative, but rather to bring these practices into the light of 
scrutiny. 
Narratology and the quest for meaning 
At first sight there appear to be sufficient reasons to believe that a narrative approach to climate 
change is a marginal and even unwise endeavour. Firstly, we live in times of growing climatic 
threats, and experiential realities related to climate change that are occurring all over the globe are 
on the rise, especially in the Global South; secondly, at the same time the worldwide “faith” of 
deniers and sceptics is flourishing and continue to form an impediment to global action; and 
thirdly, the question that has emerged on the lips of postmodernists is whether we haven’t left 
the time of the metanarratives, and analyses thereof, behind us. In other words, it appears that 
the lure of finding ready-made solutions to overcome this looming crisis is stronger than the need 
to understand the discursive practices in which these alleged solutions are enmeshed. Against this 
background, to employ a narrative paradigm has been opposed – which is all too familiar to 
constructivist critique – as an attempt to do away with climate change as something 
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“constructed”, which occurs only in our minds and in the stories that we tell about the world.23 
In this sense climate change brings to the fore the age-old dichotomy between “constructivists” 
on the one hand and “realists” on the other. The narrative approach as employed in this work 
seeks to do away with this binary opposition, for the one does not exclude the other. Whereas the 
two approaches are indeed grounded within different epistemologies – as a meaning-generating 
vehicle vis-à-vis something quantifiable and measurable – for a more profound understanding of 
climate-change realities, they need and complement each other. Climate change is both a 
biophysical and a deeply cultural and social phenomenon, as Mike Hulme has also made clear 
throughout his work:  
The world’s climates will keep on changing, with human influences on these physical 
properties now inextricably entangled with natural influences. Global climate is simply 
one new domain which reveals our embeddedness in nature. But so too will the idea of 
climate change keep changing as we find new ways of using it to meet our needs. We will 
continue to create and tell new stories about climate change and mobilise these stories in 
support of our projects (Hulme 2010a: 171).  
In other words, the stories that we tell about the climate and the things that we believe in are 
fundamental to how societies across the globe give meaning and respond to it. In turn, discourses 
form the ground upon which actions gain legitimacy, and it can thus be said that climate change 
itself has sprung from – and is the result of – a certain global system of international relations 
that is sustained and legitmized by a particular worldview; be it capitalism, neoliberalism, the 
belief in unlimited growth, in science or in the invincible power of humans. Climate change is real 
as a tangible atmospheric manifestation and physical condition, but it is also real as an all-
embracing environmental story about humans’ place on Earth that is travelling around and 
mobilizing actors across the world with increasing force. As Hulme claims in his newest work, 
“the idea of climate exists at the intersection of culture, weather and place” (Hulme 2017). 
Therefore, because climate change cannot be a single story we have to be attentive to its 
multivocality around the world. 
The narrative paradigm is integral to the attempt to reunite culture with the climate (cf. Daniels 
and Endfield 2009: 222). In a similar vein, more and more scholars are pointing out the 
importance of engaging with holistic approaches and interpretative accounts that take as a 
vantage point issues like morality and justice (Jamieson 2009; Paavola & Adger 2002; Adger et al. 
2006); values and culture (Roncoli et al. 2009); storytelling (Hulme 2011b; de Wit 2015; Rudiak-
                                                             
23 An example of this is the critique that Mike Hulme’s book Why We Disagree about Climate Change (2009) 
received from some scholars. For a brief description of this debate see: Kitchner 2010, in Hulme 2010a: 
173. 
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Gould 2011); narratives and the rising cultural profile around climate change (Daniels and 
Endfield 2009; Bravo 2009); social drama and rituals (Viehöver 2010); spirituality (Hulme 2009; 
2010a) and the religious idea of virtue with a sensitivity to love, humility, hope and wisdom 
(Hulme 2014). Put in the words of climate psychologist Renee Lertzman: “ […] it is an 
opportunity for us to think about how we can be active and be agents of change, and at the same 
time allow for what it means to […] reflect, what it means to connect, to listen and interact with 
one another in new and creative ways; and to love”.24 Furthermore, there is also a growing 
awareness and call for “alternative” epistemologies that are rooted outside climate-change science 
– such as indigenous knowledge systems – as an invaluable source of information in dealing with 
climate change. Moreover, Sheila Jasanoff (2007) proposed to develop “technologies of 
humility”, as a call to open up to “partial knowledge” that can be characterized by uncertainty, 
and which is often sidelined in climate-change policies (Jasanoff 2007).  
To conclude this section, it is important to note that I thus understand narratives as standing in a 
dialectical relation with human experience. In other words, language can be seen as an active and 
mediating force that gives meaning to our experiences, while our experiential reality similarly 
shapes our language and stories. Furthermore, I embrace pragmatism and social constructivism in 
the sense that language does not function simply as a “mirror of nature”, but that it is rather part 
and parcel of constructing it. For, as Rorty (1979) explicated: “It is pictures rather than 
propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical 
convictions” (Rorty 1979: 12). While the majority of scholars dealing with narrative have placed 
the focus of analysis on the active role of narratives in giving meaning to and constructing our 
human experiences in life, I thus wish to take the argument further and interrogate how human 
experiences endow narratives with meaning. The focus of the narrative analysis can be briefly 
summarized according to Polkinghorne’s scheme in which he makes a triple representation of 
narratives: first, there are the stories that we tell to ourselves (not available to observation and 
analysis); secondly, the stories that we tell to each other by narrating, writing or enacting them; 
and thirdly, the process of understanding and interpreting the stories that we hear or read 
(Czarniawska 1997: 19; Polkinghorne 1988). The latter process falls under the broader field of 
reception studies, which forms an important focal point of analysis in the empirical chapters that 
follow. In addition to the current research agenda, which largely deals with climate-change 
impacts and with how people give meaning to these biophysical changes, it basically allows for an 
                                                             
24 This statement was made during a speech “Why climate change produces apathy”. This event took place 
the day after Donal Trump was elected as the new President of the US, so the meeting had an extra dose 
of relevance. 9 November 2016, De Nieuwe Liefde, Amsterdam.  
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understanding of how people make sense of travelling climate-change discourses. But let us turn 
now, at last, to the climate-change spectacle as it unfold in Tanzania. 
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Setting the Stage: A Climate-Change Spectacle Unfolds 
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Introduction 
It was an extraordinarily rainy day for the time of the year when approximately one hundred 
people, including the national and international press, from all over Tanzania and abroad found 
their way to the UNDP building in Dar es Salaam to talk about climate change. Leboi Ole 
Netanga and traditional leader Meshak Ole Sambu25, two Maasai pastoralists from Simanjiro, 
were summoned to this high-profile meeting as “climate-change witnesses”, which enabled them 
to visit Dar es Salaam for the first time in their lives. Yet, the idea of climate change was not new to 
them. What we see in the picture is that these two herders are staring at a picture of themselves; a 
situation that comprises an interesting layer of encounters and travelling ideas that deserve a 
more detailed contextualization. By unpacking the following encounter between representatives 
of the government of Tanzania, grassroots testimonies from two Maasai herdsmen, technical 
experts and an NGO representative, I will show how the travelling idea of Adaptation to Climate 
Change entangles different lifeworlds and histories.26 These pictures were taken during a public 
hearing that was organized by Tanzania’s civil society “ForumCC”, which is an overarching 
platform of NGOs and expert organizations dealing specifically with climate-change-related 
issues. The event was held in preparation for the upcoming international climate change 
conference (UNFCCC, COP17) that would take place ten days later in Durban.27  
The aim of this happening was to “provide a space for Tanzanian citizens to share their 
experiences with and concerns about a changing climate and how it is, and will continue to 
impact their daily lives”. In addition to the engagement of several stakeholders that represented 
the international community (organizations like UNDP, Resources in Africa, IIED)28, and the 
national and regional government of Tanzania, this platform was intended to provide space for 
ordinary Tanzanian citizens to share their “climate testimonies”, and to give them the 
opportunity to learn from experts. The floor was given to fishermen from the coastal zones and 
Kigoma; farmers from the mountainous area of Moshi and Kilimanjaro; two pastoralists from the 
                                                             
25 Names of my informants have been changed. 
26 The following account should not be considered as an ethnographic “evidence” in the traditional sense 
of the word, but this event should be understood as an entry for storytelling, and for reflecting upon a 
comprehensive set of entangled issues that came to the fore during this meeting (cf. Ferguson 2006: 168). 
I chose this way of storytelling because this encounter between different stakeholders at this particular 
conference forms a largely fairly solid representation of the contours of different positions in the debate. 
27 “Climate Change Hearings II: Have you heard us? November 18th 2011, UNDP, Dar es Salaam. 
Organized by Tanzania National Resource Forum (TNRF) and ForumCC. The event received some 
considerable media attention as it was covered in at least three newspapers, and was also broadcasted on 
national TV. See link to program: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYsA70EV-
4U&feature=player_embedded#.  
28 Because my goal is not to analyze the working of the actors and organizations per se some names have 
been changed.  
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Simanjiro Plains; a seaweed farmer from Zanzibar, and subsistence farmers from Pemba, Kigoma 
and other parts of Tanzania. Also a traditional healer gave an account regarding knowledge about 
indigenous medicine, who came fully equipped with plants and herbs in order to demonstrate 
how climate change is affecting indigenous knowledge systems. Among the testifiers was also 
Maasai pastoralist Leboi Ole Netanga coming from Terrat (a rural village in northern Tanzania) 
and will form the focus of attention in this section, because this particular locality has formed 
part of my further fieldwork. Moreover, his testimony unintendedly sparked heated emotions 
among various actors that deserve some examination. 
 
Source: photo-story book Visions of Life with Climate Change 2011 
This picture was taken by Leboi. The photo-story book that the two Maasai men are looking at 
forms part of an initiative led by an international NGO, which aims to support the perspectives 
and needs of communities regarding adaptation to climate change, and similarly wishes to 
promote awareness in Eastern and Southern Africa. In order to communicate local climate-
change adaptation, part of their methodology is to make use of community-based theatre, 
educational docu-drama films, a cross-media web site, a “toolbox” of information and photo-
story techniques. This is what we can read about Leboi in the photo-story book: 
I took a picture of these zebras because I like to see them happy and fat. It shows 
that the land is good and healthy. It’s beautiful. I spend a lot of time on the plains, 
where I work, close to the wildlife. I was elected to become a community game scout 
by the elders because I have experience. I know a lot about wildlife because I grew 
up having them around me. I know if they are ill, I know their names, I know how to 
count them, and I know their different tracks and hiding places. I was trained by my 
father. […] A plain can keep both wildlife and livestock. It is very good land. For us 
pastoralists the wildlife is a natural resource. The wildlife gives us money, we profit 
from them. We have an agreement with five tourism companies. Each year the 
village receives income from them for keeping the plains free from cultivation. The 
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Conservation Easement area, as we call our plain, is a way to preserve our livestock 
and the wildlife.29 
With this fairly romanticized portrait about the peaceful coexistence of wildlife, livestock and 
human beings, Leboi became part of this photo-series project. The idea behind giving Leboi a 
tool (the camera) was to give him the opportunity to document his lifeworld and show the 
environmental challenges that he is facing, and thus frame and give voice to his viewpoints and 
share it with a wider public. Hinting at the climate-change-related problems that pastoralists are 
facing, like increasing water scarcity and recurring droughts, he has also taken pictures of a dried 
up river, a cow and milk, which all form part of their socio-cultural and environmental fabric. In 
a similar vein as in this photo series Leboi was asked to testify at the public hearing about the 
climatic challenges that the people in his village are facing. 
In the following analysis we have to take into account that before Leboi came to testify at the 
civil society event about how climate change is affecting livelihoods in his locality, he was already 
informed by an international organization about the causes and possible consequences. This is 
certainly not to say that his account is necessarily less “valid” or not objective, but rather that his 
newly appropriated idea about what lies at the root of this new challenge and how it can be 
surmounted has been shaped by prior exposure to information. One could argue that, at least to 
some extent, his testimony has been “scripted”. We can explore this particular situation to gain 
insight into how an idea of climate change has travelled up and down from the international level 
to the local, to the national, and back again to the local (and is even further translated here by 
me). In other words, Leboi had been exposed to climate-change discourses before he came to 
testify, which thus renders an analysis in the light of reception studies an apt undertaking. 
Furthermore, it shows how NGOs actively shape the worldviews, perceptions or epistemological 
frames of the people they actively want to engage in support of “their” goals, which in this case 
are also presented as “his” perceptions and goals. The story behind this picture serves here as a 
metaphor of how an idea about climate change travels across a distance. The questions that will 
be addressed in this section are: what can be said about this “discursive journey” if we follow the 
different actors, networks and settings that constitute the connections that enable the translation 
of climate change to take place across a distance? How do policymakers and government officials 
speak about adaptation to climate change, and how do people at the grass roots make sense of 
these changes and discourses? And, how do they incorporate these issues – which form part and 
parcel of modernity’s challenges – into their existing epistemological frameworks, local 
cosmologies and climate trajectories? By developing a portrait, or “thick description”, of the 
                                                             
29 Visions of life with climate change. Community photoseries from Namibia, Tanzania & Kenya, 2011. 
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public hearing on climate change that was held in Dar es Salaam, this section is intended to 
explore these translation dynamics. 
The International Community 
For the opening speech the floor was symbolically given to laureate Mr. Marsh, who represented 
the international community at large and the government of the United Kingdom in particular. 
He opened the meeting with following words:  
[…] With the climate change negotiations in Durban only a few days away it 
is important that national policymakers and negotiators take with them the 
stories and initiatives from today, since climate change is affecting the poor 
and the most vulnerable. It is an issue that is affecting us all and will heavily 
affect the sectors of water, health and agriculture in your country. Increasing 
droughts will impact the poor and vulnerable as the year of 2006 has shown, 
while they have contributed least to the problem. Recent droughts have cost 
1% of GDP, and in 2040 it will be costing 2% of the total GDP of 
Tanzania. So now it is time to take action to adapt to climate change. It is 
more important than ever to develop policies and strategies to address 
climate change. The international community is beginning to make climate 
funds available for reduction [inaudible…] and the UK has already planned 
to provide 1.5 billion pounds, which is over 3 trillion Tanzanian shillings 
globally for the next four years. […] Tanzania has an abundance of facilities 
for renewable energy resources, and the future carbon market could also 
provide energy with green growth opportunities. 
In addition to the urgent need for adaptation to climate change for the poor and vulnerable as 
expressed in the words of Mr. Marsh, it may become clear how his view is in line with the 
positioning of the international community that is interested in combating climate change in 
Tanzania. A discursive pattern that can be distilled from this talk goes as follows: (1) the framing 
of the problem starts with the construction of the threat that climate change will bring about in 
Tanzania, especially for the poor; (2) the donor makes himself indispensable (cf. Callon 1986) by 
arguing that this problem can only be surmounted with the intervention from abroad, which 
comprises the promises of large future investments for the benefit of the country (rhetorically 
presented as the ultimate pathway to save Tanzania from the threats of climate change); (3) and 
on the other hand he seeks to open up the possibilities for market-driven responses in order to 
tackle the issue of climate change. Here the proposed solutions are to be found in a package that 
combines green growth, adaptation and development-related issues at large.30 
                                                             
30 This standpoint of mainstreaming market-driven responses to climate change with development policies 
is fully embraced by the Tanzanian group during the international climate change conferences in Durban 
(COP17), as well as in Doha (COP18). 
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In the course of the ongoing expert discussions a critical observer implicitly stipulated the ethical 
side of the problem by mentioning how important it is to look at the causes of climate change 
from a global perspective instead of focusing on the local causes and contributions: 
In their [the panellists’] areas of identifying the issues of climate change there is 
something I want to say. Let us look at it seriously […]. There is one member here 
who spoke but we did not take his words seriously. When we talk about it in our 
country, we have some issues to deal with at the national level as a nation, for we 
have allowed practices of environmental destruction that have resulted in climatic 
changes. But there is a global issue that this forum has not discussed: the 
development activities, which are done by human beings in this world that are the 
source of climate change in the whole world. For example, our fellow here who said 
that we are talking about climate change without talking about the presence of 
industries in the world. If we will be quiet about this it is going to be very serious in 
the world today. 
[…] This problem of pollution that increases temperatures is the one which destroys 
the ozone layer, but when we come to the literature we see it is that which makes a 
human being engage in development activities that do not consider what was told by 
God; that we have to use all things in the world but conserve them. Those are the 
instructions from God, and not from human beings. God created the world well and 
put good things and asked us to go and live on earth and use the sources well. Even 
if we do not have the capacity to tell them [the industrialized countries] that we want 
this world to exist, whether we like it or not this issue of climate change will bring 
the world to an end. This forum gives us the chance to speak, because if we don’t 
speak it is like hiding a disease and one day the disease will… will reveal itself.31 
What can be derived from these two fragments is on the one hand the ethical element that points 
to the historical responsibility of the industrialized countries towards the developing world (to 
save the planet), but it also shows how climate change appeals to moral sentiments that relate to 
the idea of stewardship of the Earth, as prescribed by different religious traditions. Finally, it 
becomes clear how discourses about climate change evoke anxieties of an approaching ending of 
the world. How we can make sense of the construction of responsibility (“Think globally and Act 
Locally”), feelings of guilt and morality (e.g. the idea of stewardship) and sentiments of fear (the 
apocalyptic “aura” of climate change) that form part and parcel of the translation process of 
climate change. 
“Have you heard us?”  The Grassroots Testimonies 
After the introduction of the expert panellists from the fields of national politics, academia, 
(international) policymaking and the civil society, the floor was opened for the grassroots 
                                                             
31 All grassroots accounts are originally in Swahili. Due to translation constraints some nuances of the 
original version might have been lost. Verbatim translations are thanks to masters students from the social 
sciences department at the University of Dar es Salaam.  
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testimonies. Recurrent explanations for the causes of climate change included, among others: the 
cutting down of trees, population growth, the planting of alien tree species (that absorb too much 
water) and poverty. The proposals for a solution were unequivocally expressed in the need for 
more education. Furthermore, the more experiential testimonies all referred to the problems that 
are caused by the irregularities in rainfall patterns. For the coastal fishermen the challenges are 
the rising sea levels, and the changing timing of water levels between high tide and low tide. 
Another observation that was made several times is that the knowledge that was passed on from 
their grandparents to their parents regularly fails to serve them nowadays. For example, as 
expressed by Angelina Kapinga, a female farmer from Kilimanjaro district:  
In the side of Rombo district the environment affects us very much, because the 
rainy seasons are so distorted. We fail to identify the perfect time of planting. Many 
of the farmers are acquainted with following the grandparents” system of cultivation. 
We fail to cope with the current weather, but due to the changes every year the 
farmers fail to know the conditions of their agriculture. 
In another account it was explained that in times of a changing climate it is necessary to change 
certain norms and customs accordingly: 
[…] Another thing that we should recognize is that we have common beliefs that a 
certain crop is only cultivated in a certain plain, like maize or rice. Sometimes it goes 
with our norms and customs, but it is very important to have a collective desire to 
change due to the climate-change issues. To stop those norms and customs that we 
are used to. Now we should find alternative ways or crops, which could help us to 
overcome the effects of climate change. 
Even though it does not become clear to which norms and customs (apart from changing crops) 
are being referred to, a clear sentiment towards a general desire for change can be observed. As I 
have argued elsewhere (De Wit 2014b; 2015) climate change is often translated and perceived to 
be part and parcel of the broader challenges entailed by globalization and modernity, and it sets 
new norms and standards for how to adjust to a rapidly changing world. For many communities 
in the “developing world”, climate change has become a container notion through which an array 
of societal ills is explained. From this more general overview of grassroots accounts, in which I 
selected fragments of statements that only scratch the surface of some of the recurring 
experiential realities and how people perceive climate change, I will turn now to a more detailed 
description of the case of Leboi. 
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Leboi speaks out 
The final testimony was given by Leboi. It was quite remarkable that his testimony – as opposed 
to the other statements from the grassroots – was not written down. So he spoke freely, with a 
great sense of passion:  
My name is Leboi Ole Natanga from Simanjiro district. I come from Terrat village. 
When we used to talk with our fellows in the village about climate change we realized 
that it started to occur in 1987, when drought hit the zone of Simanjiro. We are 
pastoralists, we tried to cultivate but we failed due to the climate change, then 
variation in season and no rainfall. […] So we tried to cultivate but a few of us got 
maize, we tried more but we did not succeed […] and we realized that we are in an 
area that does not support agriculture. So we decided to continue livestock keeping. 
According to Leboi, 1987 marked the beginning of the “arrival” of climate change, for it was a 
period of unusual drought and a time in which the pastoralists from Terrat engaged in agricultural 
practices. The link appears to be made that due to the drought, the cultivation of crops was 
needed in order to complement their common practices of cattle herding, and to diversify their 
livelihood strategies. Later on he explains in more detail what the difficulties were at that time: 
We experienced changes in those years. We could find one season of rainfall 
followed by a season without rainfall, or two consecutive years with no rain. So we 
asked ourselves: what causes this? Because since time immemorial while talking with 
our fathers, they told us that there was enough rainfall, hence enough pasture for 
livestock. However, now the situation has changed, therefore it happened that if the 
rain did not come for two years, livestock were affected by lacking pasture and 
sources of water were drying. When we were growing up we experienced the increase 
in number of people in the village. So those people cultivate, cut trees without 
planting. It happened that the village became desert, and large areas were left without 
trees. But at the moment they stopped because the maize did not grow, therefore 
they stopped to cultivate and left the area for livestock keeping again. Thus we 
started to see changes in those years because there was a shortage of water for our 
livestock. Sources of water are drying because there was no rainfall. As we see in 
previous days water was available because there was rainfall. 
While speaking about the changing rainfall patterns, Leboi is similarly referring to the increasing 
population pressure and the (apparent) complicated relation that exists between keeping livestock 
on the one hand and cultivating crops on the other. According to anthropologist Terrence 
McCabe (2003): “The adoption of cultivation by pastoral Maasai living in northern Tanzania was 
the first and most significant step in the process of livelihood diversification that is continuing 
today” (McCabe 2003: 100). Moreover, he states that “[…] this attempt to craft new sustainable 
livelihoods was in response to increasing population pressure, a fluctuating livestock population, 
reductions in grazing areas, and modernization that places an increased emphasis on a monetary 
economy” (ibid). Put differently, the changes in rainfall patterns that Leboi was talking about 
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form part of a broad and complex picture that can similarly be characterized as a time of rapid 
social and economic changes, which are here given meaning by being viewed through a “climate- 
change lens”. Population pressure, and irregularity of rainfall – as expressed in Leboi’s statement 
– are among the factors that can be related to the increasing stress on grazing areas, and the 
decreasing availability of water. Yet, the importance of rainfall and access to water sources for the 
survival of the pastoralists and their cattle is repeatedly emphasized in his talk by mentioning (the 
lack of) rainfall as the source of change:  
It started to rain from October until April, but now it can rain in April and stop 
directly. So we migrate to another village out of Simanjiro. So the climate change 
brings a lot of changes, and if there is no rain for two or three years, our livestock 
dies. Therefore, we are affected more because we depend on livestock keeping. So 
we see that there is climate change, then as we come from Terrat village we see 
changes and we are trying to engage in meetings to discuss what brings this. 
It is worth mentioning that, according to a currently widely accepted (however not uncontested) 
view among ecologists, with an average annual rainfall of 500 mm arid rangelands like the 
Simanjiro plains are “nonequilibrial ecosystems” (McCabe, personal communication), meaning 
that precipitation patterns are highly variable and droughts frequent. Furthermore, this entails 
that external factors – e.g. variability in the precipitation pattern, not herbivore numbers – exert a 
strong influence on the structure and condition of the rangelands (McCabe 2003: 102). Within 
this paradigm a pronounced climate variability is thus something inherent in this ecosystem rather 
than a new dynamic, with the precipitation patterns indeed having the greatest influence on the 
structure of the vegetation. Simply put, the concepts of “nonequilibrial” or “disequilibrium” state 
(which largely fall under the “new range ecology paradigm”) hold that it is impossible to achieve a 
“steady state” or equilibrium between stocking rate and forage production in many, if not most, 
arid and semi-arid rangelands (Behnke et al. 1993). However, there are studies that point towards 
more complex explanations and contend that arid and semi-arid environments encompass both 
elements of equilibrium and non-equilibrium ecosystems, for they are extremes along a 
continuum (Vetter 2005). An extensive body of literature exists that deals with this topic, and I 
will only briefly come back to it in chapter five. It is important to note that my aim here is not to 
arrive at a better “truth”, but rather to gain insight into how these competing narratives are 
historically produced, sustained and perpetuated within the climate change debate. Crucially, 
these scientific findings always have had far-reaching political consequences. 
 
Pastoral rangelands throughout the world have been subject to an array of competing 
development narratives. Over time important shifts took place in thinking of pastoralism solely in 
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terms of unpredictability as risk, and that pastoralists make decisions based on risk aversion. In this 
development narrative risk aversion is an ecological adaptation in the face of constant 
unpredictability. More recent approaches, rather than focusing on avoiding risks per se, point 
towards the pastoralist as an active agent in pursuing ongoing efforts to reduce the probability of 
those hazards. For instance, Roe and others have developed an explicit counternarrative that 
opposes this “old (risk-averse) pastoralism”, with the idea that the central concern of the 
pastoralist is to “manage a predictably unpredictable environment better”. Drawing on “the new 
range ecology paradigm” that embraces “opportunism” as a key feature, their counternarrative 
sees pastoralism as a high-reliability institution in the face of unpredictability. Within this newer 
way of thinking pastoralists manage temporal and spatial diversity in grazing opportunities and 
diversity in livestock response. Hence, risks are accepted, and people even take risks as a response 
to hazards they cannot avoid (Roe et al. 1999: 58). 
 
Let us take a closer look at Leboi’s account. Due to the inherent variability of the Simanjiro 
plains it does not come as a surprise that for Leboi, speaking about the (changing) climate is one 
and the same thing as speaking about (changing) rainfall. Nevertheless, his expressed concerns 
deserve once again a broader historical understanding of political processes that have shaped the 
socio-cultural and environmental landscape of which the Maasai pastoralists form a part. He and 
his village members are not sure yet what causes this situation: 
Looking at history you say that the destruction of the environment causes this 
situation, but we are trying to find out how the destruction of the environment has 
caused it. It cannot be demonstrated clearly! […] We are trying to protect our 
environment so that it can rain, because we don’t know either if it is the destruction 
of the environment itself or is it because of lack of rainfall. We don’t know yet! We 
are trying more and more, but we fail. In recent years you can find there is no rainfall 
even for five years continuously. Nowadays there are some important pastures 
disappearing because of lack of rainfall. 
This fragment leaves us with the impression that the emphasis is placed on showing that the 
pastoralists are trying to protect the environment, and not destroy it. He appears to find the idea 
that the source of change lies in the destruction of the environment itself rather odd, and instead 
seeks it in an external (or non- anthropogenic) cause, namely: rain. One of the possible reasons 
why Leboi feels the need to portray his way of living as non-destructive for the environment is 
undoubtedly due to the longstanding and predominant view that has perceived the pastoral mode 
of living as “irrational”. This age-old paradigm has been given further impetus in academia and 
development planning by Herskovits’ notion of the “cattle complex” and Hardin’s article on 
“The Tragedy of the Commons”, to which I come back below. Over time this idea has provided 
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a theoretical foundation for rangeland management systems that advocated either the reduction 
of livestock numbers, total abandonment of pastoralism, raising livestock in sedentary settings, 
commercial ranging or the privatization of rangeland resources (McCabe 2003; Igoe 2002; 
Sachedina 2008). It can be said that Maasai pastoralists like Leboi have been subjected to a wide 
variety of changing paradigms and political processes, generally motivated by Western 
conceptions of pastoral inefficiency, but perpetuated by the Tanzanian government (Sachedina 
2008), which continued to have a considerable influence on the patterns and trajectories of their 
modes of living. Although the abovementioned more recently embraced “nonequilibrial” 
paradigm, which states that pastoralists do not automatically degrade the environment, we shall 
see that in the following response this idea still persists among (some) government officials. 
 Then something unexpected happened and Leboi seized the opportunity to ask the honourable 
member of parliament a question of a somewhat different nature: 
What is another issue? Let me ask the people from the government something: why 
is it that the wild animals, I mean from Tarangire [National Park], they come and eat 
our grass, but our cattle are not allowed to go to Tarangire to eat the grass there? 
The final comment expressed by Leboi stems from similar disagreements over productive 
methods of livestock keeping that exists between the state and pastoralists, but also touches upon 
another crucial and sensitive issue, namely the conservation of nature (including wildlife) versus 
development-related issues. It is worth contextualizing the particular area in which Terrat is 
located, as it forms part of the vast plains of northern Tanzania, which have a long history of 
being managed under some sort of conservation management. This larger region that is 
internationally renowned for its “natural wonders” and scenic beauty, like the Serengeti plains 
and the Ngorongoro crater, forms part of a longstanding institutional legacy of the creation of 
national parks. There exists an extensive amount of literature that addresses the complex 
relationship between wildlife conservation on the one hand and sustainable development on the 
other, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on this matter here.32 What is 
important to bear in mind, though, is that this region has a particular history of being subjected 
to globally constructed ideas of what nature is, and how humans can “fit” – or rather not fit – this  
(idea of) nature in order to conserve the world’s remaining wild places and the wildlife that live in 
them. One such place that is based on the ideology of the separation of “nature” and “culture” is 
Tarangire National Park (TNP, see figure 1). 
                                                             
32 For a detailed study on wildlife management and Maasai interaction in the Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area, see the notable work by Homewood & Rodgers (Homewood & Rodgers 1991). 
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Figure 1. Wildlife dispersal into Terrat during the wet season. Cartography: Monika Feinen. 
The village of Terrat is located on the northwestern outskirts of Tarangire National Park, which 
became a game reserve in 1957 and was “upgraded” to a national park in 1970. The gazettement 
of Tarangire as a national park remains a painful memory for people who were evicted (Igoe and 
Brockington 1999; Igoe 2002). For the Maasai of Simanjiro the area that is now Tarangire was 
central to their system of transhumant pastoralism, since the most important and reliable dry-
season water point in the entire ecosystem – the Tarangire river – is located inside the park. 
Moreover, the park contains the so-called Silalo Swamp, which was the primary drought reserve 
area for the herders of the Simanjiro/Tarangire ecosystem. Finally, it contains a number of 
seasonal water resources. Local herders have claimed that the national park has disrupted their 
traditional herding systems, and played an important part in the decline of Simanjiro’s pastoral 
economy (Igoe 2002: 80-82). Against this background, it is therefore not surprising that herders 
like Leboi, whose parents used to dwell in this area and traditionally followed the same migratory 
routes as the wildlife, complain about the increasing lack of water and green pastures for his 
cattle. Thus although the fact that the borders of the national park are, from the outside, strictly 
closed to both pastoralists and their cattle, in the other direction during the rainy season the 
wildlife disperses into the wider area. Due to the central location of Terrat within one of the 
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important migratory routes of the wild ungulates, at the onset of the dry season when the wildlife 
return to the park the cattle are often left with insufficient grasses to survive the dry season. Yet 
at the same time the village members play a vital role in the so-called community-based wildlife 
conservation by keeping the designated area free from cultivation. The majority of people I spoke 
with in Terrat complained about the lack of land and pasture. This is aggravated by the fact that 
wildebeest give birth in this area (Terrat is nicknamed “birth clinic” by the people there), which 
makes the land inaccessible for cows as the grass becomes poisonous for them, leading to 
blindness and death.33 
 
There appears to reside a contradiction between the ideology upon which the idea of a national 
park is based on the one hand, and the community-based conservation paradigm that is 
surrounding the park, on the other. The idea of a (closed) national park is based on a strict 
separation of nature and culture, which lies at the heart of Western concepts of environmental 
conservation (McCabe 2003). This idea and practice of a strictly (en)closed nature has been called 
by Dan Brockington “fortress conservation” (Brockington 2002). Outside the park we can find 
community conservation (a paradigm that spread over Africa in the 1990s) that envisions a 
synthesis of conservation and development, and assumes that human and non-human systems 
are interdependent. This contradiction resonates with the following statement made by Jim Igoe 
(2002), who conducted a detailed case study of the relation that exists between Tarangire national 
park and the Maasai of the Simanjiro Plain:  
Ironically, there is a growing evidence that national parks themselves are contributing to 
the very problems that advocates of community conservation are trying to solve. British 
administrators, who assumed that African resource management systems were 
environmentally destructive, initially imposed the national park model on East Africa. 
[…] In spite of the negative impacts of protected areas on local resources management 
systems, they were never redefined to suit the African context in the years following 
independence (Igoe 2002: 78).  
The idea behind establishing national parks was originally based on the assumption that a local 
population’s natural resources management system is inherently destructive for the wider 
environment. In his gripping book “Fortress Conservation”, Brockington reveals the complex 
history of the establishment of the Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania. He lays bare both the 
uncertainties of the ecological theories that buttress policymaking, and the negative social 
consequences for surrounding communities that are supposed to benefit from it. And crucially, 
he also shows how little all this negative scientific evidence matters with the influx and powerful 
                                                             
33
 Wildebeest transmit the malignant catarrhal fever (MCF), which causes blindness and is fatal to the 
cattle.  
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lobbying of large fund-raising machines that sustain fortress conservation (Brockington 2002). 
The ideology of national parks, protected areas or any form of gazetted reserve that falls under 
the wider protection of nature from human interference (which is only expanding throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa)34, is one of the many “denarrativized” paradigms that is simply indifferent to 
all the counternarratives that have emerged over the years. It can therefore be said that this 
narrative is endowed with a great dose of “staying power”. 
Joshua on behalf of the National Government of Tanzania 
Let us go back to the public hearing and look at the government’s response that was given in 
reaction to Leboi’s final question. The answer came from Joshua, who was the chief delegate in 
the international climate change negotiations, and represented the United Republic of Tanzania 
during the COP17 in Durban: 
Thank you moderator. The testimony that was given by our Maasai fellow is really 
correct and for a high percentage I can say that the pastoralists society, who depend 
on livestock for their livelihood, they can be affected more than those who depend 
on cultivation […] because it [climate change] goes together with loss of livestock. 
[…] I think I have already explained from my previous clarification that due to the 
current condition we should have a collective desire for change. As I said, these 
people may not change without educating them. This training is so important to 
them; they should get the education so that they can do the productive livestock 
keeping. Keeping the livestock depending on the availability of pastures. And we 
witness the conflict that occurs between pastoralists and farmers when the 
pastoralists try to get pasture or water for their livestock. There is no one who likes 
this confrontation. As I said: I don’t think that these people could move from one 
place to another if they could have been given education. I think you are the 
witnesses, as you see the situation occurs even after they migrate to those places. 
They still do not get a good welcome from the indigenous of those particular places. 
I think all of that could not have happened if they only could get that education. 
[…] So when you migrate, the place where you went to must have constraints, 
because it is at the place that is not familiar. Not only at the societal level, but also 
with the environmental issue. You can see in other places that do not support you, it 
                                                             
34 It is remarkable that the most dramatic growth of protected areas worldwide took place between 1985-
1995, which coincided with the expansion of neoliberalism. The paradox of this situation has been that 
whereas pressure increased to reduce government intervention, state control and pressure on natural 
resources actually to an unprecedented degree. For a discussion of this dynamic, see the rich volume 
“Nature Unbound”, by Dan Brockington et al. 2008. One of the arguments that the authors put forward is 
that while this set of relationships might perhaps seem counter-intuitive, capitalism and conservation are 
allying mutually to shape the world (Brockington 2008: 4-6). Paige West and Dan Brockington have also 
formulated a similar critique about environmentalism in general. They argue that whereas 
environmentalism emerged as a countermovement to its age-mate capitalism, since the 1980s “it got 
snugly in bed with its old enemy” in the ways in which it manifested itself as a powerful actor in global 
environmental governance. It was during this time that environmentalism took a step back from criticizing 
corporations and began to focus its energy on poor people living in highly biologically diverse and 
“vulnerable” places; environmentalism “went South so to speak” (West and Brockington 2012). 
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comes to the point that the pastoralists who depend on livestock keep entering the 
national parks, which has resulted in them being seen as going against the rules and 
regulations. All in all, that particular condition forces them to enter in that condition. 
[…] It is true that our fellows need more education so that they can have productive 
livestock keeping, depending on the availability of the pasture of that particular area. 
[…] The main source is the increase in the amount of people by birth, but for a large 
percentage it is those who migrate from place to place, which is no more productive. 
As I said, all of them need to be educated, to receive capacity-building so that they 
can find an alternative way to sustain their livelihood. It is my message to society that 
the training that is given to the society is given purposefully. So they should realize 
that there is no other way for the society to survive, except by accepting the experts 
from the private sector and the government’s effort. That is important, thank you. 
Joshua’s statement certainly does not stand alone in the vision of the government of Tanzania. It 
resonates with the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), which is the principal 
document for guiding adaptation policies in the country. The proposed solutions for the 
pastoralists include: the change of land-use patterns, education of farmers and livestock keepers, 
sustainable range management, controlling the movement of livestock, and advocating zero 
grazing (NAPA 2007: 22). Two things in this document deserve critical scrutiny. First, it is 
reiterated that “the existing number of cattle in Tanzania has already surpassed the normal 
carrying capacity in most areas” (p. 7). And secondly, it is also expected that the pastoralists are 
among the most vulnerable groups in the country, who will suffer from the consequences of 
climate change. Within the Adaptation discourse the Maasai are thus on the one hand portrayed 
as perpetrators (in public and media discourse the irrationality argument is nowadays augmented 
with the notion that cattle emit excessive amounts of CO2), and on the other hand victimized in 
the face of climate change (cf. Smucker et al. 2015). Particularly the first statement is remarkable 
considering the fact that livestock is the only sector for which environmentally destructive 
practices are reported, instead of giving ample attention to adaptation practices that could actually 
strengthen the position of the pastoralists. The fact that the notion of carrying capacity is deeply 
entrenched in the minds of government officials became clear to me during the encounters that I 
had. For instance, my first encounter with Paul, a very high-ranking international negotiator, was 
telling. The very first thing he exclaimed to me when I told him that I was studying climate 
change among the Maasai was:  
Do you know the figures of the carrying capacity? The Maasai have really exceeded this 
number! They think that they can wander around the whole country. You should go to 
the ministry of livestock and get the numbers, because this is really a great problem that 
we have in Tanzania (interview with a government official at the Vice President’s Office). 
These statements are rooted in the assumption that the Maasai are backward, in need of 
education and have low adaptive capacities; a tendency that turns the pastoralists in a double 
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sense into the environmental “other”. The ubiquitous view about the Maasai in Tanzania is that 
with their large herds they exceed the carrying capacity of their lands. The term “carrying 
capacity” has become the government’s mantra, to the extent that it almost coincides with what it 
means to be Maasai.  This concept feeds into the highly controversial and longstanding 
discussion about equilibrium vis-à-vis non-equilibrium ecosystems. What is important here, 
though, is that the term carrying capacity has been prone to ideological hijacking, both to advocate 
for as well as against pastoralism as a non-sustainable livelihood system. For a long time this 
scientific claim has been used to reduce herd sizes at the expense of pastoralists’ wellbeing. In a 
similar vein however, the denial that rangelands have a carrying capacity served to legitimize 
pastoralism by arguing that environmental destruction cannot be caused by a maximization of 
herd sizes (cf. Vetter 2005). Despite the many “denarrativizing” attempts by scholars to debunk 
the scientific proof of the universal value of such paradigms, the question remains why, then, is 
the scientific notion of the carrying capacity so perseverant amongst the Tanzanian government? 
To find the answer we have to trace the historical roots of this paradigm.35 
As mentioned previously, already in the 20th century it was assumed that pastoral people had an 
“irrational” attachment to their livestock, and that their livestock numbers were maximized 
regardless of the carrying capacity of the rangelands. Herskovits’ thesis about the “cattle 
complex” (1926) further underpinned this idea and also had a wide influence on development 
policies, which entailed that any attempt at sustainability involved livestock reduction (McCabe 
2003: 101). Also Hardin’s article on “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) was grounded in the 
assumption that traditional pastoral systems were fundamentally non-sustainable. This similarly 
continued to shape rangeland development policies that advocated for the reduction in livestock, 
and moreover, for the privatization of rangeland resources (ibid). It requires little effort to see the 
existing parallels with former narratives and misconceptions about human-nature interaction, and 
this notion was expressed by the chief negotiator of the national climate change agenda (with a 
fairly strong tone of voice). It is not a new phenomenon that governments, generally, see the 
pastoralist way of life as backward and as incompatible with administrative goals such as tax 
collection, provision of health and education services, economic development and the promotion 
of national unity (Homewood & Rodgers 1991: 3; see also Hodgson 2011a). What is new in this 
context, however, is that these ideas that pastoralists have an irrational relationship with the 
                                                             
35
 The question of whether Terrat forms part of an “equilibrium” or “non-equilibrium” ecosystem 
depends on several parameters (e.g. how much average rain per annum is needed for equilibrium) that one 
adheres to, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter. For an interesting discussion on this 
topic in the light of climate change see: “Climate Change and the Challenge of the Non-equilibrium 
Thinking”, Ian Scoones 2009. 
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environment and their cattle continue to persist in, and are even revitalized by, the “Adaptation 
to Climate Change Paradigm” (see for instance the NAPA 2007). 
This new development narrative therefore deserves all the more critical scrutiny in analyzing the 
translation of climate change in Tanzania. With the realization that Leboi was summoned by a 
third party to come all the way from Terrat to Dar es Salaam to speak about the impacts of 
climate change on his life, during Joseph’s talk I experienced feelings of a growing sympathy for 
Leboi. Instead of providing him with answers or constructive solutions about how to adapt to 
climate change, he received a fairly strong public reprimand about how environmentally 
destructive the pastoral mode of living is, which silenced Leboi for the rest of the meeting.  
NGOs strike back: the emergence of a counternarrative 
It is against the background of this nascent climate change narrative, that we have to understand 
the counternarrative that recently came to dominate the NGO vocabulary (mainly organizations that 
represent the pastoralists) in Northern Tanzania. The last speaker was Joseph. While mediating 
between different worlds – as a development expert and as a representative of the Maasai 
community – he intervened and turned the argument around by stating that it is not the 
herdsmen, but the people from the government who need to be educated instead:   
Thank you for the explanations about our fellow Mr. Leboi Ole Netanga from 
Terrat. I have a different opinion, because in our nation the herders seem to be a 
defect in the use of natural resources. The truth is that the peacemakers of our 
country, and those who are interconnected with development efforts, still don’t 
understand the whole effect, especially “the dynamics of the pastoral system”. And 
because there is a big knowledge gap among the dynamics of these drylands, 
promises that are made are not being very helpful for common citizens like Mr. 
Leboi. The tendency is, as we can see from his testimony, that they were encouraged 
to do agriculture. They were encouraged to cultivate because the political slogan of 
our country was “politics is agriculture” – and now the politics is to do agriculture in 
a dryland? It is a big problem within a dryland; we don’t do that within a dryland! So 
we should not do these practices in the dry places like Simanjiro […]. You can’t 
cultivate because you will get nothing in this time of climate change. The best use of 
those drylands is pastoralism, but livestock does not count in Tanzania, for a large 
number of livestock is considered to be a sin! For other countries like Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt it is not. It is a productive one for the nation and it is not a 
crime at all. If we produce something low in the industry like cashew or maize we 
will like to see more maize, more cotton, more fish etc. But then why don’t we like to 
see more livestock so our nation could become more productive? 
It is worth mentioning that the Tanzanian government’s attempt to relocate and “promote” 
agriculture and the sedentary life style dates back to the 1960s when the first president, Julius 
Nyerere, installed an African version of socialism. With a nationwide villagization program 
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people were forcibly relocated into so-called Ujamaa (Swahili: family hood) villages. In northern 
Tanzania this resettlement was known as Operation Embarnat (Maa: “permanent settlement”), and 
many Maasai herders saw this operation as another attempt by the state to appropriate pastoral 
rangelands. In other words, conservation was thus not the only force behind state-led 
resettlement (Sachedina 2008: 110). The statement of the NGO worker is in line with the 
manifold accounts about agricultural practices in Terrat, which were characterized by most 
informants as random trial and error. For example, one pastoralist told me that: “farming is some 
sort of gambling game, sometimes you win but more often you lose”. Recently, among the 
NGOs and CSOs in Northern Tanzania a counternarrative has set forth the idea that the Maasai 
are not victims of climate change, but rather masters of adaptation.  
To put it in the words of an NGO worker: “We are used to adaptation since we can remember; 
movement is our way of life”. Since time immemorial they have followed the rain and green 
pastures with their herds, which has always enabled them to adapt to the highly variable and 
unstable climates. In fact, they argue, pastoralism is a livelihood system that should be understood 
in its full complexity, within which livelihood diversification like crop production and wage 
labour (cf. Leslie & McCabe 2013), as well as mobility and a large herd size are the key coping 
mechanism for cattle to survive during severe droughts (cf. Goldman & Riosmena 2013). Thus 
the adaptation measures as envisioned by the government (reduction of herd sizes, zero grazing, 
and a sedentary lifestyle only centred on growing crops) are for the Maasai rather the antithesis of 
adaptation. In the second part of his statement Joseph continued to provide the audience with 
some critical remarks, and added some possible solutions: 
[…] So I suggest that there is a need for the peacemaker to identify, learn the whole 
science, and it is our responsibility to engage in that issue. So it is not about blaming 
someone, but there is a knowledge gap. But the big strategy of the pastoralists, as Mr. 
Leboi said, is that, if it did not rain, […] what could be the strategy of Mr. Leboi if 
the plain did not get enough rain, if all of you here were pastoralists? What can you 
do? Strategically, Mr. Leboi should shift from the plain to another area. But the 
movement could not be undertaken without a plan. The movement should be 
regulated locally through norms, traditions and regulation with those of the 
government. So if those of the government do not look at what Mr. Leboi wants, he 
will continue to live in a terrible condition. If the plains will be closed the cattle will 
die, and if Mr. Leboi will lose all his cattle he will be among the poorest of the 
nation, and I think we should help Mr. Leboi especially in our policies so he cannot 
become even poorer. […] The third issue is that, if you said that Mr. Leboi should 
not move to another area, we did not even look why he decided to move […]. The 
truth is that, nearby where Mr. Leboi lives, in the same country the government 
changed the area that had been used by Mr. Leboi for livestock keeping to become a 
national park, which is called Tarangire. So his land has been taken. If his land has 
been taken what will he do as a Tanzanian, given that Tanzania has movement of 
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people, and rules? He is forced to move out of Terrat because his land has been 
turned into a national park. So he moves elsewhere. […] So instead of blaming them 
why they shifted to those places, the government should find out first the reason 
behind what happened to their original place. They have no place to go since many 
of the areas that they used to use for grazing have been taken, to be national parks 
[…] So we need to understand why Leboi is not getting the same pasture that he 
used to get some years ago. What happened? He knows that when it starts to rain it is 
the time for perennial pasture, and annual pasture during the dry season. So if he 
loses all of them there is a turn for Mr. Leboi and all of these could be brought about 
by climate change. Now we should do research as we can identify the dynamics of 
changes of those particular plains in order to help him to manage his livelihood 
during the period of climate change. So as you see here I cannot agree to some of the 
issues, because of the existing knowledge gap regarding the dynamics of the pastoral 
system. Second, I see there is no correlation in policy to help Mr. Leboi. And third, 
the issue will place Mr. Leboi in difficulties, and he will be among the poorest people 
in our country if the policies, principles and conduct will not care about Mr. Leboi. 
Thank you! 
This heated debated, which clearly evoked strong sentiments among different parties, was 
followed by several other expert statements, and by speakers who represented human rights 
movements and the civil society. All of them referred back to Mr. Leboi, and as such his case 
became the common thread running through the discussions. What can be derived from this 
confrontation between the government and Joseph, which was evoked by Leboi’s account, hints 
towards the longstanding problematic relationship that exists between pastoralists and the 
Tanzanian state. With this portrait of the statements that were made during the public hearing on 
climate change, I have tried to demonstrate how old struggles come to the fore and are being 
framed through a new lens of climate change. Moreover, having a keen eye for the historicity of 
the “production of nature” and the broader political processes that have shaped the contours of 
the contemporary struggles of the Maasai herders for recognition and resource rights, it becomes 
clear how both Herskovits’ and Hardin’s “traces” can be found in the government’s perception 
of the pastoralist way of living in general, and in the climate change adaptation policy in 
particular. A questions that rises in this context is: what continuities and discontinuities can be 
observed in emerging climate-change policies, in relation to former nature-environment 
paradigms, which continue to colour the socio-cultural and political landscape of which the 
Maasai pastoralist like Leboi form a part? Put differently, what happens in the translation process 
when a transnationally constructed idea of adaptation to climate change enters different policy 
circles and is shaped by different, and often competing, “translation regimes”? By developing an 
ethnography of connectivity – in which encounters from the “global” to the “local” level are 
explored – combined with a detailed ethnographic account of a village like Terrat, the following 
chapters explore these dynamics of “translating Adaptation to climate change” in more detail. But 
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first, a chapter shall be devoted to reflect on what it takes to follow a travelling idea, and on its 
possible analytic novelty.  
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Nowhere or Now Here 
Notes on How to Follow a Travelling Idea of Adaptation to Climate Change 
 
 
 
 
Painting “ochtendroze” (morning-pink) by Trudie Vrolijk-Vermeiden  
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Introduction 
 
“It [the global warming story] rewrites our planetary cosmos by refiguring the biophysical 
world as well as human relation to the biosphere and it sparks a new sense of communitas, 
which is of course still far from being a real community. […] I would say the climate 
regime is thus to be seen as a complex ritual order, based on a series of ritual 
performances taking place on various levels.”  
Viehöver 2010: 145 
 
Thinking retrospectively of my fieldwork and all the different sites, venues, countries and cities 
where I immersed myself in the negotiations, speeches, talks, presentations, meetings, side- 
events, public hearings, protest marches, conferences, workshops, exhibitions and other 
platforms of exchange between expert and lay audiences, journalists, policy makers, dignitaries, 
epistemic communities, researchers, Maasai pastoralists, peasants, NGO workers, environmental 
and indigenous rights activists etcetera – all of whom have been talking about climate change in 
their own particular ways – the notion of a “spectacle” aptly comes to mind. In line with 
Viehöver (2010), who proposes to think of the climate regime as a “complex ritual order based 
on a series of ritual performances”, it will become clear that throughout this work the idea of 
climate change is treated as an enacted narrative, which is continuously performed, staged and 
ritualized. In other words, I take climate change not to be a static story but rather a fluid narrative 
that comes into being in a great many forms and a great many plots by its very enactment, which 
involves a multitude of both human and nonhuman actors.36 
 
Taking the analogy of the spectacle further, the metaphor of a theatre stage on which actors are 
performing or “staging” their climate-change narrative, will prove fruitful in gaining insight into 
the governing principles, power struggles and conditions within which such a story can unfold in 
an array of varying – and at times imponderable – scenarios. In the following account I combine 
a narrative approach (MacIntyre 1981; Bruner 1986; Polkinghorne 1988) with the drama 
metaphor as used in organizational theory by Czarniawska (1997) and in the sociological analysis 
of everyday life by Goffman (1959; 1974). Drawing on Czarniawska and MacIntyre, it will be 
demonstrated that a sensitivity to enactment enables us to observe how stories change and are 
repeated if we treat them as dramatized stories, in which participants are actors, authors, 
directors, and producers (Czarniawska 1997). This is possible for: “[…] conversations in particular, 
                                                             
36 The “plot” or “story-line” is here understood as “the means by which specific events are made to 
cohere into a single narrative” (Polkinghorne 1988: 18).  
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and human actions in general, are enacted narratives. Narrative is not the work of poets, dramatists and 
novelists reflecting upon events which had no narrative order before one was imposed by the 
singer or the writer; narrative form is neither disguise nor decoration” (MacIntyre 1981: 197). To 
begin with, the metaphor of the theatre stage and the focus on “performativity” allow us to 
explore the basic questions: what is being said in which context; who is talking to whom; who is 
giving answers and who is listening? And, whose voices are being heard and who is excluded 
from storytelling? In a later phase then, we can answer the question of what are the ideological 
effects of discourse, or the so-called “truth effects” that are created within discourses. This 
dramatic approach to the climate regime can be similarly positioned within a “narrative mode of 
knowing”. This way of producing knowledge comes again close to the metaphor of the world-as-
text as introduced by Lyotard, and brings into view the ways in which stories rule our lives and 
how our societies are constructed (Lyotard in Czarniawska 1997: 5). An understanding of social 
life as a narrative will here be combined with a focus on the “stages” where these narratives come 
into existence and are played out. 
 
The ever-expanding field 
 
How does one follow a travelling idea? And what insights does it yield? Apart from a mere 
playing with words, the title brings us right into the methodological and analytical heart of what it 
takes to follow a travelling idea or model. In the pursuit of tracing the idea of Adaptation, which 
is constantly re-crafted along its borderless journey, I was – at least for several consecutive 
periods – continuously on the move. One thing that became obvious is that, at least in part, my 
fieldwork can be characterized in terms of a patchwork. This entailed the tracing of complex 
webs of interconnectivity by following some clues, which at times however was also guided by 
the magic forces of contingency. If one thinks that the following pages are messy in their 
structure and chronology, then I have succeeded in doing justice to what it takes to follow a 
travelling idea. For an anthropologist, this mobility can easily lead to a feeling of discomfort – 
seemingly privileging surface over depth – as one of the disciplinary trademarks has been 
committed localism (Marcus 1995) by carrying out long-term and intensive fieldwork; 
(Malinowski 1922; Evans-Pritchard 1951: 75-76) “simply” by being there (Geertz 1988: 4-5; 
Borneman and Hammoudi 2009; Roncoli et al. 2003; Clifford 1997: 99).37 Indeed, we owe much 
                                                             
37 Contributing to the Writing Culture Debate, Clifford Geertz distinguished between “being there” as the 
fieldwork practice in which other forms of life are penetrated, where anthropologists mainly derive their 
epistemic authority from; as opposed to “Being There” referring to the anthropologist – palpable on the 
page – as author, which he deemed in need of self-reflection (Geertz 1988: 23). 
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of the deeply cherished long-term ethnographic fieldwork (often mentioned in the same breath as 
participant observation) in a single-site and bounded place to the archetypal image of Malinowski, 
who pitched his tent “right among the natives” in Melanesia and deemed it indispensable to fully 
immerse oneself in their daily life by “cutting oneself off from the company of other white men” 
(Malinowski 1922: 5-6).38 According to Malinowski, this proximity was necessary for the 
ethnographer to observe whatever happened without allowing anything to escape his notice: “All 
these [quarrels, rituals, and trivial but always significant events] I had not to pursue, fearful of 
missing them, but they took place under my very eyes, at my doorstep so to speak” (Malinowski 
1922: 8). Ultimately, due to the constant and sheer duration of his presence he ceased to be “a 
disturbing element in the tribal life”. However, he similarly urged the ethnographer to take a 
more active position: “The Ethnographer has not only to spread his nets in the right place, and 
wait for what will fall into them.” But, “He must be an active huntsman, and drive his quarry into 
them and follow them until its most inaccessible lairs” (ibid). 
 
After uncountable attempts to interview one of the key players in the Adaptation program in Tanzania 
(let us call him Paul), I was about to give up. My frustrations about studying “up” had accumulated 
during my fieldwork, for it appeared to be an impossible undertaking. These key players either did not 
have time, did not really want to talk to me at all, or just gave me documents to read that I could have 
simply found online. My impression was that as soon as I told them (these important persons) that I was 
a researcher, the chances for having an interview dropped to zero. Somehow I had managed to get Paul’s 
phone number from another important negotiator in the field whom I had met at a conference. By then I 
had already figured out that being among the negotiators at the conferences (and thus being to some extent 
part of them), was the only way to get access to this world of dignitaries. When I visited Dar es Salaam 
for a conference, I called Paul to inquire whether he was around that week. He told me that he was not 
around and most probably would not be in the near future. However, before returning back to the 
northern part of the country, I decided to give it a last try. I dropped by at the Vice President’s Office 
(VPO) without prior announcement. I was about to enter the office building when I saw, to my greatest 
surprise, a remarkably fancy car stopping in front of the government building. It had a peculiar number 
plate: “Project Africa Adaptation Program Tanzania”. And there he was, in the flesh, Paul himself. I 
approached him and introduced myself, after which he told me that he did not have time at that moment. I 
followed him inside nevertheless. He then sighed and said, “well okay, let me see if I can introduce you to 
my colleague”. We entered his office and I told him that I knew one of his colleagues (an even higher- 
ranking person within the UNFCCC system). This apparently opened a door, so I finally had my long-
awaited interview. He then introduced me to a colleague (and told him to talk to me), who then in turn 
introduced me to another colleague (who did the same). I learned that if one wishes to study “up”, the best 
way is to begin at the top so that the snowball can roll down the hill.  
 
                                                             
38 However, while Malinowski carried out long-term research in a village, he was already carrying out 
multi-local research while tracing the complex exchange system, or “Kula ring” by following the 
Trobrianders on their sea faring expeditions (see Hannerz 2003: 202-203; Marcus 1995). 
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While Malinowski’s motives might appear somewhat anachronistic these days, I believe that it is 
not so much the ethnographic enterprise itself – and all the basic methods that fieldwork as a 
mode of inquiry encompasses – that has changed, but rather the ever more compressed and 
interconnected world we live in with complex networks, encounters and changing configurations 
of power, together with our conceptual apparatus and localizing practices of what we think that 
constitutes “the field” (and thus our object of research). Since the 1980s, anthropology has been 
hunted by inexhaustible self-reflexivity, which, driven by a postmodern ethos and critique, has 
legitimated new (and increasingly complex) objects of study and styles of writing (Marcus 1994: 
385). This reflexive stance has indeed shaped the ways in which ethnographers relate to and 
define their study objects and field site(s), and has set into motion more mobile approaches to 
doing research, with a move away from single sites to multi-locale explorations. 
 
In the face of an increasingly interconnected world, globalization studies took root and flourished 
since the nineties, and the study of global entanglements, assemblages, connections, flows and 
fluids has become well known to anthropology. This has given rise to a bewildering array of 
metaphors and methodological prerogatives, all aimed at exploring how global change has led to 
local processes of appropriation, adaptation, rejection or resistance (Behrends et al. 2014: 9).39 So 
anthropology is no longer bound to studying “down” or “up”. But now the whole world (system) 
is within the focus, including science and technology, as well as the “tribe” of the Moderns that 
has increasingly been put under scrutiny (see for instance Latour 1993; 2013). Moreover, it seems 
that both anthropology and the social sciences more generally have come to detect some of their 
former blind spots. For instance, more and more attention is paid to canonical institutions that 
were left unexamined for a while, or all those organizations that produce knowledge and 
objective representations of the world, and thus to a large extent constitute and regulate (post) 
modern society (cf. Rottenburg 2009: xxv). It is quite remarkable that for some time the most 
widespread phenomenon of Western societies (organizational life) has been “glossed over and 
successfully blackboxed”, which can in part be explained by the fact that organizations were 
considered to be merely “instruments” (Czarniawska 1997: 1- 2). And, arguing in a Latourian 
spirit, Rottenburg has sharply observed that the omission of “modern” institutions from 
anthropological inquiry has been founded upon the erroneous misconception that “worldviews” 
– anthropology’s primary concern – could not be found there, but only belonged to other people 
                                                             
39 The authors contend that the notion of a travelling model encompasses many of the notions that have 
been coined in studying global entanglements, such as “glocalization” (Robertson 1992); “hybridization” 
or “creolisation” (Brathwaite, Shepher and Richards 2002); “scapes” (Appadurai 1996); “connectivity” (de 
Bruijn and van Dijk 2012); “fluids” (Mol and Law 1994); “liquidity” (Baumann 2000), “technological 
zones” (Barry 2006) etc. See Behrends et al. 2014: 9-10.  
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who “didn’t know better”, and still believed in angels, devils and deities. What follows from this 
observation is the implicit assumption that worldviews are an illusion that do not so much 
correspond to reality, but are rather constructed and are the product of the social conditions and 
their constitution; whereas scientifically and technologically advanced societies (including 
anthropologists themselves and development workers) see the world as it “really” is (Rottenburg 
2009: xxv). 
 
This awareness that brought into view these practices of “epistemological othering”, has given 
way to a more “symmetrical anthropology” for which Latour has defined three laws, a “triply 
symmetrical position” that uses the same terms to explain (1) truths and errors; (2) the 
production of humans and non-humans; and (3) Westerners and Others (Latour 1993: 103; 
Latour 2007). Speaking from an organizational theory perspective, Czarniawska has added a 
fourth position, namely that of an anthropology of the “doppelganger”, which consists of 
studying equals, or people who have the same educational background, make the same claims 
about knowledge validity and are part of the same tradition (Czarniawska 1997: 5).40 As I wish to 
make clear throughout this chapter, these rules of symmetry apply to the notion of a travelling 
idea, as it seeks to distil mechanisms of translation and the making of associations through which 
all actors that are enrolled in the chain come into view. Now we find ourselves studying 
everybody, everything and everywhere and their interconnections, so we are “Being there … and 
there … and there!” (Hannerz 2003). This, in turn, has resulted in the fact that a great many 
studies nowadays are lumped indiscriminately together under the encompassing term “multi-sited 
ethnography” (see Marcus 1995). As is often the case with terms that are used too often, they 
become beset with vagueness; so a few words on this approach deserve mention. As Hodgson 
has rightly pointed out, the term “multi-sitedness” can be somewhat misleading here for it carries 
the notion that it is about clearly discernable geographical sites. While my research has undeniably 
dealt with multiple sites, the term “nodal ethnography” as coined by Hodgson (2011), does more 
justice to my approach, since I have focused on places and interactions where different worlds 
and worldviews meet (cf. Hodgson 2011a: 17). The basic principles, however, are the same – that 
is ,“to follow” – the “nodal” concept explicitly denotes an ethnography of connectivity that 
illuminates how ties are established (cf. De Bruijn & Van Dijk 2012), and draws our attention to 
what happens in these spaces of encounter and what it is that makes ideas move or not. Since we 
                                                             
40 As Czarniawska demonstrates, from an organizational theory perspective “equals” are indeed people 
who work for the organizations under scrutiny. From an anthropological point of view, a true 
anthropology of Doppelgänger would of course involve carrying out an anthropology of anthropology, or 
of anthropologists. 
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have come to realize that the “global” is as much part of the “local” as the other way around, this 
dichotomy is no longer useful. Therefore, it seems to make more sense to speak of sites as 
assemblages. For instance, most conferences are hold together by an array of different locales and 
actors. We thus easily find multiple “sites” within one site. 
 
Just a few days before arrival in Doha, I had exchanged the mud hut in Terrat for high-tech and air-
conditioned venues. A sharper contrast between these two worlds could hardly be imagined. Therefore, on 
my second day at the COP18, I was thrilled to see a Maasai woman in her traditional gown. I 
approached her by greeting her in Maa, to which she responded with a delighted smile. I showed her the 
beads that I was still wearing on my arms and legs, and by observing the colours and patterns she 
immediately recognized that I must belong to the Kisongo tribe. She herself was a Kenyan Maasai. 
During our short encounter she enthusiastically greeted a Sami hunter from Norway, who was also dressed 
in his traditional gown. She explained to me that he was also an indigenous person, just like her. And it 
occurred to me that it was the “Indigenous Peoples for Climate Change Day”. The next day, I met her 
again, but this time she was dressed in “official” clothes. I asked her why she had changed her clothes, and 
she replied that today it was “Gender Day”. Today she represented women for the Kenyan parliament 
and not just the Maasai, so she had to dress accordingly. 
 
Nowhere: on the unfolding field 
 
What constitutes the field? And how can the field be delimited and identified, and who is entitled 
to do so? James Clifford (1997) already made us wary of the dangers of construing ethnography 
as fieldwork, which is a certain “spatial practice” (De Certeau 1984, in Clifford 1997), and entails a 
politics of representing and “locating” culture. Clifford argued that this spatial practice has a 
history of privileging relations of dwelling over relations of travelling. So he rightfully found that 
the discourse on “being there” was too sharply separated from “getting there”. This has led to 
the obscuring of historical realities, such as the means of transport to reach the field that reveal 
prior and ongoing connections. He criticized anthropology for excluding other parts of blurred 
boundary areas, such as all the places the researcher passes through before entering the field (the 
capital, the national and regional context etc.), the so-called préterrain, and also all the relations of 
translations, and complex global conjunctures in which ethnography was always already 
enmeshed (Clifford 1997: 99-100). Put otherwise, the “field” as traditionally conceived was in 
many ways already multi-sited, which is a reality that is nowadays more and more difficult to 
allow to escape from our ethnographic gaze. While there is no methodology free from localizing 
practices in relation to cultural translation, the notion of a travelling idea forecloses (at least some 
of) this critique. For instance, it prompts us to think beyond predominant dichotomies such as 
the global vs. local, as well as modern vs. traditional; and directs our attention instead to the 
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theoretical context within which these conceptual oppositions emerge (Behrends et al. 2014: 8). 
Furthermore, mobile ethnography can also do away with the distinction between lifeworld and 
the system, for there is an inherent claim in multi-sited ethnography that “[…] Any ethnography 
of a cultural formation in the world system is also an ethnography of the system” (Marcus 1995: 
99).  
 
We shall see in the following account that in my research the field could not be delimited a priori, 
but rather unfolded through very itinerary of the object of research itself as it moved in 
unpredictable directions. However, this does not mean that this approach is tied together by mere 
contingency or passive waiting until something worth exploring befalls the researcher. Quite the 
opposite is true in fact, and it comes closer to Malinowski’s “active huntsman” attitude or the job 
of a detective, which continuously tracks the traces of where the idea is coming from and where 
it is heading. To begin answering the question that I raised above, it is crucial to note that ideas 
or models themselves do not travel. In order to move they need to be picked up, transported or 
translated by goods or people, as Czarniawska and Sévon have put it: 
 
Ideas must materialize, at least in somebody’s head; symbols must be inscribed. A practice 
not stabilized by a technology, be it a linguistic technology cannot last; it is bound to be 
ephemeral. A practice or institution cannot travel; they must be simplified or abstracted 
into an idea, or at least approximated in a narrative permitting a vicarious experience, and 
therefore converted into words and images. Neither can words nor images travel until 
they have materialized, until they are embodied, inscribed or objectified, as only bodies 
and things can move in time and space (Czarniawska 2002, in Czarniawska and Sévon 
2005: 9).  
 
In this growing field of social inquiry that deals with the travelling of ideas (Czwarniawska and 
Sévon 2005; Merry 2006); models (Behrends et al. 2014; Kelbert 2016); blueprints (Bierschenk 
2014); norms (Acharya 2004); discourses (de Wit 2014b; 2015); concepts (Bal 2002); knowledge 
(Strathern 2006); policies (Peck and Theodore 2010); things (Cook 2004; Cook and Harrison 
2007); theories (Said 1983); cultures (Clifford 1997); fluid technologies (De Laet and Mol 2000) – 
the basic pursuit has been largely the same – that is, to understand global entanglements, 
connectivity, and how change in one place leads to, or is related to, developments elsewhere. 
Furthermore, it also raises the issue concerning why certain ideas, models or blueprints “work” 
and take root in some contexts, whereas in others they simply don’t (cf. Behrends et al. 2014: 1; 
Acharya 2004) or take on radically distinct forms. These questions have formed the heart of my 
enterprise. In the endeavour to understand what makes things move, persevere or dissolve, these 
studies inevitably deal with questions of power. I do not intend to dwell on the difference 
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between all these varying concepts, as most of them share heuristic properties. For example, a 
travelling model, idea or blueprint, are all metaphors for or representations of reality that might 
stimulate concrete and tangible manifestations, interventions and connections beyond their sites 
of inception. The fruitfulness of these concepts depends on the context in which they are used, 
so I deem it legitimate to use some of them interchangeably, since an idea or paradigm can 
become a model or a policy, which are in turn carried by certain objects and shaped by certain 
technologies of inscription etc.41 Whatever the travelling forms or vehicles, the essential point is 
that in order to move, semantics and materiality are necessarily intertwined. This is where 
translation comes in. The translation of a travelling thing or idea is inherent to its deployment, for 
it cannot be deployed without being translated (Behrends et al. 2014: 4). Put otherwise, and as I 
will make more concrete below, translation and travelling (or transportation) are cognates. 
 
It may be clear that the approach of following a travelling idea has indeed been inspired by 
Science and Technology Studies, and that a few basic ontological principles – such as insisting on 
things as the effect of practices and interaction rather than the primitive causes – are derivative of 
Actor Network Theory (ANT). Or, as John Law later devised, a more general approach to society 
can perhaps more aptly be captured by the comprehensive and open term “material semiotics”.42 
Whatever the term used, an essential point of departure in this “sociology of translation” is the 
idea that practices of knowing (but this can be extended to society, organizations, agents, 
machines, power etc.) are always the result of a heterogeneous network in which materiality and 
semantics are interwoven. Latour has called this ontological shift a “background/foreground 
reversal”, in the sense that instead of starting from a set of universal laws and taking local 
contingencies as endless particularities that could be either erased or protected, it all begins with 
these incommensurabilities and unconnected localities that might end up in “provisionally 
commensurable connections” (Latour 1996: 370). It is through the lens of “material-semiotics” 
                                                             
41 The notion of technology can refer to a technological object, like a device or tool. But it also refers to 
what Foucault described as practices that may involve technologies of the body, of power, or of the self. 
Foucault was interested in understanding how the self has been objectified through different scientific 
inquiries, which operated as “truth games”, for which he explored the workings of related techniques that 
humans use to understand themselves. He distinguished four major “technologies”: (1) technologies of 
production; (2) technologies of sign systems; (3) technologies of power; (4) technologies of the self 
(Foucault 1988: 17-18). 
42 John Law prefers nowadays to use the term material semiotics instead of ANT, as it does more justice to 
openness, uncertainty and diversity of the dimensions it seeks to explain. Furthermore, ANT is not a 
foundational theory that seeks to explain why things happen, but is rather descriptive and tells stories about 
how things assemble or don’t (Law 2007: 2). Latour in turn has argued that ANT is a method to describe the 
deployment of associations, and a method to describe the generative path of any narration (Latour 1996). 
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that mechanisms of power as an effect of ongoing interactions between material and non-
material forms and their assemblages can be explained (see e.g. Law 1992; Callon 1986).  
 
For example, if we recall the public hearing as elaborated on in the introduction, I have 
demonstrated how different realities and normativities are juxtaposed, and how legal, economic, 
moral, scientific and ontological tensions are played out, and, how the social, the cultural, the 
political and the natural fuse in the enactment of a new reality that is incited by the travelling idea 
of “Adaptation to Climate Change”. All of the actors involved in the meeting (the Maasai 
herdsmen, the NGO workers, the government official, the media, researchers etc.) form part of 
different heterogeneous networks (human and non-human) and have their own social and moral 
outlook. The Maasai men stand for their communities back home, enmeshed in broader human-
animal networks and are worried that more land is being taken from them; the NGO worker 
seeks to speak for the Maasai men but also represents a broader network of grassroots 
organizations, who in turn form part of interlinking donor-recipient webs and need to secure the 
continuation of funding; and the government official stands in an antagonistic relationship with 
the other actors, as he speaks on behalf of the government of Tanzania, again bound to a 
particular infrastructure and international-national dynamics of dependency, which prompt him 
to build upon ancient rhetoric, etc. etc. Moreover, climate change knowledge takes on an array of 
material forms in the process of translation, be it a speech act, a slideshow, a PowerPoint 
presentation, a movie, a model, a text, a scientific paper etc. And there are of course nature(s), 
present both as meta-narratives – which brought everybody in this occasion together – and as 
that natural undeniable reality that reveals itself in endless atmospheric material forms that we call 
the climate, to which everybody relates in their own distinctive ways. By analyzing this meeting 
we have explored both the enactment of realities (ontological) as well as described the making of 
knowledge (epistemological). This is, according to John Law, “material-semiotics” at work (Law 
2007).  
 
As mentioned above, in the seemingly abstract pursuit of following a travelling idea, one needs a 
material manifestation to be able to track its traces. Attending this public hearing enabled me to 
follow the actors to their respective heterogeneous networks, and observe whatever new 
connections were forged and new trajectories and networks unfolded. These observable and 
unfolding networks as described above bear resemblance to Callon’s notion of techno-economic 
networks (or TENs). He coined this term “to describe a coordinated set of heterogeneous actors 
which interact more or less successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse methods for 
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generating goods and services” (Callon 1990: 133). These networks mix humans and non-humans 
and inscriptions of all sorts, and when simplified, are organized along three axes: scientific 
(knowledge); technical (artefacts); and a market axis (money). According to Callon, these 
networks are ordered (again simplified) by four types of intermediaries: (1) texts or literary 
inscriptions; (2) technical artefacts; (3) human beings and (4) money in all sorts of forms. As 
mentioned before, in my research I have limited myself to following both key actors (humans) to 
their respective networks of translation, and an array of textual forms or so-called literary 
inscriptions (Latour 1986 in Callon 1990: 135) and speech acts. As will become clear in the next 
chapter, in the field of development cooperation, climate change documents play an 
indispensable role in maintaining and reproducing the field itself (for the role of documents in 
the international negotiations, see the work of Weisser 2014). As one Tanzanian delegate during 
the coffee break at a conference lamented:  
 
I do not need coffee because this meeting is so boring. I need to sleep. I have learned 
nothing new. The problem nowadays is that we are only dealing with paperwork. 80% is 
paperwork. We loose touch with implementation. I have two hard discs full of literature 
and documents. 
 
Later, when I visited him at his office at the Ministry of Environment and I inquired about his 
take on climate change, he gave me documents. Then he brought me to one of his colleagues 
who “had more technical knowledge in the field”, who in turn, also gave me documents. All 
these documents, in turn, referred again to more documents. 
 
Following people, papers, policies, protocols and practices 
 
And so I followed the trails of papers and people – held together by certain practices and 
protocols, and enacted into policies – “through which people become subjects of, as well as 
subjects to, global development” (Mosse 2005: 2), or more specifically, to Adaptation.43 In 
tracking these trails I interviewed different key translators who all formed part of different 
translation networks, but at times also came together in contested arenas that I have adopted as 
“translation zones” (see below). Nevertheless, it was extremely difficult – if not impossible – to 
gain access to officials that worked for the Tanzanian government in the field of climate change. 
                                                             
43 It was much more difficult to trace money, as this was among those sensitive topics that people did not 
like to talk about, especially after a corruption scandal in relation to REDD+ funding came to the fore. 
Fortunately, other researchers have done this job and their research results from tracking climate change 
finances in Tanzania can be read in the following reports: “Climate Finance Tracking Study for 
Agriculture and Livestock Sector Ministries in Tanzania 2009/10 – 2013/14”, Moshi et al. 2015. And also: 
“Tanzania National Climate Change Finance Analysis”, Yanda et al. 2013. 
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Particularly the official climate-change negotiators (said that they) never had time.44 Yet, I met 
them on several international conferences and at times got the chance to chat with them only 
briefly. Moreover, by attending these meetings I got an impression of the ways in which they 
intended to represent the government of Tanzania at the international stage, and of how their 
rationales changed once they were back in the office in Tanzania.45 Another advantage of 
attending conferences and workshop was that often the same people and organizations 
participated, which gave me an idea of an emergent “climate-change community”. It was much 
easier for me to follow representatives of civil society organizations (broadly, NGOs and 
advocacy sector), who were generally open and willing to talk. Drawing on the literature from the 
ethnography of development aid, these translators or carriers of travelling ideas can be called 
“development brokers” (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Lewis & Mosse 2006).46 Bierschenk and others 
have categorized this group, who serve as intermediaries between “donors” and potential 
“beneficiaries” of aid, as “a new social category” in Africa (as well as in other developing 
nations). The emergence of this social category has to be placed in the context of the wider 
development landscape that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, which marked 
the transition from colonial “mise en valeur” to development aid in the form of “social and 
economic development”, and has become a prevalent reality in many African countries 
(Bierschenk et al. 2002: 2-3). According to the authors, development brokers are:  
 
[…] The social actors implanted in a local arena (in whose politics they are indirectly 
involved) and who serve as intermediaries who drain off […] external resources in the 
form of development aid. […] They are supposed to represent the local populations, 
express its [sic] “needs” to the structures in charge of aid and to external financiers 
(Bierschenk et al. 2002: 4). 
 
Even though the authors refer to the comprehensive field of development aid, we can extend the 
notion of brokers to the more specific “Adaptation brokers”, for these are the social actors who 
occupy exactly the same positions, as they form part of the fragmented politics in a postcolonial 
state. Furthermore, there are many good reasons to approach Adaptation to Climate Change as a 
new form of development aid (Cannon & Müller-Mahn 2010). Particularly in the case of 
                                                             
44 One reason for this inaccessibility could be a general research fatigue that seems to be currently hunting 
Tanzania. I was told that the number of researchers has increased over the years, which is also why the 
procedure to gain a research permit is nowadays increasingly complicated. 
45 This can also be understood as a change from what Rottenburg has called a “metacode”, to a “cultural 
code” (Rottenburg 2005). 
46 Other authors have called these brokers who are caught in between different worlds, norms and 
infrastructures “transnational agents”, which can refer to a social movement or an individual “norm 
entrepreneur” (Acharya 2004); “translators” (Merry 2006; Lewis & Mosse 2006); “mediators” (Behrends et 
al. 2014); or “travel agents” (Czarniawska & Sévon 2005: 11). 
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Tanzania where Adaptation is decentralized and channelled by means of a “multi-sectoral 
approach” (URT 2007), it is for a considerable part embedded in the existing field of 
development cooperation. The key point is that brokers operate at the interface between the 
international world of development aid and local realities. One can imagine that in order to 
navigate successfully between these distinct worlds, they have to be masters in mediation and role 
ambivalence (Rottenburg 2009 in Bierschenk 2014: 80), as they have to bridge and translate 
different norms, interests and epistemologies into both directions. It is important to note that 
these brokers are not just passive executors of the “logic of dependence”, but are rather key 
actors in “the irresistible hunt” to carry out projects in and around African villages (Bierschenk et 
al. 2002: 4).  
 
As such, and crucially, it will become clear that paying attention to these translators allows for 
understanding the ways in which local actors play out strategies and evoke certain rhetorics that 
seek to establish a delicate balance between serving their own interests (and the beneficiaries’), 
while similarly meeting the requirements that are set by the donors. In this sense, it forecloses 
some of the critique expressed towards deconstructivist approaches of development that offer a 
merely “diabolic image” of the development world, and view development solely as a hegemonic, 
Western discourse to maintain dominance over the “rest”.47 As Mosse and Lewis (2006) rightfully 
point out, such “ideological deconstructivism” (Olivier de Sardan 2005, in Mosse & Lewis 2006: 4) 
does not pay sufficient attention to inconsistencies and uncertainties in this field. For instance, it 
fails to notice collaboration and complicity of marginal actors and institutions in development 
who employ their own strategies, as well as the beneficiaries who understand and manipulate the 
rules and rewards of aid. In brief, it is a perspective that demotes local actors’ agency, and fails to 
understand the complexity and social life of projects, as well as the way they aer lived through by 
development actors (Mosse 2004, in Mosse & Lewis 2006: 4). In line with the authors, I take a 
non-normative and empirical approach towards understanding the translation practices of 
Adaptation. Moreover, even though I am not abandoning a deconstructivist view, the analysis of 
the social life of Adaptation should be understood in a methodological rather than an ideological 
way (Olivier de Sardan 2004, in Mosse & Lewis 2006: 5).48 In other words, I try to approach the 
                                                             
47 The authors distinguish three modes of anthropological engagement with development. The first is 
instrumental (as carried out by applied researchers or consultants); the second is populist (celebrating 
indigenous knowledge and denigrating global science and top-down technology transfer); the third has 
been the critical, poststructuralist, or deconstructive analysis. This latter perspective has been informed by 
Foucault’s work and analyzes development as “discourse”, as a system of knowledge, practices, 
technologies and power relationships that orders and limits action (Mosse & Lewis 2006: 2-4). 
48 While building upon the ethnography of “brokerage” as developed by Bierschenk et al., Mosse and 
Lewis complement their actor-oriented approach with the notion of translation, as employed by Latour 
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translation practices and the rationale underpinning them through the eyes of all the actors 
involved. Finally, in order to study the actors’ strategies and their relationships, I have focussed 
on the range of literary inscriptions, and the discourses and narratives that buttress and sustain 
them.  
 
The field as translation zones 
 
Considering the manifold concepts that have emerged over the past years to make sense of the 
dissemination of global models and all sorts of hybrid forms, I deem it necessary to explore the 
analytical novelty, as well as the methodological merits and pitfalls, of employing a travelling idea. 
To begin with, and as will be laid bare in this chapter, despite the feeling of being everywhere (or 
Nowhere); the strength of employing the notion of a travelling idea as an analytical concept – and 
its tailored method of “following” – lies in grasping those moments and practices where ties are 
established, connections forged, assemblages (re)configured, and where meanings and 
translations are contested (the Now Here).49 It contributes to the study of how ideas and things 
move, and how meaning is produced and altered in idiosyncratic ways across a distance. Indeed it 
shines light onto how things come into being. It is during these moments of encounter between 
different actors and worlds in which friction occurs (Tsing 2005), struggles are played out or 
silenced before its meaning is temporarily congealed, gains hegemonic momentum, and travels 
further to live life anew. Put otherwise, it enables us to gain insight into the rather contingent 
processes of translation that occur when ideas travel, for they are not neutrally moving across a 
landscape – ready to be unpacked in those places where they are ultimately intended to arrive – 
but are rather actively remaking it (on mobile policies, see Peck and Theodore 2010: 170). This 
approach allows us furthermore to understand the travelling idea of Adaptation not as a 
unidirectional journey from the “global” to the “local” or from North to South, but rather as the 
fruit of a continuous coproduction – a narrative in the making – between highly interdependent 
and multiple constituencies. So by conceiving of the idea’s trajectories as our empirical object, 
which by its mere travelling establishes ties and forms alliances, it follows that our analytical focus 
has shifted from studying structure to studying practices of making things hold together (Marcus 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and others in ANT. So their social theory differs in the sense that in the ethnography of aid by Bierschenk 
and others, the brokers are considered to be part of, or “by-products” of, an a priori structure of the 
“development configuration”. Yet, Mosse and Lewis rather take their role as performative and always as 
the result of translating interests (Mosse & Lewis 2006: 13). It may be clear by now that this is in line with 
my own position; see also the next section on translation zones.  
49 An obvious comparison is made with “situational analysis” as developed by Max Gluckman and the 
Manchester School. I come back to this comparison in the following pages. 
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1995; Behrends et al. 2014: 10). Furthermore, this research seeks to do justice to the complexity 
of emergent global interlinkages that are brought into being by the idea of Adaptation to Climate 
Change. Yet I have similarly attempted to remain faithful to ethnography’s main tenet of 
longevity by capturing the idiosyncrasies of daily life in a Maasai village, where the idea of 
Adaptation is ultimately supposed to be received. Here is a fragment from an ordinary day of 
herding cows: 
 
It was an exhausting but pleasant day. I joined Leboi with herding cattle. I carried three 
litres of water and some bread, and in order to cope with the heat I had to drink 
continuously. It struck me that throughout the day Leboi did not drink a single drop of 
water. He told me that his breakfast (a litre of milk) was sufficient to support him until 
dinner. Around noon we sought refuge under the shadow of a tree. It was one of those 
trees where the phone signal worked, so Leboi climbed up the tree and made some calls. 
Then he fell asleep under the tree, while his herd grazed on. When he woke up it took 
him a split of a second to figure out where his cows had gone to and he ran after them. 
With extraordinary speed he disappeared out of sight, and within some minutes I received 
a phone call that he had found his herd back. When we were reunited I asked him 
whether it was he herding the cows, or the cows herding him. He explained that during 
the rainy season the cows might take the lead, for there is sufficient grass and water (with 
well-known restrictions that are under strict social control). But during the dry season the 
herders have to take the lead, for this period requires careful land-use planning. While 
walking I gained insight into the relationship between herders and their herd, the strength 
it requires, human- environment relations, land-use planning, social control etc. In brief, I 
gained an insight into their day-to-day lives that one only acquires by “being there”. 
 
To make things more concrete, I have identified three interrelated translation zones in tracing the 
translation chain of adaptation from global platforms all the way to Northern Tanzania. Political 
geographer Andrew Barry (2013) has introduced the concept of a “translation zone” in the field 
of international relations as a way to attend to those instances where translation turns out to be 
difficult (Apter 2006, in: Barry 2013: 4).50 Barry draws our attention to the politicized borders of 
translation, to untranslatability, and to the possibility of resistance, for it corrects an earlier 
erroneous assumption of actor-network theory, that the hybrid actor-networked world was 
understood as a world without boundaries or structural inequalities in resources in which all 
translations were in principle possible. Yet, the field of international relations can be marked by 
contestations, ambiguity and “enduring blockages” (ibid). First, there where the Adaptation to 
                                                             
50 Barry has borrowed the term translation zone from literary theorist Emily Apter (2006). By making use 
of the metaphor of international conflict and language wars in the aftermath of 9/11, with the term 
translation zone Apter envisaged “a broad intellectual topography that is neither the property of a single 
nation, nor an amorphous condition associated with postnationalism, but rather a zone of critical 
engagement that connects the “l” and the “n” of transLation and transNation” (Apter 2006: 5).  
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Climate Change paradigm is “talked into existence” before it sets on its journey to travel all 
around the world (the international climate change negotiations): Let us call it “upstream”. 
Secondly, I have paid attention to the end of the translation chain, or the “receiving context” 
(Terrat village). Let’s call it “downstream”. And thirdly, I have interrogated the so-called 
interstitial spaces, which is neither there where the idea originated nor where it is supposed to be 
implemented (Rottenburg 2009: xiv) and can be found somewhere “in-between” (e.g. NGOs and 
international advocacy organizations etc.).  
 
We can think of this field as a riverbed that channels the stream. It is important to note that 
global ideas travel up and down all the time and that there is perhaps not a clear-cut direction. 
Yet, the flow of a river is an apt metaphor for describing the general movement of the idea of 
Adaptation, for I believe that it would be a mistake to think that there is no direction at all. There 
is clearly a discernable “upstream” where the idea accumulates volume and gains sufficient power 
(expertise, money and political will) before disseminating in different directions. The general 
direction Adaptation takes is to some extent predictable (just like a river’s stream), for it can be 
traced back to historically produced unequal power relations between the Global North and 
South. As such, the river’s stream symbolizes the historical debt of the disproportionate emission 
of greenhouse gases by the industrialized countries, expressed in a tangible financial flow to 
compensate those countries that are vulnerable to climate change (with the greatest emphasis on 
the Global South). In other words, the river flow that is branched off along the stream in endless 
bifurcations constitutes by and large a new development rationale that shapes the new landscape 
of “The Will to Adapt” (see next chapter).51 It may be superfluous to mention that a researcher can 
never follow the full trajectories of the travelling idea of Adaptation, for its connections are 
endless, so we have to limit ourselves in trying to grasp the most prominent contours that came 
to the fore during fieldwork. 
 
Nevertheless, the chronological order of analysis has been much more messy and at times prone 
to serendipity. But in principle I worked as follows: I took the village as my “base camp”, and 
                                                             
51 “The Will to Adapt” refers to Tania Li’s “The Will to Improve”, which builds upon Michel Foucault’s 
notion of “The Will to Govern”. As Li explains, “The Will to Improve” is the development rationality 
shared by many partners who operate as trustees, and whose aim is to enhance and direct the capacity for 
action of others. Their intentions are benevolent, even utopian as they wish to make the world of others 
better than it is (Li 2007: 4-5). This idea of improving populations falls under Foucault’s wide use of the 
notion of “government”, which he understood as “the conduct of conduct”. He proposed that 
“governmental rationality”, or “governmentality”, should be understood as the attempt to govern and 
condition people’s behaviour through a whole set of calculated means. According to Foucault, 
government was not so much about imposing laws on men, but rather a question of disposing things, to 
employ tactics rather than laws, or even use laws as tactics (Foucault 1991: 95).   
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stayed there as long as possible, only to leave when there was a climate-change-related activity, or 
a meeting somewhere, or on a more mundane level, when I needed to buy vegetables at the 
market in Arusha. Some of the climate-change conferences could not always easily be planned in 
advance.52 For instance, while being in the village I could not always be aware of all the climate-
change-related activities and meetings that were going on, so it happened that I had to leave the 
village unexpectedly and jump on a bus, a motorbike, a car, a taxi, or an aeroplane in order to 
arrive on time. One can perhaps imagine that the challenge of such a mobile approach lies mainly 
in its practical nature, as the road from the mud hut in Maasailand to these air-conditioned 
venues was often long, exhausting and expensive.53 In order to participate in the international 
high-profile meetings of the UNFCCC (Conference of the Parties), I had to fly to Durban 
(COP17 in 2012) and Doha (COP18 in 2013) where I immersed myself fully in two weeks of 
exhausting and highly technical talk. Other influential policy meetings took place in Arusha, Dar 
es Salaam or other places in Tanzania. For example, I attended the yearly African Ministerial 
Conference of the Environment (AMCEN) meeting that was hosted by the Tanzanian 
Government in Arusha in 2013, where African delegates prepared for their position during the 
conference in Doha that would take place a few weeks later. After Doha, I attended workshops 
in Tanzania in which policies (elaborated through endless speech acts and inscribed in 
documents) were further developed that had been drafted at the international level. In this sense, 
at times, I was able to literally follow the generative path of the idea of Adaptation and the ways 
in which it materialized.  
 
In other instances the trajectory appeared more abstract when I tried to witness the idea’s 
inception in new institutional surroundings, for example when I simply attended climate-change 
meetings that had no traceable prior referent. Because Adaptation is in fashion, it is just a matter 
of time before different actors jump on the bandwagon. Yet, the idea does not fall from the sky, 
and usually there is an international call for projects, or texts to which organizations will refer 
before they begin drafting their own documents, texts, and proposals, and build new 
heterogeneous networks. Building upon Foucault’s notion of a “governmental rationality” 
(Foucault 1991), Li (2007) has demonstrated that calculated programs of intervention are not 
                                                             
52 For the international conferences complex processes are demanded in order to get accreditation. Over 
the years this process has become increasingly difficult due to the overwhelming amount of people who 
are willing to partake in these meetings. One needs to affiliate with an accredited organisation, which in 
turn only has a limited amount of participation ‘sloths’.  
53 As such, I see these very practical challenges as inherent in research that was designed to follow a 
travelling idea across remote distances, which similarly can be taken as an invitation to future, more 
collaborative ethnographic approaches in which the skills of different researchers can be bundled. 
 
 77 
invented out of nothing, but are traversed by the will to improve and are seldom the product of a 
singular intention. Such programs are more often “pulled together from an existing repertoire, a 
matter of habit, accretion and bricolage” (Li 2007: 6). In other words, as much as Adaptation 
draws upon a wider (and older) utopian field of the will to improve, once picked up, it will be 
situated in already existing organizational structures, vocabularies, repertoires and modes of 
conduct. What follows from this is that a genealogy of older travelling ideas, and historical 
contextualization of the webs within which the travelling becomes embedded, enriches our 
understanding. 
 
Now Here & Situational Analysis 
 
The first observable step towards bringing Climate Change Adaptation into being usually begins 
with the organizing of a meeting. These gatherings are those “Now Here” situations in which 
regional NGOs in northern Tanzania decided that they also need “to do something about climate 
change adaptation”. The regional meetings that were organized by NGOs and which dealt with 
pastoralism in general or Maasai in particular took place in and around Arusha and were fairly 
easy to gain access to. In the course of my stay in Tanzania, sensitization workshops and 
conferences about Adaptation mushroomed. The meetings varied between expert meetings 
(knowledge accumulation and exchange), workshops in which several stakeholders took part 
(NGO workers, policy makers, government officials and grassroots communities), or 
sensitization workshops that were solely aimed at informing the local population about “this 
thing called climate change”. I tried to attend as many of these workshops as possible, and 
described in meticulous detail everything that was being said and done. In many ways, attending 
and observing these events – including the international mass conferences – bears similarities to 
Gluckman’s analysis of the opening of a bridge, which later came to be known as “situational 
analysis” (Gluckman 1958; van Velsen 1967). He demonstrated that by the detailed description of 
social situations (i.e. complex micro-social events) as a starting point for analysis, one could 
abstract the social structure, relationships, and institutions of that particular society.  
 
For example, by describing in close detail everything that happened during the opening of a 
bridge in “Modern Zululand”, he excavated the power structures that were prevalent at that 
particular time and place.54 He described in exact and rich ethnographic fashion how he got there 
                                                             
54 The bridge was planned by European engineers, built by Zulu workers who had also paid taxes for it, 
and would be used by a European magistrate to rule over a Zulu community, and by Zulu women to 
attend a European hospital; it was opened by European officials and a Zulu Regent in a ceremony that 
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and with whom, who opened the bridge, who funded it, who greeted whom, where everybody 
was sitting, why the bridge was built, its historical context, who was invited by whom, what was 
being said by whom, and people’s clothes, codes, rituals, behaviour, singing, silencing and so on. 
Crucially, the fact that Europeans and Zulu were cooperating in the celebration of the bridge 
together meant that they formed a community with specific modes of behaviour, which were 
directly observable.55 Gluckman called these “social situations”, for he analysed them in their 
relationship with other situations in the social system of Zululand. He defined (the analysis of) a 
social situation:  
 
A social situation is thus the behaviour on some occasion of members of a community as 
such, analysed and compared with their behaviour on other occasions, so that the analysis 
reveals the underlying system of relationships between the social structure of the 
community, the parts of the social structure, the physical environment, and the 
physiological life of the community’s members (Gluckman 1958: 9). 
 
So it was the centrepiece of a bridge that brought people into association with one another, 
which enabled Gluckman to unravel several and complex layers of interaction. On closer 
inspection we learn that what Gluckman methodologically proposed – starting an analysis from 
an event such as the opening of a bridge – was indeed already (even though somewhat indirectly) 
a detailed analysis of human and non-human networks; perhaps even some sort of material 
semiotics avant la lettre. Whereas some elementary principles on the origins of organization differ, 
such as Gluckman’s assumption of an a priori social system within which people operate, as 
opposed to material semiotics’ conviction that this is rather the effect of ongoing practices and 
interactions, my concern here is only methodological. And as empirically grounded approaches I 
draw on some of these valuable and shared characteristics. In brief, the detailed ethnographic 
descriptions of the social “Now Here” situations have ultimately enabled me to gain insight into 
Adaptation’s journey, and into some of the intricate processes that are entailed by translating 
Adaptation. We can now finally turn to an exploration of the concepts “travelling” and 
“translation”. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
was attended by both Europeans and Zulu, whose actions could be historically derived from their 
respective culture, and must partly be related to a system of European-Zulu relations etc. (Gluckman 
1958: 10).  
55 Of course, this always occurred in segregated ways and on unequal terms; however as Gluckman noted, 
enforced separation is also a form of association (Gluckman 1958: 12). 
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To Translate is to Travel and to Transform 
 
What do a climate model, the front cover picture of this book, the daily weather forecast, an 
NGO officer talking to the Maasai about Adaptation to Climate Change, a Maasai giving account 
to changing patterns of rainfall, Al Gore’s movie “An Inconvenient Truth”, a scientific journal 
article on increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide; a 
newspaper item about melting glaciers, the depiction of an ice bear holding onto a disappearing 
ice sheet, and an anthropologist writing about it all have in common? They are all acts of 
translation. The basic aim or ideological orientation of these translations might differ, for 
example, the one evoking emotions by employing “sensational forms” (Meyer 2011) – such as a 
drifting iconic ice bear – in order to spark activism, while the other seeks to achieve an accurate 
representation of reality in the name of science. In every instance an abstract climatic 
phenomenon or atmospheric materiality is mediated and rendered understandable from one 
actor, medium or audience to another. And it involves people. As Latour succinctly put it: 
 
The spread and time of anything – claims, orders, artefacts, goods – is in the hands of 
people; each of these people may act in different ways, letting the token drop, modifying 
it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it (Latour 1986: 267). 
 
This process is not only bound to the translation of complicated jargon by experts to lay people, 
or to NGO workers explaining climate change to indigenous people, but extends to the rather 
closed circles of epistemic communities as well. In this sense, whatever the form in which it is 
cast, the direction it travels to or its ideological intention, “Climate change communication is 
ultimately an issue of translation” (Rudiak-Gould 2012: 46). Also, Adaptation’s journey is driven 
by continuous acts of translation. And, we can add another layer of translation to this intractable 
translation chain: the anthropologist writing about it. Not only in this chapter, but also 
throughout this manuscript I intend to reflect on my translation of translations (sometimes 
indirectly), for we should not forget that our own stories further weave webs and enact realities 
that are never innocent (Haraway 2004). 
 
Much can be said about the comprehensive concept of translation, for it has played an equivocal 
role within the history of anthropology, linguistics and philosophy, and it has reoccurred in a 
variety of shapes in the wake of the “ontological turn” (Hanks & Severi 2014), as well as with the 
development of science and technology studies. In this work I limit myself to two forms of 
translation. Firstly, as already touched upon, it is understood as a general operation – a way of 
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exercising power (Callon and Latour 1981) – in which both the translator and what is translated 
are transformed (Serres 1982 in: Czarniawska and Sévon 2005: 7). The second form of translation 
that I employ attends to the “ontological politics” entailed by the fascinating linguistic journey 
that the term climate change undergoes from English into Swahili into Maa. While this first 
approach to translation features throughout all the chapters, the second linguistic focus will 
receive less, but more specific, attention in chapter six. In the following I shall flesh out some of 
the elementary principles of translation that will prove fruitful for my overall analysis. 
 
If we take a look at Translation’s etymology and meaning, two essential features spring to mind. 
Stemming from Latin translationem it refers to “a carrying across, removal, transporting; transfer of 
meaning”.56 And as the participial stem of transferre57, its first signification is: “Transference; 
removal or conveyance from one person, place, or condition to another” (OED). Thus first of 
all, translation always involves transformation and motion. What follows is that there is no such 
thing as a perfect translation (otherwise there would be no translation necessary at all), an 
observation and challenge that is very well known to linguistics. Secondly, and crucial to my 
analysis, is the fact that translation connects formerly disparate phenomena, forging a passage 
between two domains, or establishes communication (Serres 1982, in Brown 2002: 5).58 Simply 
put, translation connects what was separate before. By assuming the existence of an endless 
number of realities, the notion of translation as introduced by Serres (and after him employed by 
many others), is a way to circumvent the ancient controversy about the question of whether there 
is only one reality, or many equivalent realities instead (Rottenburg 2005: 259). 
 
How to make sense of shifting rationalities? 
 
Throughout my fieldwork I witnessed several times that an informant radically shifted 
perspective once he or she was out of the public debate or “stage”. An important question 
therefore that I have been grappling with has been how to make sense of these shifting 
rationalities? Put otherwise, why would a person say something in a particular public context, 
while radically opposing this view in another (such as during an interview with me)? Perhaps part 
                                                             
56 Online Etymology Dictionary, which should not be confused with the Oxford English Dictionary that 
shares the same acronym. 
57 Transfer is in turn defined as: “To convey or take from one place, person, etc. to another; to transmit, 
transport; to give or hand over from one another” (Oxford English Dictionary). 
58 The work of social scientist Michel Serres – and particularly his concept of translation – has been of 
profound influence to Science and Technology Studies, since Callon (1980) and Latour (1986) have picked 
it up and placed it at the heart of ANT (see Brown 2002; Czarniawska and Sévon 2005). 
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of the answer can be found in “opportunism”, since people often simply say what suits their 
interest best, resulting in a different account across different contexts. Yet, the question remains 
then how or why did they get into this conflicting situation to begin with? As will be elaborated 
below, on a philosophical level Rottenburg provides us with some helpful insights. For a 
sociologically grounded understanding, I first turn to Goffman and to the metaphor of a theatre 
stage. I am aware that the use of a theatre metaphor bears the risk of getting carried away by 
discussions about “backstage” and “on-stage”, what is scripted or non-scripted, or about notions 
of  “authenticity” as opposed to acting. It is not my intention to drive the metaphor this far, but 
it serves first of all as a way of organizing and bringing into being one cohesive narrative out of a 
mesmerizing complex of narratives that I collected in the field. Metaphors are in the first place 
foundational communicating devices that are at the heart of how we give meaning to the world. 
In order to circumvent some of the abovementioned technical debates, I build my theatre 
metaphor on the idea that there is no clear distinction between on-stage and backstage in the 
sense of what is “unreal” (transformed, staged, fanciful, make-believe) or “real” (everyday life); 
but as Goffman proposed in his Frame Analysis, one must rather speak of “multiple realities” 
(Goffman 1974: 3-5).59  
 
Being part of the official delegation of the Tanzanian government, Leon featured prominently through all 
the presentations given at the international negotiations. Tanzania positioned itself as a REDD+ 
pioneer, which means that tree planting is seen as an effective strategy to mitigate climate change. It is also 
presented as a fair economic strategy, for the developed countries pay the Global South for the planting of 
trees. Once back in Tanzania, I finally managed to interview Leon. When I asked him about his own 
opinion about REDD+, he replied: “REDD+ is neo-colonialism in its purest form. You are a 
researcher, you will see it with your own eyes: our people do not benefit from tree-planting. What they need 
is food, not trees”.  
 
In the end social life is engrained with performativity and ever-changing roles, sometimes more 
and sometimes less scripted but always governed by certain rules of conduct, and organized 
around and sustained by a set of ritualized practices. Put in the words of Robert Ezra Park 
                                                             
59 Goffman follows here a tradition established by William James, who, instead of asking “what reality is” 
gave it a phenomenological twist and asked: under what circumstances do we think things are real? This theme 
was taken up by Albert Schutz in 1945 who introduced the term “multiple realities”, and was later taken 
up again by Harold Garfinkel, who further looked for rules that allow us to generate a “world” of a given 
kind. Goffman in turn questioned whether one can know how many different worlds there actually are, 
and whether everyday life can be seen as “but one rule-produced plain of being”. He stressed the 
methodological hindrance that “the announcement of constitutive rules seems an open-ended game that 
any number can play forever”. It is in this context that he then pointed to the structural similarities 
between everyday life and the various “worlds” of make-believe, but that there is no way of knowing how 
this relationship should modify our view of day-to-day life (Goffman 1974: 3-6).  
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(1950): “It is probably no mere historical accident that the word person, in its first meaning, is a 
mask. It is rather a recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more or less 
consciously, playing a role… It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that 
we know ourselves” (Park in Goffman 1959: 19).60 In order to account for the multiple realities 
and shifting roles of actors, it is worth mentioning that beyond the focus on climate change 
events, performativity and “stages”, I have also followed actors to other localities where their role 
– and their account of climate change – transformed. To understand narratives and human 
actions it does not really matter whether things are supposedly staged or not; they exist – are thus 
observable – and form part and parcel of social life. As Czarniawska has stated in line with 
Goffman: “what appears as “untransformed reality” in one context is a transformed reality in 
another context – it is, after all, turtles all the way down. That is why “theatre” is a good 
metaphor of life and not a contrasting notion” (Czarniawska 1997: 30). 
 
Another instance that caught my eye was of a different nature. The Emir of Qatar, who hosted the 
COP18, had promised to tackle climate change through a range of technological and scientific innovations 
and by investing in renewable energy; a position that he explicitly and repeatedly made clear during the 
negotiations. At the same time, I came across an article in a local newspaper (outside the venue) in which 
the Emir was shown on a picture together with religious leaders of Qatar, performing a countrywide rain 
prayer. 
  
If we think of Adaptation as an idea that is drafted “upstream”, it makes a lot of sense to assume 
that in the long journey down the stream it not only shapes, and is also shaped by, an endless 
number of different realities, while still maintaining a certain consistency or lifeblood – at least as 
long as we can still speak of it as Adaptation. In other words, drawing on Rottenburg’s work, in 
order for the model or idea of Adaptation to move across space and be communicable, it needs 
to be recognized as Adaptation to begin with. Rottenburg has framed this shared language, which 
is the indispensable driving force for this idea to be translated, as a metacode. Conversely, this 
assumption that presupposes the existence of one describable reality suggests that all the other 
codes are particular cultural codes. Instead of trying to solve the somewhat paralyzing question 
about the nature of reality or realities, Rottenburg takes the issue to an analytically more fruitful 
and interesting level, and shines light on the question of how and under what conditions people 
shift from a metacode to a cultural code (Rottenburg 2009 [2002], 2005). 
 
                                                             
60 In Classical Latin the word persōna referred to a mask used by a player, or a character in a play, a 
dramatic role, the part played by a person in life, individual personality, role, position, personage, human 
being in general etc. (Oxford English Dictionary). 
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During the COP17 in Durban, one of the largest climate change protest marches in history took place to 
strive for “climate justice”. It was a truly impressive and massive event, and driven by curiosity I took part 
in the march. Taking a closer look at all the banners, quotes, t-shirts, propaganda and people that 
“walked and shouted along” this social event appeared to be a mesmerizing potpourri of activists who all 
had their own agenda, and used climate change as a platform to raise their voices. For example, the 
Durban “waste pickers club” was telling: wearing green outfits they were carrying banners bearing on the 
front the text: “Fight for Climate Change”; while on the rear the banners were covered with quotes such 
as: “Malema for president”; or “Malema until Jesus comes back”. 
 
This navigation between a metacode and cultural code becomes particularly interesting in the 
context of the international negotiations, or any other event where people gather in the name of 
climate change. It is under the denominator of a metacode that can be (tremendously simplified) 
framed as: “climate change is a threat to humanity that urgently needs to be tackled” that brings 
thousands of people together at the UNFCCC conferences. To be able to communicate the 
participants need to agree on this metacode so that the negotiations can take place, after which 
people take it home and start translating it into a cultural code. Moreover, if one looks more 
closely, under the negotiation-surface into all the niches that are present at such mega events, one 
manages to distil manifold cultural codes and the occurrence of continuous shifting between the 
meta- and cultural code. As we shall see throughout the following chapters, the concept of 
translation seeks to examine whatever happens in this process. 
 
After attending one of the technical negotiation sessions, my colleague and I talked to a Ugandan delegate. 
We inquired about his take on the ongoing negotiations of the Nationals Adaptation Plans (NAPs), 
and the continuous attempt of the OECD countries to delay the money that was supposed to assist the 
developing countries. He replied: “Let Them (the OECD countries) pay for their sins, because they have 
caused all this”. I took his answer to be an explicit moment of unearthing the shift to a cultural code, in 
which morality took centre stage. It became clear that one could only scrape off the thick surface of 
technical talk, which revealed the cultural code, outside the negotiation room. 
Also the story of Eric, a civil society representative and young climate change activist, reveals the somewhat 
hidden shifts from the metacode to a cultural code. Because the Tanzanian group was underrepresented 
during one session they had asked him to take a part in the session on Tanzania and REDD+. I was 
surprised to see him playing a prominent role in the panel, as I had got to know Eric very well and I 
knew that he did not support many of the views of the government. After the panel we went for lunch and 
I also asked him about his personal take on REDD+. Then he carefully and somewhat secretly (looking 
around if none of his colleagues could see him) took out a book with the title: “No REDD!” Similarly to 
Leon, he figured that REDD was a very bad idea. He explained that this is just a smart and easy way 
for the developed nations to offset their emissions in Africa, while the source of the problem remained 
untouched. 
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What travels, what stays behind and what puts it into motion? 
 
Understood as a general operation, translation implies definition. These definitions depend on 
past translations, and must be inscribed into intermediaries. Hence, Callon has argued that one 
needs to specify the medium or material into which a translation becomes inscribed. In the case 
of climate-change adaptation some of the following intermediaries have crossed my path: 
presentations, group discussions, people, models, graphs, money, stories, pictures, drought-
resistant seeds, erosion measurements, embodied skills, policy prescriptions, movies, radio 
programmes and so on. Whatever the form translation takes, the elementary operation is always 
triangular: there is a translator, something to be translated, and a medium in which it is inscribed 
(Callon 1990: 143). And translation involves transformation of all three. But it changes almost 
everything that is involved in this transference, including the sending site (in case a model travels 
successfully the sender gains in power) as well as the receiving site (where actors will translate and 
interpret it anew). Nevertheless, in this de- and re-territorialization process not everything travels 
along; but some things stay “behind”. In fact, the only thing that is transportable is the objectified 
idea or model and its vehicle. What stay behind are the social and material orders in which the 
idea was enmeshed together with the rationalities that gave life to it, for these are reinvented 
along the way. The extents to which some elements change in the process depend on many 
factors. We can look at the degree of transformation of different elements in the translation 
process as a continuum. If the travelling idea does not impact the receiving site much, we can 
speak of it as appropriation or vernacularization. So we find that one extreme side of the 
translation spectrum is when the travelling object becomes appropriated and all the rest remains 
the same; while on the other extreme side is when the object remains the same and the receiving 
context changes (Behrends et al. 2014: 2-3). 
 
From this basic understanding of translation we can now move on to the essential question of 
what is the driving force behind translation; or, what makes models and ideas move in the first 
place? A very obvious and almost banal answer is: money. Therefore, it is surprising to find 
reflections on the role of money conspicuously absent from the literature on translation and 
travelling ideas (with an exception of Callon’s concept of TENs, and Rottenburg’s work on 
development cooperation, 2009 as mentioned above). Notwithstanding the fact that there is 
certainly more to making ideas travel than this materialist take, it comes perhaps as no surprise 
that it does play an indispensable role in the context of translating Adaptation in relation to 
North-South configurations. And even though it is always there, it is usually hidden, under a thick 
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layer of rhetoric, technical negotiations and moral talk. Thus money is not sufficient to explain 
the whole set of intricate forces and relations that puts the vehicle into motion, for it also needs 
social and material infrastructures to have value and to “work”. Moreover, there are always 
legitimizing narratives needed to hold each other accountable for our actions. As mentioned 
earlier, for ideas to travel they must be translated, which is a process that occurs through their 
being picked up, modifying and interpreting it. It is also a process prone to friction, as Latour and 
Callon have proposed: 
 
By translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of 
persuasion and violence, thanks to which an actor or force takes, or causes to be 
conferred on itself, authority to speak or act on behalf of another act or force (Callon & 
Latour 1981: 279).  
 
While this is an apt description of the process, it does not explain the driving force behind 
translation, because there must be something that prompts people to translate. Callon has 
proposed the idea of a shared desire: 
 
Considered from a very general point of view, this notion [translation] postulates the 
existence of the single field of significations, concerns and interests, the expression of a 
shared desire to arrive at the same result (Callon 1980: 211, in Czarniawska and Sévon 
2005). 
 
However, I believe that we need to go one step even further back and ask: what is it that 
instigates this shared desire to begin with? Czarniawska and Sévon (2005) raise the same question 
and guide us further by introducing the concepts of fashion and imitation. In order to describe 
this process they use the allegory of a vehicle: “Translation is a vehicle, imitation its motor, and 
fashion sits at the wheel” (Czarniawska and Sévon 2005: 7). Perhaps it does not hold for all forms 
of translation or travelling ideas, but if we look at Adaptation, we can easily and meaningfully 
extend the vehicle allegory by adding the missing notion of fuel – as a representation of money – 
that very sticky substance, which is needed by the motor to generate power so that it can imitate. 
Still, the question about what is worth imitating, and what is not remains partly open. The answer 
revolves around the notion of how to deal with “superiority”, and brings us closer to the analytic 
novelty of the travelling idea. Remarkably enough, what we learn from Behrends and her 
colleagues is that the first rival theory of the travelling models concept is rationalization (in the 
Weberian tradition). The idea underpinning rationalization in this sense is that models, which 
increase rationality, will always thrive and beat other models. This approach thus assumes a force 
of superiority inherent to some models as opposed to others, which is a heavy supposition that 
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cannot be found in the travelling models perspective (cf. Behrends et al. 2014: 2). By leaving the 
idea of a higher or “superior” rationality behind, I believe that we must attribute more power to 
the somewhat unpredictable forces that we call contingency. In other words, we simply cannot 
always predict why, how and under which circumstances a model will travel or not. This is 
comforting in so far as we do not need to come up with yet another model in order to analyze 
travelling models. 
 
In order to cope with unpredictability, Czarniawska and Sévon have brought in the notion of 
fashion. Drawing on the work of Tarde (1890/1962), the authors refer to fashion as a collective 
choice among an endless number of tastes, things and ideas; which can thus be understood as an 
ordering principle that seeks to find and create a “time collective” (Sellerberg 1994, in 
Czarniawska and Sévon 2005: 9). Speaking within the context of management, they argue that 
fashion works like an ordering practice that appears to bring some sort of predictability into a 
disorderly and unpredictable future (ibid: 10). Put otherwise, we can see fashion as an ordering 
practice of time. Since it is very difficult, if not impossible, to foresee future fashions or explain what 
forces brought them into being, I believe that we are left with the task of exploring the ways in 
which it prompts people to choose and imitate particular ideas and elements, and how these 
become appropriated by different actors, and why. However, I suggest that the question of how 
fashion itself comes into being can be explained by treating imitation – initially – as its 
antecedent, instead of its consequence alone. It is not only fashion that makes people imitate, but 
also imitation that generates fashion. And then of course the order of things is turned around and 
people also imitate because of fashion, which owes its inherent appeal to the fact that being in 
vogue has the power to enhance a sense of belonging. And this is exactly how travelling ideas 
accumulate power. The more an idea is picked up and translated, the more easily it travels and 
possibly reaches the status of a model or policy. It is important to note that part of the success of 
a widely embraced model is that it becomes stabilized and ultimately black-boxed (Behrends et al. 
2014: 3). For the Global South in general and sub-Saharan Africa in particular the idea of 
Adaptation – as an Adaptation imperative – has to a large degree attained an unchallenged status. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the way in which Adaptation is supposed to be implemented is 
prone to debate, the bare conviction that people have to adapt is not (or is to a much lesser 
extent). However, as we shall see, the further down the stream the idea flows – i.e. when the idea 
leaves policy-making circles and enters Maasailand – the more it seems to be prone to meeting 
forms of resistance. 
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The final step towards understanding why certain ideas are imitated and others are not can 
perhaps best be explained by the notion of an aura, a certain persuasive quality that is at the same 
time convincing yet invisible. But it has nothing to do with rational choice, and rather depends on 
dimensions such as past translations, and on how well the model adapts to the ontological and 
epistemological circumstances of the receiving site (Rottenburg 2005). Moreover, for diverging 
rationalities to accept a metacode, widely accepted categories are needed to make it 
communicable. In addition to rationalization there are two other predecessor concepts from 
which translation and “travelling models” distinguish themselves, in the sense of being an 
explanatory concept for the spread and circulation of ideas and customs. The first one is 
diffusionism and the second one modernization.61 The basic idea underlying diffusionism was that 
certain cultural traits (e.g. languages, religion, objects) spread from cultural centres to peripheries 
through physical contact. By drawing an analogy with a physicalist metaphor (Czarniawska & 
Sévon 2005; see also Rogers 1995), the spread of ideas into outward circles was understood as the 
natural consequence of a concentration of contact in one place that provided the energy for its 
mobility.62 Diffusionism differs from translation and travelling models in the way it seeks to 
explain the moving force, for the latter does not assume a physical necessity to make things move 
but rather interrogates how and why a certain model is picked up as opposed to others. 
Moreover, as also mentioned earlier, there is a different approach to centre and periphery, which 
are considered to be generated by the translation and travelling of the idea itself  (Behrends et al. 
2014: 11). The idea of a centre and periphery is thus again considered to be the outcome of 
translation, and not the cause. Also within modernization theory this centre and periphery 
distinction holds, as it sees the world divided into industrially and economically more advanced 
societies, being a worldwide desired model, which is blindly followed by less developed societies 
(ibid: 13). The concept of a travelling idea does not make such clear a priori assumptions, and 
focuses instead on the contingent processes that occur when things, ideas and objects are 
travelling across a distance, and as such, continuously remake and reorder the world. 
                                                             
61 It should be noted that Behrends et al. 2014 refer to modernization theories as introduced by Rostow 
(1960, that all societies go through the same stages towards modernity) and Huntington (1968, on social 
mobilization and economic development as driving forces behind modernity). Thus the travelling models 
concept differs from this type of modernization thinking, and not from other sophisticated theories of 
modernity such as introduced by Foucault, Adorno, Luhmann and many others (Behrends 2014: 12-13). 
62 According to Rogers, diffusion is a kind of special communication, a message that deals with the spread 
of new ideas. Therefore it always carries a certain uncertainty that leads to social change (Rogers 1995: 6). 
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 89 
Introduction 
 “What we need to talk about when we talk about Adaptation” 
 
My research partner Naini had arranged a meeting with a man “whom I definitely needed to talk 
to”. She insisted on an encounter with him, for she had been told that he was an honourable 
man, widely known among Maasai communities for his efforts to engage broader development 
issues with pastoralism. Moreover, it appeared that he had initiated a project that was dealing 
with climate change adaptation and pastoralism. And so we jumped on her pikipiki and rushed to 
a local restaurant in Arusha town, where, to my great surprise, I came to realize that the man she 
had been referring to was Joseph. Since my arrival in Arusha, a couple of months before the 
public hearing that took place in Dar es Salaam (described in chapter two), all my attempts to get 
in touch with him were to no avail. From the very moment that I had witnessed his appearance 
during the climate change conference he had left an indelible impression with his graceful 
rhetoric, as well as with the persuasive power with which he had pleaded for Leboi’s case and the 
rights of the Maasai at large. When we arrived at the restaurant, Joseph was encircled by a group 
of Maasai men – who were wearing their customary dress and eating nyama choma (roasted meat) – 
while being engaged in lively discussions. Apparently, they had just come back from a conference 
where they had spoken to the government about politics. Upon arrival Naini greeted Joseph 
respectfully by bowing her head, which is a common way of greeting elders among the Maasai, 
and so I followed suit.  
After this first conversation many other fruitful encounters followed, which all the more 
confirmed my impression that I was dealing with a knowledgeable man of great dignity. 
Furthermore, he formed an essential pillar in the way adaptation to climate change projects and 
discourses emerged in the so-called interstitial spaces of northern Tanzania. With years of 
experience as a key actor in this “in-between” arena he had become a skilled broker who 
masterfully navigated between the (often irreconcilable) worlds of global development discourses, 
which have largely informed Tanzania’s national development rationale and the local realities of 
the Maasai pastoralists. While being a Maasai himself, he had also worked for and cooperated 
with several international development organizations as well as Tanzanian CSOs; he was the 
quintessence of the social category that Bierschenk and others have called “development broker”. 
As explicated in chapter three, brokers operate at the interface between the target group on the 
one hand, and the development institutions (or donors) on the other. They do so by representing 
local populations’ interests and translating their needs to the structures of aid and to external 
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financiers (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 4). Our first interview with Joseph was a mesmerizing 
experience, as it not only revealed what it takes to occupy such an intermediate arena, but also 
laid bare the intricate and complex web of relationships – which forms part of the so-called 
“global architecture of aid” (Mosse 2005: 1) – within which these actors operate. In line with 
these authors I demonstrate in this chapter that brokers are far from passive receivers of aid 
within the overall structural logic of dependence, but are rather key players in the active search 
for projects. As such, as is the case within many contemporary African states that can be 
characterized as being “extroverted” (Bayart 1989, in: Bierschenk et al. 2002: 5); after the socialist 
era in Maasailand in northern Tanzania (where the state is rather grudgingly present), brokerage 
too, has indeed come to play an important role in (re-)ordering contemporary local realities. 
Joseph’s account gave proof of the fact that that if one wishes to understand the fate and future 
of the Maasai pastoralists in Tanzania a comprehensive view of transnational ties is needed, as 
well as an understanding of historical processes with a particular emphasis on the way in which 
the nation-state has drafted policies that have been, and continue to be, detrimental to the well-
being of the pastoralists. And, crucially, whatever the form or content of the new discourse – at 
least as far as the Maasai at the grass roots are concerned – one of their greatest anxieties revolves 
around the fear of losing access to and control over land. While sketching this complex picture 
for us, he stipulated his trenchant vision on what we need to talk about when we talk about 
adaptation to climate change for the Maasai pastoralists. He mentioned, almost in one breath: 
multilateral and bilateral aid arrangements, Millenium Development Goals, national poverty 
strategies, the nation-state, sectoral policies, decentralization, UN aspirations, IMF, World Bank, 
privatization and neoliberal discourses and reforms, Ujamaa, capitalism, land alienation, 
powerlessness, culture of silence, drylands, livestock, hybrid breeds, resilience, pastoral livelihood 
systems, mobility, conservation, wildlife, tourism, natural resources, national parks, climate 
change, drought, rain, God, law and policies, adaptive capacity, and science and technology, to 
mention only a few. The complexity and sensibility of the topic of Adaptation for the Maasai 
began to dawn upon me. Here is a fragment of his account: 
Adaptation is when you allow people to adapt to changing circumstances in various ways, 
for example, when you allow pastoralists to move from one place that did not receive 
rainfall to another place that received sufficient rainfall. Or another way is that people sell 
cows during the dry season and buy again during the rainy season; these are all strategies 
carried out by the communities. This is to make sure that their lives will not be greatly 
affected by the effects of climate change; it is to make them resilient to these changes. But 
if you look at the policies in our country, for instance one of the policies is that cows are 
not allowed to walk by foot but must be transported by using lorries. On the other hand, 
the government says we don’t allow a nomadic way of life, which involves the movement 
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of people from one area to another in search for water and pastures. Here the 
government says that: “We don’t allow that because this is the root cause of 
environmental destruction”. So if you prohibit or stop these people from moving to 
different places in search for water and pasture, what do you think will happen? What will 
actually happen is that their cattle and also their economy will collapse, and if this 
happens, you find that the government has once again created many poor people within 
its own country. It increases poverty, and contradicts with the dream of the government 
that by the year 2025 many people should have moved from severe poverty to a better 
life. So this is where the politics are and so our role is to do a lot of research, small, big, to 
show the government: don’t decide this way on policies because you will kill your people! 
Sometimes we are listened to, sometimes we are not. Sometimes our points are taken, 
sometimes our points are refused. It depends on which interests are being addressed. 
By enrolling varying policymakers and arenas Joseph has been one of the driving forces behind 
the emergence of an “Adaptation community”. We are left with the impression that a great part 
of engaging new development discourses rests on a process of “trial and error”. Indeed, as we 
shall see, part of the translation process builds upon social technologies understood as “skilled 
practices” (Haraway 1991, in Behrends et al. 2014: 2). Just like Joseph’s extensive experience of 
more than 25 years in the field of development as a consultant, teacher, trainer, development 
worker and policymaker has most certainly enabled him to skilfully espouse and meaningfully 
translate international discourses that have passed the revue over the years. So too did he push 
this nascent discourse of Adaptation into maturity. Fascinatingly enough, one day Joseph invited 
Naini and me to his house at the outskirts of Arusha. While his house clearly showed all the 
properties of being a “modern” or urban house, he similarly told us about his boma, his herd, his 
family and the strong ties he still maintains with life in the village. In the course of our discussion 
he showed us a book, which was an anthropological study that I knew all too well, and he 
proudly told us that he was the young Maasai man portrayed on the front cover. Without being 
aware of it, I had been talking to and following a man with whom I was already familiar. And I 
realized that though at first sight this seemed a fully serendipitous encounter, on second thought, 
perhaps we could read more into this in terms of ever-ongoing entanglements. It is indeed very 
likely that if I had carried out my research 20 or 30 years ago – on a topic that was in vogue at 
that time, say gender or indigenous rights – I would have stumbled upon the same man (or a 
similar visionary). And the same holds true for the wider network of people, technologies of 
representation and organizations within which Adaptation is being embedded. And who knows 
what battles Joseph will be fighting 10 years from now, and which anthropologist will find this 
work somewhere in a living room in Arusha.  
The question of agency arises here, which does not solely lie in the hands of these key actors, but 
is rather distributed across the wider network that consists of both human and non-human 
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actors. These models, once they are picked up, translated and disseminated, widely gain a certain 
appealing power (just like fashions) and thus agency of their own. Therefore, we can view the 
practice of development as a matter of selecting one of the globally circulating and highly 
esteemed development models, which generally come with specific technologies, which are then 
adapted to a local context (Rottenburg 2009: xxvi-xxvii). Against this background, it is not 
surprising that NGOs’ agendas – in order to meet the ever-changing international standards, 
paradigms, fashions and goals – are regularly relabelled and redesigned as a means to safeguard 
their continuity and to attract donor funds.63 
The Will to Adapt 
In this chapter I wish to bring to life the ways in which Adaption is brought into being in the 
interstitial spaces in northern Tanzania. As already touched upon in chapter three, by interstitial 
space I mean that middle ground between there where global ideas or models take off and their 
local sites of reception and implementation. Each time the idea of Adaptation is translated and 
communicated from one group of actors to another, a new interstitial space emerges. It is this 
space between different understandings and worldviews that provides not only grist for 
contestation, but also serves as a creative ground for novel ideas to take root and flourish. By 
exploring this space as an organizational field where borders are unclear and ideas contested, we 
gain insight into connectivity, and into how they are entangled with global and local orders. In 
this regard, the world of NGOs and CSOs and the brokers that work in the sector of 
development cooperation also operate in interstitial spaces. Considering Joseph’s positioning, it 
may be clear that political economy (and political ecology) will stand alongside my analysis as a 
necessary and overarching critical lens in understanding “what we need to talk about when we 
talk about Adaptation”. Notwithstanding the fact that my account follows Joseph’s traces here 
and there, my intention is not to study brokerage per se, since other excellent ethnographies have 
already been carried out on this topic (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Merry 
2006). Neither is it my aim to contribute to an understanding of how NGOs or CSOs (Civil 
Society Organizations) “work”64, or to contribute to the rich body of development theories that 
also have received widespread attention within anthropology (see e.g. Ferguson 1990; Fisher 
                                                             
63 This process of adaptation by NGOs to meet foreign standards and agendas has been termed “co-
optation” by Fisher (1997). It is a common critique of development aid, for it has led to an overreliance 
on donors and their agendas. 
64 For an analysis that gives insight into the ways in which aid contributes to the maintenance of a regime 
of global inequality, see the work of Gould (2005), who draws both on his own ethnographic work carried 
out in Tanzania as well as on comparative case studies (Gould 2005). 
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1997; Li 2007; Escobar 1995; Tsing 2005).65 I also do not intend to condemn, or to come up with 
guidelines or prescriptions for how people should adapt.  
Instead, I align with Tania Li, who sees her predicament as an anthropologist as diagnostic. In her 
seminal book “The Will to Improve” (2007), in classic anthropological fashion, Li aims to “make 
improvement strange” as a way to probe the inherent peculiarities and effects (Li 2007: 3). In a 
similar mode, I attempt to “make adaptation strange” by bringing to the fore those dissenting 
voices that generally find no resonance on global platforms, or get silenced and black-boxed all 
along the way. I found it striking to observe that the fiercest opposition to this new discourse on 
Adaptation came from the grassroots. Is it not paradoxical, to say the least, that the most 
resistance to this will to Adapt comes from the people whom it seeks to aid? Following Li, this 
diagnostic stance can be seen as a way to prompt questions about what ways of thinking are 
required to “translate messy conjunctures, with all the processes that run through them, into 
linear narratives of problems, interventions and beneficial results” (Li 2007: 4). This chapter seeks 
to flesh out what happens at the very moments in which the idea of Adaptation is translated, 
storied, picked up, confronted, contested, rejected, re-crafted and endowed with meaning, before 
it sets foot at the end of the translation chain (which is the focus of chapter six and eight). In 
order to understand what happens in the interstitial spaces it will indeed prove fruitful to analyze 
the brokers and mediators, like Joseph, who translate formal ideas and models into 
understandable and meaningful concepts. However, by zooming in on this process and 
employing a microscopic analysis of translation, we find that the (discursive) practices of 
mediators constitute only a part of the picture. The interstitial space of Adaptation is caught in 
between the irreconcilable perspectives of the Maasai herders, who continue to fear land 
alienation on the one hand: 
[…] While efforts to mitigate effects of climate change are welcome, it is also important 
for pastoralists to stay alert because some people, parties or institutions may use the issue 
of global warming as an excuse to evict cattle keepers, hunters and gatherers and other 
minority groups from their native lands in the name of environmental conservation. 
- Pastoralist representative, during a meeting to “push for climate change” 
And the stubborn “wisdom” about the Maasai as “environmental destroyers” that is propounded 
by both the media as well as the national government on the other: 
                                                             
65 As it is not my intention to criticize development organizations or how they work, inspired by 
Rottenburg, I have decided to make both the organizations and the individuals working for them 
anonymous in order to draw attention away from individual responsibility and towards the more structural 
properties that are inherent to the field of development cooperation. 
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We have too many cows in Tanzania! Our recent experience shows that there are too 
many cows to be sustained on the land. The carrying capacity of the land has by far been 
exceeded. 
-     Member of the Vice President’s Office (VPO), interview fragment 
A recent study visit to Maasai land [sic] in Arusha revealed that people who keep large 
number of cattle contribute to global warming and therefore to climate change 
significantly. This refers particularly to local people in Maasai land, Mwanza and Mara 
regions in Tanzania.66 
- The Arusha Times, 7 February, 2009 
Finally, the pastoralists are generally pictured as victims of climate change and in need of 
technical support and assistance from expert organizations: 
We all know that dryland areas are the most hit by climate change and other stress 
factors. TNRF’s [Tanzania Natural Resources Forum] interventions will certainly have 
remarkable impacts. 
- Prof. Pius Yanda, guest of honour opening an Adaptation workshop 
 
However, the “victimization” and “masters” narratives do not always unfold as mutually 
exclusive approaches. By some leading CSOs the vulnerability (or victimization) discourse is 
articulated together with the resilience (or masters) approach. This might seem contradictory, but 
if we look closely at the following fragment we see that vulnerability is explained as the result of 
an exogenous force, while the idea of being masters of adaptation is seen as an endogenous 
feature of the pastoral livelihood system itself:  
First, climate change is likely to affect the drylands earlier and more severely because 
these areas, for lack of investment, are not as developed as other areas of the country. 
Increasing climate variability in the form of more severe droughts and floods will thus be 
more keenly felt. Second, people who live in dry lands are masters of climate variability 
and climate change. They have lived with uncertainty for hundreds of years and have 
developed strategies to deal with climate unpredictability. These strategies today are no 
longer as effective, not because they are not relevant, but because they have been 
undermined by a range of external factors (e.g. loss of pastoral land, loss of livestock 
mobility, increasing population) that are squeezing people into smaller and smaller areas. 
- Presenter IIED, during a learning group workshop67 
 
                                                             
66 By Ramadhani Kupaza. The Arusha Times, 7 February, 2009. Newspaper article. The heading of the 
newspaper article reads “Tanzania: Maasai Cattle Cause Global Warming”. Online: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200902090821.html. Accessed 13 April, 2016. 
67 In “Mainstreaming Climate Change Adaptation in Dry Lands Development Planning in Tanzania. 
Monduli Learning Group Workshop Report”, 21-22 February 2012. Mto Wa Mbu (TNRF/ IIED). 
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It becomes clear that climate change is challenging the already complex and conflicting set of 
development narratives that have principally revolved around the issue of pastoralism’s agency in 
the face of unpredictability and hazards. The very basic question that emerges is who can learn 
from whom? While the CSOs acknowledge the increasing challenges of the pastoralists in face of 
climate change, they also tend to emphasize the fact that policy makers can actually learn from 
the longstanding experience of pastoralist communities in how to deal with climate variability. As 
the abovementioned IIED representative also stressed:  
So although people living in the drylands are facing many challenges today, it is important 
we learn from them on how their strategies helped them to respond to climate variability 
and change. These lessons will be important for other districts in Tanzania (presenter 
IIED). 
Furthermore, adaptation policymaking is highly informed by climate science and so the role of 
the epistemic community; a role often fulfilled by development experts, will also receive ample 
attention in chapter five. Furthermore, the calculated programmes of interventions that are 
entailed by it do not fall from the sky, but are by and large “traversed by the will to improve” (Li 
2007: 6). Drawing an analogy with Foucault’s notion of “the will to govern”, Li situates what she 
has wittily called “the will to improve” in the field of power in which Foucault dealt with the 
question of government as the “conduct of conduct”. Or, in other words: “a form of activity 
aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Foucault 1991, in: 
Gordon 1991: 2). In contradistinction to sovereignty, which according to Foucault comprised a 
circular finality (i.e. the end of sovereignty is nothing other than submission to sovereignty), he 
argued that government has specific finalities that reside in the things it manages: 
Government is defined as a right manner of disposing of things so as to lead […] to an 
end which is “convenient” for each of the things that are to be governed. […] On the 
contrary [to sovereignty], with government it is a question not of imposing law on men, 
but of imposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of 
using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain 
number of means, such and such ends may be achieved (Foucault 1991: 95). 
In brief, government, in Foucault’s understanding, concerns the well-being of populations at 
large, and is the attempt to shape human conduct by a multitude of calculated means. As Li 
succinctly put it, since it is not possible to coerce each and every individual or to regulate their 
actions in close detail, government rather operates through the education of desires and by 
configuring habits, aspirations and belief (Li 2007: 5). Foucault further argued that the purpose of 
government is the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its 
wealth, longevity, health and so on (p. 100), which is always guided by a particular governmental 
rationality – or governmentality – that thinks of government as the “right disposition of things” 
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(Foucault 1991: 93; 95). In order to achieve this goal, calculation is key, for the government 
demands “the right manner” to be defined, and that the processes to be governed can be 
characterized in technical terms. This is, in turn, the precondition for interventions to be devised 
(Foucault 1991; 1984, in: Li 2007: 6).  
What can be taken from this notion of government is that power runs through it as a rather 
subtle force that does not seek to impose authority or coerce people as such, but is rather a way 
to make people believe, through particular techniques, what is best for them and induce certain 
practices and desires that enables people to enhance their own well-being. Based on her 
longstanding experience in Indonesia, Li has come to see the array of programmes and 
development schemes that set out to intervene and improve the lives of others in line of the will 
to govern, more specifically as the will to improve. Nevertheless, what is crucial to bear in mind is 
that – notwithstanding the utopian intentions that guide these programmes – the very positioning 
of actors to improve the lives of others, and the assertion that they have the particular expertise 
to do so, is also a claim to power that warrants critical scrutiny (ibid: 5). I argue that we can 
fruitfully extrapolate this concept to the context of northern Tanzania, which is currently seeing 
an influx of parties who all seek to take part in – what we can rephrase here as – the will to Adapt. 
The rhetorical shift from an “Adaptation Imperative” (as employed in the introduction) to the 
“Will to Adapt” is intentional, for along the way a more subtle form of power is exerted when 
actors in the interstitial space appropriate the adaptation paradigm by allegedly creating 
“ownership”. The era of structural adjustments is over in which competition, confrontation and 
ideological contestation were key drivers of aid. This has given way to a language of convergence 
and mutual complicity. Also Jeremy Gould has framed this “ethos of the new modality of aid” in 
terms of governmentality, for key words are partnership, complicity and ownership, which form the 
normative ideals upon which aid relations are justified (Gould 2005: 61-65).   
Central questions that will be addressed in this chapter are: How is Adaptation translated in the 
interstices? What is being said, and who is speaking to and for whom? Who is listened to and 
who is silenced? What are the continuities and discontinuities with older travelling narratives? 
Which (new) entanglements can be observed, and what can they reveal to us about patterns of 
power? Finally, and crucially, what are the effects of translating Adaptation in the interstitial 
spaces for different groups? What are the challenges that are being confronted, and which 
opportunities are created? In this chapter I advance one basic argument. The first argument 
contends that there are many good reasons to believe that Adaptation to Climate Change bears 
structural similarities with “conventional” development paradigms. This, in turn, raises questions 
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about the very notion of “The will to Adapt” that is freighted with salvation for the Global 
South. Put differently, while Adaptation yields a new vocabulary to think through development in 
the drylands, many of the issues confronted are a mere relabelling of existing projects and 
struggles; or, a typical case of “old wine in new bottles”. In order to illustrate my point, we need 
to go back in time. 
Maasai NGOs and the politics of being, becoming and belonging 
Before the globally circulating idea of Adaptation to climate change set foot in the northern 
circuit of NGOs in Tanzania around 2009/201068 - since more than two decades – a range of 
international development paradigms had already undertaken similar trajectories. A glance 
through the historical conjunctures that enabled Maasai NGOs to emerge and the political 
struggles confronted by them is needed to understand the echoes over time. Moreover, it reveals 
how the recurrent discourses, political debates and assumptions are historically produced and 
thrive in some periods and contexts while losing their (political) relevance in others. Prior to the 
turn of a changing political landscape of the 1990s virtually no NGO existed in Tanzania. When 
the socialist era came to an end and gave way to political and economic liberalization, Tanzania 
experienced an influx of foreign investors in search for land and other natural resources (joined 
by Tanzanian elites). Due to land-tenure reforms and schemes that ignored traditional land rights, 
such as conservation, state farms and private agribusiness, pasturelands underwent the most 
immediate pressure (Cameron 2001: 55).69 Maasai leaders of grassroots movements responded to 
this changing political landscape by establishing a variety of officially registered NGOs to resist 
the alienation of traditional grazing land (Igoe 2006a: 399-400). The emergence of NGOs was 
thus the result of new constraints and increased pressure on land and other natural resources, as 
well as new possibilities that were brought about by democratization and neoliberal reforms. 
 
The first Maasai NGO (KIPOC, which means “we shall recover” in Maa) was founded in 1990. 
Its formation was an attempt by several Maasai men to engage the global struggle of indigenous 
peoples and “to restore respect to their rights, cultural identity and land of their birth” (KIPOC 
1991, in Hodgson 2011a: 63). Traced and described by Hodgson with vivid detail, we learn about 
the fascinating story of its founder, an influential Maasai activist and former member of the 
Tanzanian Parliament, a man called Parkipuny. During one of his travels to the U.S. Parkipuny 
                                                             
68 I locate the “arrival” of Adaptation in this year when the first policy proposals were drafted and ongoing 
research reports presented. However, it took a few years before the first projects were initiated in 2011-
2012. Mititgation was already under discussion around the year 2007.  
69 In 1998 a land bill was passed in Parliament, which according to some NGOs, just signalled the de jure 
recognition by the state that village lands were officially open for sale (Shivji 1998, in Cameron 2001: 55). 
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met a Navaho Native American at the airport who talked about the pressing issues that they as 
indigenous peoples were confronted with. Parkipuny’s curiosity grew, so he spontaneously 
accompanied him to his reserve and stayed with the Navaho for two weeks. He was struck by the 
resemblances between the injustices suffered by the Native Americans and the Maasai in 
Tanzania. Inspired by this encounter – which would become a truly “transformative epiphany” 
(Hodgson 2011a: 28) – he introduced the idea of the struggle of indigenous peoples back home 
in northern Tanzania, where it began to live a new life. This marked the beginning of the 
widespread engagement of grassroots organizations with the indigenous rights movement in 
Tanzania, which in part also fostered the establishment of a great many NGOs in the region. 
 
The reason I dwell on this story in detail is that it captures both the contingency of encounters, as 
well as the influence of visionary actors (similar to Joseph) on specific articulations. What if 
Parkipuny had never met this Native American at the airport? Would the indigenous peoples’ 
movement have taken shape in Tanzania and Africa regardless? It was this particular encounter 
that broadened Parkipuny’s horizon, which instigated the connection with global discourses and 
political agendas beyond their own Maasai context and nation-state. What prompted Parkipuny 
and his fellows to join the transnational community of indigenous peoples was a sense of 
recognition and belonging that they didn’t find at home; a shared history of structural inequality, 
and ongoing marginalization and economic disenfranchisement within their respective nation-
states (Hodgson 2011a). They saw a commonality in the circumstances and structural problems 
faced by all indigenous peoples throughout the world, such as a strong attachment to land, 
distinct identity, vulnerability and marginalization (IWGIA 2016: 421). Parkipuny addressed the 
UN Working Group with the following words:  
 
The most fundamental rights to maintain our specific cultural identity and the land that 
constitutes the foundation of our existence as a people are not respected by the state and 
fellow citizens who belong to the mainstream population (Parkipuny 1989). 
 
Considering the fact that most African countries regard all their citizens to be indigenous (cf. 
Yatsuka 2015), the decision to “become indigenous” was to say the least a remarkable move. 
Furthermore, the history of settlement and migration in Africa differs significantly from the white 
settler colonies such as Australia, the Americas and New Zealand where there is clearly a notion 
of “first peoples” (Hodgson 2002a; 2002b).70 This international engagement made them the first 
                                                             
70 While also sharing similarities, an important difference between the Americas (together with Australia 
and New Zealand) and Africa is the latter’s contemporary absence of a dominant colonial population; a 
long history of migration, assimilation and conquest, and thus the lack of a clear notion of territorial 
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African representatives at the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in history 
(Parkipuny 1989). Interestingly enough, internationally, Parkipuny’s efforts were yielding success. 
The Maasai predicament (together with that of other groups from Tanzania, such as Hadzabe 
and Barabaig) found resonance with the fate and histories of other long-recognized “first 
peoples” from white settler colonies. As such, the UN Working Group showed a willingness to 
consider their claims that the Maasai and other groups do indeed share structural positions and 
grievances with other indigenous peoples throughout the world. Crucially, their involvement in 
this forum challenged common definitions of what it means to be “indigenous”, and encouraged 
the consideration of a more encompassing notion (Hodgson 2011a: 26). Nevertheless, despite the 
international recognition and visibility of their situation, in the national context of Tanzania – 
after its initial flourishing – the idea did not take root; gradually lost its appeal and political 
relevance. While voting in favour of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
2007, Tanzania does not recognize the existence of any indigenous peoples in the country 
(IWGIA 2013; 2016).  
 
This shows that some discourses are only “useful” internationally, but are not always very 
relevant domestically, which has been the case with claims to indigenousness in many African 
countries (cf. Yatsuka 2015: 42). The newly embraced positioning even eroded the already 
precarious relationship that existed between the Maasai and the Tanzanian government. Partly 
due to internal differences and struggles among the different NGOs, but also because their 
claims to indigeneity were met with great hostility at home (in the context of Tanzania’s nation-
state), in the course of time, a change in the development rhetoric became inevitable. As such, 
the Maasai reframed the language of indigenous rights to a less value-laden term, “pastoral 
livelihoods” (cf. Hodgson 2002b; 2011a). This language continues to be used today and also 
features prominently within the Adaptation rhetoric. For instance, as Joseph kept reminding the 
audience during workshops: “The government needs to recognize the fact that pastoralism is a 
livelihood system [my emphasis]. Pastoralists depend on three things: natural resources; the herd 
and the institution of people.” This point will be further elaborated below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
precedence. In Africa the term indigenous has been adopted much more recently and does not refer to the 
notion of first-comers as such, but rather includes structural properties such as cultural distinctiveness, a 
long experience of subjugation and marginalization, and dispossession by colonial and postcolonial 
powers (Hodgson 2002a). Jim Igoe also points to the paradoxical nature of the term indigenous in the 
African and Tanzanian context. While the term implies a primordial state that precedes something foreign, 
the term “indigenous Africans” does not represent a “miraculously preserved pre-colonial existence”. 
Instead, it is an identity category that would not have made a lot of sense prior to the 1990s. It should, in 
part, be understood in relation to increasingly close ties with global networks of institutions, ideas and 
money (Igoe 2006a).  
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The founding story of KIPOC is a striking example of how global ideas circulate, shape and 
entangle local concerns. Yet, this case is all the more interesting because the idea took shape 
through the outward movement of a local concern that found an alliance with a transnational 
platform. This trajectory challenges the more common understanding of development paradigms 
circulating from global platforms through international organizations, and being then dispersed 
to different localities around the globe. It illustrates how, as Parkipuny also explicated, this NGO 
was an important platform to challenge a state apparatus that he considered to be biased against 
pastoralism (Gardner 2016: 28). Due to the visible success and the ability of these nascent NGOs 
to attract donor money, a remarkable mushrooming of NGOs began to take place in northern 
Tanzania and they expanded to one hundred of such organizations in the year 2000 (Hodgson 
2002b: 1088). By 1993 these NGOs were no longer just Maasai NGOs, but included Barabaig 
herders and Hadzabe hunter-gatherers as well. These organizations began to collaborate and 
formed the first umbrella organization in 1994, called Pastoralist and Indigenous NGOs Forum 
(PINGOs Forum) (Cameron 2001).71 
Climate change and “being indigenous” again 
Remarkably enough, it turns out that climate change has provided new avenues for PINGOs and 
other organizations to re-engage with the transnational indigenous rights movement. This has 
been, in part, a response to the international call for the full involvement of indigenous peoples in 
the UN climate-change process. On August 9th 2007, during the celebration of the International 
Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon emphasized that:  
Recently, the international community has grown increasingly aware of the need to 
support indigenous people – by establishing and promoting international standards; 
vigilantly upholding respect for their human rights; integrating the international 
development agenda […]; and reinforcing indigenous peoples’ special stewardship on 
issues related to the environment and climate change (Ban Ki-Moon 2007, UN Press 
release). 
Also the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2008 focused on “Climate change, bio-
cultural diversity and livelihoods: the stewardship role of indigenous peoples and new 
                                                             
71 For a detailed account of the emergence of PINGOs Forum see the work of Greg Cameron. He argues 
that an analysis of this organization provides an important case study in understanding the rise and fall of 
pastoralist NGOs, as it exemplified some of the problems typical of the Tanzanian NGO sector. An 
important conclusion is that due to the influence of donors in framing their responses ultimately led the 
Forum to lose control over their organization and marginalized their own priorities (Cameron 2001). This 
is a typical case of “co-optation”. 
 101 
challenges”.72 Over the past years, within the UNFCCC there has been an increased interest in 
the role of indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) in the global effort to respond to climate change. 
This global call for indigenous peoples’ engagement trickled down to NGOs in northern 
Tanzania in 2007. However, the urge for engagement of indigenous NGOs (INGOs) was born 
out of their initial exclusion from the national REDD-strategy (funded by the Norwegian 
government). The indigenous peoples were not represented in the newly established national task 
force, which was against the Operational Guidance issued by the UN-REDD policy board. After 
realizing this exclusion, representatives of indigenous organizations in Tanzania formed the 
National Indigenous Peoples’ Coordinating Committee on REDD (NIPCC on REDD) in March 
2009 (Laltaika 2009). Another advocacy organization (Alapa) was founded because they saw an 
urgent need in keeping an eye on the rights of indigenous peoples concerning the REDD 
programme in Tanzania. During a strategic meeting with different indigenous NGOs73 in 2007 it 
was observed that: 
[…] if indigenous peoples do not meaningfully engage in the REDD-process, there will 
be a perpetuation of the negative stereotype that pastoralists/ indigenous peoples destroy 
the environment. Another threat is the possible enactment of laws, policies, plans and 
strategies that continue to negatively affect indigenous people’s rights to land, natural 
resources, livelihood and culture. 
During a workshop that I attended in 2012 about “indigenous peoples and REDD”, organised by 
PINGOs, their critical and cautionary stance became all the more clear. Because the organizers 
were very well aware of the land dispossessions that had taken place elsewhere in the name of 
climate change mitigation, they were seeking strategies to protect land rights and fight negative 
stereotypes. As the representative of Alapa explained: 
The key driver of deforestation is agricultural expansion, and forest burning, but we 
[pastoralists] have also been identified that we are doing deforestation and forest 
degradation according to that strategy. […] This may result in reducing the number of 
livestock. Therefore, when they say that overgrazing is one of the key drivers of 
deforestation it worries us that it might be in their head, they are planning to reduce the 
number of livestock. […] But the biggest challenge is that our land laws are under the 
President. REDD wants to implement projects on general land, which is open land. And 
this is where the pastoralists are. Therefore, again the current land act that exists gives 
power to the President to evict pastoralists in favour of the investors of REDD. 
                                                             
72 See UN press release August 9th 2016: 
www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/int_day_press_release07.pdf  
73 These were PINGOs, CORDS, UCRT and TAPHGO. In 2009 Association for Law and Advocacy for 
Pastoralists (Alapa) was founded to follow up on REDD and climate change issues on behalf of 
indigenous peoples in Tanzania. 
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The involvement with REDD by indigenous groups has thus principally been driven by a 
defensive incentive; i.e. to make sure that indigenous peoples shall not be negatively affected by 
it. And since the implementation of REDD projects requires land, representatives of indigenous 
groups saw the need to make sure that REDD does not become yet another excuse to sell off 
pastoral lands.74 There was clearly also an element of opportunism involved, for the question was 
raised how to channel the financial benefits to local communities.  
With support from the International Working Group of Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), PINGOs 
found again its way to the UN platform by participating in the UNFCCC process during the 
COP21 in Paris. It was also the year when the Tanzania Indigenous Peoples’ Taskforce on 
Climate Change (TIPTCC) was established in order to coordinate all programmes related to 
indigenous peoples and climate change in the country. This taskforce was hosted by PINGOs on 
behalf of 7 member organizations (IWGIA 2016: 426). However, back home in Tanzania their 
language remained more politically “neutral”; allowing thus for more encompassing development 
notions, such as “livelihood rights challenges”. In policy documents and research reports, 
ethnicity or culture-based identity issues are virtually absent, but revolve around the notions of 
livelihoods and land tenure security instead. For instance, a climate change study that was carried 
out in 2012 on behalf of PINGOs focused largely on “the impacts of climate change on land use 
patterns and livelihoods of pastoralists and hunter-gatherers” (Bwagalilo & Mwakipesile 2012). 
Other NGOs have also embraced Adaptation to climate change as a “general” development issue 
that needs to be “mainstreamed with existing development planning processes” (TNRF 2012a, 
see also below). The alternation between international platforms (where their indigenousness is 
embraced) and Tanzania’s national context (where being indigenous is look upon with disdain), 
requires a constant repositioning and change of language, which reveals the somewhat polarized 
identity politics of these INGOs. 
On Tradition and Modernity: Retrofitting Climate Change Adaptation 
The marginalization of the Maasai has not only been material, but has always been accompanied 
and underpinned by (mostly) derogatory discursive practices as well. Disparaging stereotypes, 
archetypical projections of the Maasai as backward and labels such as “second-class citizens” 
formed part of efforts by the elite to disenfranchise Maasai (Hodgson 1999). Taking a longer 
historical perspective – from the time of the first explorers in the 19th century – the array of 
Western perceptions, ideas and myths manifested in either heroic or horrific depictions of the 
                                                             
74 Because my focus is on adaptation and not on mitigation, I will not elaborate further on the INGOs’ 
engagement with REDD. For more details see the work of Laltaika (2009) and IWGIA. 
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Maasai as the embodiment of “untamed” and “authentic” Africa, have proven to be remarkably 
stubborn. Even today the Maasai continue to be promoted as “primitive savages” and culturally 
conservative, for these depictions serve the lucrative tourist industry very well (ibid). Also, during 
interviews and encounters with government officials it became clear to me how these stereotypes 
have lodged in their imaginations. Whenever I explained that I was staying among the Maasai, 
jokes were made, and comments would follow about whether I had already been circumcised or 
had received a brideprice. In any random travelogue we can still find unchanged depictions that 
have their root in the colonial imaginations. For instance, in a safari advertisement from this 
weekend’s newspaper I found a picture of a Maasai man, elegantly leaning on his spear while 
overlooking the Ngorongoro Crater. The advertisement reads: “safari through prehistory”.75 
These archetypes, which were in part triggered by (what foreigners perceived as) “aesthetically 
splendid” or fearless warriors, continued to resonate with the colonial and also postcolonial state 
imageries today (Hodgson 1999; 2004). And whatever the form or content of these disparaging 
stereotypes and resultant interventions, it can be said that they have by and large been played out 
against the background of a “traditional” versus “modern” dichotomy (this discussion is further 
detailed in the next chapter). The discursive marginalization is important to consider how the 
nascent idea of Adaptation – and the concomitant articulations and positioning that it fosters – 
draws on these “historically sedimented practices” (see Li 2007).  
Particularly pertinent for the Maasai has been the fact that some of these ambivalent images and 
clichés – in the name of promoting modernity or preserving tradition (or both simultaneously) – 
have had far-reaching consequences for: the constellation and the development of their cultural 
identity and political representations (Igoe 2006a; Hodgson 2002a; 2002b; Gardner 2016); 
livelihood strategies and socio-economic position as an “ethnic” group (Spear 1993b; McCabe 
2003); as well as for their internal gender relations and shifting masculinities and femininities76 
(see Hodgson 1999; 2000; 2011) their religiosity (Hodgson 2005; Groop 2006); and conservation 
policies and land tenure insecurity (Homewood et al. 2009; Igoe 2002; Igoe & Brockington 1999) 
etc. The history of perceptions of the relationship between the Maasai pastoralists with their 
                                                             
75 Dagblad Trouw, 11 June 2016. 
76 For a detailed ethno-historical analysis of the articulation of modernity and shifting gender relations 
among the Maasai, see the valuable work of Dorothy Hodgson in which she (and others) dissolves the 
“myth of the patriarchal pastoralist” (Hodgson 2000a) in Africa in general, and the stereotype of the 
Maasai as being predominantly seen as a “pastoralist and a warrior”, in particular (Hodgson 1999; 2004; 
2000b). One important insight that she reveals in her work is the fact that most interventions in the name 
of “modernity” were all guided by an image of pastoralism as a purely masculine endeavor. The resultant 
interventions have not only reinforced the opposition between Maasai as “traditional”, against other 
people as “modern”, but has also led to a fixation of certain masculinities and the expansion of male 
power over women (Hodgson 1999). 
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cattle on the one hand, and their environment and wildlife on the other, has been fraught with 
controversy. As briefly touched upon in chapter one, dominant scientific paradigms have been 
infused with ideas of pastoralists being the main cause of overgrazing, environmental 
degradation, poaching, overstocking and poor-resources management. The fact that these 
paradigms (which were informed by colonial, and later Western range ideas based on 
“productivity” and “efficiency”) overlooked complex social relations of production, exchange 
networks and reciprocal ties of Maasai systems (Basset 1986; Homewood & Rodgers 1991, in 
Bwagalilo & Mwakipesile 2012: 11), attests to the prejudices of the Maasai as backward, careless 
planners. Particularly these deep-rooted conceptions turn out to resurface over and over again, 
for they are given new life through the Adaptation to Climate Change paradigm. Finally, in turn, 
the Maasai themselves have tried to make use of global discourses on cultural authenticity and the 
rights of indigenous people to access development resources, and as an attempt to leverage 
changes in their relationship to the state (Hodgson 2011a). 
Here is only a snapshot of the most common, yet persistent clichés. Thomas Spear has nicely put 
a classical imagination of the Maasai: “Uncowed by their neighbours, colonial conquest, or 
modernization, they stand in proud mute testimony to a vanishing African world” (Spear 1993a: 
1). From the very early encounters with Western travellers, the Maasai have been depicted and 
described as the antithesis of modern Europeans (Hodgson 1999: 125). These images are not 
only propounded by outsiders, but have to some extent also become part of the Maasai self-
imagination, as a booklet prepared by a Maasai community to commemorate The Maasai Cultural 
Festival (which took place at “The National Village Museum” in Dar es Salaam) attests:  
The Maasai are among the few Tanzanians who are still holding onto their culture and 
traditions while many other communities are forgetting and neglecting their own cultures 
and traditions. As if this is not enough, the Maasai customs and traditions have had a 
special attraction (Msemwa 1998: 9).  
While displaying cultural pride, among these Maasai representatives there is similarly an 
awareness of the misrepresentations that these images can lead to:  
Unfortunately this same special attraction contributed to the reporters and the media 
press penchant for glaringly misdirecting their reporting to sensationalism […]. Naturally 
this erroneous misrepresentation of facts displeased the Maasai people whose only special 
attribute appeared to be the killing of lions! (ibid).  
Thus in contrast to a celebration of the “noble savage” and the “authentic” Maasai culture that 
needs to be quarantined, stands the widespread idea of a tribe that is a reminiscence of the “wild” 
past; hence the “progressive, modernizing urge” to control the dangerous and wild nomads 
(Hodgson 1999: 121). Hodgson writes: 
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[…] Such ambivalent attitudes toward Maasai have shaped their long history of 
engagement with the complex, overlapping cultural processes and material structures of 
modernity. Structured and propelled by Enlightenment notions of individuality, progress, 
order, rationality, and civilization, these processes include colonialism, economic and 
social development, missionization and nation-building. […] The complex intertwining of 
modern interventions and reified cultural differences have had substantial material 
consequences; as an ethnic group, Maasai have been marginalized from both political and 
economic resources in first the colonial and now in the postcolonial nation-state 
(Hodgson 1999: 122). 
A lot of ink has been spilled over the question of what modernity is, and what it is not (see 
Latour 1993), and it is beyond the aim of this work to dwell on it in detail.77 The discussion is 
relevant in so far that adaptation to climate change seems to trigger an amalgamation of a 
tendency to attempt to stay true to, or revitalize “ancient wisdom” on the one hand, and to seize 
new opportunities that “fit” the modern world on the other. In an in-flight Kenyan Airways 
magazine a portrait of a Maasai man, or “modern eco-warrior”, figured in a touristic account of 
the Maasai: 
The Maasai have been here for centuries. They have to adapt to a changing climate by 
creating new green jobs and protecting the flora and fauna to create a future for the 
generation to come.78 
Another “responsible” tourism company coined the term “climate warriors”, thereby referring to 
a programme that seeks to raise awareness and provide solutions concerning the adverse impacts 
of nature and people (Basecamp Foundation). The basic idea behind this program is to provide 
carbon neutral travel by planting indigenous trees in Maasailand. Put differently, by investing in 
the pristine nature for the Maasai, tourists can “offset their own traces of modernity”. One of the 
basic threads of the Adaptation debate is the idea that climate change allegedly impinges upon 
“traditional” knowledge systems, forecasting techniques and adaptation strategies of the Maasai. 
It is said that these old techniques are no longer viable due to the climate’s increasing 
unpredictability; hence the need for experts to bring in more “sophisticated” knowledge systems. 
                                                             
77 It is important to note that I use the notion of modernity here as a power-laden concept that is imbued 
with a teleology of progress and development, which has always been inclined towards a certain 
positioning of the West (and all the Enlightenment values) that has set the norm for an “ideal” trajectory 
for development (Said). In Latour’s understanding, “modern” denotes all those people (not specifically 
designating a certain geography), who perceive the world behind them as an archaic past in which Facts 
and Values are combined, while being pushed to a brighter future in which these two realms will be 
distinct (Latour 2013: 8). Furthermore, Latour puts forward that even though “we” have never been 
modern, The Moderns have certainly thought of themselves as such, which has “made them act in a 
thousand contradictory ways” (Latour 2013: 14). We should understand the notion of modernity here as a 
certain appeal of progress and its material manifestations, under which many developmental discourses 
have travelled to northern Tanzania in general and Maasailand in particular. 
78 Kenya Airways Magazine, Edition 83. September – October 2012.  
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In many ways climate change discourses reinforce the existing dichotomy between “modernity” 
and “tradition” – a point that deserves more careful examination in the following chapter. 
Before setting a new stage, a short vignette will inform us about the broader political context and 
timing in which my research took place. This is necessary for it was a time of heightened 
tensions, in which ongoing land conflicts came to the fore. The sensitivity of the topic became 
clear during public meetings, particularly when grassroots people emotionally raised their voices 
(at times publicly crying or shouting out of despair), but also during those instances when I was 
asked to switch off my audio recorder. Here is a story about how the nascent climate change 
adaptation narrative entangles and obscures the eternal problem of land. 
How Adaptation entangles the eternal problem of land 
During the closing ceremony of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment 
(AMCEN) that took place in Arusha in October 201279, the president of Tanzania at that time, 
Jakaya Kikwete, addressed the international crowd of African ministers of the environment and 
other high-profile delegates on the topic of climate change with the following words:  
 
Ladies and gentlemen: it is common knowledge that the planet we all call our home is 
facing serious environmental degradation and threats. […] Developing countries, 
particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, are suffering the most, for lack of the capacity, or 
adequate capacity to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change and environmental 
degradation. As we all know this is the case because the majority of these countries are 
either poor or very poor, or they are marginally above the poverty line. […] As a result 
they do not have adequate financial resources, technology and the human skills to 
respond effectively to the challenges. It is important to note that these countries, 
however, contribute least to the serious environmental challenges threatening our planet 
today. As a matter of fact, they contribute minimally to carbon emissions, which are 
responsible for global warming. This fact speaks volumes about our interconnectedness 
in the world we all live in. […] Droughts are much longer. Too frequent. I think between 
2005 and now we’ve had three attacks of drought. I call them attacks because they are 
very severe. This part of Tanzania [northern Tanzania] is home to the Maasai. The Maasai 
are cattle keepers. […] We have a district called Longido. People lost close to 500,000 
heads of cattle. The Maasai families became suddenly poor. And he is not a Maasai if he 
doesn’t have cattle. So their way of livelihood was completely wiped out. We have just 
begun a program of giving them three to four heads of cattle, to start a life again. 
 
In the first part of Kikwete’s speech we observe a sound resonance of global climate change 
discourses. We hear about Africa’s “Adaptation Deficit”, and about the unequal distribution of 
                                                             
79 The topic of climate change took centre stage during this conference, as it took place a few weeks 
before the COP18 in Doha. It was the platform for African delegations to work on a united “African 
position” to stand strong as one “negotiation block” during the international conference that would take 
place a few weeks later.  
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responsibilities (developed countries) vis-à-vis the countries that have to bear the burden of 
global warming (developing countries). In the course of his closing words, the President 
continued to emphasize that in Africa people suffer the most but contribute the least. And while 
lamenting that “those countries” are not doing enough, he concluded with the observation that it 
is all a matter of lack of political will. He then shared a story of a small boy from a particular tribe 
that one day took his arrow and bough and went out for a walk: 
 
People asked the boy: “Where are you going?” 
The boy replied: “I am going out hunting.” 
People asked the boy: “What are you going to hunt?” 
The boy replied: “An elephant.” 
People asked again: “You, hunting an elephant?” 
And the boy said: “Yes, me hunting an elephant.” 
“Can you do it?” 
“Yes, I will try, try, try and try again.” 
 
The President continued: “So we have to continue trying. And we have done that from the 
several COPs. We are now going to COP18, in Doha. Try, try, try again. Some day, the elephant 
will fall.” While embracing part of the global discourse in which Africa is victimized and in need 
of support from the developed countries; Kikwete also gave this metacode of climate change a 
pan-African twist, by drawing a sharp distinction between those who pollute and those who 
suffer. He did so by finding an external cause for all the ills of the African continent in the name 
of global warming. A seamless switch to a “national code” was easily made, and so the 
unfortunate fate of the Maasai cattle keepers was in a similar vein posited in the global picture of 
climate change, while washing the hands of the Tanzanian government in innocence. Instead, he 
positioned himself as their saviour who enabled them “to start a life again”. To frame the cause 
of the Maasai’s poverty in technical terms (i.e. to adapt to climate change one needs support in 
enhancing particular skills, for “the poor” lack adequate capacity), falls under what James 
Ferguson has termed the “anti-politics machine” of development that reposes political questions 
such as land and resources, as technical “problems” that are amenable to technical (development) 
interventions (Ferguson 1990). As will be further elaborated below, it is also part and parcel of 
expert discourses and practices to posit themselves as indispensable players in the field of 
development cooperation.   
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By making us believe that it is due to climate change that the Maasai “became suddenly poor”, 
Kikwete drew all the attention away from the structural inequalities that have contributed to their 
marginalization. If we juxtapose president Kikwete’s explanation of climate change as the 
principal cause for the cattle keepers’ deplorable condition in Tanzania with accounts of local 
communities and NGOs representing them, a fairly different picture emerges. A brief historical 
contextualization and political ecology lens are helpful in understanding the contrasting truth 
claims between the President on the one hand and the Maasai on the other (cf. Bollig & de Wit 
2014). In the year 2009 a severe drought indeed struck large parts of northern Tanzania, which 
led to massive losses of livestock among pastoralists.80 Yet, there was another event in the 
country that particularly drew national and international media attention to the northern parts of 
Tanzania. It was in the same year that a longstanding land conflict between the Tanzanian 
government and the communities of Loliondo Division (Ngorongoro district) surfaced and 
reached heightened tensions. The government initiated a police operation under the Field Force 
Unit and violently evicted thousands of Maasai from a disputed area east of the world famous 
Serengeti National Park, leaving more than 3,000 people homeless and more than 50,000 cattle 
without access to grazing lands. Allegations of human rights abuses followed, and economic 
losses to the communities like burnt houses, death of livestock and property loss were reported 
(Tanzania Natural Resources Forum 2011: 4). The 2009/2010 droughts that struck the northern 
part of the country escalated the tensions. As a matter of courtesy and in order to express his 
sorrow for the loss of livestock due to the drought, Kikwete visited various affected 
communities, and promised to give support for a restocking program. It was the same year in 
which president Kikwete officially leased their land, after which the villagers were violently 
evicted. Villagers were outraged and felt utterly helpless. An NGO collected some of the 
grassroots accounts in a documentary as a way to give them a platform to voice their anger. Here 
is one account of a villager who responded to the land alienation during a village assembly 
meeting: 
  
Hasn’t Kikwete been here? Wasn’t he the one who stood on that platform? When he 
arrived here, didn’t I receive him with four levels of welcome? First, I received him with 
great happiness and joy. Second, I received him in a land full of wildlife and trees. Third, 
didn’t I contribute the fuel for his car? Above all, I gave him a bull as a token, a token of 
our livelihood. But he decided to destroy us in return of all that kindness? It’s really hard 
                                                             
80 Longido was one among the seven districts in the country that was severely affected by the drought. 
The government has provided support to two of the affected areas in Maasailand: Longido and Monduli. 
According to the Red Cross approximately 65% of total livestock was killed due to the 2009/2010 
drought: http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/11/MDRTZ012EA.pdf  
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to believe he is really the one who is doing this to us! Go and tell him we disagree with 
his proposal!81 
The source of the conflict dates back to 1992 when the government leased a Game Controlled 
Area (GCA) for hunting purposes to an influential private investor from Dubai, who owned the 
Ortello Business Corporation (OBC). While the GCA partly overlapped with Loliondo village 
land, and invoked controversies among different stakeholders at the time, it did not have any 
direct bearing on land use management. However, the situation changed when the 2009 Wildlife 
Conservation Act was passed, which prohibits living and livestock grazing in the area and gives 
GCAs effectively the same legal meaning as Game Reserves (TNRF 2011: 15). The exclusive 
hunting rights that were granted to OBC had far-reaching consequences for the communities 
who used to dwell in this area for generations. Ironically, the government of Tanzania legitimized 
the malevolent police operation by stating that the pastoralists had allegedly both “invaded” a 
private hunting block as well as degraded the environment in the respective area by cutting down 
trees in a protected forest. This “discursive trick”, in which nature is framed as vulnerable and in 
need of protection from these “perpetrators”, is in line with what Seagle has framed as a process 
of “inverting the impacts”, whereby local people are posited as being the primary agents of 
environmental degradation (Seagle 2012: 456).82 The irony here is of course that by mimicking 
dominant conservationist discourses the government of Tanzania is framing the Maasai as 
destroyers of the environment, as a means to legitimize land acquisitions by private investors. 
After the royal family from the Arab Emirates bought the land and built their own airstrip, they 
were free to hunt for wild animals. Here are other voices from villagers of Loliondo who were all 
too aware of this discursive trick: 
I grew up here witnessing herds of wildlife roaming around. I am sure we haven’t killed 
wildlife, we don’t kill or sell wildlife. But the Arabs did! 
The government says we’re a threat to the environment. I would like to tell them that we 
are not! Look, we live in a land with succulent grass and evergreen trees; they have 
destroyed their lands walking on floors instead of grass. (Applause from villagers). Is it 
because they think we are weak and cowards that we deserve to be branded as destroyers? 
We became slaves in our own country while a foreigner enjoys it to the fullest. 
They burnt our homesteads so the Arab could go hunting. We have been living for 
centuries with wildlife grazing together with our livestock, but this Arab does not want us 
to live next to him. So the government is telling us to move using the excuse that we kill 
wildlife. How dare they say that! We take care of them, not kill them. […] 
                                                             
81 “People have Spoken: The Voices from Loliondo.” (TNRF, Sponsored by Oxfam).  
82 In her study on the Rio Tinto/ QMM mining company in Madagascar, Seagle shows how a mining-
conservation partnership creates a narrative of biodiversity scarcity, and posits the mining company as the 
active biodiversity saviour, while the local population is fined for trespassing on the highly restricted zones 
(Seagle 2012: 448-451). 
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This highly controversial move of the government to sell off land to a foreign investor at the 
expense of its own people unearths the striking truth about how the devastating drought of 2009 
– in the name of climate change – came in handy as a discursive framework within which to cast 
aside all national political responsibility related to the Maasai’s fate. In 2012 the conflict further 
escalated when it became clear that the government had pushed the deal with OBC forward. The 
minister of National Resources and Tourism proposed to divide Loliondo into two sections – 
2,500 sq. km for the Maasai and 1,500 sq km for a “wildlife corridor” to be reclaimed “for the 
benefit of the country”, as the minister put it.83 It reached widespread media attention worldwide 
– including being the subject of a petition by the Avaaz community – which has put a renewed 
pressure on the Tanzanian government to reconsider their highly controversial decision. As an 
example of a recent land grabbing, “Loliondogate” – as it became internationally known – does 
not stand alone in Tanzania. In the past decade, pastoralists have suffered several incidents of 
abrupt and large-scale land loss (Igoe and Brockington 1999: 8).84 While it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to elaborate on the complex land matters in detail, this conflict was a case in point, for 
those in power tangibly linked it to climate change.85 Furthermore, and crucial for my analysis, as 
will be demonstrated in the following section, the grassroots accounts speak for themselves: the 
Maasai do not see climate change as the biggest threat; what they truly fear is first and foremost 
the loss of land, and restrictions in grazing areas. Another telling example is a climate change 
movie made by local CSOs, in which journalists and documentary makers are showing 
apocalyptic scenes of cattle that died a slow and painful death as a consequence of the drought. 
Notwithstanding the journalists who were in search of local climate-change testimonies, the 
communities that were interviewed were conspicuously aware of the fact that the drought and 
changes in the climate cannot alone be blamed for the loss of their cattle, as one elder 
emphasized:  
We were removed from our pasture grounds; we were evicted with our livestock. We are 
relocated to this area without enough grassland. I will lead you to see the carcasses that 
died around the settlements. I am wondering what I should feed my entire family with. 
Others gave similar explanations for the cause of the death of livestock in this particular area: 
                                                             
83 See http://www.wilderutopia.com/international/humanity/welcome-to-loliondo-maasai-struggle-
against-game-hunters-for-land-rights/. Accessed 23 December, 2016. 
84 For an overview of recent land losses and evictions of pastoralists in 2015, see IWGIA 2016. 
85 For a detailed study and overview of land alienation of pastoral rangelands see the work of Igoe and 
Brockington, 1999. An overview of the genesis of colonial and postcolonial land-tenure regime and their 
bearing on current land politics and land-tenure problems can be found in Shivji’s extensive study Not yet 
Democracy, which he wrote as the appointed chair of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, 1998. 
 111 
This was brought about by the congestion of all the livestock in this place, when they 
were removed from the pasture grounds, by the hunting companies here. 
When Arabs burnt our homes, livestock were congested here, they died to date. When 
this [sic] cattle get finished then people will die also.86 
Whereas for the media and politicians too climate change is alluring as an explanation for poverty 
and dying cattle, since it is a trendy topic, the affected communities continue to refer back to 
land-use practices and land alienation. Local community members see drought not as the root 
cause of poverty, but rather as a dimension that exacerbates their marginalized position. In line 
with these grassroots accounts, John Galaty has argued that “[…] pastoralism is most critically 
challenged by the appropriation of rangelands by a variety of actors who use political means to 
achieve what would normally be socially and economically impossible” (Galaty 2011: 1). Also, 
Benjamin Gardner writes: “It is not unreasonable to read the history of the Maasai in East Africa 
as one long land grab in the name of global conservation and national development” (Gardner 
2016: 19). 
The problem of land and land alienation for the pastoralists (as well as for other communities 
throughout Tanzania) dates back to the colonial times, when the Maasai were forced to move 
into one of the most desolate areas in the country. Furthermore, that was the era when the 
mainland’s current land tenure regime had its genesis (Shivji 1998: 1).87 Later, as part of President 
Nyerere’s Ujamaa ideology government officials also continued with colonial practices of land 
alienation and redistribution of the most fertile areas of Masai District to economically more 
“productive” people (Hodgson 2011a: 66). Yet the issue of land reached its peak during the 
period of increased economic liberalization around the 1980s, when the state began to encourage 
commercialization and intensification of land use. As is written in the report of land commission: 
[…] One of the tendencies which has gathered considerable momentum during this 
period (of economic liberalization since the mid-1980s) is the alienation and allocation of 
rural and village lands to outsiders – individuals, local and foreign companies, etc. 
involving thousands of acres of land (Report of the Land Commission of Inquiry into 
Land Matters 1991, vol.1: 137-138, in Igoe and Brockington 1999). 
The crux of the matter for the pastoralists – according to the NGOs and CSOs representing 
them - is that the strength of their adaptive capacity is essentially based on (seasonal) mobility and 
flexible land use patterns, which can only be maintained if there is sufficient access to land and 
                                                             
86  Movie “Where is my Future?” about climate change and the 2009 drought, produced by Orkonerei 
Mass Media (Ormame) in collaboration with Partners Indigenous Heartland Organization (IHO) and 
IOPA. 
87 Both the land regimes established by the German (1885-1916) as well as by the British (1918-1961) 
colonial authorities, were based on the “convenient” assumption that indigenous occupants had no 
ownership rights over land (Shivji 1998: 1). 
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concomitant natural resources, such as water and pastures. Whereas the government and other 
expert communities alike “neutralize” the problem of adaptation to climate change, and frame it 
as a global and external force, for the Maasai communities on the ground adaptation is intricately 
bound to the politics of land use. 
Concluding reflections 
In this chapter I have demonstrated how the translation of Adaptation in the interstitial space in 
northern Tanzania draws upon earlier engagements with travelling ideas and development 
discourses, which have become “historically sedimented practices” (Li 2000: 151). These have 
become meaningful experiences for Maasai representatives and development brokers, for they 
have contributed to an understanding of what “works” (or rather what does not work) as political 
strategies; both internationally as well as in relation to the Tanzanian state. The development of 
certain skills forms part of the rather contingent way in which new articulations and a unique 
time/ place positioning emerges. What we can learn from the brief historical detour around 
grassroots organisations and their shifting articulations in northern Tanzania is that their 
emergence should first and foremost be understood as a way to manoeuvre oppressive politics, to 
leverage change and create opportunities in the absence of a benevolent state. Moreover, NGOs 
also have to position themselves between transnational discourses and policy regimes (such as 
with REDD), and the lack of political representation at the national level. Nevertheless, while 
NGOs have played an important role in building political representation and advocating for 
indigenous rights; from the work of Dorothy Hodgson (2011a) and Jim Igoe (2006a) we also 
glean the limits of NGOs as agents of change. One important factor has been the overreliance on 
donors and their respective development agendas, which entail the risk of “speaking for” rather 
than “listening to” Maasai communities (see Hodgson’s work on FGM 2011b).  
Moreover, also global factors and hegemonic discourses about nature conservation have been 
essential in shaping the trajectories of NGOs. Increasingly close ties with complex transnational 
networks, shifting donor agendas, and entanglements with global ideas, money and alliances have 
facilitated their emergence. As Benjamin Gardner once again reminds us in a recent study, the 
safari tourism industry and foreign-owned ecotourism – facilitated by a neoliberal landscape that 
is focused on private investment, and buttressed by hegemonic conservation discourses – exert 
an extraordinary influence on the livelihoods and culture of the Maasai. However, he contends, 
the weakening of the state is not necessarily lamented by the Maasai, who never enjoyed the full 
benefits of Tanzanian citizenship. As many Maasai associate land dispossession as much with the 
nationalist state since independence as with the German- and British led-colonial state, 
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neoliberalism is also celebrated as a “potentially promising change” to fight for their long-sought 
land rights (Gardner 2016: xv). Nevertheless, I argue that whereas it is indeed within this 
neoliberal political landscape that indigenous rights organizations have found ways to link their 
concerns with transnational platforms and discourses, it is that very same political landscape that 
has exacerbated the problems that they now seek to address. More concretely, this is certainly in 
part due to the environment in which unprecedented land acquisitions and human rights 
violations continue to take place. The Maasai and CSOs representing them are therefore 
squeezed in a narrow political space where they seek to manoeuvre between transnational 
resources that provide chances and opportunities on the one hand, and an increasing hostile 
environment of the Tanzanian nation state on the other. It is against this highly precarious 
background that we have to understand the translation of Adaptation to climate change. How 
this translation process looks on closer inspection will be illustrated in the next chapter. 
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Introduction 
Whereas the former chapter has drawn attention to historical trajectories and the more structural 
logic underpinning the Will to Adapt; in the following a microscopic analysis of translating 
Adaptation in the interstitial spaces will be advanced. This chapter takes to heart the very basic 
presupposition (as laid out in chapter three) that narratives not only operate as a cognitive 
instrument for imposing a meaningful order onto human experience, but are as much a part of 
the condition of social life itself. In other words, narratives have performative and ordering 
power through which they constantly make and remake the world. A workshop offers a fruitful 
insight into these dimensions, and opens the “black-box” of a narrative in the making that is 
continuously contested, unstable and in flux. Furthermore, it gives a platform to those voices that 
are too often silenced along the translation chain. While we have to situate this workshop in a 
particular time and place, I believe it also offers a window into particular power dynamics that are 
at play that form part of the art of translating development in northern Tanzania in general, and 
the Maasai predicament in particular. In this section I employ a similar narrative strategy as in 
chapter one. However, the public hearing that I introduced earlier was narrated in actual 
chronological order and as it occurred in real time and (in one, confined) space. In what follows I 
have taken the liberty of allowing my cumulative results to aggregate so as to effectively 
constitute archetypical spokespersons that stand for and represent varying communities in the 
debate. It should be mentioned that all the quotes or speeches are real; none are invented. 
However, for the sake of readability I have united varying opinions (which were spoken out in a 
manifold different workshops) into one workshop.  
I believe that I have amassed sufficient data to be able to stay true to the varying positions that 
have come to occupy the interstitial spaces of Adaptation.88 As will be shown, a great many 
parties – fulfilling the position of trustees – share in the will to Adapt. Trustees are parties that 
can be characterized by a claim to know how others should live and what is best for them, and 
whose aim is ultimately to enhance and direct others’ capacity for action (Li 2007: 4-5). Even 
though the position of different ideational communities varies significantly, and no community is 
fully homogeneous, for my own narrative I deem it legitimate to distil the principal contours of 
the convictions and narrative strategies of each distinct community. However, it should be clear 
                                                             
88 This involved participation in workshops, sensitization meetings and conferences, from which I 
analyzed hundreds of pages of conference transcriptions, many hours of movie and audio material; heaps 
of policy documents, PowerPoint presentations, handouts, briefings, educational videos, newspaper 
articles, interviews with key actors, and so on. I am immensely indebted to my research assistant Saruni 
Shuaka Kaleya, who transcribed and translated most of the conference and workshop material from 
Swahili to English with extraordinary care and attention. 
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that these have to be imagined as ideal-typical forms. For this reason, in order to do justice to the 
heterogeneity that can also be found across different archetypes, at times, where I deemed 
necessary, I have chosen to let one community speak with two or more voices.89 
Work-“shopping”: adapting to Adaptation 
Beyond the organizers’ expectations it was a full house when the inception workshop 
“Mainstreaming Adaptation into Drylands Development Planning” took place. The event was 
held at the Equator Hotel in Arusha, where I had attended a series of similar workshops and 
conferences before. The participants seemed to appreciate the location because of the excellent 
catering facilities. Some NGO workers were complaining about the “culture of daily allowance”, 
which referred to the fact that too many people were only conference-(s)hopping in order to get 
a daily allowance, a reimbursement of their travel costs and a good meal. In the beginning of my 
fieldwork, these workshops were fairly small and I was the only researcher from abroad who 
attended. Almost a year later, more than a hundred participants attended the workshop (including 
a whole team of researchers), all sharing the same interest in adaptation to climate change, and 
pastoralism. A fashionable topic it had become indeed. If we take a look at the recent history of 
the development-projects alone that are concerned with pastoralists in this area, it becomes clear 
that it has been just a small step to adapt to Adaptation by “mainstreaming” it into 
“conventional” development planning. In this regard a parallel can be drawn between northern 
Tanzania and Peru, as Orlove (2009) has also demonstrated how the continuity of Adaptation in 
relation to other development paradigms works in the context of Peru:  
Because of its loose, multifaceted quality, the term “adaptation” allows the organizations 
to continue working in areas in which they already have expertise: small-scale technical 
assistance in one case, disaster relief or water development in others. It also lets them to 
function in a familiar world of projects, in which they submit and receive proposals, 
manage budgets and personnel, run and evaluate projects themselves, and produce 
reports and other briefings” (Orlove 2009: 158).  
In northern Tanzania we find buzzwords such as, “livelihood resilience”, “poverty reduction”, 
“reducing vulnerability”, “adaptive environmental management”, “strengthening customary 
leadership institutions”, “natural resources management”, “coping strategies”, all of which lend 
                                                             
89 Richard Rottenburg has employed a similar narrative approach, which he framed as being part of 
“experimental ethnographic writing”. He has placed this in the context of the end of the grand narratives 
and critique, a time in which anthropologists needed to develop new vocabularies and novel ways of 
“speaking truth to power”. Furthermore, my attempt aligns with his position to maintain a balance 
between engaging with the practices of powerful organizations with the respectful affection of an 
anthropologist, while not glossing over things that might have negative effects (Rottenburg 2009: xix- xx). 
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themselves fairly well to a relabelling of projects in Adaptation planning in the drylands. As also 
one participant from the grass roots remarked:  
The issue of the environment is not a new thing; we have been talking about the 
environment for a long time. But still there is a problem and we have not attained a good 
solution. […] The other things that we have been talking about, like the issue of reducing 
the number of cows, having the appropriate budget to deal with the issue of climate 
change, and many other things that we talked about in this meeting: I want to say that 
nothing is new. 
This observation is not intended as a critique, but is rather to illustrate how Adaptation allows 
development projects to reconstitute themselves – indeed, to adapt to Adaptation – by relabelling 
their aims and following fashions. Following Foucault, we can view this stability as being part of 
“the art of government”, which, he argued, can be characterized by the essential continuity of 
one type with the other (Foucault 1991: 91). Nevertheless, if we differentiate the varying 
development paradigms that have passed the revue over the years it becomes clear that climate 
change adaptation is a particularly encompassing notion. We can imagine that issues such as 
wildlife conservation, the fight against HIV/Aids and FGM or the protection of indigenous 
rights have addressed more specific development goals and therefore require new institutional 
arrangements (e.g. fences, anti-poaching measurements, health infrastructure, education). 
Adaptation to climate change, on the contrary, relates to an array of general development issues 
that have been addressed before. To mention only a few examples, environmental conservation, 
access to natural resources, mobility, poverty reduction etc. 
As the workshop convener and program coordinator, Joseph had taken up the role of moderator. 
In his welcoming words Joseph urged the participants to stick to the “mzungu time” (referring to 
the “white man’s time”), and not the “kibongo time” (Tanzanian time), which made people burst 
into laughter because everybody knew exactly what he was talking about. After some jokes were 
made about how Europeans deal with time, the workshop participants agreed that – considering 
the full agenda – a strict German approach to time management was needed. During the time of 
the workshop, the project was in the middle of a one-year preparatory phase to build up the 
“adaptive capacity” of the government officials of the three districts of Monduli, Longido and 
Ngorongoro. Each district had established a “Climate Change Adaptation Learning Group”, 
consisting of 25 people such as government officials, customary leaders, NGO workers and 
community members. This phase was funded and technically supported by international donors 
and implemented with relevant national institutions, local government authorities of the three 
districts, customary leaders and CSOs. The workshop’s aims were threefold: (1) firstly, to explore 
how Adaptation could be mainstreamed into dryland development planning; (2) secondly, to 
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evaluate the research findings in order to design a four-year pilot project that would be carried 
out in three different districts in northern Tanzania; (3) and thirdly, to assess how the finances 
could be devolved from the national government to the districts. The following representatives 
were present: 
Joseph: workshop organizer and convener (development broker) 
Vincent: guest of honour (working for the Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries) 
Tim: member of the Vice President’s Office (VPO) 
Adam: Maasai herder (from the community level) 
Madumi: expert working for Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA) 
Elijah: researcher from the university of Dodoma, (carried out research for an indigenous CSO) 
John: expert (a scientist working for a European knowledge centre) 
 
Vincent 
 
Joseph introduced the guest of honour, who replaced the Minister from the Ministry of Livestock 
Development and Fisheries. After observing all protocols by thanking and congratulating 
everybody for organizing this event, the guest of honour explained the challenges related to 
adaptation to climate change for the livestock sector: 
My name is Vincent and I am replacing the Minister, who apologizes that he could not 
make it today, as he had other obligations. […] As we all know climate change is really 
happening; it is a fact. It is not news. And it has some long-term consequences for the 
livelihoods in many sectors, particularly in the livestock industry. In the past 50 years we 
have seen extreme changes, such as droughts. And unfortunately, most of the droughts 
are occurring in the drylands. As you all know for the livestock sector drought is a major 
problem. Not others. The frequency of droughts is increasing. The one drought of 2008/ 
2009 was so severe that the President himself came to look what is happening and he 
gave 12 billion Tanzanian Shillings to compensate for the loss of their cattle. So there is a 
need to come up with an adaptation strategy because we cannot prevent these things 
from happening. We as a poor country like Tanzania, we can only adapt. So despite all 
the efforts, we still have many challenges. We have a low level of awareness and 
understanding of climate change. […] We also need funds for the projects. We also lack 
the adequate capacity to address climate-change impacts. If it continues like this, vision 
2025, which was expected to be a time by which everybody will have improved their lives, 
will not be successful. 
Vincent continued to explain that climate change is mainstreamed into the national 
environmental management policy. He then enlisted all the government’s efforts, some focusing 
on mitigation, some on adaptation. “We have the NAPA; we have the National Adaptation 
Strategy Action Plan; we have the – currently very recent – National Climate Change Strategy; we 
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have the guidance for the Climate Change Adaptation into Policies and Programmes; we have the 
National Climate Change Communication Strategy of last year [2012]; we have tried to 
mainstream climate change into MKUKUTA II [national poverty reduction strategy] etc.” In 
many ways, Vincent’s technical account is typical for a national policy-maker, as questions 
relating to the political economy are entirely cast aside. In his emphasis on the vulnerability of the 
drylands a certain victimization of the pastoralists can be observed, while in turn, he lauded the 
national support and proudly presented all the initiatives carried out by the government so far. 
Furthermore, by stressing that as a poor country, Tanzania cannot do it alone, he also appealed to 
the international donors for financial support.  
In line with Kikwete, as well as with the aforementioned international “adage” “Africa’s 
Adaptation Deficit”, Vincent’s emphasis on the capacities of the poor (or rather the lack thereof) 
has the tendency to “depoliticize” climate change. It does so by framing vulnerability as an 
inherent property of the poor, without questioning what made them poor in the first place. 
Climate change is also pointed out as the main culprit for the possible failure of vision 2025 to 
eradicate poverty in Tanzania. Ferguson and others have identified the practice of excluding 
questions about the means of production, and forces that support systemic inequalities, as a key 
feature of expert discourses (Wisner et al. 2012; Ferguson 1990; Li 2007).90 It is important to note 
that this practice – what Li has called “rendering technical” – is never neutral, as it is an 
intervention in itself with far-reaching consequences that “both limits and shapes what 
improvement becomes” (Li 2007: 7-8; cf. Callon 1986). In the following we shall see how 
defining the problem exclusively in technical terms forms one of the key practices of translating 
the will to Adapt into concrete projects. 
Victims versus Masters 
The fact that the national government of Tanzania91 – largely informed by international expert 
discourses – is framing adaptation in technical terms has resulted in a discourse that reduces the 
pastoralists to primary victims of climate change. Furthermore, pastoralists continue to be framed 
as irresponsible destroyers of the environment who are keeping cattle irrespective of the 
“carrying capacity of the land” (see also URT 2007: 22). In the National Climate Change Strategy 
and Action Plan – as part of mitigation strategies – appropriate livestock management practices 
are also promoted that seek to reduce greenhouse gas emission (URT 2012, annex). As 
                                                             
90 For a similar observation regarding climate-change discourses, land grabbing and “anti-politics” in 
Tanzania, see Wisner and others (2012). 
91 I am referring here mainly to formal documents that have been drafted within the context of 
international policy-making of the UNFCCC, such as the NAPA and other climate change strategies. 
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mentioned before this process of “environmental othering”, has prompted a counternarrative 
from the side of NGOs in northern Tanzania that postulates that the pastoralists are masters of 
adaptation. Notwithstanding the recognition that climate change impedes development efforts 
and their adaptive capacity, this stance similarly brings into view the broader socio-political 
context. Therefore we can see this discursive move as a way to “repoliticize” adaptation, because 
the source of the problem is not perceived as an inherent lack of capacity of the livelihood 
system of the (Maasai) pastoralists. This point of view also became clear during the workshop 
when a fragment of a movie was shown. Horrific images of cattle carcasses, drought-stricken 
grazing plains and a starving population were all portrayed as part and parcel of the “novel 
climate change landscape”. Nevertheless, the documentary did not lose sight of the overall land- 
use practices. Here is a telling fragment from this educational movie about adaptation, resilience 
and resources mapping: 
For centuries pastoralists in East African Drylands have supported their livelihoods 
through a deep knowledge of the ecological dynamics of their surrounding environment. 
They are experts at adapting to climatic changes and resource limitations. But in the last 
five decades the Maasai have found it more difficult to effectively adapt. This is due to 
population growth, loss of access to pasture and water, to other land uses like industry 
and farming, and more frequently, droughts. […] For communities in Longido, land use 
planning is not typically done on paper, but as the government tends to view pasture and 
grazing land as open areas, it is clear that unless communities in Longido are able to 
formally demonstrate the value and actual use of this areas, land tenure will be threatened. 
[…] And as climate change adds pressure to Tanzanian drylands, flexibility, adaptive 
capacity, and mobility will be key to securing the livelihoods for those who live there.92 
As mentioned in chapter one, this perspective in which mobility is propagated as a key adaptation 
strategy stands in sharp contrast with Tanzania’s (overall) official take on pastoralism as it is 
formulated in the NAPA, which advocates controlling the mobility of livestock and the 
implementation of zero grazing instead (URT 2007: 22). Joseph then took the opportunity to 
share his take on adaptation and largely agreed with Vincent, while at the same time assessing the 
role of the government more critically: 
As the guest of honour already said, the issue of climate change is a very big issue 
bringing a lot of problems to our country Tanzania. The issue is no longer a secret; it is 
no longer a dream. So we must agree with each other, we have been talking much about 
climatic changes. But also we saw that people who are living in the drylands, they are the 
ones who are facing very big problems. […] For example the people who depend on 
pastoralism have been really, I can say they are experiencing the loss due to climate 
changes. If you try to consider these changes, they do not come from humans, or from 
the government. I can say that it is something coming from the sky. But scientifically we 
                                                             
92 Educational movie “Resource Mapping to build livelihood resilience” – Kimmage; TNRF; IIED. 
Funded by Gorta and Cordaid. 
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talk about it more practically. But the problems that are coming out of this, is also 
because policies, strategies and methods, and manners which are used by the government 
– all social – are not exactly capable of reducing or preventing the effects of climate 
change. Let us not forget that pastoralists are masters of adaptation. 
During interviews with development brokers the term “masters of adaptation” was used 
frequently to characterize pastoral livelihoods; and it also figured in newspaper articles 
(representing CSO voices), as well as in policy briefs and conference reports.93 As a CSO worker 
expressed in an interview with me, and also in the Daily News: “We found that while pastoralists 
are masters of adaptation, climate change has proved to make this impossible but unfortunately 
government formal planning processes are not incorporating their knowledge though being 
possible" (Daily News, 20 February 2013). More implicitly referring to the strength of the 
ecosystem itself in a summary of an adaptation workshop, it was stated that: “Dryland pastures in 
Tanzania and East Africa are diverse, complex, adaptable and resilient – contrary to popular 
perception they are not inherently fragile” (TNRF/ IIED 2012b: 11). Also in our conversations 
Joseph repeatedly made this point clear, as illustrated in the following interview fragment94:  
Climate change is not new in Africa, especially for pastoralists. They are masters of 
adaptation; they have key strategies and knowledge. You don’t need to tell them about 
climate change, this is not new to them. They will tell you! The only problem is the laws 
and policies in our country. Our government is ignorant and there is a big knowledge gap. 
The minister of livestock was pro-mobility! He said that mobility is a key strategy, and 
then there was a radical shift of 180 degrees. All we need to have acknowledged is that 
the livelihoods of pastoralists is a system, and that mobility is part of it. […] Our leaders 
are very embarrassed. 52 billion dollars are collected in Ngorongoro Conservation Area 
and people are dying of hunger! One Maasai man saw that the water in his vicinity was 
gone, so he followed the pipe and saw that it is being collected to flush the toilets of 
tourists. One flush of a toilet is enough to keep a Maasai family alive for two days! 
Tourists need glittering toilets. Then the Maasai man rightfully complained: “and then 
they tell us about conservation”. 
Considering the historical continuity of the hijacking of scientific misconceptions by those in 
power – usually at the expense of the pastoralists’ interests - I believe that we can understand the 
newly coined term “masters of adaptation” as an explicit move to counter the victimization of 
pastoral communities. Moreover, in opposition to being “reckless wanderers” in need of 
                                                             
93 At times, the term “masters” was also interchangeably used with “experts” at adaptation. Many other 
terms in policy documents are used to describe the adaptive capacity of the pastoral system and dryland 
pastures. For example: “autonomous adaptation” is defined in a policy brief as “a unique understanding of 
how communities can best adapt to climate change, which is due to their in-depth and accumulated 
knowledge of their local environment”. 
94 It is important to note that Joseph clearly would not have articulated this point in the same words 
during the workshop in presence of the government as in the way he did to me. This strategy is in line 
with what Rottenburg (2009) and Bierschenk (2014) have observed; if people want development projects 
to succeed all actors must be “masters in role ambivalence” (Rottenburg 2009, in Bierschenk 2014). 
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education, it is a shift that emphasizes agency and denotes a more sophisticated environmental 
understanding and sustainable livelihood instead. Joseph’s statement above is interesting in so far 
that the shift from the metacode to the cultural code is unveiled.95 As Rottenburg reminds us, we 
need a metacode as the basic precondition for making a discussion possible in the first place 
(Rottenburg 2009; 2005). The metacode is employed in the language of objectivism: i.e. “climate 
change is real and it is affecting us all”. Outside the workshop setting, during interviews or 
informal talks, the cultural code manifested itself explicitly as a counternarrative. Hence, the term 
“masters of adaptation” can be regarded as the cultural code that seeks to debunk age-old myths 
that regard pastoral communities both as victims and perpetrators of the environmental changes. 
Tim 
As a member of the Vice President’s Office (VPO), Tim was invited to present the recently 
launched National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS). He summarized the main goal of the 
strategy, which is “to adapt to climate change and participate in global efforts to mitigate climate 
change with a view to achieving sustainable development”. Furthermore, he elaborated on how 
climate-change issues follow the institutional arrangement established in the Environmental 
Management Act (EMA) Cap 191 of 2004. In other words, climate change in Tanzania is 
channelled through existing frameworks and policies, and there is no stand-alone climate-change 
policy framework. As Tim further explicated:  
Climate change in Tanzania is addressing the politics of environmental management. We 
are using the environmental policy of 1997. We don’t have a policy working on climate 
change, because we recognize it as a crosscutting issue that cannot be treated in isolation. 
Here is a schematic representation of his account: 
                                                             
95 Following Rottenburg, the cultural code occurs when “players in the game” comment on the moves of 
other players before or after the game. Empirically speaking we can only observe code switches and code 
uses, whereas frameworks and perspectives remain explanatory models underpinning them (Rottenburg 
2009: xxix). 
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Source: URT 2011, National Climate Change Strategy (first draft), p. 43. 
He clarified how the overall coordination of the NCCS will be under the responsibility of the 
National Climate Change Focal Point (NCCFP, which is the VPO), and is at the same time in 
charge of preparing the national climate change framework guidelines (NAPs, NAMAs96 etc.). 
The National Climate Change Technical Commitee (NCCTC) and the National Climate Change 
Steering Commitee (NCCSC) will guide the implementation of the strategy, while being evaluated 
and supervised by the VPO. While the scheme gives a fairly decentralized impression, on closer 
inspection we glean that a great deal of climate-change-related responsibility is centralized in the 
VPO.97 Namely, the Division of Environment (DoE) – which is responsible for all climate 
change activities (in the VPO) – is both the NCCFP for the UNFCCC, as well as the Designated 
National Authority for Clean Development Projects under the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, the 
NCCST and the NCCTC are respectively chaired by the Permanent Secretary in the VPO and the 
Director of Environment (NCCS 2011: 41). It is in part against this background that we have to 
understand the aim of the workshop organizers to find ways to devolve the finances to the 
respective districts. 
                                                             
96 National Adaptation Plans; Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. 
97 In spite of various “sectoral policies” that are said to address climate change (NCCS 2011: 41). 
Sector 
ministries 
NGOs Media Research/ 
Academics 
Agencies  DPG-E 
UNFCCC 
NCCFP 
NCCTC 
COMMUNITY 
NCCSC 
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Tim talked also about the institutional set-up and how it is in turn embedded within and shaped 
by international agreements and conventions: “With the convention we mean the UNFCCC and 
with the Protocol we mean Kyoto Protocol, and with agreements we have some like the Cancun 
and Bali agreements, the Marrakesh Accords; those are some of the agreements that belong to 
the convention.” He then proceeded to sketch the financial picture:  
For the financing plan, the implementation of the strategy will largely depend on financial 
support from international community. Domestic funding from government budget, 
private sector, and individual contributions. Development partners are encouraged to 
support the government in implementing the strategy by providing technical and financial 
support, as well as facilitating resource mobilization. 
An insight into these complex transnational linkages and money flows illustrates that the 
positioning of the government of Tanzania regarding climate change can be characterized by a 
high degree of “extraversion”.98 For instance, one of the specific goals of the NCCS, as Tim 
explained, is to “facilitate accessibility and utilization of the available opportunities in the context 
of the convention and related protocols, as well as agreements”. And for financial support major 
funds are expected to come from the “external environment” through multilateral and bilateral 
funds, loans and grants and also revenue collection by the government. This is in a nutshell the 
financial plan of the Tanzanian government to access climate-change-related funds (as presented 
by Tim, but see also the NCCS 2011: 78). 
Multilateral Funds Bilateral Funds 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
Kyoto Protocol: Adaptation Fund (AF) 
UNFCCC:  
- Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) 
- Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) 
- Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
Governments of: 
- Australia 
- Germany 
- Japan 
- Spain 
- U.K. & E.U. 
- Norway, Denmark, Sweden 
- Ireland 
- Canada 
- The Netherlands 
- Switzerland 
 
Government Revenues Loans & Grants 
- National Environmental Trust Fund99 - World Bank Fund 
                                                             
98 According to Bayart, leading actors in sub-Saharan societies employ strategies of extraversion and 
resource mobilization – derived from the (possibly unequal) relation with the “external environment” – in 
a context when these actors seek to compensate for the fact that they have difficulties in autonomizing 
their power. He writes: “The ‘external environment’ is then turned into a ‘major resource in the process of 
political centralisation and economic accumulation’, and also in the conduct of the social struggles of 
subaltern actors from the moment they attempted to take control, even in symbolic ways, of ‘the relations 
with the exterior on which those who dominate the society base their power’” (Bayart 2000: 218-219).   
99 Not yet operational in 2011.  
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- Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
- Private- Public Partnerships 
- Local NGOs 
- Africa Development Bank Fund 
- East Africa Climate Change Fund 
- Individual Foundations and Funds 
 
The outward-directed financial gaze was met with criticism from the audience, and people 
questioned why there is a need to look for donors outside the country instead of creating their 
own resources within Tanzania. During a learning group workshop it was concluded, “this 
[outward] economic behaviour is being transformed by globalization and regionalism, trends 
which undermine inward looking economic nationalism” (TNRF/IIED 2012b: 5). After 
presenting the financial plan, an overview of all sector-related adaptation strategies followed. On 
the specific goals of the NCCS for the livestock sector Tim articulated two basic strategies as 
stipulated in the document:  
(1) First, it needs to promote climate change resilient livestock farming practices. We need to 
do research to see which type of cattle can be resistant, which has been brought about by 
climate change.  
(2) So there is a need to acquire appropriate technologies for livestock production systems.  
Finally, Tim concluded by emphasizing the fact that according to him the biggest challenge is 
related to land-use plans: 
I think this is among the big problems in Tanzania. Most of the areas do not have land-
use plans. So if people see a forest they just enter, and harvest what they want to harvest, 
bring their cattle and whatever. So if we have a land-use plan, so that we have a plan with 
the land we are doing this and this, this piece of land will be for this and this, the strategy 
needs to promote and enhance sustainable land-use planning at all levels. 
And also to mainstream climate change into land-use planning. Thank you! 
 
Adam 
After the audience had patiently listened to an hour of political rhetoric and expert talk, Adam, a 
Maasai man from the grassroots stood up and calmly began to articulate his concern: 
It is a pity that the minister never attends these conferences himself, and he always sends 
a representative. Because it would be good for us to speak to the minister himself. The 
first thing to say is that we are happy that the government made a [climate change] 
strategy, and that it has been brought to us, so we have understood that there is a national 
strategy. But here we have the members from three pastoralist societies, local pastoralists 
for more clarification. This project is being carried out in three districts inhabited by local 
pastoralists, namely Monduli, Ngorongoro and Longido. The government in this country 
is using a lot of money to protect animals like giraffe and elephant, but it does not even 
use a single shilling to protect a person known as the pastoralist. We are in danger of 
being chased away by the government from our land, where we have been living for 
several years. If we are not sure of the ownership of the land we have been inhabiting 
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today, you’re sleeping in the village but you are not sure if it is yours, because tomorrow 
the government may come and chase you away. […] I was born in 1956 at a place known 
as Sirotera. Before independence we were living in the Serengeti, later the government 
chased us away arguing that it is government land. So you are just chased away like 
animals. So how will this strategy help us so that we are going to have assurance of our 
land, which we are using for pastoralism? Because for me the big threat to pastoralists is 
not climate change! The big threat is that the government is going to take away our land 
and increase the vulnerability of pastoralists. To me this is the issue. To me climate 
change is not the issue. 
Though Adam began speaking serenely, towards the end of his speech he could not suppress his 
anger any longer. And in his attempt to peacefully communicate his grievance about the land 
situation of the pastoralists in Tanzania, he got carried away by his emotions and burst into fierce 
outrage. His anger was felt throughout the room, and the audience responded with an uneasy 
mixture of supportive applause and laughter. It was not the first time that I had observed such an 
emotional statement. Adam’s account was remarkable in so far as he did not only remind those in 
power of the marginalized position of the Maasai, but relegated the alarmism of climate change to 
the margins altogether. As will be demonstrated in chapter 6, Adam’s reluctance towards this new 
prophecy does not stand alone among Maasai communities. The same course followed when 
Rehema, a Maasai woman from the community level, stood up and aligned with her “brother”. 
She began her talk with a rather soft and careful tone of voice, but during the course of her 
speech anger gathered and she became very emotional:  
We can see that when the investors come they quickly get the land to invest but if you 
look the kind of the life that the indigenous peoples are living, it is very difficult that 
some of us have no land to establish settlements! 
Joseph thanked Tim for his presentation and for elaborating on the finances. He also supported 
Adam by reiterating the importance of his point, which according to him will need careful 
attention in the policy process. Two more questions from the audience were allowed before the 
next presenters were given the floor. The first question came from a Maasai herdsman, who 
aligned with Adam:  
Mr. chairman. I guess we want to have this point regarding different sectors clear. 
Concerning livestock you have mentioned two strategies, but there is this issue that is 
highly controversial, as my fellow here already mentioned, which is the issue of land 
acquisition for the pastoralists. I think it should be addressed in the national policy that 
the land acquisition of pastoralists is very important. It has not appeared; perhaps I did 
not catch it well, but I don’t think it was mentioned. 
A district officer raised the second concern: 
I cannot see in our general strategy, where is the local adaptation strategy for climate 
change reported in the national climate change system that we are trying to implement 
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now at the district level? Let me just remind you. Climate change is very [inaudible] […]. 
It is not the first time that this appears in the globe, it has been there several times 
particularly in those drylands, where people are living in semi-dry areas with local climate-
change strategies. 
While the second interlocutor did not reject climate change as such, in line with Adam he also 
relativised the threat by framing it rather as being part and parcel of normality in the drylands. As 
such, he reminded the audience that the pastoralists are all too familiar with changes in the 
climate, and have their own knowledge system. For the same reason, in his view, the district level 
is better equipped to deal with the issue than the national government. Tim and Vincent 
addressed the questions together: 
Tim: For the man about the government taking away the land from the pastoralists, I 
believe that what has been written about land use in the project, if we work with it I think 
we can get the solution. That the government and the pastoralists should sit together to 
see where can we have pastoralists in an area, and where can we also keep the animals. I 
think this is very very important for settling these disputes. 
Vincent: I have written myself about pastoralists, and I like the pastoralists so there is no 
way that the land could segregate the pastoralists. So it is in the strategy. The ministers are 
going to discuss how to solve the issue of pastoralism, and especially the issue of 
Loliondo. The prime minster saw the letter that the ministry is going to try to appoint 
certain people to deal with that issue. 
According to Joseph, this week in which a particular meeting took place (presumably about the 
Loliondo conflict) marked an historic moment, for it was the first time since the 1960s that the 
sector of livestock and pastoralism was given special weight within the nation-state. The Prime 
Minister had appointed a certain committee of experts in order to find a solution to this conflict. 
It was also the first time that I sensed a glimmer of hope in Joseph’s tone; as if a certain political 
breakthrough was about to take place. According to him, it was now the time to look forward for 
constructive solutions: “This is a very, very big issue. But what I have heard yesterday, there is a 
way. The Prime Minister is recognizing the current problems and wants to solve the issue once 
and for all by including the pastoralists. So let us now concentrate on how to talk to the 
government on how to move forward”. 
Expanding the network and rendering adaptation technical 
Joseph reiterated the aims of this workshop, which can be summarized as the attempt to expand 
the network and enrol different actors:  
The reason we are here is to discuss the proceedings of this project. Furthermore, we are 
trying to see how we can cooperate with different partners who are all doing the same 
work. We have our fellows doing different research for different organizations. We also 
have our colleagues from England, who will share their experiences. Some of you might 
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remember that we have cooperated before on the issue of natural resources. The district 
cannot stand alone, and must try to connect to the national level. For example, we have 
talked to TMA [Tanzania Meteorological Agency], and we saw that there is no way to 
move forward without them telling us about climate change. 
Part of translating Adaptation forms the establishment and expansion of a network of both 
people and things. Sociologist Michel Callon (1986) has called the implementation of strategies  – 
in which the various roles allocated to others are defined and interrelated – enrolment, and this also 
forms part of translating the will to adapt. We can see that in this adaptation programme 
enrolment occurs through the reinforcing of existing ties, as the revitalization of these old 
entanglements also attest to. This means that a partner organization that was providing expertise 
before, in terms of, let us say, natural resources or conservation, can now also offer knowledge 
on climate-change adaptation. But first a problem needs to be identified. Expert knowledge, 
underpinned by science and accompanied by certain technologies, is deemed indispensable in this 
process. Very often this type of expertise is imported from technologically “advanced societies”, 
such as Europe or the U.S. Interestingly enough, as other authors have also demonstrated, 
sometimes the order of things is completely reversed and a problem is identified according to the 
solution experts have to offer (Rottenburg 2009: xxvii; Li 2007: 7). This problematization falls under 
the second key practice that Li distinguishes as part of translating the will to improve into explicit 
programs (which is linked to rendering things technical, see also Callon 1986 below). It is a 
process in which a whole set of practices concerned with representing the domain to be governed 
is made into an “intelligible field”. This is the job of experts who are trained and paid to define 
problems in technical terms (Li 2007: 7).  
In studying the role played by science and technology in structuring power relationships, 
sociologist of science Michel Callon has also discerned four moments of translation that have 
proven fruitful for my analysis. According to Callon, translation is a process in which researchers 
impose themselves and their definition of the situation upon others. He has defined 
problematization (the first moment of translation) as follows:  
[…] the researchers sought to become indispensable to other actors in the drama by 
defining the nature and the problems of the latter and then suggesting that these would 
be resolved if the actors negotiated the “obligatory passage point” of the researchers’ 
programme of investigation (Callon 1986: 196). 
The obligatory passage point is in this case when actors accept the problem of climate change as 
real, and consequently agree to the experts’ role as being indispensable in the overall program of 
intervention. Experts are to some degree similar to scientists, as they are academically trained and 
employ scientific methods, but their strategies are directly aimed at the improvement of the 
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situation (Bierschenk 2014: 79). In order to illustrate their instrumental role let me introduce you 
to the experts John and Madumi. 
John 
One of the member organizations of the adaptation project is a European knowledge centre that 
provides basic mapping technologies and data-management support. As a researcher working for 
this organization John was invited to share his scientific insights with the workshop participants. 
John began to work with the adaptation project in the comparative phase, about a year prior to 
the workshop, and has been supporting them mainly with data management. 
We are specialized in information and social systems. So I am gonna talk about what we 
have done over the last year, in terms of modelling the impact of climate change, 
response and adaptation. […] Through a chain, a process by which data came from local 
people, which was validated, checked in the field and integrated into a standardized data 
system. It contains a whole draft of information sources, different types, base data, social 
data, physical data, information about pastures, location. 
 
 
What often happens in this “problematization” process is that experts represent the field of 
intervention in extremely complex terms. For example, digital representations of the field are 
shown in highly sophisticated schemes, graphs, and figures and explained by complex feedback-
loops. Here are other illustrations presented by John: 
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Furthermore, what I have often observed during these workshops is that the technical solutions 
are based on other, remote socio-ecological systems that are at best analogous to the situation at 
hand (pastoral systems elsewhere, e.g. in Ethiopia), but at worst may be very different. This can 
result in far-flung experiences from Jamaica, Bangladesh or China being used as blueprints for 
adaptation planning in northern Tanzania. As John explained: 
I will go on to explain some of the current things that we have been doing, not in Africa 
so much but in Asia. […] We did a lot of things in the Ganges, in the Bangladesh Delta. 
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Now these are riverine examples but the principles remain the same: how do we use 
ecosystem services and how do we measure what those are? 
 
John’s representation of adaptation as an extremely complex reality on the one hand, and yet as 
an “intelligible field” – for those who are endowed with the appropriate knowledge and 
technology – on the other, forms a part of his making himself, as an expert, indispensable. The 
“obligatory passage point” is attained when the different parties accept their knowledge as truth, 
after which ties are officially established. It was clear from the audience’s quiet response that his 
presentation had left people in great awe of the alleged complexity. When Joseph took over the 
floor he remarked that: 
The only thing that I understood was the blue charts. So you will hopefully forgive me, I 
got lost a lot but it is really mind-blowing, but … ehm, I think this is part of the 
complexity of science, and part of the visualization and so on. 
I take the silence that followed after John’s presentation as a testimony of the discrepancy 
between the highly abstract and complex scientific representation of reality on the one hand, and 
how local Maasai communities express and relate to the particulars and lifelikeness of human 
experience on the other. Two Maasai men responded by saying that images and satellites always 
need to be crosschecked and complemented with what is “really going on in different localities”. 
They objected to the static representation of these images, and argued that landscapes change all 
the time so these images might already be outdated. These two Maasai men were in fact 
contrasting the abstract method of science – and its universal value – with their personal 
observations that have emerged from (embedded) engagement and experience with their 
environment.  
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In fact, this was a frequently heard response from local community members. Whenever satellite 
images of a particular locality were presented, many felt that the pictures needed to be 
complemented with “the real situation”. Furthermore, when climate change was presented as the 
main cause of (environmental) change, it was not necessarily accepted at face value by the 
pastoralists. For instance, a Maasai man challenged the conclusion that climate change is causing 
changes by arguing that we have to look at environmental destruction instead: 
The main reason for the disappearance of the green colour [representing grass and forests 
on the satellite picture] is just environmental destruction, because rain can fall only in a 
place where there is a good distribution of forest. Thus if all the trees have been cleared it 
will not rain, unless there is a mountain that can pull the rain. So these have a great effect, 
because for example bees need flowers to make honey. So when there are no trees to 
produce these flowers how are the bees going to make honey? Also keeping cows requires 
grasses, so how can we continue keeping cows if land is used for agriculture? This is the 
problem of environmental destruction. 
Sheila Jasanoff has described this encounter as “the tension that arises when the impersonal, 
apolitical and universal imaginary of climate change projected by science comes into conflict with 
the subjective, situated and normative imaginations of human actors engaging with nature” 
(Jasanoff 2010: 233). John’s standardized chain of causal explanations of how to analyze changes 
and make use of ecosystem services, clearly follows what cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner 
(1986) has termed a “paradigmatic” or “logico-scientific mode” of knowing. The objective of the 
paradigmatic mode is to fulfil the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description and 
explanation. Moreover, in its higher reach for abstraction this mode of knowing is in search of 
universal truth conditions and general causes; hence, it disclaims the explanatory value of the 
particular (Bruner 1986: 11- 13). Bruner has placed this mode of thought in opposition to the 
“narrative mode of knowing”; which has a distinctive way of ordering experience and 
constructing reality. It is important to add that, while these distinctive modes are irreducible to 
one another, Bruner sees them as complementary. He summarized the narrative mode as follows: 
The imaginative application of the narrative mode […] deals in human or human-like 
intention and action and the vicissitutes and consequences that mark their course. It 
strives to put its timeless miracles into the particular of experience, and to locate the 
experience in time and place (ibid: 13). 
The point of differentiating two different modes of knowing is that it enables us to observe that 
when the story of climate change travels, the abstract paradigmatic mode of knowing the world 
becomes increasingly beset with a particular and located (Hastrup 2015) understanding and 
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expressing it.100 On a somewhat different level, but one I deem useful and comparable here 
nevertheless, pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty has criticized the general preoccupation of 
the Anglo-American philosophy, which he brings down to the question of “How to know truth” 
(which he overall rejects); and which he then contrasts with the more comprehensive question of 
“How we come to endow experience with meaning” (the question that occupies the poet and the 
storyteller) (Rorty in Bruner 1986: 12). Therefore, perhaps the role of the anthropologist does not 
differ much from that of the poet or the storyteller, with the primary task of bringing into view 
the relation between people’s lived climatic experiences and the system of meaning it engenders. 
It is important to emphasize that I am not trying to create a dichotomy between so-called 
“indigenous knowledge” (i.e. Maasai) and science (as represented by John). Instead, I follow Arun 
Agrawal, who dismantled this divide by arguing that all knowledge systems are endlessly 
heterogeneous. Moreover, he rightly stated that the focus on difference seems to fix and seperate 
in time and space systems that can never be separated, because they have been in intimate 
interaction since at least the 15th century (Agrawal 1995, see next chapters). Nevertheless, the 
fact that we cannot treat these knowledge systems in opposition does not mean that there are no 
differences. In line with Mara Goldman (Goldman et al. 2015) and many other authors who have 
embraced the “ontological turn”, I argue that these differences should not so much be explained 
in epistemological terms (how do people know about the climate), but rather in ontological terms 
(how do different enactments of climate take place). The authors build their argument on recent 
case studies in which contradictory responses to drought were explored. In 2008/9 a severe 
drought hit much of Eastern Africa, and the Maasai were badly affected. The problem was not so 
much the rainfall quantity (they had experienced worse years), but rather that the pastures were 
depleted. For them it was the worst drought in living memory and they reacted by moving with 
their cattle. In 2010/11 another drought hit the region. And according to scientific data this 
drought was much worse, even the worst in the region in over 60 years. Yet, for the Maasai and 
regional NGOs it was not a drought, so neither humanitarian aid nor livestock sales were 
mobilised. What mattered for the Maasai were their mobilising strategies and systems of 
reciprocity; in other words, their enactment of drought was key in how they experienced it. As the 
authors have rightfully observed in the context of different responses to drought in Maasailand: 
conflicts over knowledge are usually about a lot more, about ontological differences (Goldman et 
al. 2015). I have termd this inseperability between ways of knowing and being an “inclusive 
ontological weave” of the world through which the Maasai nurture their relationships to each 
                                                             
100 John’s account can also not be reduced to “science” alone, but I see it as the manifestation of what is 
expected of an expert in his role. 
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other and to nature.101 In other words, in the next chapters we shall see that for the Maasai in 
Terrat, the notion of climate evokes a whole different set of social, moral and environmental 
connections from those recognized in a scientific and technocratic understanding of it. 
Madumi 
Let us now turn to another expert. As a member of the Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA), 
Madumi was invited to explain the evidence behind climate change in Tanzania. TMA is the main 
institution for the collection and dissemination of climate data and weather forecasting in the 
country. A challenge for Maasailand and the northern highlands is that a huge lacuna of data 
exists. For places like Terrat, the most reliable rainfall data can be obtained from private farms in 
the vicinity such as Sukuro (McCabe, personal communication). Since independence, many 
weather stations and instruments have been out of order. And during my visits to the TMA 
offices in Dar es Salaam and Arusha Airport, I was told that they do not have the money to 
maintain the instruments. For the workshop Madumi came to talk about the “observed impacts, 
climate-change scenarios, and on how to monitor information”: “As you can see the problem is 
global warming. We had twelve years that were too warm”:
 
                                                             
101 As Agrawal also argued “Instead of trying to conflate all non-western knowledge into a category, it may 
be more sensible to accept differences within these categories and perhaps find similarities across them”. 
(Agrawal 1995: 427) He further assured that it makes much more sense “to talk about multiple domains 
and types of knowledges with differing logics and epistemologies” (p. 433). The author furthermore 
distinguished three themes that have emerged in differentiating these knowledge systems. The first theme 
is substantive and refers to the subject matter that is addressed (IK is allegedly only dealing with daily 
livelihoods of people rather than abstract ideas and philosophies). The second theme is methodological and 
sees IK methods as based on common sense, intuition, and as closed and non-systematic. The third theme 
is contextual and holds that IK is more deeply rooted in its context. These claims can easily be discarded. 
Nevertheless, as I demonstrate in chapter 8, I believe that the idea that Maasai knowledge is embedded in 
a different worldview can be sustained. 
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Madumi explained that when we talk about global warming we mean the industrial revolution, 
which is basically “done in the developed world”, and which has pumped lots of Greenhouse 
Gasses into the atmosphere. In order to explain the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, he made a comparison with wearing a thick blanket that captures the heat, “whereby 
the long-wave radiation instead of being backtracked into space it bounces back into the 
atmosphere, and thereafter you know the warming”. For evidence of climate change in Tanzania 
he showed graphs from Zanzibar and explained that TMA has observing stations that have data 
from the 1920s. He also showed data from a place called Engare Rongai, which he picked 
because it is fairly close to the three dry districts (Monduli, Longido and Ngorongoro) that are 
also characterized by a bimodal rainfall pattern. He showed the rainfall for the month of 
December because this month usually receives most rainfall. He concluded that: “We can see on 
this graph that there is a decline in rainfall. So it explains something.” 
 
Madumi furthermore spoke about the shifting seasonal rains and increasing dry spells in a place 
called Mpanda Boma, which is located in southwest Tanzania. They have observed both a 
shortening of the rainy season from 4 to 1.5 months, and an increasing risk during dry spells. The 
dark line (in the figure on the right) represents the period from 1959 until 1983, and the pink line 
is the period from 1983 until 2007. He clarified the graph as follows: 
Comparatively, if you look at the latter years, you see that in November when the rain 
sets, the risk is also 10%. But look at the way in which risk is fluctuating with time, as you 
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go towards the end of the season. Between January and March, look at the dry spells; they 
will get to a risk of about 60%. 
 
 
It is worth noting that the case of Mpanda Boma does not lend itself very well to a comparison 
with northern Tanzania, because the southern part of the country can be characterized by 
unimodal rainfall as opposed to bimodal rainfall patterns in the northern part of the country. The 
climate predictions for both regions differ significantly. It is expected that an increase in rainfall 
of 5% - 45% will occur in areas with a bimodal rainfall pattern, whereas those regions with 
unimodal rainfall are expected to experience decreased rainfall of 5% - 15% (URT, NAPA 2007: 
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14).102 It should be clear that for my analysis I am not necessarily interested in the question of 
whether science is used correctly or not, but rather in how science – while being circulated and 
translated – produces certain truths. We shall see below that these underpinning strategies can be 
fairly random and selective, for different actors arrive at conflicting conclusions. All these claims 
and counterclaims form part of the politics of translation. 
Finally Madumi elaborated on TMA’s strategy to improve the monitoring and dissemination of 
climate-change data in the country. They are facing many challenges regarding data collection, as 
they lack the financial means and do not have enough stations, which impedes accurate 
measurement and makes countrywide forecasting impossible:   
We have the plan to increase our stations, because the stations that we have are few. We 
need 108 stations, working on the land, to measure land, wind and rainfall. We are having 
now 28 that TMA is directing. 
He also explained that TMA wants to improve the dissemination of data, which is occurring now 
only occasionally and with a seasonal outlook. The data are collected at the regional centres and 
brought back to the national level, so it takes a while before they reach the rest of the country. In 
addition to the conventional media such as television and newspapers, mobile phones are 
increasingly being used. Madumi said that they want to find ways to get this information to the 
pastoralists. He also added that he thinks it is important to include traditional forecasting, and 
receive feedback from the local level, as he knows that the pastoralists are good forecasters 
because they have their own traditional forecasting techniques. 
                                                             
102 In the NAPA it is furthermore concluded that: “An analysis of total annual rainfall for 21 
meteorological stations in selected regions of Tanzania indicated that there is a decreasing trend for over 
13 stations (61.9%) whereas an increasing rainfall trend was observed over 7 stations (33.33%) and 1 
station had almost a constant pattern” (URT, NAPA 2007: 15). 
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One Maasai man from the audience (with a very low voice) made an important comment: 
We are pastoralists and we know about the rainfall. Even though I did not go to school, 
we know about the weather. We can look at the birds, at the clouds, so if TMA says it will 
rain, we may not accept it sometimes. But for this year the information really worked. 
The Maasai and the pastoralists do not always believe in the information that is given by 
TMA, because we have our local ways of predicting. 
This herder touched upon the heart of the challenges that are brought about by the encounter of 
different knowledge systems. The question arises regarding under what conditions people accept 
certain knowledge claims as truth. There are both epistemological and cultural reasons why the 
Maasai do not easily embrace weather forecasting information from scientific sources (to which I 
will come back in the next chapters). Whereas science in the context of climate change is 
circulating as a hegemonic and privileged knowledge regime, it is important to keep in mind that 
weather information as disseminated by TMA in its current form is not very useful for people 
living in the northern drylands. As the following question pointed out: 
You have been giving out this prediction and we are getting it. The big problem for the 
farmers and also the pastoralists is that if you say it will rain, for us, you might predict a 
big rainfall. Is it possible that you give at least accurate information that if the rainfall will 
rain it is for how long? For example, you can say four months or three months. Because 
that is more useful to us, for us who are farmers and pastoralists. 
One of the challenges of climate- and weather forecasting for the northern highlands is the fact 
that the area can be characterized by a high degree of spatial and temporal variability. And the 
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stations can only predict regionally without differentiating between localities, which makes the 
information for the pastoralists generally inadequate. Furthermore, these semi-arid regions are 
subject to both inter- and intra-annual variations in rainfall, which means that rainfall fluctuates 
not only between years but also during seasons. For the predictions to be of any use they must be 
much more accurate, in terms of both the temporal and the spatial dimensions. The pastoralists 
are very well aware of this and therefore prefer to trust their own forecasting techniques. Finally, 
the visualized form in which the information is cast is often very abstract and too complex to 
understand for local communities, as one Maasai woman remarked: 
 
They should go further to try to simplify at least the ways the chart, the diagram, the 
pictures – what does it mean? It is sometimes a bit difficult for the pastoralists to 
understand. It is good that you are giving out information through TV, radio, but there is 
a problem. Some parts in the country, especially the parts where the pastoralists are 
found, radio and TV don’t reach those places. So we need to be critical and find a way, so 
there is a need to find a way much more that the information can reach the pastoralists 
because radio and TV are not found in the interior part. 
 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a certain ambiguity in the way in which the science of climate 
change (adaptation) is communicated. The visualized abstractions (in the form of facts, figures 
and graphs) and the level of complexity trigger both a certain fascination and detachment. In the 
case of the latter, little resonance is found among the pastoralists, and we can observe that in the 
translation process a disjunction emerges between science and local ways of knowing and relating 
to the climate. 
Elijah 
The last presenter was Elijah, who gave a very noteworthy presentation. As a researcher based at 
the University of Dodoma, Elijah had carried out research in name of an Indigenous CSO. Elijah 
talked about the study that he and a colleague had been carrying out in different regions inhabited 
by pastoralists and hunter-gatherers (P&H-G). One of the districts under scrutiny was Simanjiro, 
and by sheer coincidence, part of their analysis has been the village of Terrat. Elijah summarized 
the aim of the research, which was to study “the impacts of climate change on land use patterns 
and on livelihoods of pastoral and hunter-gatherer communities”. He shared a graph of annual 
total rainfall in Simanjiro District: 
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Figure 5.1: Simanjiro District Annual Total Rainfall (mm) 1980 – 2010 
 
Source: TMA 2012, in Bwagalilo & Mwakipesile 2012: 17  
 
A combined rainfall graph of the different study areas was also displayed in order to illustrate the 
inherent climate variability of the region. The red line depicts Simanjiro: 
 
Elijah used these graphs to make it clear that rainfall variability is an important characteristic of 
rangelands, or Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) including Hanang and Simanjiro. As a result of 
this inherent variability, he explained, “pastoralists in these areas have adapted to variations by 
developing different mechanisms to ensure their resilience”. 
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After clarifying the different methods that were used, which was a combination of both 
quantitative mapping (using remote sensing, GIS and satellite images of land-use cover) and 
qualitative techniques (focus group discussions, interviews), Elijah went on to share the main 
research findings:  
Findings suggest climate change to be an insignificant reason to change of [sic] way of 
living of P&H-G communities. Therefore the impacts discussed refer greatly to climate 
variability and land-use change rather than climate change per se. […] This study 
therefore, is aimed at looking at changes that have occurred in land-use plans in P&H-G 
communities. 
Against all alarming predictions the researchers have intentionally put forward “a thoroughly [sic] 
and thoughtful challenge that an ongoing advocacy of the impacts of climate change on P&H-G 
communities does not balance the reality” (report 2012: 16). It should be mentioned that this 
research distinguishes itself from the other scientific studies presented above, in the sense that 
“detached” scientific data have been complemented with more engaged ethnographic fieldwork. 
Local experiences and perceptions of the pastoralists themselves have been included; hence also 
social and more localized and contextualized data feature throughout their analysis.103 After 
considering both socio-cultural dimensions; land use changes; detailing an extensive literature 
review about the equilibrium versus non-equilibrium paradigm; and an historical analysis of the 
adaptation skills of the pastoralists the researchers have come to conclude that: 
[…] P&H-G communities have existed in ASAL [Arid and Semi-Arid Lands] for more 
than three hundred years with climatic variability. Nevertheless, the influence of both 
internal and external forces like policies and legislations on land and wildlife has placed 
these communities at more risks [than climate change]. Their livelihood systems’ 
resiliency has decreased significantly following a change in herds’ mobility patterns and 
hunting-gathering patterns, for example as a result of land use and cover change.104   
Elijah made it clear during the workshop that they are not denying climate change and its 
worldwide impacts. Their findings support the fact that the pastoralists and hunter-gatherer 
communities are greatly affected by climate variability, such as the severe drought of 2009. But by 
the very comprehensive nature of their analysis, the researchers have sought to bring complexity 
                                                             
103 In the research report decision-makers are criticized for largely drawing upon technical expertise 
without taking local understandings into account. For instance, the expansion of conservation lands has 
been undertaken without considering the needs of the adjacent communities (Bwagalilo & Mwakipesile 
2012: 50). 
104 Another partner NGO in the region has come to a similar conclusion and argues that there are no data 
to confirm a permanent shift in the patterns and amount of rainfall over the last 30 years. In a training 
manual for the districts it is written that: “The rainfall variability we are seeing today is not so different to 
rainfall variability we have seen in the past”. Furthermore, it is also acknowledged that rainfall predictions 
are not very certain in comparison with temperature measurements, for which more confident 
meteorological data exist (TNRF 2012: 4-5). 
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into the debate, and their results suspended the singling out of climate change as the primary 
determining factor of vulnerability. Indeed, their research findings can be read as a critique 
against climate determinism:  
Nevertheless, it should also be understood that ASAL including Hanang and Simanjiro 
are characterized by rainfall variability, which is an important characteristic of rangelands. 
Pastoralists in these areas have therefore adapted to variations by developing different 
mechanisms to ensure their resiliency. Findings on pastoralists’ awareness on [sic] the 
effect of climate change impacts suggest that pastoralists have suffered greatly, however, 
one factor should not be singled out. There could be more factors perpetuating many 
challenges facing pastoralists in Tanzania. […] Despite the fact that climate change 
impacts have negatively affected livelihoods of different communities in the world, it is 
not the only paramount reason to some areas. 
 
Elijah elucidated how limited access to land has severely impacted upon herd mobility, which in 
turn led to decreased milk production and impeded herds’ resilience. Furthermore, lack of land 
has forced the pastoralists to sell cattle as a way to adapt to land and water scarcity. Elijah showed 
the results for changing land cover for Terrat over the period from 1990 until 2010: 
 
Terrat Village Land Cover 1990 – 2010 in percentage  
 Land Use/ Cover Types 
Coverage Cover Change 
1990 2010 1990-2011 
  Ha % Ha % Ha % 
Bare Soil (brown)  0 2,540 13 2,540 13 
Bushland (pink) 4,268 21 2,360 12 -1,908 -10 
Cultivated Land (yellow) 7,961 40 4,782 24 -3,179 -16 
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Cultivated Land Irrigated (dark green) 1,011       -1,011 0 
Grassland (light green) 2,150 11 3,811 19 1,661 8 
Inundated Bushland (dark blue) 1,157 6 5,219 26 4,062 20 
Inundated Grassland (light blue) 3,321 17 1,156 6 -2,165 -11 
Total 19,868 100 19,868 100     
Source: UDSM-IRA 2012, in Bwagalilo & Mwakipesile 2012: 41 
 
Elijah explained that the land-use cover changes in Terrat are somehow shrouded in mystery, 
since there has been biofuel plantation (Jatropha) expansion and also the establishment of private 
ranches, making it fairly unclear whether grassland and cultivated land have increased or 
decreased. Another factor that is important to take into account – beyond these satellite images 
that clearly always reduce complexity – is that Terrat forms a breeding ground for wildlife, which 
makes the area for a large part of the year inaccessible for cattle (I will come back to this point in 
chapter 7). Godson, a Maasai man from Terrat, took the floor to correct some of the conclusions 
and to give more details to the satellite images as presented:  
On the pictures the blue land is demarcated for pastoralists but we should not forget that 
the same area is not only for cattle but it is being used by a lot of wild animals, because 
we are close to Tarangire [national park]. So conservationists consider this to be part of 
their breeding ground. […] Also in 1990 there were no trees in that area, only grasses, and 
even when a lion came there was no place to protect yourself. Trees were uprooted to 
combat the tsetse fly. Now we see a lot of regrowth of the trees in Terrat. Perhaps there 
is a way to make it clear in the picture. 
In line with Godson, some other pastoralists followed and added an extraordinary amount of 
localized data and information about soil type, grasses, trees, seeds, etc. etc. What Godson and 
others tried to do was to “add reality” to the colourful abstractions depicted in these satellite-
produced representations. The researchers thanked Godson for his clarification, and added that 
this kind of information is really important for them. The researchers concluded that the main 
factors that have contributed to land use and cover change in the study areas – as their findings 
suggests – are climate variability, population growth and (in other localities) also the expansion of 
agriculture. They found that these changes are likely to affect P&H-G communities in several 
ways “including food security, way of life as well as peace and tranquillity”. As Elijah explained, 
P&H-G communities are victims of agricultural expansion because their land is taken to be idle 
land (while it is actually being used or left fallow for grazing). This has resulted in the 
establishment of farms at the expense of pastoral land. The expansion has involved rapid 
clearance of forest, and also – “as we all know” – rapid and uncontrolled grabbing of land. Elijah 
concluded by reiterating their main conclusion: 
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Climate change currently has emerged as a reason for many impacts on many aspects that 
threaten human existence on earth. Literatures and facts are put forward to prove the 
same as well as documentaries to support the same. Nevertheless, climate change alone 
cannot be established as a sole fugitive to [sic] crime against earth and survival of human 
being on earth. There are bunch of reasons to why the survival of human on earth is at 
threat [sic] and yet does not receive a big attention compared to climate change. 
In line with their findings therefore, the recommendations regarding adaptation to climate change 
are rather cast in the more encompassing language of “human rights”, including the securing of 
land rights. The report stresses that without the protection of land rights of indigenous 
communities, human rights violations will continue to take place in the form of massive land 
grabs. In a similar vein, other proposed solutions relate more broadly to the political economy 
and address the structural inequalities entailed by it, such as the political will to solve land issues, 
creating a conducive environment for an effective dialogue between policy makers and land users, 
and control the rapid agricultural expansion. Finally, this study proposes to mainstream land use 
cover changes as a priority into the Forum’s programmes with the aim to “guarantee tapping of 
local experiences in addressing the impact of climate variability to P&H-G communities in 
ASAL” (Bwagalilo & Mwakipesile 2012: 51).  
The way ahead 
After Elijah’s fairly unconventional and surprising talk it was time for the three districts to 
present their experiences with the adaptation project during the preparatory phase of the project. 
An important finding that was shared by all three districts was their experience of the conflicting 
ways in which the national government operates (slow, centralized and rigid mechanisms) and 
how the communities themselves adapt to the climate (highly flexible). For instance, local 
government authorities gather community opinions through a process called Opportunities and 
Obstacles for Development (O&OD). This meeting usually takes place in July and marks the 
beginning of the annual government planning and budgeting cycle. This is in contrast to 
community planning, which begins usually before the onset of the wet season in October and 
after that adjusts throughout the year, responding to the changing nature of the season (IIED 
April 2015). They all complained that the inflexible government planning mechanisms undermine 
the overall resilience of the districts. For example, the district officials explained that during the 
drought of 2009 the money from the national government came very late because it follows a 
pre-fixed budgeting cycle. Therefore, one of the aims of this workshop was to find ways to 
devolve climate finances to the respective districts, which is in turn an attempt to create more 
autonomy. As a colleague of Joseph lamented:  
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The districts do not have enough authority and autonomy to modify plans and budgets 
once they have been approved, so they cannot make flexible decisions. But farmers and 
pastoralists just look at the climate: is it going to rain, or is it not going to rain?  
Another contradiction between the two planning systems, as one participant from the districts 
made clear, is that one of the greatest adaptation strengths of the social system of the pastoralists 
is mobility: 
The social system and the government system on how to deal with adaptation are not 
matching. For example, the issue of mobility, the pastoralists cannot just stay in one place 
while the things are getting worse, so they keep on moving from place to place. So the 
issue of moving, a nomadic way of life, and the government plans cannot be put there so 
that is where the contradiction arises with this system of adapting to climate change. […] 
The plans of the government cannot be changed very easily; there is permission needed 
for changes to be made, while the social systems can change every time depending on the 
weather conditions. 
In fact, during the learning group sessions (consisting of 25 members) a consensus was reached 
among the district members that the pastoralists are actually mastering adaptation to climate 
change, and that their livelihoods can be very resilient. As a member from the Monduli learning 
group remarked: “The big thing that we have learnt here is that the pastoralists are capable of 
curbing the challenges of climate change”. The major problem that has been identified lies rather 
in the rigid government planning structure, which is not designed to capture the complexity of 
pastoral livelihoods. Hence, the proposed way ahead for the Adaptation project has been to find 
ways to bridge the planning gap by finding ways to draw down finance from national funds (cf. 
IIED 2015). The financial strategy that has been put forward is to create an Adaptation Fund – a 
decentralized and discretionary budget to support climate change – that will be under the control 
of the district, for which no permission from the national government is needed. One of the 
project coordinators, Sam (on behalf of Joseph and his colleagues) gave the last overview of the 
state of the project. He concluded by stating that:  
The objective is not to invest in Adaptation. But why? Adaptation is in order to build 
strong economies and livelihoods to address poverty and build economic value. That is all 
that we are looking at. We need to be able to demonstrate that investing in Adaptation is 
worthwhile. Then the Adaptation Funds that are available that we saw this morning that 
is available at the global level with various global actors they become more accessible. We 
also hope that this will demonstrate the benefits of channelling national climate 
adaptation funds down to the districts. 
One district official also mentioned that: “Climate change is not an environmental issue, but a 
development issue that is why we need to mainstream it within our development planning.” 
Indeed, I believe that there are many good reasons to argue that Adaptation has gained status as a 
new development narrative, which with all its discursive power shapes and is shaped by an array 
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of different actors who all seek to pursue their very own development goals and strategies (see 
Roe 1991). 
Concluding reflections 
By employing a microscopic analysis of the translation of Adaptation in the interstitial spaces in 
northern Tanzania, I have sought to bring to life the manifold ways in which this new narrative in 
the making unfolds and is enacted. The workshop has served as a window to look into the 
different practices and representational techniques that are used in a variety of ways by different 
actors and ideational communities. As such, it has given us insight into how the network is 
expanded, and how old ties are reinforced between actors that already cooperated in the past. I 
have demonstrated how the encompassing nature of the Adaptation to climate change discourse 
can strategically be used as a way of relabelling old fashions and development goals and projects. 
Hence, as is generally the case with development projects that are informed by transnational 
paradigms and newly available funds, it enables actors on the ground to support their own 
interests and pursue particular aims so as to safeguard their existence. This is also made possible 
due to the uncertainty of climate-change science, and the many opposing claims that have come 
to occupy the debate. Furthermore, I have given attention to the way in which science circulates 
and in this process appears to be fairly flexible, for it can randomly and strategically be used to 
support opposing and contrasting truth claims. It became clear that experts and policy-makers 
have a tendency to “render Adaptation technical”, whereby the Maasai are by and large portrayed 
as innately vulnerable or as “victims of climate change”. This needs to be considered as a political 
act in itself, because it masks the systemic injustices and a long history of marginalization that 
form part of the broader political economy and the Maasai predicament. Therefore, the fact that 
an umbrella CSO has refused to single out climate change as the paramount cause for the 
vulnerability of the Maasai – by bringing back the politics of land use – can be understood as a 
strategic counternarrative.  
While situating the workshop explicitly in a particular time and place, I have similarly tried to do 
justice to both historical continuities and discontinuities – in relation to older travelling ideas - 
that can be observed in the process of translating Adaptation. Over the years, experts (local 
NGO workers and visionary leaders such as Joseph) have acquired skilled practices that enable 
them to draw on a particularly useful rhetoric, while discarding a vocabulary that aggravated 
existing tensions between the pastoralists and the national government in the past. What is even 
more striking is that the voices from the grassroots attest to a general reluctance to accept climate 
change as a key driver of change and vulnerability. As Adam’s and Rehema’s account reveal, 
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these “grassroots” Maasai are not so impressed by the alleged looming climate-change crisis that 
is generally cast in the language of an ever-more catastrophic future. It is not the climate that they 
fear, but rather land alienations that have been made possible by their own national government. 
Although Adam and Rehema are given a platform to voice their concerns, it is hard to tell 
whether their voices matter and are actually “being heard” or whether they occupy a mere 
symbolic role. Only contingent forces and unforeseen political processes will tell whether this 
new narrative in the making will leverage change in their eternal struggle for autonomy and 
recognition of their rights and control over land. 
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Glossary of Maa words105 
 
Eleenore Exploration of grazing areas by the young men 
Emanyata Warriors’ village 
Emooto  To cope with difficult circumstances (loosely translates as “to adapt”) 
Endito  Young, unmarried girl (pl. intoyie) 
Eng’ai  God, rain, sky/ heaven 
Engijape Air (direct translation means air, but it can also include clouds, winds, weather, 
temperature) 
Engolong Sun 
Engop  Earth/ soil/ ground  
Engibelekeny Change 
Enkang’ Homestead (often referred to as Boma, the Swahili term) 
Enkanyit Mutual respect 
Ewoi aang’ Environment around the boma (it does not capture the “environment” as we know 
it) 
Ilang’eni People who are knowledgeable about weather forecasting 
Imbaalon Lambs 
Ilopir  Clouds that appear at the end of the dry season 
Irkisirat Summer (or vuli in Swahili) 
Koko  Grandmother (Bibi in Swahili) 
Kurumari This is best translated as “winter” because it is relatively cold (kipupwe in Swahili) 
Lengare  Water (or L’enkare) 
Lolodoendolit Red bone marrows 
Olaigwanani Traditional Maasai leader (elected by the community) 
Olaimg’ang’a Sky 
                                                             
105 Here I follow Maasai orthography, but there are dialectic variations. Some words in Terrat are 
pronounced differently, for instance, olaigwanani is pronounced as alaigwanani. Also pronounced with an a 
are alari, aileilili and alamei.  
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Olaji  Age set/ grade (pl. ilajijik) 
Olamei  Dry season (kiangazi in Swahili) 
Olari  Year (and also denotes the long rainy season, or Masika in Swahili) 
Oleilili  Dry-season reserve 
Olmorani Warrior (pl. Illmuran)  
Oloiboni Traditional spiritual healer and diviner 
Oltau  Soul, spirit 
Orkujita Grasses 
Osiwo  Strong winds 
Shumata Heaven 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrat in the rainy season, picture taken by author 
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Introduction 
 
In the prairies of Alberta, Canada, winters are cold, wood is scarce. This is a place that is 
home to Native Indians – many of them are well educated nowadays. One summer, a 
young Indian Chief, college-educated, but incapable of reading the signs of Mother 
Nature, was asked by his people how cold the next winter would be. Embarrassed about 
not having mastered the traditional skills for predicting the weather, and to be on the safe 
side, he just said to his people: “Well, I think this will be a pretty cold winter this year”. 
He then sought help from his college friend, a meteorologist at the local Weather Channel 
station. “Tell me, Michael, don’t you think we are facing a cold winter this year?” Equally 
unable to predict the weather so far ahead, and also to be on the safe side, Michael the 
meteorologist confirmed the Chief’s opinion: “Yes, you may be right, Chief. This winter 
could turn out to be pretty cold”. Happy about this confirmation the Chief went back to 
his people and confidently declared: “I see signs that the next winter will be pretty cold – 
let’s start collecting wood now”. And so the Indians started to collect wood along the few 
rivers. As autumn neared, the young Chief returned to the meteorologist and asked: 
“Michael, now that winter is getting closer, how cold do you think will it be this year?” – 
“Oh, I think this will be a really cold winter”, came the answer. So the Chief went back to 
his people and announced: “Folks, this year, I know, the winter will be particularly cold – 
let’s all join forces to collect as much wood as we can”. A few weeks later the Chief asked 
his meteorologist friend for a more accurate prediction of the winter. The meteorologist 
answered: “I am certain this will be an extremely cold winter!” Back with his people, the 
Chief announced: “People – I have signs that this winter will be so cold that none of our 
fathers, as long as our memory reaches, have encountered. Let’s collect all the wood we 
can find!” Just before the winter the Chief consulted his meteorologist friend again, and 
the meteorologist told him: “This is going to be a record-breaking winter!” Curious about 
his certainty, the Indian Chief asked: “Michael, tell me, how do you know this?” To which 
the meteorologist replied: “You know, my friend, I have never seen this before: all the 
Native Americans have been collecting wood like crazy this year” (adopted from Huang 
2013: 415-416).106 
While intended somewhat jokingly by the storyteller, I believe there is a striking truth about this 
“folktale of the Indian and the meteorologist” in the context of this study. It captures vividly the 
positive-feedback cycle that is possibly incited by the global circulation of climate-change 
discourses and scientific information. And, as will be argued here, there are many good reasons to 
believe that anthropological climate-change studies are part and parcel of, and to some extent 
also nourishing, this corroborative chain. I remember my research assistant’s reply after I had 
asked her on the phone, upon my return from the field, how she was doing: “We are doing fine, 
but we are really suffering from climate change.” Her answer had triggered some discomfort 
about the traces that I had left, as she was unaware of the phenomenon of climate change before 
we had met. The point here is only partly a constructivist one – in the sense that we use language 
to give meaning to and create the world. In other words, once we have the discursive frame of 
                                                             
106 There are many different versions of this story found online and it is difficult to trace the original 
source, but it is circulating as some sort of modern folktale or “weather joke”. 
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“global warming” at hand, we can begin to see the world through this lens. But the issues that are 
at stake here are also about representation and translation. A tricky epistemological dilemma that 
arises in this context, which has occupied the anthropology of climate change for a while now, is 
the question how our informants can know about climate change. It is important to note here 
that the epistemological practices of “remote” communities in the Global South are by and large 
treated in a radically different way (acquired solely through observation) from the ways in which 
people in the Global North accumulate their knowledge (through reception). Inspired by the 
work of Rudiak-Gould, in this chapter I wish to advance the argument that in this increasingly 
mediated and connected world, it is a timely exercise to dismantle this divide. Another question 
(which has received less attention) is: what role does the ethnographer play in the 
representational practices, which unavoidably form the basis of these truth-claims? And are the 
“global” or etic categories (often advanced in the language of crisis and catastrophe) that we have 
at hand well equipped to accurately describe and do justice to local realities? Indeed, these 
questions might very well bring us back to the older debate that held anthropology in sway in the 
80s, which came to be known as the Writing Culture debate, to which I will return only briefly 
below.  
A sharp reader has perhaps already observed the similarities between Leboi’s story at the 
beginning of this manuscript and that of the well-educated Indian Chief. When Leboi (among 
others) was asked to share his own local weather observations on an international platform it was 
taken as “evidence” of climate change, with him being a representative of the “grassroots” and 
“nature-bound” people. The rationale behind organizing a public hearing on grassroots climate 
testimonies was based on exactly the idea that “environmentally-savvy” people, who live close to 
and are directly dependent on nature, know what they are talking about when they talk about 
climate change. For their long-standing knowledge is built on ancestral wisdom, and moreover, 
unlike “detached” urban Westerners who have lost touch with Mother Nature, grassroots people 
have by and large “ecologically trained” senses. So the argument goes.107 Yet crucial here for our 
                                                             
107 Even though this take on the difference between these knowledge-making traditions is exaggerated 
here, it is not uncommon to find such general statements about indigenous knowledge as opposed to 
science. Of course, the reverse argument – that science is superior to indigenous knowledge – is more 
often pursued, as science forms the basis of all IPCC reports etc. (Even though this is changing since 
there is an increasing appreciation of incorporating indigenous approaches into scientific reports such as 
the IPCC). Yet, as anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup has also pointed out, since the increasing interest in 
knowledge-making as a field of inquiry (testified by the success of science studies), the uneasiness with this 
opposition has grown (Hastrup 2015: 140). See also Julie Cruikshank’s work on the Arctic in which she 
debunks this stark opposition between scientific and indigenous knowledge (e.g. Cruikshank 2007). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, a landmark attempt to dismantle the divide between indigenous and 
scientific knowledge has already been proposed by Arun Agrawal, when the notion of indigenous 
knowledge became “a glamorous phrase” within development thinking (Agrawal 1995).  
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understanding of Leboi’s account is that prior to the meeting, the information about this 
phenomenon had already reached him. Just like the Indian Chief, considering the fact that Leboi 
featured in several educational programs, we can assume that during that time he was already 
fairly well educated about climate change. Thus being exposed to scientific information Leboi 
inevitably embarked on a process of reception, here understood as “the uptake of scientific 
theories, measurements, and predictions of global warming as disseminated by journalists, 
teachers, government officials, and other science communicators” (Rudiak-Gould 2014a: 75). 
This is not to say that his account at the conference was necessarily untruthful; but the point here 
is rather that these allegedly disparate knowledge systems are increasingly entangled, and should 
thus – when deemed necessary – be treated as such.  
This is not to say that people cannot know their climates (or environments) directly. By 
proposing a theory of direct perception Tim Ingold has criticized such a “cognitivist account of 
perception” – which holds that people can only know and act upon their environment indirectly 
through the medium of cultural representations – the roots of which lie, according to Ingold, in a 
Western dualistic worldview. He proposes an alternative theory of perception by introducing the 
notion of mutualism (as a continuous intercourse between a person and the environment), which 
in very general terms he refers to as “the life process”. According to Ingold, a person can in fact 
acquire direct knowledge of his environment in the course of his practical activities (Ingold 2000: 
39-40). While I embrace Ingold’s phenomenological take, the point here is related to knowing 
climate change directly, which is of a different nature than knowing the environment. The 
difference lies in the type of knowledge that is generated. To give just one example, the statement 
“it is raining” is a first-order observation; but to say “this is climate change” is inevitably a 
second-order observation for nobody can say with certainty if and when a particular weather 
event or climatic manifestation falls under (human-induced) climate change. I believe therefore, 
that there are good reasons for anthropologists to be wary of contributing to this positive- 
feedback-cycle, as in the “folktale of the Indian and the meteorologist”. This caution is important 
for reasons that I wish to make clear throughout this chapter. One point of interest that is worth 
mentioning here, and which is due to the overall focus on observation, is that the anthropology 
of climate change has positioned itself initially as a subfield of environmental anthropology. This 
has brought about a research paradigm that treats global warming mainly as a local ecologically 
experienced hazard, rather than as a globally disseminated idea or discourse (Rudiak-Gould 
2011). 
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In this regard I share Kirsten Hastrup’s (2015) uneasiness with the current engagement of 
anthropology with the climate that seems to include “a rather strange return to a kind of holism”, 
in which traditional knowledge is treated as an immutable and bounded system (Hastrup 2015: 
146). Therefore, she proposes to replace the old-fashioned concept “local”, so well-known to 
anthropologists, with the notion of “located” knowledge that denotes the entanglement of place 
and epistemic practices. Particularly vital is her observation that we need to get away from both 
puzzle-solving (the unproductive residue from twentieth century anthropology) as well as casting 
people as mere victims; and instead we should aim to contribute to demonstrate how different 
perspectives and practices of place may locate climate change differently (ibid). And she rightly 
remarks: […] “today we realize that all worldviews are plastic and continuously incorporating – 
and locating – knowledge coming from elsewhere, along with new patterns of weather and wind, 
for instance” (Hastrup 2015: 143). Nevertheless, while there seems to be indeed a burgeoning 
realization of the fact that cultures and related knowledge practices do not emerge in static and 
autonomous ways, there is also enough evidence within the climate-change literature that to a 
large extent they are still treated as such. As we learn from Rudiak-Gould for example, there are 
largely two sources through which people can gain knowledge about climate change. The first is 
through direct observation (with the naked senses) that can be interpreted as being linked to 
climate change, and the second is by the reception of information as mentioned above (Rudiak-
Gould 2011; 2014). In this context he has called to attention that, while the majority of studies 
dealing with so-called “frontline communities” focus on observation, and only some on 
reception, there is very little research carried out on the interaction between the two (Rudiak-
Gould 2014a: 75). Particularly within anthropology there is a tendency to focus on observation 
studies, in which local observations by communities in the Global South are by and large taken as 
a direct proof of climate change (e.g. Crate 2008; Crate & Nuttal 2009). In the following analysis 
we shall incorporate both observation and reception dimensions, for they mutually influence and 
are co-constitutive of each other.108 
 
                                                             
108 Rudiak-Gould has also demonstrated in his work in the Marshall Islands that reception does have a 
significant influence on people’s perceptions of climate change (2013b; 2014a). In a similar vein, the 
asymmetries regarding media coverage and people’s concern for global environmental problems also came 
to the fore in the ethnographic research carried out by the research team of the Climate Worlds project (see 
Greschke 2015). In my work on the Bamenda Grassfields in Cameroon I have come to a similar 
conclusion that people who are more exposed to discourses of global warming are more prone to talking 
about it and thus observing it (de Wit 2015). 
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Another important aspect that is touched upon by the “folktale of the Indian and the 
meteorologist” is the parallel struggle that both scientists and “environmentally savvy” people are 
confronted with in their pursuit to “know” and predict the weather and the climate. Whereas 
both knowledge systems are perhaps grounded upon different ontological principles, the climate, 
let alone climate change, barely allows itself to be known and understood. This holds particularly 
true for the Simanjiro plains, of which Terrat village forms a part, as it is characterized by climatic 
conditions that are spatially and temporally highly variable and unpredictable (McCabe 2003). The 
Maasai agro-pastoralists of Terrat are very well aware of this, yet they have their own detailed 
environmental knowledge and ways of forecasting the weather (for examples of weather 
forecasting indicators see box 6.1 and 6.2). The story of Leboi continues in this chapter, in which 
the deeper layers that underpin his climate-change testimony will be uncovered. It will be argued 
that in order to make sense of his translation and interpretation of climate change – and that of 
his fellow Maasai villagers who were generally less cognizant of climate change – we need to gain 
insight into Terrat’s “interpretive context”. In other words, if we wish to understand how the 
novel idea or worldview of climate change travels and is translated, a thorough understanding of 
the new place in which it takes root, or is refuted, will prove fruitful. It is this vital conjuncture 
where different worldviews meet – a space to manoeuvre in which seemingly disparate horizons 
fuse or rather confuse in their encounter – that forms the focus of analysis here. At the heart of 
these encounters always lies a moment of translation; this process (in its comprehensive sense, 
see methods chapter) lies at the basis of what this chapter seeks to explore. Therefore, the leading 
question here is a deceivingly simple one: How is climate change translated in Terrat village? 
Being aware of the fact that I cannot exhaust all the constituents of the “interpretive context” of 
Terrat village, I will limit myself to some basic structural dimensions that came to the fore during 
my fieldwork, which I deem essential here for the analysis. 
Box 6.1 Weather forecasting methods of the Maasai in Terrat used by the ilang’eni  
(people who have a particular knowledge about the environment and are skilled in 
interpreting weather signs) 
 
Strong winds:  [Osiwo] This is a type of strong wind that can be used to predict rainfall. 
 
Flowering plants:  When plants start to blossom and give out flowers in the dry season it signifies that 
rainfall is near. [Olekitelyan] This plant only grows when the dry season is ending. It is not 
appearing in the rainy season. When it first appears people will say: “grace is not far”, and 
speak about the approaching rainfall. 
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Clouds:  [Ilopir] When this type of cloud appears people know that the end of the dry season is 
approaching and that rainfall is very near. Different types of clouds have different levels 
of predictability. (See box 6.2 for a typology of different clouds.) 
Shape of the moon: Only during the rainy season does the moon have predictive value. The first, second or 
third day of appearance the moon is interrogated. When it bends like the horn of a cow 
[irmowarak] – as if a bowl of water is pouring – it indicates that rainfall is approaching. 
Star: [Ingakua] A star that disappears on the 25th of May after a loud thunderstorm. That is the 
last sound of the year to be heard in the sky. When the star goes down the rain ceases. 
After 7 days of not being seen the star appears again on the 8th day on the other side and 
remains until the next year to announce the rainy season again. The end of this spring 
rains coincides with the disappearance from the Pleiades cluster of stars. No ceremonies 
shall be mounted until the cluster has reappeared at dawn (see also Spencer 2003: 72). 
Animals: Great and reliable sources of prediction are the animals. For example, when the cattle 
give out faeces and urinate while they sleep and are lying down a lot, one can be sure that 
the coming year will be bad. When a cow sleeps with its front legs straight the year is (or 
will be) bad. (Even though the environment is still profitable and there are sufficient 
green pastures). Furthermore, when the calves don’t run to their mothers and the bulls 
abstain from fighting, this predicts a bad year. Reversed, when the cows express 
happiness, and the bulls are fighting – despite the fact that there are no pastures – a good 
year is ahead. Also when the goats and donkeys are crying a lot it is a sign that a bad year 
is ahead. 
 
Box 6.2 Typology of clouds [Ilopir] with varying levels of predictability 
 
There are different types of Ilopir: 
1. Altatwani Is the most reliable type of cloud and appears in the west and is said to come from the 
Atlantic Ocean. This cloud never lies, which means that when it appears one can be sure 
that the rains are approaching. 
2. Olorkeri  Also appears from the Atlantic Ocean but in the southern part. 
3. Olengaresero  Appears in the northwestern part from the strong heating of the Atlantic Ocean. 
4. Arpalakangai  Appears in the East and is the result of strong heating of the air above the Indian Ocean. 
This cloud (or group of clouds) has also a high predictability. It is trusted by most people 
and signifies that the rains will not be late this year. 
5. Larkaria Also appears in the east and comes from the heating of the Indian Ocean. Many people 
do not have faith in this cloud and that is where it derives its name from, which means 
liar. This means that the cloud may appear but the rains may not come. 
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6. Engatambo A type of white cloud that indicates that the rainy season is about to end. The whiteness 
tells that the cloud does not host any rain, and only very little rainfall will follow before 
the rainy season is really over. 
 
 
First, we shall explore the ways in which climate change evokes stories of declining cultural 
values. Secondly, drawing upon Hastrup’s supposition that we need to focus on “the 
entanglement of epistemic practices and place”, we shall briefly touch upon some basic 
environmental and climatic features of the area and how this relates to people’s perception of 
risk. Thirdly, and inextricably linked to environmental issues, are the ways in which people relate 
to and perceive the climate, which can be understood through cultural and ontological horizons 
by exploring religious beliefs and practices. The deeply engrained conviction that the domains of 
the sky and rainfall belong to Eng’ai, the Maasai’s (predominantly) female deity, forms the most 
essential fundament for how climate change is translated in Terrat (for an overview of different 
names that exist for Eng’ai see box 8.6 in chapter eight). As part of the epistemological quest for 
understanding the reception of climate change, we need an insight into the linguistic practices 
that are entailed by translating climate change, to which I will now turn. 
On linguistic translation and the struggle over meaning 
The process of translation of the idea of climate change to northern Tanzania entails many 
challenges, first of all because there is no widely accepted language for it in Maa yet. In order for 
climate change to be understood, a double translation is needed: from English, to Swahili, and 
then into Maa – a translation challenge that thus finds expression in the linguistic struggles over 
meaning-making. The term climate stems from Greek – Klima – and means slope or inclination. It 
refers to the inclination of the earth in relation to the sun. Originally, the climate was seen only as 
the result of the latitude, and thus the position or height of the sun at the horizon (Fleming 1998: 
11).109 Scientifically, in its most basic sense, climate is defined as “the average weather in an area 
over a long period of time” (calculations are based on conditions over a 30 year-period, WMO). 
Also in its contemporary usage the term climate has come to occupy a meaning that solely refers 
to statistical descriptions and atmospheric proxies. However, as Fleming and Jankovic 
demonstrate, if we consider the term historically it appears that the description of the climate as 
solely an index and indicator of weather trends is rather an anomaly. They argue that such a 
                                                             
109 For a historical overview of different ways in which humans have come to understand the climate in 
Europe and America since the Enlightenment, see the work of Fleming 1998. 
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definition of the climate only holds validity in relation to an “instrumental, quantitative and 
weather-biased understanding of the atmosphere”. Outside this context the climate has been 
more often defined as something that does rather than what is (Fleming & Jankovic 2011: 1-2). 
This shift in meaning from a biophysical description (‘is’) to something that can act (‘do’) has 
important implications for the notion of agency. For instance, the Swahili translation for “it is 
going to rain” is mvua (rain) inataka (wants or wishes to) kuenyesha (fall), which literally means: “it 
wants to rain”. In this case “it”, or nature, is the agentive force. Let us now consider the 
fascinating linguistic journey of the idea of climate change from English into official Swahili and 
then into the vernacular expression.  
The official Swahili term for climate change – mabadiliko ya tabianchi (or tabia ya nchi) – is a highly 
technical one that remains largely incomprehensible to native Swahili speakers. A literal 
translation means something like “changes (mabadiliko) in the habits or behaviour (ya tabia) of the 
country/ land/ soil (nchi)”. However, this literal translation does not capture its technical meaning 
because tabianchi simply means climate. Even at the Institute of Kiswahili Research at the 
University of Dar es Salaam a group of teachers told me that they found it difficult to make sense 
of the term, and expressed that the term is too technical for many people to understand. They 
also could not tell me the source of the term, as they had all grown up with it. In the TUKI 
dictionary of Swahili, the translation for climate is “tabia ya nchi” (yaani joto (heat), baridi (cold), 
upepo (wind), mvua (rain) TUKI 2006: 141). A more widely used and better-understood term (in 
daily conversations, both also often used in media and during workshops) is mabadiliko ya hali ya 
hewa. Hali means condition or situation and hewa means air, but hali ya hewa combined refers to 
the weather. At times these two expressions were also mixed, which resulted in the term 
mabadiliko ya hali ya nchi (freely translated as a change in the condition of the country/ land/ soil). 
For Terrat the situation is even more challenging, because only a part of the population 
understands Swahili. 
 
As is always the case with languages, but all the more prominently in formerly colonized nations 
of the world, the ways in which languages develop and become official and hegemonic systems of 
expression reflect historical and political trajectories of domination and subjugation. As Wisner 
and others (Wisner et al. 2012) also point out in the context of Tanzania, the Swahilization of 
society has become a political practice in itself, and the highly technical coinage of Swahili terms 
for climate change is a testimony to this top-down creation that carries the superior knowledge and 
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authority of the Tanzanian state.110 They write that “while the political project died by the time 
Tanzania had abandoned ujamaa in the 1990s, the effects had already penetrated deeply into 
society; so linguistics survived but only serving a new master”. Based on a combined research 
effort, in which it became clear that only a tiny percentage of the population is familiar with the 
term mabadiliko ya tabianchi – the authors conclude that the translation of the term climate change 
has been targeted at Swahili-speaking bureaucrats; a Swahilization of the term has taken place, but 
the discourse has not been localized (Wisner et al. 2012: 10). My own research findings in Terrat 
underpin their conclusion, and only a handful of people were familiar with the official term. 
For the case of Maasailand this lack of “localization” holds even truer, as for many people Swahili 
remains the language of the elite and the educated. How then does one meaningfully translate 
climate change into the Maa language? The contestation over an accurate linguistic translation from 
Swahili into Maa reveals that there is more at stake than merely a talk about a changing 
atmospheric reality; and rather attests to the ontological politics that are brought into being by 
the arrival of a new global discourse. One advantage of the fact that the term climate change has not 
yet been widely translated into Maa, at least for our analysis, is that it enabled us to know whether 
or not somebody had already received information about climate change. In other words, if our 
informants had never heard about the terms “mabadiliko ya tabianchi” or “mabadiliko ya hali ya hewa” 
before, we would be confident that climate change as a scientific notion was still alien to them. 
However, a methodological challenge emerged, for how can one ask about a changing climate if 
there is no language for it at hand? To overcome this dilemma, we resorted to querying different 
indicators, such as rain (Eng’ai or engan – a semantic goldmine, for it has the same word as the 
supreme being, a remarkable observation to which I will come back in chapter 8); or the 
environment more generally (in Swahili the term mazingira was known to many people, but of 
course does not capture the climate dimensions well, so it evoked other observations); or the 
different seasons that exist in Maa (irkisirat, olari, kurumari, or olamei). 
While according to my knowledge there is no official term for climate change in the Maa 
language yet, there have been some translation attempts by the people working at the radio 
station in Terrat. One term that was coined by a documentary maker was: engibelekenyata (change) 
engijape (air) engop (earth/ ground). This was the term that was used in videos and for educational 
purposes. Yet, according to many informants this translation in Maa is not appropriate, for it is a 
too literal translation from Swahili, which does not do justice to the idiosyncracies of the Maa 
                                                             
110 Since independence in 1961, Tanganyika (and from 1964 united with Zanzibar, Tanzania) the 
Swahilization process (a vigorous policy of making Swahili an official and vernacular lingua franca) was 
part and parcel of the construction of a socialist vision of an ujamaa society (Wisner et al. 2012). 
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language and culture. Here we are at the heart of every the translation dilemma, for there is no 
language or culture perfectly commensurable. In this context, anthropologist Rudiak-Gould 
argues that climate change communication is ultimately a matter of translation, even within the 
same language and culture (for example from experts to a lay audience). Drawing on translation 
theory, the author has demonstrated that the translation challenge consists essentially in the 
inevitable trade-off between fidelity (to the source text) on the one hand and transparency (to the 
target audience) on the other (Rudiak-Gould 2011). Adhering to either one of these strategies 
comes at the expense of the other, as became visible in the abovementioned example. The 
translated term for climate change in Maa is so close to the original text in Swahili that it has 
become incomprehensible to the target audience. Before bringing to attention the larger 
epistemological and ontological debates to which this chapter seeks to contribute, let us first 
follow Leboi to Terrat so that we gain a snapshot impression of the study site. 
 
 
Leboi with his herd in Terrat (in ewas). 
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Vignette 
 “Leboi’s revelation”111 
 
From the “folktale of the Indian and the meteorologist” we move on to a similar anecdote, taken 
from my own fieldwork, which I have named “Leboi’s revelation”. In this vignette – or empirical 
episode – I want to shed light on the questions of why some ideas do not travel, and why some 
ideas that do travel are picked up and welcomed, while others might be looked at indifferently or 
are even refuted. More specifically, I will explore the possible reasons for why the idea of climate 
change is wholeheartedly embraced by several actors along the translation chain from 
international to regional actors, until it reaches the village of Terrat in Maasailand where it is not 
conspicuously present, and (parts of) the discourse are by and large even rejected. This void has 
fascinated me in my fieldwork ever since I was confronted with the absence of that which I was 
looking for, at least as far as Maasailand was concerned. Climate-change discourses were 
omnipresent throughout Tanzania, and regularly found on the radio, in newspapers and in daily 
talk. Yet, I hardly encountered any traces of climate change narratives in Terrat. I will explore this 
conundrum by continuing the journey that began in Dar es Salaam. After attending the 
international meeting, in which pastoralist Leboi featured prominently as a climate-change 
witness, he brought the message back home to the village, to which I followed him. My choice to 
do research in Terrat village was mainly guided by preliminary online research. Yet, during this 
digital engine search for climate-change-related projects in Maasailand in Tanzania, I realized that 
they were fairly rare, or at least hard to find online. Being aware of some NGO work that had 
already been done on climate change, and of a radio station that broadcasted environmental 
programs, Terrat promised all the appealing features for an interesting research site. Orkonerei 
Radio Station (O.R.S.) is located in Terrat and is the only nationwide radio station that – in 
addition to Swahili – broadcasts programs in the Maa language, which was another major factor 
of appeal for carrying out my fieldwork there. It was the meeting with Leboi and traditional 
leader Meshak in Dar es Salaam that strengthened my decision to carry out my fieldwork there, 
and which sparked my curiosity further. What brought these two men to travel all the way to this 
international conference to talk about climate change? It must be of pressing concern to them, I 
thought.  
                                                             
111 A shortened version of this vignette has been presented as a conference paper at the second results 
conference of the SPP1448, which took place in October 2014 in Saly, Senegal. It was subsequently 
bundled with other conference papers as a joint working paper, see: de Wit (2015) in Gebauer (ed.), pp. 6-
10. 
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Eager to find out how climate change discourses were translated at the “local” level, I set out on 
my journey to the breathtakingly beautiful plains of Maasailand in the Simanjiro plains, soon to 
realize that climate change – both as a scientific discourse and a physical observation – was not 
so much part of peoples’ daily concerns and talk. Crucial to note is that, while there were 
accounts of increasing droughts and irregular rainfall patterns, tales about the climate and the 
weather hardly ever came alone, but were rather accompanied by general observations about a 
rapidly changing world, new ways of praying and believing, and loss of (cultural) values. 
Confusing but revealing was the following fragment of a focus group discussion held in Terrat in 
December 2011, (R = researcher; X/Y/ Z = first, second and third informant; A = research 
assistant): 
R: Do you think that the rains [Eng’ai, or engan, or mvua in Swahili] nowadays are different 
from the past? 
X: Yes; before, my grandfathers, they went to large trees to pray to their God, then they 
made a sacrifice. Some cattle, maybe a sheep or a goat. It must be a black one. And at the 
same time they went to see a witchdoctor to ask for rain. […] But now we are Christians, 
we have to go to church to pray: “God give us the rain”.  
R: Does that mean that you are praying to a different God to get rain; or what about the 
Maasai God? 
X: We found that this God lied to us, including the witchdoctors [oloiboni]. Because the 
witchdoctors, they pretend to be God. But we realized that they are not really God 
because they die as normal people, so they are not really God. So when the Christians 
came and told us about Christ we decided to follow them. […] Now in church we are 
happy to have found the real God, and we believe that when we pray everything will be 
possible.112 
R: So you don’t believe in the Maasai God anymore? 
Y: We hate them so much. 
R: Really? What about you? [Asks research assistant]. 
A: Me too! I never ever believed him. 
R: So it is God who decides to give you good or bad weather? 
Y: We see that God is capable, God does everything for us. […] 
R: And how come that sometimes He doesn’t give you rain? 
Y: He is the only One we believe that can do everything for us. But sometimes when He 
stops to give us the rain, there is nothing to do. 
                                                             
112 Interestingly enough, as will become clear in the section on new trajectories of believing, the relatively 
recent conversion to Christianity in Maasailand has incited a rejection of some Maasai “traditional” 
religious forms. For example, praying to the spiritual diviner (Oloiboni) is looked upon with grave disdain; 
while at the same time there is a certain continuity in believing in the divine being (Eng’ai). 
 163 
Z: We find that God is the end of everything. No one can do anything apart from God. 
X: For me I don’t know what is the reason, but we believe that God, God gives us the 
rain and that sometimes He does not want to give us the rain. But for this year, God gave 
us enough rain. 
R: And what about the seasons? Are they changing? I mean the rainy season and the dry 
season are they different from before? 
Y: In the past it was also changing. But not so much like now. 
It was certainly not uncommon to begin a conversation about rainfall or the weather and 
promptly enter into a discussion about God, morals and a changing society and culture. In the 
midst of this confusing attempt to make sense of the conversation, a herder by the name of 
Leboi entered the compound. I then came to realize that this was the herder who had given an 
impressive speech about climate change at the international conference that took place in Dar es 
Salaam the previous month. After introducing ourselves we asked him to join the conversation. 
My research assistant rushed to ask Leboi: “So, Leboi, what can you teach us about the 
weather?113” After which he explained (L = Leboi): 
L: For us it is terrible, since we do not have enough education. We are poor people 
[inaudible] so with this climate change it is very terrible for us, yes. 
 R: And if people explain what climate change is, do you understand what it means? 
 L: We see it maybe when we go to town because we didn’t hear anything in the village. 
 R: So what was the first time you heard about it? 
L: We see the changes since 1993. Yes, the climate change began. It was in April 1993. 
The rains stopped. Then years passed by. We decided to move from our village to 
another village. When we went there, still no rain. No changes, our cattle died a lot. Also 
people died. It was terrible. We started to ask ourselves, “what is this”? Before, there was 
nothing like this. What kind of bad things have we done? And what are we going to do? 
R: And did your grandparents maybe also experience difficulties in the climate? 
L: Everybody is wondering “what is this?” But we are not sure. Maybe it is because we 
are cutting down trees and make destruction.  
X: And maybe because of our sins. 
R: Sins? 
L: Because since that time there is a goldmine. 
R: Goldmine? 
                                                             
113She used mabadiliko ya hali ya hewa.  
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X: Yes the Maasai decided to go there to look for gold. Then when they didn’t get it they 
came to our village and started killing or taking our blood. Because they went to the 
witchdoctor who told them to kill somebody, then you will get enough money. Later they 
came to take the blood of that person during the night. That was for those who are not 
Christians. But for us, we went to church and decided to follow the mighty God. 
R: There seems to be a different understanding about God who arranges rain and 
drought, or climate change. What did Leboi understand when he heard about climate 
change? 
L: It is not God so much, for me it is not God. We have learnt that it is not God, but it is 
us, due to our activities. When we fail we now learn that it is not God, it is us, according 
to our human activities. We were few in number in previous times, but now we are high 
in number. And this boma [enclosed compound, or kraal] because of human activities like 
cultivation, people are cutting down trees. There are some people who go to the river to 
take stones for selling as a business. They need money. And the rest they sell firewood 
because they need money. So I believe that human activities are making these changes.  
R: And is there something you can do to stop it? 
L: In this village we try to stop people from cutting down trees, especially in the river. 
Then we try to stop people from taking away the stones to sell the stones. And then we 
try to convince people to grow the trees, a large number of trees. The village government 
decided to elect some people for such work. 
R: Do you talk to other people about this climate change? 
L: People are very busy, looking for money. The rest is taking care of cattle and other 
activities. I try to tell them but people are not serious about this. 
 
While Leboi’s interference confused the group, I had the impression that to me at least some 
clues were unfolding. Asking the villagers about changing rainfall patterns or changes in the 
weather was as if I was asking about their modes of living and believing. It appeared to be 
irrational for most informants to detach changes in the weather and the climate from more 
general societal changes. For the Maasai in Terrat the climate is rather part and parcel of an 
integral moral weave of the world that binds society together. These tales about environmental 
degradation were related to a loss of morals and values that once were so vital to holding Maasai 
society together. And these were now threatened by the temptations entailed by globalization and 
modernity, such as mining and other attempts at diversifying their livelihoods in the pursuit for 
money, wealth or for bare survival. Talking about the climate or the weather is like a commentary 
upon society in which morality is being held up to scrutiny; a fertile ground for cultural stories to 
make sense of their place in this world (compare de Wit 2015).  
My thoughts were drifting back to Dar es Salaam, and to Leboi’s performance at the conference. 
Part of the conundrum remained unresolved. If climate change was indeed so “terrible for them”, 
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why was he among the very few villagers to talk about its effects? Was it because he was well 
informed as opposed to the others? This seemed rather strange to me considering the 
sensitization activities that had taken place. Leboi had certainly come to play an important role as 
a climate change ambassador, linking Terrat to wider transnational discourses and platforms. This 
is how it happened. First, he was enrolled by an international climate change NGO because he 
works a community game scout in Terrat. This means that Leboi is being paid by several 
conservation organizations to keep the area (where wildlife congregates) free from cultivation and 
settlement, and to spot illegal poachers. He then played a role in a movie about climate change; 
after which he was spotted by another NGO who traced his phone number and invited him to 
testify in Dar es Salaam. From a community game scout, Leboi thus became an actor and then a 
climate change ambassador, and finally now figures in my research. I came to know Leboi as a 
very friendly and charismatic person, a man of laughter, jokes and goodwill. In Terrat he 
appeared to be friends with everybody. He regularly invited me to his boma where he proudly 
introduced me to his two wives, and ten schoolgoing children. He owned a small moped with 
which he regularly went to check on his herd, in case they were grazing far away. He belonged to 
the minority of herders in Terrat who did not cultivate. According to him the environment is not 
very suitable for agriculture, and in the past he had tried, but all his attempts had failed. 
Moreover, as a community game scout he receives an extra monthly income with other activities.   
But Leboi was not the only one who was “climate-change cognizant”. There were other herders 
who took part in the climate-change sensitization activities, and also featured in a movie. 
Furthermore, prior to my stay in Terrat, a team of other researchers carried out a climate change 
study (as referred to in chapter 5). Some informants referred to these researchers as their source 
of information through which they came to know about climate change. My exploration 
continued and I first wanted to know more about Leboi’s experience in Dar es Salaam, so I asked 
him whether he enjoyed the trip: 
L: I really enjoyed it. I have never been there before and it was good. They [NGO] gave 
me money for transport and food. I wish I could get another chance to go there and 
speak out. I tried to ask the secretary of the president’s office [VPO] – his name is Joshua 
Ngang – why the animals from Tarangire come here to eat our grass, but our cattle are 
not allowed to go to Tarangire and eat their grass there. But he did not answer me well. 
R: Did you feel that the government was taking you seriously? 
L: I didn’t like Mr. Joshua Ngang. Because when I was there I shared my feelings, but Mr. 
Ngang tried to talk falsely to everybody. But thank God there was Mr. Joseph [NGO] 
who tried to tell them the truth about his speech. Mr. Ngang wanted to convince 
everybody that the Maasai are foolish people, and that we don’t want to take care of a 
small number of cattle. But Mr. Ngang forgot that we have to take care of three or four 
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wives, and kids and shelter, food and other things. Also for treatment. […] I wanted to 
get enough time for my speech but there was not enough time. I also wanted to talk to 
Mr. Ngang to elaborate on our life here, what it is like. But there was no time. I don’t 
think that he knows what is going on here in the village. 
Listening to Leboi’s experience of having felt gratified at having had the chance to speak out on 
the one hand, and the frustration of ultimately not being heard by those in power on the other, 
Spivak’s (1988) postcolonial critique of the mute subaltern comes to mind. While sympathizing 
with Leboi and his attempt to voice his concerns, I did not perceive him to be merely a voiceless 
victim but quite the contrary in fact. It gradually became clear to me that Leboi had creatively 
used the climate-change platform to address an issue that was of (more) serious concern to him; 
namely, encroaching wildlife and the loss of land to the creation of national parks. Of course, he 
greatly enjoyed the trip to Dar es Salaam that was being paid for, and he masterfully fulfilled his 
role as a “climate-change witness”. But it was not climate change that he had travelled for. This 
glimpse of a focus group discussion turned out to be only the beginning of the time that I would 
spend with Leboi and other villagers in Terrat. Many hours of herding cattle, talking, joking, and 
walking through the plains followed. I believe therefore that “being there” enabled me to 
establish a certain level of trust with my informants, which provided the conditions under which 
Leboi’s “official” climate-change rhetoric in the course of time (i.e. more than half a year later) 
took a drastic and remarkable turn. That is, he revealed to me that he in fact does not believe in 
climate change. At least not in the way that these scientists are talking about it: 
Because we are aware that these changes are coming from God, and God is having many 
things, and nobody knows the secret of God. Sometimes we say “Okay today it might 
rain probably”, because all the things that we normally use to predict the weather, 
showing that maybe today there is a star. All the things that we use to predict […] but 
while we expect that it will rain maybe that year there will be no rain at all. And 
sometimes we might say “Okay this year is very dry so I think there will be no rain, 
because we cannot see the star, you cannot see this”. So all the signs indicate that the 
rainfall cannot be seen, so they don’t expect rainfall. But while we are expecting no 
rainfall, the rain falls down. Enough rainfall. And in our locality the climate knows a lot of 
fluctuations. One year you might expect rain and there will be no rain, in another year you 
expect drought but there is enough rainfall. And because of these fluctuations nobody 
knows the secret of God. And that is why also we cannot trust these men [the scientists] 
who are telling us about climate change.  
Leboi’s reluctance to ultimately accept climate change as an explanatory framework for the 
ongoing changes in the weather and the climate does not stand alone in Terrat. Initially, the fact 
that I stumbled upon an apparent “climate-change void” and a rejection of the discourse left me 
somewhat despairingly questioning “the point of all this inquiry”. But now I know that this is the 
point. The remainder of this supposition is that we are faced with the challenge of how to make 
sense of absence. How does one write about something that is (allegedly) not there? I argue that 
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one way of circumventing this is to juxtapose this void with the things that we do encounter; such 
as older environmental discourses that travelled to northern Tanzania and that have profoundly 
shaped human-environment relations. Moreover, we shall then embed these narratives in the 
context of older discourses that have travelled to Maasailand before, and interrogate the “truth 
effects” that have consequently been brought about. Let us now turn to the broader debate on 
representation and epistemology, after which we move on to Terrat’s interpretive context. 
Blinded by Sight114 
We tend to find what we are looking for. This does not mean that there is no real basis to 
what we find. Rather, it is just that reality has a tendency to reveal itself in accordance 
with the perspectives through which it is engaged. 
 
Garreth Morgan 2006: 338 
 
It is remarkable that since climate change rose to prominence as a key theme within anthropology 
– for approximately one (Roncoli et al. 2009: 87) or two (Crate 2011: 178) decades at the time of 
writing – anthropologists have also begun to “see” and encounter the broader socio-cultural and 
political effects of climate change all across the globe (Crate & Nuttall 2009: 9). It has even been 
argued that the flourishing interest in these dimensions has changed the scale (as in particular 
perspectives) of anthropology accordingly (Hastrup 2015: 144). Similarly, in his seminal historical 
reader on the anthropology of climate change, Michael Dove has come to the observation that: 
“Anthropologists, like scholars in other disciplines, often seek to link their studies to the 
overweening concerns of the day. In the mid-twentieth century, that was the threat of global 
nuclear war; today it is global climate change” (Dove 2014: 24). If we take Morgan’s words to 
heart, perhaps it is somewhat unsurprising that a new research focus has come along with a lens 
that brings to light exactly that what it was “designed” to unveil. This new research fashion is 
certainly not limited to anthropology, for climate change is a widely shared cross- and 
interdisciplinary concern. Nowadays we can speak of a true efflorescence of ethnographic 
                                                             
114 I took the liberty of borrowing the title of this subheading from Francis Nyamnjoh’s fabulous article on 
postcolonial power structures within anthropology departments in South Africa, in which he raises an 
extremely valuable epistemological question: “How do local knowledge practices take up existential issues 
and epistemological perspectives that may interrogate and enrich more global transcultural debates and 
scholarly reflexivity?” (Nyamnjoh 2012). 
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climate-change studies that progressively set the stage for the anthropological research agenda.115 
This outlook is not just good news for our discipline, but it should all the more be embraced as it 
meets the call for a re-examination of climate change by the humanities and interpretive sciences 
as called for by scholars like human geographer Mike Hulme (Hulme 2011b). This disciplinary 
engagement is vital as it contributes – to mention only a glimpse of the merits – to a critical 
understanding of the universal and globalizing tendencies that climate-change discourses entail 
(Hulme 2008b; 2010b; Wisner et al. 2012; Arnall et al. 2014). Moreover, it has also proven fruitful 
in the attempt to give insight into the discordances between locally grounded approaches and 
global models and discourses (Greschke & Tischler 2015; Hastrup 2014). 
This growing body of ethnographic work that documents climate-change realities can lead to two 
distinct (though not mutually exclusive) lines of thought. On the one hand, one can argue that – 
if we take into consideration the (expected) devastating impacts upon the Global South in general 
and sub-Saharan Africa in particular – climate change is increasingly visible and observable on the 
ground. Hence, it is not surprising that anthropologists who set out looking for climate change 
will inevitably find it. Yet, an alternative interpretation of this increasing “visibility” holds that 
this is, at least in part, the consequence of a new research focus and corresponding paradigm. 
For, put in the words of Günther Schlee: “Scientists do not open bottles of champagne when 
their assumptions have been falsified. They do so when they have been corroborated” (Schlee 
2010: 223). Notwithstanding that there is a philosophical truism in both positions, since the first 
stance has become the engine that largely drives climate-change research, we shall here explore 
the consequences of embracing the second. Seen in this light we can pursue the argument that 
there is a need for some epistemological caution in making claims about the a-priori devastating 
effects of climate change, for we might fall into the tempting self-fulfilling trap that “Leboi’s 
revelation” also bears witness to. A point of concern in this regard which brings us back to the 
Writing Culture debate, is the question of whether – by relying closely on observation – we aren’t 
denying the fact that to some extent we as ethnographers are also shaping our objects of 
research?116 In other words, as we are looking for climate-change realities, and witnesses thereof 
(who are said to be observing climate change firsthand) aren’t we feeding our own climate-change 
                                                             
115 For a review and overview of foundational studies on climate and culture see Crate 2011; Dove 2014; 
and for notable edited volumes with rich ethnographic case studies see Casimir 2008; Crate and Nuttal 
2009; Strauss and Orlove 2003; De Bruijn et al. 2005 among many others. 
116 As Bornemann & Hammoudi (2009) have pointed out, one diagnosis of anthropology that was 
identified in the Writing Culture debate was the three denials running through its practice: 1) that 
ethnography is a literary genre; 2) that reliance on observation leads to a denial of the role of the 
ethnographer in shaping our object/ subjects of study; 3) that ethnographers tend to deny the constructed 
character of their object, and hence the knowledge that is produced (Bornemann & Hammoudi 2009: 2). 
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“gaze”? It is certainly not my intention to open up a deconstructionist Pandora’s box that was 
brought about by the “crisis of representation” (Marcus and Fischer 1986: vii) as in the Writing 
Culture debate. But there are important lessons about self-reflection to be drawn (Schlee 2010: 
217). These lessons touch upon the role of the ethnographer, the lenses that we use and 
construct, and hence, upon the data that we (hope to) collect and bring back home. Considering 
the thriving climate-change “fashion” it is necessary to ponder over the question: what are we 
looking for when studying climate change?  
To begin with, anthropologists do not see or feel climate change with the naked eye or bodily 
senses, nor are we or our informants capable of observing it directly, for it is a phenomenon that 
is – unlike manifestations thereof – not perceptible in unmediated form.117 Yet we ask questions 
about it and we very frequently receive satisfying answers that by and large testify to the fact that 
climate change is real, and that it is also already being experienced by “vulnerable”, or so-called 
“frontline”, communities on the ground. But on closer inspection we might glean from our field 
studies that an excessive focus on climate change might obscure as much of the socio-cultural 
complexity of local realities as it aims to reveal. Let me illustrate my point with one experience 
(among several others) that I had while presenting my work at a conference in a “climate change 
in Africa” panel. After the five presenters (all anthropologists including myself) had presented 
their work, during the question-and-answer session a person in the audience raised a general 
point that was addressed to all of us: “If we carefully listen to your presentations, it seems that 
none of you is actually talking about climate change but rather about something else”. I was both 
stunned and comforted by the sharpness of the question, as I had been grappling with this 
concern for a while, and it often surfaced all the more prominently during conference panels. All 
five of us got the chance to reply, and I was very keen on paying a compliment to his 
observation, for it succinctly captured the argument that I tried to put forward. But to my 
disappointment, my fellow presenters were instead defending their results by arguing that “in fact 
– even though perhaps under the surface – we are dealing with climate change”. Arguments were 
made in line of “we [educated researchers] know that it is climate change, but they [uninformed 
informants] don’t know it yet”. Even though this point might be relevant in the context of 
scientifically uninformed communities, by positioning oneself in this way the issue turns the basic 
                                                             
117 I am aware of the fact that this is not an uncontested statement. And even though it is not the focus of 
this chapter, it should be emphasized that this stance is certainly not to say that climate change is not real, 
nor that people are not directly affected by it; but it should principally be understood as a philosophical 
position that holds that as soon as we claim that a certain climatic event is the result of climate change, it 
is always mediated by language. This point deserves further explication below. For a detailed and insightful 
discussion of the differing ideational standpoints in this debate, see: Rudiak-Gould “We have Seen it With 
Our Own Eyes: Why We Disagree About Climate Change Visibility” (2013b). 
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anthropological pursuit around; namely that we have to enlighten our interlocutors instead of 
learning from them. It not only installs a problematic difference in the power relations but also 
amounts to a problematic epistemological challenge.  
Namely, by assuming that “we” know something that “they” don’t know, we are foreclosing the 
possibility of local and alternative categorizations of climate change (that often deviate from 
global notions of it). Moreover, this approach does not allow for the possibility that people might 
have other things on their mind. For example, another interesting reply from a presenter was: 
“my informants did not want to talk about climate change, but they only wanted to talk about the 
threat of elephants that are killing people”. And instead of wondering why people insisted on 
talking about elephants and discarded the topic of climate change, the presenter had developed a 
sophisticated scheme as a means to “locate” climate change in the field. Here we touch upon an 
important political and representational issue: if our informants wish to talk about elephants, 
should we continue talking about climate change instead? A central question that arises in this 
regard is: what can we make of the absence of that what we are initially looking for, while 
similarly assuming that it must actually be “there” – somewhere – if not in the minds of people, it 
must be hanging in the air as a looming crisis that one day will inevitably reveal itself? Based on 
findings (or rather a lack thereof) that are similar to my own, Greschke and her research fellows 
have raised questions that I deem relevant in this context: “are they [informants] all ‘sceptics’ or 
ignorant”? And: “Do we primarily have to enlighten our research fields about the ‘real’ causes 
and dynamics of the global socio-ecological system […]”? (Greschke 2015: 124). For reasons that 
will be explained below, I will pursue the argument that – instead of “enlightening our research 
subjects” – an approach that is more faithful to anthropology’s basic tenet is to interrogate the 
reasons for “absence” by means of juxtaposing it with “presence”. Also Foucault reiterated the 
central role of the “visible” for philosphy as opposed to the scientist: 
For a long time one has known that the role of philosophy is not to discover what is 
hidden, but to make visible precisely what is visible, that is to say, to make evident what is 
so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us, that because of that we do not perceive 
it. Whereas the role of science is to reveal what we do not see, the role of philosophy is to 
let us see what we see (Foucault 1994: 3.540-541, in De Vries 2016: 4). 
The first problem of assuming a worldwide climate crisis is that it uncritically leads to the creation 
of an omni-explanatory framework that sees climate change as the main culprit for all possible 
societal ills. Or, touching upon a similar problem is the perceived urgency that drives this new 
research focus, which tends to bring about a hyper-focus that exclusively focuses on climate 
change. As such, it possibly obscures other issues that are – considered from an emic point of 
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view – of much more pressing concern, thereby leaving us indeed blinded by our own sight. 118 
Anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup has put forward a similar critique by stating that “[…] climate is 
no longer seen to make places but rather mostly to destroy them, with anthropologists called upon 
to mediate local understandings through their incomparable method of fieldwork” (Hastrup 
2015: 146). To be sure, the fact that climate change is not conspicuously present (as a second-
order observation) in Terrat does not mean that it is not there. Nevertheless, and as already 
touched upon in chapter one, I contend that this climate change focus similarly bears the risk of 
engendering blind spots that are co-constituted by crisis narrations (cf. Roitman 2014). As such, 
this chapter speaks to the large body of literature that takes climate change to be the dominant or 
sole determinant factor of social life, and instead seeks to bring “complexity” back into the 
analysis. As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the singling out of climate change has 
been criticized by Mike Hulme, who termed this erroneous tendency a new form of climate 
determinism, or reductionism, in which the climate is elevated to become the dominant predictor 
variable in a complex matrix of interdependencies (Hulme 2011a: 247).119 While this critique in 
itself is thus not new, this chapter seeks to fill the void of the scant attention that has been given 
to the phenomenon of absence.120 By doing so it thus critically engages with current climate change 
debates in social sciences and the humanities and questions the general tendency to “see” and 
hence construct climate change as an overall dominating reality of lifeworlds “on the ground”. It 
explores the taken-for-grantedness of the universal, all-embracing and threatening biophysical 
effects of climate change, and instead questions the effects of these knowledge claims. 
These points touch in fact upon ancient epistemological dilemmas about the relationship between 
the models of abstraction that the anthropologist generates, and the subject of research or 
empirical reality they seeks to describe. To mention just one old disciplinary example, 
anthropologist Edmund Leach criticized the structural-functionalist idea that the social structure 
of a society is directly observable, and he insisted that this is rather an abstract model created by 
                                                             
118  In the work of anthropologist and Maasai expert Dorothy Hodgson (2011b) a very similar argument is 
advanced in relation to gender issues and the ways in which these have taken root as “a travelling idea” in 
northern Tanzania. She demonstrates that the Western obsession with abandoning FGM as a “traditional” 
and violent cultural practice results in a move to speak for, rather than listen to the priorities of Maasai 
women themselves (Hodgson 2011b). In this sense, Hodgson’s argument (and my own) to a large extent 
underpin Spivak’s critique of the well-intended and benevolent attempts to give a voice to, and hence, 
“save” the voiceless subaltern from oppressive system of power; while in fact perpetuating the silencing 
that it seeks to oppose. 
119 Climate determinism is here understood as the epistemological fallacy that individual and collective 
human behavior is predominantly (or ultimately) determined by climatic influences. 
120 The notion of absence that I am talking about should not be confused with the term “invisibility” as 
used by Rudiak-Gould and others. While absence refers to the general lack of (overly) experiencing and 
talking about climate change the latter refers to the question of whether climate change can actually be 
observed with the naked senses. 
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the analyst that is the product of a particular way of looking at the world. Thus his criticism was 
directed at how anthropological analyses create “entities” by lifting them out of space and time of 
social interaction (Leach 1970, in Moore & Sanders 2014: 6). These dilemmas remind us that the 
knowledge that we generate as social scientists is always bound to a certain form of abstraction. 
The same holds true when we seek to describe and try to make sense of climate-change realities; 
therefore this relationship deserves more critical attention within current climate-change debates. 
It is in this context that Greschke (2015), in line with Albert Schutz (1953), has pointed out the 
underlying difference between physical and social facts, thereby reminding us that natural and 
social climate scientists depart from a radically different reality. Whereas the natural scientists 
focus on the physical facts, social scientists predominantly deal with the social facts of global 
warming. This type of knowledge should be considered as “second-order observations” – being 
part of the epistemologies of social scientists – as opposed to “first-order observations” or the 
biophysical effects of climate change – being part and parcel of the climatologists’ quest for 
knowledge production (Schutz 1953, in Greschke 2015: 129). It is important to keep this 
distinction in mind to contextualize the following discussion, which has provoked quite some 
debate among varying ideational climate-change communities.  
In recent years, the question of whether climate change can directly be observed with the naked 
senses has sparked a heated debate, centred around the contrasting positions of the “invisibility” 
on the one hand vis-à-vis the “visibility” of climate change on the other. The first stance holds 
that it is inherently impossible to observe climate change firsthand; while the latter stance 
stipulates that its effects can, and are in fact already being seen, particularly in the Global South. 
There is also a third approach, which can be placed somewhere in between and which assumes 
that climate change cannot be observed from the outset, but can be made visible with 
communication strategies such as the miner’s canary (Rudiak-Gould 2013a: 120). Anthropologist 
Rudiak-Gould has convincingly demonstrated how and why these divergent approaches are 
propagated by different ideational communities (such as indigenous advocates, anthropologists, 
physical scientists etc.) thereby revealing the political dimensions underlying this controversy 
(ibid). This debate will be addressed in more detail later, in which the value of local climate 
change accounts will be interrogated. In other words, how can we, in an increasingly 
interconnected world, make sense of the grassroots accounts that we collect in the field? With the 
positive-feedback cycle in the back of our mind it will be argued that these seemingly different 
knowledge systems should not be treated in isolation from the outset, but instead we have to 
allow for the possibility of the entanglement of epistemic practices. Furthermore, we need to 
account for the role of the ethnographer in mediating and shaping our object of knowledge. 
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What makes Terrat village an interesting site for exploring these spheres of mutual influence is 
the fact that the idea of climate change has entered (so far) only marginally. 
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Terrat Village in Maasailand 
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Introduction: On Tradition and Modernity in Maasailand121 
Without the land and cattle, there will be no Maasai. But my people are still holding on 
and continue to celebrate our culture despite the urgent demands that we change our 
ways and assimilate to contemporary modes of living. If change must come, as seems 
inevitable, it must be gradual, not abrupt. We will adapt, we will survive. 
Tepilit Ole Saitoti, The Worlds of a Maasai Warrior: an Autobiography (1986) 
 
Our first exploratory trip to Terrat was an instant infrastructural “baptism of fire” for my 
research partner Naini and I, as we were tested in terms of our physical endurance and creativity 
to bear the obstacles of getting there in the first place. The village, located only 84 kilometres 
South of Arusha (see map 7.1), turned out to be a great many hours and challenges further than 
one could imagine possible for such a relatively short distance. Public transport offers two 
options. There is the Simanjiro Express, a touring-car-sized vehicle that usually departs once daily 
from Arusha town. One needs to be early enough to secure a ticket, and a lot earlier to secure a 
seat. While the bus is scheduled according to a fixed timetable, in practice its departure resembles 
more a “stuff and go” time. I have observed with great awe not only the skills of the bus station 
workers’ precise emplacement when getting all the passengers in, but all the more the art of 
masterfully putting things, parcels, food, people and animals into a certain order that follows the 
itinerary chronology; or in other words, according to a “first out, last in principle”. At times it 
occurred that we were late and the bus was so full that we needed assistance to be pulled in (or 
out) through the windows in order not to destabilize the efficient composition of the bus. And if 
one thinks that the bus has reached its saturation point upon departure, then it might come as a 
surprise that along the way, even more passengers are embarking and that only in exceptional 
cases (flat tyre, bad roads) is the bus considered to be full.  
In the dry season one has better chances that the bus actually leaves, and also arrives sometime 
before dusk. But this depends on both the state of the road and vehicle. Due to the drought, 
fractured roads are inevitable, while the loose sand turns the surface into a substance that is as 
slippery as ice, and the safest way to pass is at high speed. If everything runs normally though, 
one can expect to arrive within 3 (at best) to 5 hours. The picture in the rainy season looks much 
bleaker as there is the risk of muddy, flooded and inaccessible roads, rivers that overflow their 
                                                             
121 As Homewood and others write about Maasailand: “Maasailand denotes a loosely bounded area of East 
Africa whose rural population is dominated by Maa-speaking communities which, despite their diversity, 
self-attribute to Maasai ethnicity. It is not a formal term and does not denote an administratively 
recognized region” (Homewood et al. 2009: 1). 
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banks, or collapsed bridges. Despite these challenges, this large bus is the most comfortable and 
safest option to reach Terrat by public transport. The second option is to take the smaller, 
privately organized four-wheel-drive cars, which are more expensive and take even longer to 
arrive, if at all. These old, run-down cars – already discarded long ago by safari companies – are 
in such a deplorable state that after our third miserable experience, Naini and I had relegated this 
form of transportation to an emergency option. Even after I had bought my own (admittedly, 
twenty-year-old) car, much time has been spent along the side of the road waiting for creative 
solutions to befall upon us, usually with the grace of some helping hands. Much time was also 
passed at different garages and shops, buying and replacing car parts, waiting, and some more 
time waiting before we could continue our journey. This rather lengthy description of mundane 
practicalities is not intended as some sort of ethnographic exhibitionism. The sheer obstacles of 
getting (and leaving) there not only reveal a part of people’s infrastructural hurdles, but they are 
foremost a symbol and tangible example of how (many parts of) Maasailand are largely 
disconnected from urban centres and excluded from access to basic infrastructure such as good 
roads, health facilities and education. In this chapter I situate Terrat in the wider context of 
Maasailand, and sketch the basic contours of how earlier travelling ideas – and policies that 
emanated from them – have come to shape contemporary life. 
 
Map 7.1 Terrat in Simanjiro District (Manyara Region). Cartography: Monika Feinen. 
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On the absent state and the “invisible Maasai”  
The lack of access to resources and the large deficit of development initiatives for the Maasai, 
and their general marginalization in the country go back to the colonial state, yet continue to 
persist until the present day. With independence, the African elites who took power embraced 
the outlook of progress and development, which was clearly out of step with what the 
“primitive” Maasai stood for. As Hodgson writes:  
Except for their photo opportunities, Maasai were generally out of sight and out of mind. 
Mocked by the elites as primitive, accused of cultural conservatism, and excluded from 
most state-sponsored development initiatives, Maasai became increasingly impoverished 
as their land, livestock, and possibilities for viable livelihoods continue to disappear. […] 
Similarly, the rudimentary rural health services available to Maasai have been sponsored 
primarily by private (usually religious) sources, since the government has also neglected its 
obligations to care for the health of one of its most marginalized populations (Hodgson 
1999: 121).  
These perceptions of the Maasai’s “conservatism” and “cultural backwardness” are still 
widespread among government officials and the Tanzanian elite. This became vividly clear to me 
during interviews that I conducted with officials. The current political landscape of economic 
liberalization has in many ways also impeded Maasai development, particularly concerning land 
matters and access to natural resources. And while the Maasai are put back into view as aesthetic 
icons of a primitive and traditional Africa in order to attract tourists, it is the same gaze that has 
led the few state-sponsored development initiatives to have almost vanished. This is the 
consequence of a government that is afraid to lose the lure of the authentic Maasai who are 
considered to be part of the landscape, which forms a lucrative foreign exchange for the 
development of the Tanzanian nation-state (Hodgson 1999: 122). Particularly from an economic 
standpoint, as well as for national and international conservation organizations, Maasailand is of 
invaluable significance. Tourism plays into this complexity, as northern Tanzania is among the 
country’s most prominent areas of touristic appeal. And thus in order to reap the benefits of 
tourism the government of Tanzania rather leaves the Maasai “untouched” and marginalized as 
they are, as colourful but timeless figures in a tourist brochure; like fossils exhibited in a museum 
that bear witness to a former geological epoch. This idea is succinctly echoed in the words of 
Edward junior, a young Maasai man, a radio presenter and documentary maker and indigenous 
rights activist from Terrat: “Many white people are interested in the Maasai that is why the 
government can get money of [sic] them, because we are keeping our culture. The government 
benefits from the Maasai, but the Maasai do not benefit from the government. That is the 
reality.” The long history of the marginalization of the Maasai in Tanzania, explains, at least in 
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part, the overall lack of climate-change knowledge and information in Terrat, which is a direct 
result of an “absent state”.122   
The village and the city are not only physical worlds apart, but have a long history of being 
produced as antagonistic forces that have come to stand in an ambiguous relation to each other. 
It can by and large be said that most interventions have been buttressed by the pursuit of either 
planting the seeds of “modernity”, or to preserve the Maasai’s “cultural authenticity”. The 
resultant conflicting relationship between these two distinct ideals vividly speaks to the 
imagination when one travels to Maasailand. Village life symbolizes “tradition”, sense of 
community, agro-pastoral modes of living and all the values and practices that are encapsulated 
by what it means to be a “true” Maasai. Yet city life stands for all the disenchantments that are 
considered to be part of modernity’s progressive quest for wealth and development. However, 
this depends on the perspective one takes. For Naini, who explicitly presented herself as a 
“modern Maasai” (proudly driving on her motorbike, or piki piki, in town), the life in the village 
is seen as backward, trapped in the past with an immutable culture that is foremost oppressive to 
women (through its maintaining of practices such as FGM123, polygyny and forced marriage); and 
a culture in which people are still carrying out derogatory religious practices (visiting traditional 
diviner and spiritual leader, drinking blood etc.). In turn, through the eyes of the Maasai family 
with whom we lived in Terrat, the city dwellers have fallen prey to greed, individualism and to an 
array of erosive cultural values (“modern” clothing, loss of proper greeting and of mutual respect 
etc.). They would often exclaim about the “urban” Maasai: “They are not real Maasai. They 
cannot even greet you properly anymore!” It is in view of the long history of engagement of the 
Maasai with the complex discursive and material structures of modernity, or of what we have 
come to think of as modernity, that we need to understand the ways in which climate change is 
received. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that this narrative not only evokes imaginations 
about a changing climate, but all the more of a rapidly changing world that impinges a particular 
form upon this dichotomy. 
The communities inhabiting Terrat and the wider Simanjiro plains belong predominantly to the 
Kisongo tribe. Originally they are semi-nomadic herders, who are – like Maasai elsewhere –
increasingly diversifying their livelihoods through the adoption of agriculture and labour 
migration (McCabe, Leslie & DeLuca 2010). The gatekeeper who introduced us to Terrat and the 
                                                             
122 Absent in the sense that it does not provide the Maasai with basic social services that one can expect 
from the state. Its presence is felt, however, in the appropriation of land for conservation purposes and 
the fear this has evoked among the Maasai communities. 
123 The official term is Female Genital Mutilation. Dorothy Hodgson has reframed it into the more neutral 
term Female Genital Modification (2011b). 
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village executive officer (called Israel), and kindly mediated our permission to carry out research 
was Naini’s uncle. As he was the village executive officer of another village in Maasailand, he 
knew Israel personally. This greatly smoothened our access and secured us of some top-down 
support. It turned out that Israel was a faithful church attendant of one of the popular 
Pentecostal churches in the village. When he was asked to accommodate us with a homestead (an 
enclosure or kraal; boma in Swahili, engang in Maa) in which we could live during my research, he 
logically brought us to a family that was a member of the same church. And so it happened that 
we found ourselves living in a small mud hut (a former goat- and henhouse, see picture) amidst a 
deeply faithful Pentecostal family, who at the same time considered themselves to be 
“traditional” Maasai. The Maasai encounter with Christianity has certainly complicated the 
relationship between what is considered to be “modern” and what “traditional”, to which I will 
return in the next chapter.  
The livelihood of the family where we stayed was in many ways representative of the homesteads 
that were found in the village, even though the boma was relatively small, comprising only two 
families. Petro, the head of the boma had two wives and ten children. His younger brother Logolie 
also had two wives and five children. Like most families in Terrat they were engaged both in 
raising livestock as well as in agriculture, mainly cultivating beans and maize. There are a few 
natural water points and self-dugg wells in the area, and one water pump constructed by the local 
NGO Llaramatak. While the natural water points are highly polluted, as cattle use it, people do 
not hesitate to drink from it. When water becomes scarce in the dry season, women fetch the 
water from the pump (if they have money, otherwise they have to walk a long way with their 
donkeys). In the rainy season the women can earn a little extra income by selling the surplus of 
milk to Llaramatak.124 On Sunday’s they all go to church, except for Logolie. He has a small shop 
in Terrat centre where he sells fuel, cigarettes and some other basic articles.  
Logolie complained to us about the importance of the church in Petro’s life. He said that “a lot 
of money and time is going to the pastor, and he does not even have time to look after his own 
herd”. After attending a few church services myself, it became clear where the wealth (and the 
flatscreen television) of the pastor had come from. Little did I realize at that point that the church 
played such an important role in the lives of this Maasai family. I also learned that they were not 
an exception. Terrat is home to six churches: one Lutheran, one Catholic and four Pentecostal 
                                                             
124 There is a true Dutch cheese factory that produces cheese from the milk of local cows. The cheese is 
sold throughout Tanzania, and it gives women in the area a good opportunity to earn a little extra income. 
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churches.125 There is also one small Mosque with only a handful of attendants. While explaining 
our research topic to Israel, he agreed to give us permission under the condition that we would 
treat the topic of land conflicts carefully. His caution was driven by the fear that it could bring 
him and other villagers into trouble, because the issue had evoked heightened political tensions 
(the police and the national government were already involved) and the village council was in the 
middle of settling the manifold ongoing land disputes with bordering villages.126 He explicitly told 
us “the biggest challenge in Terrat is land, and wildlife that destroys our crops or eats our maize.” 
Despite the vast area that comprises Terrat (some 400 km²) and Simanjiro at large, and the 
relative low population density (6,000 inhabitants) struggles over land are on the rise, and access 
to land is prone to ever more tensions. Land management and changing livelihoods in this area 
should be understood in view of the many conflicting interests between different interest groups 
and communities; varying from conservationists (with wildlife conservation priorities), to 
development agencies (aiming at poverty reduction); the state, which is encouraging commercial 
cultivation; hunting companies and private investors (for economic purposes), and the agro-
pastoral Maasai dwelling in the Simanjiro Plains (seeking to sustain their livelihoods). The 
conflicts in Terrat mainly contributed to the challenges entailed by Tarangire National Park, 
increasing population pressure, the expansion of cultivation of both small-scale farmers (many of 
whom have immigrated to Simanjiro in the 80s and 90s), and large-scale commercial farms in the 
area (see also Igoe 2006b; Leslie & McCabe 2013). Moreover, restricted access to key resources, 
and thus constraints on movement due to land privatization, subdivision, conservation policies 
that lead to the creation of national parks and (expansion of) wildlife reserves, have greatly 
impacted upon the Maasai (see also Homewood et al. 2009; Århem 1985: 28).  
Since the pastoral economy has deteriorated over the last decades as a result of the loss of land, 
agriculture has formed an important livelihood diversification strategy (Nelson et al. 2010: 81; 
McCabe 2003). Many conflicts are occurring and are likely to increase between agriculturalists 
and pastoralists, and between pastoral communities and national park officials, as well as between 
villages about unclear borders and complicated legal regulations concerning land rights. Yet 
crucially, as already touched upon in chapter four, according to my informants the greatest 
challenges for the agro-pastoralists of Terrat are entailed by the Tarangire National Park. Against 
this background, I share the concern expressed by Wisner et al. (2004) and Homewood et al. 
                                                             
125 The four different Pentecostal churches are called, respectively: Tanzania Assemblees of God (TAG); 
Free Pentecostal Church Tanzania (FPCT); Kanisa La Pentecosta Arusha (KLPA); Kanisa La Mitume. 
126 For a detailed insight into the sensitivities related to land issues and conservation, and the hostilities it 
evoked among informants towards a researcher dealing with this topic, see the work of Sachedina 2004. It 
is once again a testimony to the deeply engrained fear of losing land for conservation purposes. 
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(2009) that it is not unlikely that climate change – and not just its biophysical conditions but all 
the more the political and economic responses it might trigger – will exacerbate matters 
concerning access to vital resources for local populations (Wisner et al. 2004; Homewood et al. 
2009: 2). Against this background some recent historical and political dimensions shall be 
considered, with a focus on present land-use patterns and how access to natural resources is 
arranged. 
Notes on recent history & the politics of land use 
Due to the lack of (access to) written historical data and archives, these notes on the history of 
Terrat are predominantly based on oral histories from elders and the traditional leader 
(olaigwanani)127, and were crosschecked with other village administrators and complemented by 
secondary sources. The area that is now Simanjiro District (that contains roughly some 20,000 
square kilometers, see map 7.1), formed part of the territory of the Kisongo Maasai. It is said that 
the Maasai have utilized the plains and dwelled here since mid-1800. Several crises, such as severe 
droughts, zoological epidemics and intensified British control over land, pushed the Maasai to 
follow a more regular pattern of transhumant pastoralism around the 1900s within the Simanjiro 
Plains (Davis 2011: 27). 128 Before Terrat was officially established as a village in 1974, it formed 
part of the broader area that was known as Simanjiro proper (at times referred to by my 
informants as Maasai proper). The area was vast and stretched from what is now Tarangire 
National Park, all the way up to Orkesumet. At the time of its establishment the majority of the 
pastoralist Maasai were still leading a nomadic life. To be more precise, at the heart of their 
transhumant pastoral mode of living were the seasonal migration patterns in which families were 
on the move with their herds in search of water and green pastures, and followed a migratory 
pattern similar to that of the wild ungulates (Igoe 2002: 80). This meant that during the dry 
season (July to October) both people and animals concentrated around permanent water sources, 
                                                             
127 The traditional leader is chosen by the villagers and does not hold an official administrative function, 
yet he is a highly respected person as he is chosen on the basis of his moral conduct and personal qualities 
(see also Århem 1985: 18). He plays an essential role in mediating conflicts and helping people by giving 
advise in certain difficult situations. When he is elected he receives a cow and a bull, which is his only 
payment and symbolizes that he has to treat women and men equally. In brief, it can be said that he 
decides about how local injustices should be compensated (this happens generally through the gift of 
cattle).   
128 Contrary to commonly held ideas of the Maasai as archetypical pastoralists, historical evidence shows 
that they are in fact among the most recent arrivals in East Africa. Moreover, their adoption of a purely 
pastoral mode of living is a relatively recent innovation, and some Maa-speakers – who consider 
themselves to be Maasai – are not even pastoralists at all (Spear 1993a: 1; Spear 1993b). For a history of 
the development of Maasai identity in relation to the economic specialization of pastoralism, and 
Maasailand with a longer historical time span in which also more general existing myths are debunked, see 
the introduction of Thomas Spear (1993a) and the seminal edited volume Being Maasai (Spear & Waller 
1993). 
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particularly around the Tarangire river, reliable dry-season water sources which are now found 
inside the borders of the national park. And with the onset of the brief rains (around October or 
November) they would disperse into the Simanjiro Plain (Borner 1985, in Igoe 2002: 80). Because 
of their nomadic lifestyle, and also because of the low population density, during the time of its 
official formation, the village counted only three bomas. This is in part due to the fact that there 
were no permanent settlements at that time.129 Moreover, the bomas at that time were relatively 
large, comprising many families and many herds at the same time. When the rains ceased, people 
and herds moved all together, leaving the area – which according to my informants mainly 
consisted out of forest – completely desolated. Thus temporary settlements sufficed and the 
houses were of a provisionary nature made of cow hide, not comprising the mud-hut style houses 
that can be found nowadays.  
Wildlife generally returned to the river in June (and still does). And according to Igoe (2002), 
even though depending on the conditions, pastoralists stayed in the wet-season dispersal areas 
(which now thus form part of Terrat and other bordering villages) until August (Igoe 2002: 80). It 
should be noted that oral accounts revealed that the pastoralists also avoided many parts of this 
area altogether, for the wildlife posed major challenges to the Maasai and their herds. The sub 
village that is now called Lomukuta B (see map 7.2 Terrat) was infamous for its abundance of 
wildebeest, which grazed and calved there in the rainy season, and continue to do so until the 
present day. When wildebeest give birth a substance is emitted that results in poisonous grasses, 
which are lethal to cattle or cause blindness (leading to the Malignant Cattarhal Fever). In the 
thickly forested areas there was also the danger of predators such as lions and hyenas that 
attacked both people and livestock. Moreover, there were a variety of diseases (for example 
caused by the tsetse fly that carries trypanosomiasis or sleeping sickness) that made parts of the area 
uninhabitable, because both health services and dipping facilities for treating livestock were non-
existent. Nevertheless, despite these natural or environmental restrictions that were inherent to 
the human-animal relations, there was free movement of people and animals – although it was a 
regulated management system based on common property130 – until Tarangire National Park was 
officially gazetted in 1970 (see map 7.2). 
                                                             
129 According to some informants, the only permanent settlements at that time were built by the first 
British settlers in the area, who had constructed some buildings in Loiborsoit. Upon independence in 1961 
they left the buildings to the Maasai of that area, which was the beginning of the first settlements. 
130 It is important to make the distinction between an “open-access” system in which the resource is found 
in the public domain and to which there are no rights, as opposed to common property such as these 
grazing lands that are regulated by the communities who dwell there. It is said that Hardin’s argument on 
“the tragedy of the commons” was flawed because it mistook pastoral grazing land for open-access land 
(McCabe 2003). 
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Map 7.2 Terrat village, Tarangire NP and wildlife dispersal patterns. Cartography: Monika Feinen. 
Needless to say that this enclosure drastically impacted upon people’s livelihoods after they lost 
access to crucial water points (an issue that deserves further explication below). People who were 
found inside the enclosed borders were removed that same year (see also Igoe 2006b: 86), which 
remains a painful memory to those who were forcefully evicted (Igoe & Brockington 1999). 
Another political decision that impinged upon the mobility of people occurred around 1974-75 
when Julius Nyerere’s socialist ideology of Ujamaa reached parts of Maasailand.131 During this 
                                                             
131 In Swahili Ujamaa means familyhood, and in Maa this operation was called Operation Imparnati, which 
means “permanent settlement”. According to Nyerere, his ideal of a Tanzanian version of socialism could 
be captured by the name Ujamaa itself. He wrote: “ […] it is an African word and thus emphasizes the 
African-ness of the policies we intend to follow. […] its literal meaning is family-hood so that it brings to 
the mind of our people the idea of mutual involvement in the family as we know it. By the use of the 
word ‘ujamaa’, therefore, we state that for us socialism involves building on the foundation of our past 
[…]. We are doing this by emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization, and 
extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of modern technology and enable us to meet the 
challenge of life in the twentieth century world” (Nyerere 1968: 2).   
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period nomadism was prohibited, for people were forced into nucleated villages (also called 
development villages) that were permanent settlements. According to some of my informants the 
effects of this policy were not felt in Terrat until 1977.132 In their memories it was the beginning 
of a visible increased population density, and an altered socio-political and ecological landscape, 
as the seeds were planted for the Maasai’s (widespread) engagement with agriculture. Part of the 
Ujamaa ideology was to increase the agricultural productivity countrywide, but the need for 
increased agricultural productivity was also triggered by the Tanzania-Uganda war in 1978, which 
drained the country economically. Also the Maasai pastoralists were obliged to pay taxes, and 
instead of selling cattle they gave preference to selling crops, permitting the maintenance and 
possible increase of their herd, which ultimately forms their most fundamental source of living. 
Several other reasons can be pointed out for the Maasai’s adoption of cultivation in this area, 
which overall should be seen in light of the unprecedented pressure that African pastoral systems 
are facing. As mentioned before – in the face of increased population pressure, modernization 
and reduced grazing areas (among other stressors) – among the Maasai of northern Tanzania 
cultivation was the most significant step to diversify their livelihood (McCabe 2003). Interesting 
to note in this context is that the engagement with agriculture contains a paradox. It might lead 
us to think that cultivation is a step away from the pastoral identity (which we have come to think 
of as being part and parcel of “Maasaihood”); yet the opposite is true. As McCabe has also 
demonstrated, the principal reason to begin farming is indeed to save the livestock (ibid 2003: 
106). This is in line with my own findings, and most informants explained to me that despite the 
risks inherent to cultivation, any successful harvest was considered worth undertaking as it 
prevented them from selling their cattle. As one informant put it: “We cultivate so we can keep 
our cattle, they are like a bank to us so we only sell an animal in case of an emergency”. A second 
crucial reason concerns land-tenure security. Approximately twenty years ago villagers began 
allocating land to individual households as a defence mechanism to foreclose further land 
alienation and appropriation by the state for wildlife conservation (see also Sachedina 2008; Leslie 
& McCabe 2013: 119). This has to do, in part, with the Village Land Act that became operative in 
1999, to which I will return below. Other factors that have spurred cultivation as pointed out by 
my informants were hunger and the need to supplement their diet; a change of diet driven by an 
                                                             
132 While the country-wide villagization program of resettlement officially began already in Dodoma in 
1971, the Maasai were initially excluded from the Ujamaa resettlement program, because – like all other 
pastoral communities – they were considered to be a problem by the policy makers (Nyerere 1968: 140, in 
Ndagala 1982: 28). And it was only after 1974 that for the pastoral areas it was recognized that 
development trajectories needed to be adapted to pastoral conditions, and the concept of “livestock 
development villages” was created (Parkipuny 1979: 154). 
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increasing taste for eating maize (as the basis of ugali); and increasing costs of living (education of 
children, medication, vaccination for cattle etc.).   
Thus Ujamaa was only one factor in a complex web of other socio-political and economic 
dimensions that made cultivation part of the day-to-day activities of the Maasai in the Simanjiro 
Plains. One of the fundamental ideals that underpinned this African (or Tanzanian) version of 
socialism was that by moving people permanently into settled and demarcated areas, basic social 
services could be more effectively provided. Indeed, as my informants also explained, the good 
thing about Ujamaa was that children for the first time received drugs and vaccinations, which 
brought a halt to widespread diseases (such as chicken pox) and child mortality that was prevalent 
at that time. The downfall of the permanent settlement into villages for the pastoral communities 
was clearly the restriction of mobility patterns, but also a rapidly changing environment. Yet most 
significant for the Maasai, the socialist ideology (combined with the single-party autocratic State) 
maintained the centralized forms of resource control, which resulted in the reinforced economic 
opportunity for national elites. These lucrative economic opportunities in turn infused 
conservation ideology with new life, and led to repressive models of power (Homewood & 
Rodgers 1991; Igoe & Brockington 1999). It is very likely that in East Africa the Maasai have 
been the most severely affected by protected areas (Neumann 1998, in Sachedina 2008). 
Thick forest gradually diminished as larger concentration of people demanded more charcoal for 
cooking, leading some animals to disappear, and water sources to diminish (this was in 
combination with the enclosure of TNP). As one informant put it: “the health services were 
really improved, but it was the time when the destruction of the environment began”. Some 
informants also gave account of trucks coming in and stripping off large number of trees, most 
probably for selling as charcoal in Arusha (see also Schade 1997, in Igoe 2006b: 92). It is very 
likely that the effects of socialism were felt differently throughout the region, as different 
scholarly have come to different conclusions. While according to some records the actual 
relocation of bomas did not “mean real change in the Maasai settlement”, or have far-reaching 
social and economic consequences (Ndagala 1982: 30), others have claimed that it drastically 
disrupted territorial and authority relations (Hodgson 2004: 161), and that it entailed a 
rearrangement of traditional settlements, leading to the emergence of single-family bomas (Jacobs 
1978, in Homewood & Rogers 1991: 209). What certainly stands out is that the forced 
resettlement of “Operation Imparnati” was thought of by many pastoral Maasai as another 
attempt of the government to subjugate them and alienate them from their grazing lands 
(Ndagala 1982: 29). Ultimately, the villagization program thus formed an infringement on their 
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political autonomy as it imposed a new authority structure, and the move towards a sedentary 
lifestyle was seen as a threat to their transhumant pastoral way of life. Furthermore, the policies 
that were predetermined to limit herd size touched upon the very core of the Maasai culture 
(Århem 1985: 25). 
 
Map 7.3 Terrat Map sub-villages (Source: Mansoor et al. 2009: 33)  
 
Map 7.4 Terrat Map drawn by Traditonal Leader (olaigwanani) 
 187 
Demarcations & enclosures: the impact of Tarangire National Park on local 
communities 
Terrat is the oldest village and can thus be seen as the mother village from which the other 
villages in the vicinity of Terrat have sprung. Initially, Terrat formed the area up to Naberera, and 
was later split into several other villages (among which Sukuro, Naberera, Loiborsoit, Komolo, 
Emboreet, Loswaki). It should be noted that Terrat is both a ward (consisting of 11 villages)133, 
and a village (consisting of 10 sub-villages, see map 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5).134 My research comprised 
Terrat village. According to the olaigwanani of Terrat and another senior elder, the demarcations 
of these villages occurred during a meeting in 1981 that took place in Terrat village. It was a 
procedure in which they were involved during a meeting, which was attended by them and some 
other villagers and administrators from Simanjiro District. According to their account it went as 
follows: 
In 1981 there was a meeting of the people from Simanjiro District. We followed them 
and sat in a meeting here in Terrat. And they decided that “now we have to define the 
villages”. Loboirsoit needs to be demarcated from Terrat. We are natives here so we knew 
every place. So we put an agreement, let’s separate Loboirsoit from Terrat through a 
certain tree, and let’s separate Sukuro from Loborsoit through a certain place. So we 
made an agreement over those demarcations and then we wrote letters, which we gave to 
the government so that the government could come and recognize these places. […] 
After that the decisions that were made in that particular meeting, the tree that was used 
in 1981 is still present until today (focus group discussion with olaigwanani, educational officer and 
another respected elder). 
As mentioned before, the land-use patterns and the causes of livelihood changes (and conflicts) 
that have occurred over the past years in Terrat and in the broader Simanjiro Plains are complex 
(see also McCabe, Leslie, and DeLuca 2010), and it is beyond the scope and intention of my 
study to dwell on the subject in detail. But in the face of the overall theme “adaptation to climate 
change”, a few insights into the major challenges and conflicts concerning landholdings and land-
use patterns deserve mention. The basic premise on which the following discussion rests is the 
notion that pastoral mobility – as flexible and opportunistic movement – is among one of the key 
adaptation strategies in response to unpredictable and highly variable climate of semi-arid and 
arid landscapes (Scoones 1995; Scoones & Graham 1994; Goldman & Riosmena 2013; 
Homewood 2008; Bollig & Schnegg 2013; Galaty 2013).135 While these demarcations were the 
                                                             
133 The villages (or kijiji) are Terrat; Loswaki; Engonongoi, Nambatano; Losunyai; Sukuro; Komolo; 
Kitiengare; Nadonjukin; Oiborkishu and Lorokare. 
134 The subvillages (or kitongoji) are Madukani A & B; Loondelemeti A & B; Lomukuta A & B; Shuleni; 
Ormanie; Loorng’oswani and Lolteer. 
135 There is of course an array of complex and interdependent adaptive strategies related to pastoral 
livelihoods that have evolved and changed in the course of history. We can think of changing herd 
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beginning of the separation of distinct villages in administrative terms, the Simanjiro Plains 
remain a multiple-use, semi-open and communal grazing land for the pastoral communities – 
although with clear regulations based on traditional grazing patterns. Maasai resource- 
management systems and land-use patterns are grounded upon principles of reciprocity and 
solidarity. An important notion that generally guides reciprocity principles among the Maasai is 
known as enkanyit, which means mutual respect. However, many of my informants lamented the 
decline in important cultural values such as enkanyit. Also some authors have demonstrated that 
this customary adaptation strategy is declining due to several stressors (see Goldman & Riosmena 
2013).  
The land that surrounds the TNP and that forms part of the Simanjiro Plains is so-called “village 
land”. This land falls under the authority and jurisdiction of the local communities of the 
respective villages, which are predominantly Maasai pastoralists. The villages are governed by 
village assemblies (all adult residents), and an elected village council (consisting of 25 members) 
which is headed by the village chairman. Whenever decisions are made about access to land, such 
as setting aside dry-season pastures, a meeting of the village assembly is organized and decisions 
are made and enforced collectively (cf. Nelson et al. 2010).136 In Terrat, usually before the general 
meeting of the village assembly takes place, the olaigwanani of the different villages organize 
themselve and draft a proposal that they can discuss in the assembly meeting. Also in case of 
conflicts or misunderstandings the traditional leaders are called upon to mediate. Nevertheless, 
while the Village Land Act was said to strengthen land tenure rights through village institutions, it 
catalyzed land privatization instead (Celender et al. 2005, in Sachedina 2008: 274) and it did not 
prevent further land loss experienced by the Maasai (as the Loliondo case attests to). It can be 
said that land tenure security at the village level is far from stable and desirable for local 
communities, which is in part due to the complexity of the procedures to acquire formalized 
rights, and land laws that are cumbersome and fraught with inconsistencies. Since the inception 
of the Village Land Act, one particular clause has been of great concern to the pastoralists, 
namely the fact that the President of Tanzania remains with the power to redistribute land that is 
considered “unoccupied” or “unused” (TNRF 2012a); often also referred to as “idle land”. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
composition, livelihood diversification, trade, social networks, values such as reciprocity, and the 
introduction of new species. I highlight mobility here because it appeared to be an important adaptation 
strategy in Terrat, which is increasingly being challenged by changing land-use patterns and competition 
over land. 
136 Since the Village Land Act (1999) came into force, Village Councils have been set up with the task of 
categorizing their land according to pre-existing or new land-use plans, a task that needs to be approved 
by the Village Assembly, and is subject to advice from the District Council. 
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definition of what constitutes this unoccupied land remains open for interpretation.137 For 
example, pastoralists leave large grazing areas deliberately aside for a part of the year as dry-
season reserves. Hence the fear of the Maasai pastoralists that their fallow grazing lands - which 
are left to recover for a considerable period of time – are considered to be unproductive 
(Sachedina 2008: 274). Not only in Terrat but also in the wider region this fear has set into 
motion the allocation of individual plots for cultivation to hedge against land appropriation. 
 
Passengers on the road close to our boma in Loondelemeti B, which is the name of these white 
flowers. 
Basic land-use patterns, adaptation and customary institutions in Terrat 
After having stayed in the boma with Petro’s family for some weeks, I witnessed the remarkably regular 
pattern of their days. Particularly sunset occurred to me as a miraculous chronicle. First, the smallest 
animals (lambs and kids) returned, playfully taken care of by the smallest members of the family. Then 
the bigger animals (calves and goats) followed, herded by the older children of the family. Finally, before 
dusk the cows and bulls returned, usually in guidance of the illmuran or the intoyie (unmarried girls). 
After milking, the female and male elders of the family gathered around the fenced animals and stared at 
                                                             
137 The confusion over what constitutes what type of land is rather technical. In Tanzania “All land is 
public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of all citizens” (URT 1999: 25); and thus it is the 
President who has the ultimate say in land allocation and transfer of rights. There are three categories of 
land: 1) Village Land; 2) General Land and 3) Reserved Land. The major threat and challenge for the 
pastoralists is the confusion and lack of agreement over what falls under General versus Village Land. 
General Land is defined as: “all public land which is not reserved land or village land” (URT 1999: 14) and 
includes unoccupied or unused village land. However, the Village Land Act does not state that general 
land includes “all unoccupied or unused village land”, which is thus prone to uncertainty (TNRF 2012). 
Furthermore the President is authorized to transfer village land to general or reserved land for public 
interest, which includes investments of national interest (URT 1999: 26). 
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them with almost sacred devotion. I learned that each family member followed the genealogy of one of his or 
her animals until they were assured that their flock was complete and in good health. Now it was time to 
eat and socialize. 
If one wanders around into the vast plains of Simanjiro – particularly during the dry season – 
there are not many clues that unveil the fact that access to land is in many ways controlled and 
regulated. Only on closer inspection, for example by witnessing social interaction or herd 
movement, do existing grazing rules become apparent. The basic land use in Terrat is managed 
and arranged according to spatial and temporal movements, following a rotation system with dry-
season pasture reservation that allows for grasses to recover. There is common grazing land 
(divided into wet-season pastures and dry-season refuges); and there is individually owned land 
for farms, homesteads and kraals for calves or sick animals (cf. Nelson et al. 2010: 80). The 
communal dry-season reserve – also called oleilili in Maa – can only be accessed from the first of 
July (with the onset of the dry season) until February. In exceptional cases, when one has a weak 
or sick herd, with permission from the traditional leader, herders are allowed to let their herds 
enter. There is strong social control to make sure that all protocols are observed, which prevents 
people from taking their herd into lands that are reserved for the dry-season, unless one has 
official permission. I have observed this social control while herding cows with a pastoralist who 
had gained permission to take his herd into the aleileli before the dry season. If one encounters 
other pastoralists there is an elaborate question-and-answer session to make sure that nobody is 
entering this land illegally. For example: where are you from, what is wrong with your herd, who 
is your father, who gave you permission to bring your cows here, etc.? These rules of access are 
strictly obeyed and the dates of access remain the same for each year. As the traditional ruler 
emphasized:  
We do not need to repeat the dates for when people can enter ewas [communal oleilili]. 
They are planted into people’s minds. So everybody knows that in February cows have to 
leave the place and we cannot enter again before the first of July. 
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Map 7.5 Terrat village. Cartography: Monika Feinen.138 
The use of an oleilili is an important adaptation strategy that serves as a drought refuge to survive 
the dry season, which is the most vulnerable period of the year. But it similarly functions as a way 
to prevent over-grazing. Furthermore, each homestead has its own individual oleilili that is 
designated for calves and sick animals that cannot range far in search for pasture, and can thus be 
found close to each boma. In principle, this is individual property belonging to a single homestead 
(comprising several households), but people are always free to ask each other permission to 
access any individual oleilili. There exists a significant difference in planning between the dry 
season and the wet season. During the dry season there are no demarcations, for most land 
(including farm land) turns into grazing land, apart from the individual oleilili. There are several 
traditional institutions and meetings in which the land management of the dry season is planned. 
The so-called engigwana engishu is a traditional meeting (without any involvement of the formal 
                                                             
138 Not everything is depicted on the map. Terrat has 2 primary schools, 1 secondary school, 1 health 
centre, 5 bore-holes, 1 river, and 1 NGO. 
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government) in which all elders and the young men or warriors (illmuran)139 discuss the 
improvement of land management of the dry-season pastures and the use of water sources. The 
traditional leader pointed out the importance and ongoing procedures of this meeting: 
The main thing that is being discussed in the meeting is about the improvement and land 
management based on pastoralism. For example, we may say “now the dry season is 
coming”. And because we are depending on this area, this river for example, or the 
underground water, which has been drilled, we will depend on here. “Your cattle for 
example” – the cattle of this elder will be the first to come, they come maybe at 7 o‘clock 
early in the morning. And they leave maybe at 9 o’clock. The second group of cattle are 
from another person. We decide here in this meeting. “Your cows should come maybe at 
9 o’clock and they leave maybe at 5”. So we arrange it in that way. 
These meetings take place before the onset of the dry season, or are called whenever new 
decisions need to be made about issues concerning land, cattle or natural resources, mainly water. 
Another traditional practice for the Maasai to plan the dry season – or to recover from it – is an 
institution called orpul. This customary practice is a healing retreat in which large (or rather 
excessive) quantities of meat are consumed, knowledge about herbal medicines is exchanged, and 
the illmuran are taught general traditional lore (about the environment, as well as songs, dances, 
veterinary knowledge) by the elders. The retreat can last several weeks and usually takes place in a 
forest. Orpul is an important retreat to recover from physical disorders, stress, diseases or general 
bodily weakness after the dry season, or rather to prepare both physically and mentally for the 
upcoming hardships of the dry season. Leboi explained to me that they see orpul as a garage for 
the body. As one olmorani (korianga age-set) in preparation of orpul explained to me:  
We eat as much meat as possible. If we go for a long period we try to collect enough 
money to buy half a cow each. We feel so strong after orpul, because of all the meat that 
we eat. We only eat meat in that period and take herbal medicines. […] And we also listen 
to a lot of lectures from the older men so that we know what to do with our cattle in case 
of a serious drought, for example.  
In addition to this, orpul is also said to have spiritual and psychological dimensions and should 
thus be seen as a holistic system of health care. Much time is dedicated to songs and dances, 
meditation, communal prayer and remembrance of ancestral spirits (Burford et al. 2001). 
Nevertheless, especially elder men in Terrat lamented that the importance of orpul is diminishing 
among the current generation of illmuran. One elder told me that the illmuran of today do not like 
to go to orpul anymore because “they don’t like it, it is another generation. They are used to eating 
                                                             
139 The status of the ilmuran within Maasai society can best be described as “a society within a society” that 
functions within a gerontocratic model. As Spencer put it: “The murran are suspended somewhere 
between boyhood and full adulthood and are placed in limbo for an extended period of adolescence that 
stretches well into their twenties. They are trapped in a regime imposed by the elders and yet at the same 
time are a law to themselves [...]” (Spencer 1993: 141). 
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ugali (maize porridge), they are used to eating beans, and whenever you give them milk they say 
‘that is not food’. So they don’t like it”. But some illmuran gave me the explanation that they are 
more drawn to the city and to finding alternative ways of generating income, such as trade and 
mining.140 In a similar vein, many other customary adaptation strategies are losing their value, are 
fully abandoned or even prohibited. For example, drinking cow blood was a very common 
practice among the Maasai, which formed an important nutritional supplement in times of food 
scarcity. Nowadays this practice is prohibited by all churches, which disdain this “devilish” 
traditional practice. I have observed only a few men drinking blood during a circumcision 
ceremony. However, all the women that I met stated that they abstained from drinking blood 
nowadays. The traditional sacrifices and rain prayer in lead of oloiboni (the traditional healer and 
diviner) are also prohibited by the church. For an overview of the most significant adaptation 
strategies as pointed out by my informants, see box 7.5 below. 
Box 7.5 Basic land-use management strategies and most significant adaptation practices and 
traditional institutions to cope with climate variability and drought 
 
Seasonal mobility Seasonal mobility was pointed out as the greatest and most vital 
adaptation strategy of the pastoralists. This is not a random 
strategy, but a highly planned and organized livelihood strategy. 
Selling cattle In order to survive harsh conditions such as drought, herders 
sell cattle, goats and sheep in order to complement their diet. 
Networks and reciprocity [Enkanyit] Mutual respect is a sacred notion that guides the 
building of relationships and networks of solidarity 
Exploration of dry-season pastures [Eleenore] Before the illmuran move with their cattle to other 
pastures a few selected warriors (two or three) will explore the 
new grazing area. They investigate the availability of water and 
pasture, and check the health and population density of local 
livestock, check for diseases, and talk to people about major 
challenges that exist in the area. After their exploration the 
illmuran come back and make a decision in a meeting (engigwana 
engishu) with elders and other illmuran about whether to bring the 
cattle there or to continue with finding an alternative grazing 
area. Nowadays the use of mobile phones has to some extent 
made this communication between different localities easier. 
                                                             
140 Many young men from Terrat and other villages in Simanjiro have migrated to Mererani to become 
middlemen in trading the rare gemstone Tanzanite. However, in the past years this trend has declined. For 
an overview of how many men have migrated in the past years from Terrat, see McCabe et al. 2014. 
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Dry-season reserve [Alailili] The area surrounding each boma is protected by leaving 
it fallow during the rainy season so that there are enough 
pastures left in the dry season for weak or sick cows, calves, 
lambs and kids (young goats). 
 [Ewas] This is the communal dry season reserve that is shared by 
the villagers in Terrat. It is the area where wildebeest give birth 
and emit a liquid that is dangerous for cattle. It is free from 
trees, which enables the wildebeest to choose a place to keep an 
eye on the predators. Since the pastoralists cannot use the area in 
the rainy season they have effectively turned the area into a 
communal dry-season reserve. Access to the area is strictly 
arranged by the traditional authorities and one can only enter 
with permission from the traditional leader, and only if one’s 
herd is weak. There is strong social control. 
Wet-season grazing [Engusero] This is the area that is used for grazing during the 
rainy season when the Ewas is not accessible for cattle. 
Temporary settlement [Ronjo] This is a temporary fenced boma without houses. It serves 
as a protection during the night for the warriors and their herd 
while they are far away from home taking care of the cattle 
during the dry season.  
Warrior healing retreat [Orpul] This is a recurring yearly gathering – or healing retreat – 
organized by different groups of warriors who assemble together 
with some elders in the forest. It is a retreat for the body to 
recover and gain strength, but this event also has a spiritual and 
social significance to connect with members of the group. One 
aim of this meeting can be to prepare for (or recover from) the 
dry season. They do so by eating an excessive amount of cow 
meat, and use traditional medicine in order to make them strong 
and survive the upcoming harsh dry season. They also discuss 
the best adaptation strategies. Also, in the longer term the Orpul 
is meant to hand over detailed knowledge of plants, medicines 
etc. by the elders to the younger generation of warriors. The 
Orpul also has a spiritual dimension and the illmuran spend time 
singing, dancing, meditating, and remembering the ancestors. 
Drinking cow blood According to the account of some elders, drinking cow blood 
was an important adaptation strategy to survive the dry season 
when there was not enough food. They would drain the blood 
from the cattle without the need to kill them. Nowadays this 
practice is hardly carried out because most churches prohibit this 
“traditional” habit. 
Traditional meeting [engigwana engishu] This meeting takes place whenever it is 
necessary, when urgent things need to be discussed concerning 
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land use, cows etc. At least every year before the onset of the dry 
season it is organized to plan the adaptation strategies, and the 
access to land, grasses and water are discussed. This meeting is 
attended by all adult men and illmuran. 
Restriction on drinking water [angaroni] On this day cattle are not allowed to drink water, as a 
way of saving water resources. 
Place with good pastures [engaron] At the day that cows are not allowed to drink water, 
they are allowed to go to engaron, a place with good pastures. 
Drinking day [Okore] On this day cows are allowed to drink water. 
 
Let us briefly go back to the function of one of the most important dry-season adaptation 
strategies, the communal oleilili as mentioned above, which has not been turned into a large 
drought-refuge without reason. While villages are dealing with livelihood changes in different 
ways, the villages of Terrat, Emboreet, Sukuro and Loiboirsoit have intelligently bundled their 
resources and turned the obstacles posed by the enclosure of TNP into a commonly shared dry-
season grazing reserve141 (the place is called ewas, see map 7.2 “Land use in the Simanjiro Plains” 
and map 7.3 “Terrat Village”). The wider Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem (or “Maasai Steppe”) is 
renowned for its large seasonal migration of large ungulates. And as mentioned earlier, the 
Simanjiro Plains belong to a vital calving and dispersal areas for wildebeest, zebra and elephants 
(Sachedina 2008: 25). In the wet season large concentrations of zebra and wildebeest (thousands 
of animals, which is a considerable proportion of Tarangire’s wildlife) disperse into the heart of 
ewas. Here they graze for 6 to 7 months until the dry season sets in, which is the period when the 
wildlife returns to TNP. During my stay in the area I witnessed indeed large groups of zebras and 
wildebeest congregating in this area on a daily basis. When I drove past ewas with Petro, we 
observed large groups of zebras and wildebeest, after which he exclaimed: “Ai ai ai, these animals 
are finishing all our grasses! And we still need to survive the dry season”. This was a widely heard 
complaint in Terrat. The attraction for the wildebeest to graze in ewas during the wet season lies 
in the availability of enriched nutrients in the soil, which comprise higher mineral levels and are 
phosphorous-rich (Nelson et al. 2010: 80; Sachedina & Nelson 2012: 150). Moreover, because the 
area is wide and not thickly forested the animals prefer to give birth there so that they can see 
predators from afar. This is where Terrat derives its name “birth clinic” from.  
                                                             
141 For an overview of response diversity and the different livelihood stratification strategies in Simanjiro 
see: Leslie & McCabe 2013. 
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The idea to designate ewas as a communal oleilili is an efficient way of turning an obstacle into an 
opportunity. The first reason for keeping the area free from human intervention is driven by a 
recent pilot project that was initiated in 2004 by several tour operators and NGOs together with 
Terrat. The idea behind a so-called “Conservation Easement Area” has been to spur local 
communities to protect wildlife and keep the wildlife corridors free from human intervention (i.e. 
settlement, cultivation, charcoal burning, hunting, poaching). This initiative was set up by several 
tour-operators and NGOs to engage local communities with protecting wildlife habitats, and pay 
them in their effort to protect the area. This payment scheme can be framed as a so-called 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) agreement, and the designated area comprises 93,00 ha 
(Nelson et al. 2010), which logically forms part of the ewas, the shared dry-season reserve and 
wildebeest “birth clinic”. Game scouts have been appointed to take care of the monitoring, and 
watch for illegal poachers and hunters and other forms of human intervention. As mentioned 
before, Leboi is one of the game scouts. 
Secondly, it is during the calving period of the wildebeest that the pastoralists with their herd are 
forced to abstain from entering this area altogether, until the moment arrives when the first rains 
wash away the poisonous fluids emitted by the wildebeest. Just like Leboi and Petro, my 
informants unequivocally complained about the lack of pasture, and the wildlife that “finishes all 
their grasses”. They found that the greatest injustice of TNP is the fact that the wild animals can 
graze everywhere all year round, whereas in turn their cattle cannot enter into the park. As one 
male informant lamented: 
We are really affected because during the rainy season wildlife from TNP are coming to 
Terrat to Tokota [plain area without trees, which is in ewas] to give their young ones, and 
they are staying here 7 to 8 months. They call it a clinic for the wildlife. Cattle are not 
going there because of Malignant Cattarhal Fever. They also finish the grass and water of 
the animals. But during the dry season when people from here or from other villages try 
to go back for water and pastures they are not allowed, while the animals from Tarangire 
are coming here, and finish our grass and also water.  
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Wildebeest in Ewas. 
What clearly stands out among the major challenges to which the villagers in Terrat gave 
testimony was the restricted access to dry-season pastures and water sources that are found inside 
TNP, as well as the encroachment of wildlife onto their farm lands and grazing areas. One of the 
reasons why many villagers in Terrat did not plant maize in 2012 and 2013 was because zebra had 
eaten their crops in previous years, so they felt it was safer to plant beans instead (which are 
however also more drought-prone). Petro went out to check his farmland three times at night in 
order to chase away the zebras. Others paid young boys to keep an eye on the farmlands at night. 
Petro’s elder brother, who lives a couple of kilometres further away, mentioned that he really 
missed the lions that used to be present in the area in much larger concentrations, which kept 
zebras at a distance. And of course the threat of wildlife to their animals was also pointed out, 
and the injustice that wildlife are much more protected than their cattle: 
When we kill a lion you can be in trouble with the government, so they can say the 
government can displace your cow […]. Maybe a lion can come into my boma and kill my 
cattle but when you kill a lion they come and take you to jail. So there are many 
challenges. 
Another influential component in shaping the livelihoods of pastoral communities adjacent to the 
park is the fear of (further) alienation from land, or restricted access to resources due to 
conservation imperatives, which is not surprising if we consider the history of past land evictions 
of many Maasai communities (cf. Leslie & McCabe 2013: 119), which continue to take place 
today. The lack of land-tenure security is at the heart of many of the challenges the Maasai are 
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facing, which is an issue that particularly well-educated Maasai are strongly aware of. Edward, a 
young Maasai man and documentary maker that I mentioned earlier, succinctly put it as follows: 
The Maasai don’t have a high number of land rights […]. They say the land belongs to the 
President. So sometimes if you can live here, and this is a nice place, people maybe come 
to hunt or maybe to put a camp there. They say because the land belongs to the 
President. So you have to move here, go to find another way. […] So in the kind of tribes 
based in Tanzania, the tribe that is suffering is Maasai. Really around Tanzania a lot of 
Maasai are more suffering.  
If we go back to the time in which Tarangire was established as a national park, it becomes clear 
that – despite its promises to give local people control over natural resources (Igoe 2002: 77) – it 
was not intended to serve the interests of the local communities. It foremost entailed a radical 
rupture in the seasonal migration patterns of the Maasai. The following account from a well-
educated elder (who spoke English) also reveals that the “agreement” to demarcate the land 
occurred without considering the long-term consequences of local communities properly: 
Tarangire was Simanjiro Proper. But when the government saw that there is a variety of 
animals and water sources they saw it is better to be a national park. So the government 
sat down with the leader who was known as Mariko. He was the traditional leader of 
Maasai, he was the olaigwanani and they made an agreement. […] It was sold after 
independence. But at that time people were not affected because the population was very 
small […]. So you may pass from here to Naberera and you find no people! So the land 
was very large that is why it was not bad to make a national park because the main land 
was very big (interview with elder).142 
Furthermore, as the traditional leader at that time made a secret agreement with the park 
management, most people were not informed that they had lost access to this land. Their eviction 
came rather as an unfortunate surprise, and the long-term effects were unforeseen: 
The man [Mariko] made that agreement secretly. He did not inform the people about the 
fact that this place is going to be a park. Therefore, when people were grazing their cows 
inside that place they found an aeroplane to chase them very far away from that place, 
saying that “this is a national park”. Now we have come to realize that Tarangire was a 
very good place because water sources are available throughout the year. Whether it is dry 
season or rainy season, water was always available. And we are now realizing that this 
place was very valuable after all these changes are taking place. Because you may find your 
cows two days in a row, they don’t find water. You are normally running from here to 
there and you go through the national park you will find that water sources are available 
throughout the year. There are pastures but it is only for wild animals. Wild animals that 
are kept by people to help them make a living. Safari and tourists also. So we came to 
realize that Tarangire is a good place for the people here also (olaigwanani Terrat).  
                                                             
142 At that time there was only one olaigwanani among the whole of Maasai community, as opposed to 
nowadays, when every village (or even sub-village) has its own traditional leader. 
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Many informants indeed explained that the negative effects of the enclosure of TNP were felt 
only later (see also Igoe 2006b: 86), and were particularly deplored in times of severe drought. 
Among the Maasai, eventful years and years that can be characterized by a pronounced 
environmental or climatic feature are given special names (see box 7.3). Sometime in the 80s, it 
was the year of the lamb (the exact year was apparently forgotten, but people referred to its name 
olari laambaalon), in which the dry season lasted for an unbearably long time, when some village 
leaders of Terrat asked the government of Tanzania (TANAPA) – as a matter of exception – for 
permission to enter the park with their herds. Water sources were dried out and many cattle were 
dying, or struggling for survival (as were the people). Their request was denied. In addition to 
this, people are telling stories about the consequences of trespassing the boundaries of the park 
with their cattle, which for good reasons have left the people frightened. As one senior elder told 
me: 
They will fine you [if you enter]. There are some police who are taking care of that. They 
can kill you even. There was even a case in which 50 cows were killed. They killed the 
cattle. 
Fundamentally, with the establishment of TNP the Maasai of the Tarangire/Simanjiro ecosystem 
lost their most reliable dry-season water source, the Tarangire river, and their primary drought- 
refuge, the so-called Silalo swamp (Igoe 2002: 81; Leslie & McCabe 2013: 127). The enclosure of 
Tarangire National Park has been driven by Western-dominant international discourses about 
nature conservation, infused by the conviction that nature and culture need to be detached. This 
ideology is a typical vision of African environment and society and is largely the lifeblood that 
shapes conservation throughout the continent. As mentioned earlier, this falls under what 
Brockington (2002) has coined “fortress conservation”, and is buttressed by three (generally 
erroneous) premises. First, the vision is purported that the environment was once threatened by 
destruction, but is now saved.143 Secondly, the argument is defended that the people who were 
evicted were not indigenous to the area so it was not their ancestral land, and that it was an 
indispensible step towards a return to a pristine wilderness. And finally, conservation is 
legitimized by the need to provide for the development needs of the communities around the 
national parks, such as education and health care (Brockington 2002: 3). Particularly the history 
                                                             
143 Interestingly enough, there is often little or no ecological evidence to support this stubborn idea of 
environmental damage done by local people. This has been brought to the fore by Homewood and 
Rodgers in the case of Ngorongoro. This touristic attraction had been the battleground of continuous 
political struggle without much sound ecological evidence about the ecology of the Maasai, until their 
study came out in 1991. While conservationists continue to see the Maasai as a threat to the environment, 
historical evidence shows that the Maasai have a long history of successful and sustainable land use in the 
area (see: Homewood and Rodgers 1991).  
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of wildlife conservation in Eastern Africa has been driven by two lingering myths that formed the 
heart of policy design. The first relates to the tales about both the African untamed wilderness 
and its paradisiacal qualities, which were brought into being by the first explorers and were an 
antagonism to industrial Europe. Secondly, the myth related to the people who inhabited these 
places – most notably the Maasai. The attitude towards them was perceived in a similarly 
ambiguous way: they were greatly admired for their “warlike instincts”, but similarly feared for 
the same reason, and seen as an obstacle to development that needed to be tamed by outside 
intervention (McCabe 2002: Hodgson 1999).  
It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate on conservation issues in detail, but it is 
important to point out the “truth effects” of these convictions in order to understand the 
construction and politics of nature in environments like Simanjiro. The tragic irony of the 
conservationist paradigm is that by justifying the removal of people, the resultant policies in fact 
contributed to environmental degradation and biodiversity loss that were aimed at being 
prevented in the first place. For example, research has shown that in the past the Serengeti 
grassland ecosystem was maintained by the presence of Maasai and their cattle until they were 
expelled which resulted in less grazing for antelope (Adams and McShane 1992, in: Chatty & 
Colchester 2002: 8). Furthermore it is important to point out that Western conservation ideology 
bears similar ontological premises to (parts of) the Adaptation to Climate Change discourse. The 
categorical separation between Nature and Culture features in both, as well as the idea that there 
is something like a pristine nature or climate that we have to preserve, and go back to a situation 
that we can “reset”, like a default setting.  
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Source: Cartography GRID-Arendal144 
Good neighbours: Conservation versus Development 
A large body of literature exists about the relationship between sustainable development and 
nature conservation, and as always the arguments that are advanced and the proposed solutions 
depend on the ideational community one belongs to. It therefore comes as no surprise that 
historically there exists a conflict of interests between local communities and wildlife 
conservationists (Igoe 2002, 2006b; TNRF 2011). In northern Tanzania, the horizons between 
social scientists (and those who advocate for indigenous rights and development) on the one 
hand, and conservationists on the other have also been out of tune for a long time, to the extent 
that (at times intentionally) no communication has existed between these groups (McCabe 2002). 
                                                             
144 See website: www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/simanjiro-conservation-easement-tanzania_42db 
(accessed 7 January 2017). 
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Since the 1980s conservationists have been concerned with the loss of dispersal areas and 
corridors outside of the TNP for wildlife, due to agricultural extension and ranches that have 
blocked migratory routes in the Maasai steppe (Borner 1985; Davis 2011). But the villagers of 
Terrat have primarily been concerned with sustaining their livelihoods, and securing land tenure 
for their land-use patterns, and have been strongly influenced by the fear of losing land for the 
protection of wildlife. As mentioned earlier, this impasse is principally caused by the fact that 
since independence “proper land use” in Tanzania is equated with farming. In other words, 
“open” land can be considered “unused” or idle – despite the fact that this type of land has great 
significance for pastoralism – and can thus be taken away from them and sold to investors or 
used for conservation purposes. Cultivation has thus become a defence mechanism to prevent 
further land loss (Sachedina 2008).   
Although the wildlife policy that was adopted in Tanzania in 1998 advocated the need to increase 
the economic benefits for local communities, wildlife remains under central control and financial 
benefits are limited (Sachedina 2008; Nelson et al. 2010). A widely heard complaint that was 
expressed by village administrators in Terrat was been the fact that TANAPA has never 
sufficiently compensated the village for the establishment of TNP and the challenges that it 
continues to entail. Over the years the relationship between the Maasai communities in the 
proximity of the park and TNP has deteriorated. Israel, the VEO of Terrat who was introduced 
earlier, shared his disappointment about TANAPA and his attempts to negotiate about 
compensation strategies with us: 
We try to discuss things with the leaders of Tarangire about Ujirani Mwema [in Swahili this 
means good neighbourliness]. How they can compensate us if a lion injures somebody or 
eats our livestock maybe, what happens? Who can be responsible for paying that animal? 
We are discussing but there is no solution yet. […] They have helped us with building one 
classroom a long time ago, but we want them to help us every year. Our cows die. 
Animals make many destructions [sic] in the village, diseases, destruction of farms, 
injuring people, sometimes killing people. They [TNP] say “we can’t pay’, but maybe 
share in the costs”. But you cannot pay for a life of a man that is lost. 
Israel emphasized that Terrat is fulfilling their role as good neighbours since they try to keep the 
area free from cultivation and settlement, but that the village has hardly received any benefit in 
return. The Ujirani Mwema concept goes back to 1988, when TANAPA initiated a programme 
known as Community Conservation Service (CCS). In 1994 it became the official mechanism to 
channel benefits and information to local communities (Igoe and Brockington 1999: 39). The 
programme’s mission was intended to share park benefits with adjacent communities, and 
improve relations between national parks and neighbouring communities as well as promote 
sustainable development (Kangwana and Mako 2001: 5). Nevertheless, in 1989 the enmity 
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towards TNP among local communities rose to prominence when a group of conservationists 
proposed a 6,000-sq. km extension of a conservation area on the eastern side of the park (Igoe 
2002: 83; Igoe and Brockington 1999: 41). This proposal of a large conservation area, which 
recommended the prohibition of agriculture and the forced destocking of local herds, was 
motivated by the concern about large-scale farms in the area that impacted upon wildlife 
corridors (Borner 1985).145 The sheer focus on conservation as expressed in this proposal shows 
the overall lack of concern for the local communities’ well-being. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that an assessment of this project related to TNP concluded that it has not resulted in 
any meaningful support for pastoral communities (Kipuri and Nangoro 1996, in Igoe 2002: 85).  
Other studies, too, have revealed that local populations in the vicinity of the park have expressed 
various levels of distrust and perceived risks associated with the park (Davis 2011: 27). These 
findings are in line with what I encountered in Terrat. Not only Israel but also many villagers in 
Terrat expressed their fear and mistrust vis-à-vis TANAPA, despite efforts such as Ujirani 
Mwema, which attempted to foster better relationships between the park and local communities. 
The problem has been that for the Maasai the idea of good neighbourliness is based on the 
principle of reciprocity, which should allow the herds of the pastoralists to access Tarangire, just 
as wildlife is entering their grazing areas. Accounts of my informants reveal the experiences with 
park rangers who forced them to pay high fines (or bribes) up to 700,000 Tanzanian Shillings, 
because for trespassing the boundaries of the park. Others reported that police had beaten them, 
violently chased them away or confiscated some cattle. While the intention of TANAPA 
(together with the African Wildlife Foundation who partnered this initiative) was to engage local 
communities in conservation efforts, their subsequent attempts to limit farming in the area and 
establish a wildlife corridor were met with great hostility from the local people, who saw this 
Ujirani Mwema initiative as a trick to extend the boundaries of the park (Sachedina and Nelson 
2012: 152; Igoe 2002: 85). Subsequent proposals followed by the government that called for the 
Simanjiro Plains to be protected and farming restricted, and even a new game reserve was 
proposed by the District authorities of 3,822 km² (URT 1993, in Sachedina and Nelson 2012: 
152). Furthermore, their mandate was to interact with local communities and to fund community 
projects. According to my informants, only one classroom has been built in Terrat. Two elders 
were not really impressed by the attempts of TANAPA to provide the village with funds, which 
they rather saw as a strategy to silence them: 
                                                             
145 The motivations for this proposal were outlined by Marcus Borner of the Frankfurter Zoological 
Society in the article “The Increasing Isolation of Tarangire National Park”, Borner 1985. 
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There is at times for leaders who are responsible, they give some funds, they help in 
building maybe a classroom. That is just to minimize the noise of the people, crying about 
the destruction of those animals. So sometimes you cannot cry because you have received 
something from them. […] But there is no direct compensation because now when a lion 
has eaten your cow you need to be paid. There is not something like a direct 
compensation. 
Concluding Remarks 
Considering the highly politicized history of conservation, land appropriation and violent land 
evictions, it is hardly surprising that everything revolving around national parks and conservation 
has bred distrust among the Maasai. This suspicious attitude became clear during my interviews, 
in which many informants were asking me questions about the purpose of my visit and whether 
they would receive something in return. One very old man critically stated: “I am tired of NGOs 
coming to talk about the background of the Maasai and so on, because we never see any impact. 
Maybe there is some help from abroad but they never brought it to us. Instead they come to take 
our land so our cattle does not get enough grass”. The history of marginalization and general 
neglect has inevitably left traces of injustice, and incited sufficient reasons for the Maasai to be 
cautious towards the influx of alien (environmental) discourses. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, climate change is at times seen as yet another such travelling discourse. The overall 
resentment towards conservation was shared by many of the NGO workers representing the 
Maasai that I met in Arusha, which was articulated more than once with the words “the animals 
in Tanzania have more rights than the Maasai”. These complex historical processes of land use 
and settlement that have largely been shaped by ideas about development and conservation, 
reveal only a glimpse of Terrat’s “interpretive context”. By focusing on Terrat’s cultural 
background and complex set of norms, local ideas and “prior commitments”, we can now finally 
turn to a description of how climate change discourses dawn upon Terrat. 
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Introduction 
After the market day had come to an end my research partner and I were about to return to our 
boma. Every Thursday, Terrat’s usual tranquil ambience gives way to the bustling vibrations of the 
weekly market, which attracts a great many people, both Maasai from all over Simanjiro and non-
Maasai coming from Arusha to sell their foodstuffs and produce. Male pastoralists come to trade 
cattle, or to inquire about the current state and prices of the animals. Women are preoccupied 
with buying and selling food and household goods, such as soap, cooking utensils and calabashes, 
but also with clothes and bodily paraphernalia, like cloth, beads, jewels, shaving knives, 
ornaments etc. The marketgoers also seize en masse the opportunity of having access to an 
electricity hub, and mobile phones are cued up to be charged in the local small stores and barber 
shop. If one has nothing to sell or buy one comes to socialize. It was my last day of fieldwork in 
the village and as the day progressed, I did not have enough time left to say goodbye to my 
friends and informants, as their houses were too far apart. Twilight was majestically heightening 
the colours of the surroundings, and for the sake of having a ritual closure I ordered my last 
warm Kilimanjaro beer. While looking back at my fieldwork in a rare moment of quiet 
contemplation, and puzzled by the awareness that time had escaped me once again, a sensation 
struck me that can best be described as the “fieldwork goggles”. (Adopted from the “graduation 
goggles”, the term refers to a nostalgic feeling when a particular time in life is about to end, and 
makes one forget all the hardships that were part of it).   
And by the fortuitous grace of kairos – the conception of time that dictated the rhythm of life in 
Terrat much more than chronos – one by one, my friends appeared and sat together with me for 
some last jokes, stories, questions, laughter and exchange. Elijah, a friend of the family where I 
stayed, said: “So Sara, you have been living with us in the village for a while and have been asking 
a lot of questions to us. Now it is our turn”. Filled with pleasure as I found their curiosity more 
than fair, because it was the only way that I could possibly reciprocate their hospitality, I sat, 
listened and answered. “Tell us about these airplanes that we see. How do they work?” “How big 
are they?”, “Can we bring our cattle inside?” And, “How do these mobile phones work?” “How 
does your government deal with farmer- pastoralist conflicts?” Or, “Is the sun moving, or is it us 
who are moving?” And, “What about the moon, is it attached somewhere, or is it just hanging 
there”, and “Where does it go to when it disappears for some days?” “Is it true that you also have 
a culture, just like us?” “Who is taking care of our cows that are in your country” (according to 
Maasai myth, they believe that all the cows on Earth were given to the Maasai by Eng’ai. Here the 
question was intended more as a joke). This interrogation by the villagers was nothing new to me. 
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In fact, their curiosity had already appeared at an early stage in my fieldwork. And because I was 
often confronted with an absence of climate-change vocabulary, I greatly profited from the 
questions posed by my informants. In brief, reversing the roles between informant and myself 
became a methodological means to sharpen my own questions. This portrait of Terrat seeks to 
do justice to the idiosyncracies that guided the villagers’ lives, curiosity, anguish, anxieties, 
dreams, hopes and great sense of humour.146 The following account provides insight into a village 
that is confronted with a new (and still somewhat alien) discourse, which is seeking to impose 
new explanatory pathways about a changing world. This chapter addressess the very basic 
question “what does climate change mean to the villagers of Terrat?” 
 
Weekly market in Terrat centre. 
                                                             
146 I find it more legitimate to use the term “portrait” for this account than “ethnography”, since I have 
only scratched the surface of understanding the lifewords of the people who dwell in Terrat. One of the 
disadvantages of carrying out a nodal and multi-sited ethnography (at least as a novice anthropologist to a 
certain locality) is the fact that I was often travelling in and out of the village. This account should 
therefore only be seen as the beginning of a conversation about the ways in which climate change 
discourses travel to Maasailand. 
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Barbershop, Terrat Centre (Tunachaji simu hapa means “Here we charge mobile phones”) 
Climate change dawns on Terrat  
Many villagers in Terrat have the impression that the rainfall is diminishing nowadays, which they 
relate to a decreased sense of morality in society. Others, who have heard about “this thing called 
climate change”, find this new scientific prophecy unconvincing, or utterly confusing, since they 
see it as nothing new. Again others, particularly the elderly, say that they have not observed 
changes in the weather or climate, and they emphasized that bad years have always been part of 
normality in Maasailand. Villagers who own a radio in Terrat hear about a global problem that is 
dawning upon Maasailand. And they are told that the main culprits of the looming crisis are the 
rich countries with their polluting industries, but that the Maasai – together with all the other 
poor people in this world – are the ones who will suffer firsthand the most. They are encouraged 
to plant trees, and explained that carbon dioxide is dangerous, that God has nothing to do with it, 
that there is something like an ozone layer protecting the earth that we as humans are depleting, 
that science is real (more real than God for this matter), among many other things. While there 
are other sources through which the “new prophecy” is disseminated, such as NGOs, researchers 
and the church, I observed an overall lack of climate-change information, awareness and 
discussion. Furthermore, while some informants complained about the lack of rain, people’s day-
to-day worries did not resonate with global climate crisis narrations, for they had more pressing 
concerns like access to basic health care, medication, vaccinations for their animals, education 
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and basic access to natural resources like land, water and grasses. Environmental hardships, such 
as recurring droughts and irregular rainfall, play into this complex set of challenges. 
As mentioned before, the overall absence of climate change discourses is in part due to an absent 
state that continues to neglect one of its most marginalized populations in the country. It will be 
demonstrated that both the dissemination and the translation of climate change discourses, as 
well as the lack thereof, are highly political processes. But there is more to this absence, since 
there are villagers who have heard about climate change, but who were not impressed by it or 
who were somewhat indifferent towards it. This section explores this complex mixture of 
“absence”, translation, observation and reception. It interrogates how a nascent story dawns on 
Terrat and entangles old and new horizons, and how it is at times embraced by some, but refuted 
by others. I argue that a rejection of this incoming discourse should be seen – in part – as a form 
of resistance, an attempt to remain faithful to ones own set of norms, values, beliefs, principles of 
causality and “cosmological configuration” (compare with Rudiak-Gould 2013b; 2014b). What 
happens when a rural village like Terrat is confronted with a new story about a changing world 
that carries a message of doom and decay? How do villagers, who have never seen industries with 
their own eyes, receive this narrative for which they hold no responsibility and in which God and 
morals are relegated to the margins? Here is a snapshot of this translation process. 
In an educational short movie clip called “Climate Conscious Program”, made by several NGOs 
and recorded in Terrat with a group of villagers, we witness Leboi herding cows in the Simanjiro 
Plains. He and his fellow “actors” are lamenting about a changing world:147  
Actor 1: There are changes in this world and I don’t know why. 
Leboi: There has been a prolonged drought, at least three years with little rain. Even those 
who came here from Kenya had their cattle die because of the drought. 
Actor 2: So where will I give my cows water? 
Then Edward, the documentary-maker, sits with them under a tree and begins to explain in Maa: 
Edward: Let me tell you something. I learned about this at school. We are not the only 
ones experiencing these changes. It is like if you pinch yourself on the finger. You will 
feel the pain all over. It is the same for the world.  
Then Edward then takes a football that symbolizes the globe. He continues his explanation: 
                                                             
147 This movie was produced by an international NGO together with Ujamaa Community Resource Team 
(UCRT) and Tanzania Natural Resources Forum. The movie is scripted so that is why I refer to these 
Maasai herders as actors. 
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 Edward: Let’s say this is the world we are living on. 
 Actor 2: That ball? 
In the next shot the ball has turned into a globe. 
Edward: There is a place called America, which is here (points it out on the globe). And a 
place called Europe, here, and another one called China. These places produce a lot of 
smoke because they have a lot of vehicles, and airplanes, and they have these things called 
industries. (Accompanied by images of industries, smoke, cars etc.).They burn a lot of 
fuels, like diesel, petroleum and oil. After they burn, the smoke comes out, which is called 
carbon dioxide. That is the bad one. The pollution rises into the sky where it affects our 
protective blanket. Then the blanket becomes denser and denser. And the whole world 
becomes hot.  
Leboi: So now the world is like someone who is suffering from malaria. It is heated, 
becomes hot, and gets malaria. 
Edward: Right, these climate changes we are getting is because the world is heated. 
Droughts come and we don’t get rains when we expect, like these past ten years. It is 
caused by humans and humans should fix it.  
  Actor 1: So it is not God’s fault? 
Edward: It is not God’s fault. This is not caused by God. It is caused by humans 
themselves. Like those countries I mentioned. So don’t cry to God, we are destroying our 
environment ourselves. 
Actor 1: So humans are beating themselves? 
Edward: Yes, we are. It is caused by humans and humans should fix it. Yes, humans 
should have to stop cutting the rain forests we still have. And protect the world’s forests 
for our future generation. Our protected trees will help meet the growing generation. 
While this scripted video fragment is partly meant to serve educational purposes, considering its 
limited outreach possibilities among the grassroots people (there is one mobile cinema), it was 
certainly also intended to target the donors.148 The fragment is so intriguing because it gives us a 
vivid insight into the translation process of climate change – including the mediating forms and 
practices – at the very end of the “translation chain”. It reveals a glimpse of the climate narrative 
in the making; here a story (supposedly) told by the Maasai to the Maasai, yet a clear NGO 
rhetoric can be discerned. A new allegiance is forged between Terrat and the globe. The actors 
are placed in the role of ignorant and helpless victims who need to be enlightened by NGOs, 
who operate as true “pedagogues of progress” (Englund 2011). However, at the same time their 
observations are used as a way to confirm that climate change is actually happening. The picture 
is painted as if the Maasai, while wandering around, are complaining to each other about a hotter 
                                                             
148 The educational movie was shown at the COP17 in Durban where it won a prize. 
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world, questioning what is going on in this world, and therefore seek recourse to the NGO for 
clarification. While, of course, the reverse is actually happening. It is the NGO that aims to 
illuminate the villagers, and makes them question “what all this is”, prior to, and as a necessary 
step towards, their own intervention. 
 
Image from an educational movie in which a documentary-maker explains a few Maasai from Terrat about 
CO2 and industries as the causes of climate change on the globe. 
 
Put in Michel Callon’s terms, the NGO is here engaged in a process of “problematization”, in 
which it defines the nature of the problem after which it “makes itself indispensable” in order to 
solve it (Callon 1986). This fragment can in fact be read as the (staged) culmination point of the 
positive-feedback cycle, as featured in the “folktale of the Indian and the meteorologist”. 
Furthermore, it also reveals the process of how the global is localized (e.g. the analogy with 
malaria, and how remote industries have a direct impact in Maasailand), and how the local is 
made global (plant trees to protect the globe). And while the polluting countries are pointed out 
as the major culprit, the Maasai themselves are also not spared from culpability as they are 
reminded of their own role as environmental destroyers. While I will touch upon the notion of 
cultural decline as an inherent element of the Maasai society’s self- critique, I will not elaborate 
here on the questions of externally imposed blame and responsibility (i.e. blaming the victims), 
since I have written about this issue in another context where it was more prominent (De Wit 
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2015).149 Of concern to my analysis here are rather the dichotomies that ermerge in the 
translation of climate change.  
It is very tempting to understand the worldview of the Maasai in relation to natural dangers as 
“traditional”, and as being radically different from a “modern” understanding of the world. As 
one of the “binary fruits” of enlightenment thinking, we all too easily create a dichotomy in 
which societies that are without science and technology are driven by superstition; whereas 
modern societies are allegedly intellectually free and have an “objective” view of natural dangers, 
such as climate change. Following Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the common view has been 
that for all other societies “before us”, every natural disaster is freighted with meaning and nature 
thus seen as constructed and endowed with political, social and moral significations. This is 
contrary to our understanding of modern society – that owes much to science – which is 
supposed to be privileged by seeing nature as “it really is”, morally neutral, and politically empty 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 29-30). The authors’ objection to this alluring opposition is: 
But no! Try not to get into an argument about reality and illusion when talking about 
physical dangers. There is no need to adopt any relativist standpoint about what is really 
out there to make our point. We are only concerned with selection and priority among 
real dangers. On this subject we shall see that there is not much difference between 
modern times and ages past. They politicized nature by inventing mysterious connections 
between moral transgressions and natural disasters as well as by their selection among 
dangers. We moderns can do a lot of politicizing merely by our selection of dangers. 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 30).150 
In line with the authors who employ a “cultural theory of risk perception”,151 in the following I 
shall query the confrontation between these allegedly opposing worldviews, and focus on the 
                                                             
149 See also the work of Rudiak-Gould (2013b) and Eguavoen (2013) on trajectories of blame and the 
translation of climate change. Their studies also demonstrate how both climate change discourses as well 
as local observations feed into a society’s (cultural) narrative of “in-group blame”. However, both authors 
come to a different conclusion. Eguavoen sees self-blame as something that “ignorant” societies need to 
be liberated from in the form of education, while Rudiak-Gould instead argues that we need to approach 
it as a form of local agency. This conclusion is in line with my own research findings. Yet an important 
difference is that in Rudiak-Gould’s analysis local communities embraced climate change, while in Terrat 
people were much more reluctant towards it. 
150 It should be evident that the terminology to describe other cultures as “ages past”, or “pre-modern” 
and “primitives” is archaic and has long been discredited within anthropology. They refer to societies that 
are “living without ‘modern’ science and technology”. And even though the Maasai in Terrat have 
experienced an influx of mobile phones, radios and other technologies, and largely have embraced 
Christianity, I believe that much of their analytic framework in understanding pollution beliefs remains 
highly relevant. 
151 In line with Rudiak-Gould, I adhere to their “general” model of risk perception and not to Douglas’s 
more rigid scheme based on group/ grid distinction, which has been criticized for being functionalist, for 
treating cultures as bounded systems, for assuming a too close fit between cosmology and society (or 
discourse and behaviour), and for not accounting for enough variance among individuals in risk 
perception (see Rudiak-Gould 2013b: 11).  
 213 
existing dichotomies related to natural dangers in general and climate-change-related explanatory 
pathways in particular. That is, between the secular and the sacred; the morally blank and morally 
endowed; the depoliticized and politicized. And finally, I shall touch upon the crucial distinction 
between the anthropogenic and the natural – features that presumably mark the difference 
between “modern” climate worldviews and all societies that are considered not to be so. 
Following Douglas, first of all, risks are undoubtedly always selected. Secondly, ideas of nature 
are always deeply politicized (as is the notion of an untouched and pristine natural condition), as 
well as what it means to adapt to a changing climate. In earlier chapters I have shown the 
inherent moral and political nature of climate change and the ways they are advanced in 
“modern” society. Also, the video fragment above underpins the highly moralized tone of 
climate-change narratives. While God is discarded as a causal agent and even fully removed from 
the explanatory horizon, morality takes centre stage. “Humans are causing it, so humans should 
fix it”. In brief, we can begin by doing away with the two supposed dichotomies relating to 
morals and politics (or modern and traditional) related to risk and danger, since we are all too 
aware in anthropology – thanks to Mary Douglas’s enduring engagement with the subject – that 
the universe, at all times and in all places, is moralized and politicized (Douglas 1992: 5).  
According to Douglas and Wildavsky, a sound point of departure in understanding the 
comparison between “moderns” with “primitives” (by lack of better terminology I shall 
henceforth use “traditional”), and the politicizing of nature is to look into the idea of pollution. 
Pollution here refers to a condition of impurity in which some harmful interference with natural 
processes has taken place. In other words, an abnormal intrusion of foreign elements is assumed 
that brings about destruction of what is perceived as normal. According to the authors, two 
forms of pollution can be distinguished. The first concerns a strict technical one (like river or air 
pollution) that rests upon a clear idea of a pre-polluted situation that can be measured precisely, 
and carries no moral load. The second notion of pollution is nontechnical and speaks of a 
contagious and harmful state, which carries the idea of moral defect and is mysterious in its 
origins (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 36). It is the latter, nontechnical pollution that they speak 
of as “pollution beliefs” or “pollution ideas”, which is of particular importance to my analysis. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that while talking about observable changes in the 
environment or the weather, many of my informants referred to the first, strictly technical form 
of pollution. This is perhaps not surprising as dwindling resources like grasses, plants, trees, rivers 
and water are more tangible, and indeed measurable, than an abstract phenomenon like the 
climate. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that these two forms of pollution are at times empirically 
mixed up (a dry river might be pointed out as a proof of climate change), analytically it makes 
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sense to disentangle them. For indeed it holds true that mere technical pollution is largely 
explained by overpopulation, in contrast to weather and climate conditions, which are 
predominantly attributed to society’s moral conduct. We can reduce observations of a changing 
climate, to the two main variables of rain and drought, because they were put forward as the 
quintessential features of the climate (rising temperatures were only rarely mentioned). 
Nothing new under the sun: On the climate’s inherent variability 
Coming back from Arusha town in the rainy season to the boma where I stayed, I was often 
overwhelmed by a sensational joy in the beautiful environment and cheerful Maasai family that 
was waiting for me on the side of the road. Their boma was located in the sub-village called 
Loondelemeti B (see map 8.2), which owes its name to the wealth of white flowers that are growing 
there. This boma was amidst other scattered compounds that are found in the vast plains of 
Simanjiro. During the period of long rains, in the case of a good year, the area is exceptionally 
beautiful and blessed with an abundance of lush pastures, blossoming flowers and sufficient 
crops like maize or beans to feed the family. It is the time of plenty. When the rains arrive on 
time, if they arrive at all, both people and cattle will have the chance to recover from the 
harshness of the dry season, and regain their strength in order to prepare for the next dry season 
to come. In this period of abundance there is no need for long-distance movement, because the 
grasses and water are usually found in the vicinity. Families are united; there is time for leisure 
and ceremonies as there is enough milk and meat to share. The contrast with the dry season 
couldn’t be sharper, when the area turns into a semi-desert with dust clouds covering the 
pastures, the water resources drying up and the food for both people and cattle gradually 
diminishing. That is time to search for green pastures and water sources. The selected illmuran are 
sent out on their exploration journey (eleenore), after which they report their findings back in the 
traditional meeting (engigwana engishu) in which strategies for the dry season are planned. It is the 
time of scarcity. Women’s daily activities amount to an ever-greater burden (see box 8.1), because 
men are often far away with their herds and women need to walk great distances to find firewood 
and water. Cattle and people lose weight and strength, while their concerns grow until the first 
signs of rain can be found in the sky, and villagers sigh with relief “thank God, we made it”. 
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Mama Eliya milking a cow. 
 
Children milking a goat. 
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Box 8.1 Account of dry-season activities from Mama Eliya 
The dry season is too hard for us. It is very tough because everything is very difficult to get, and 
there is no milk. And if you want to buy maize it is too expensive. We buy 20 kg of maize for 
12,000 TSH. During the rainy season it is cheap because most of the people have maize in their 
shamba (farm), fresh maize that we can cook directly. But during the dry season, there is no food. 
When I wake up I milk and then prepare chai (tea with milk) for the family. Then I prepare 
porridge for my kids who go to school. After cooking porridge I clean my house. Then I go and 
fetch water with the donkeys. When I come back I repair the house with mud and sometimes I 
also repair the goat pens. Later we go and look for firewood. 
 
Pentecoastal church in Terrat. 
 
Leboi climbed a tree to make a phone call. 
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The boma where I stayed. 
It goes without saying that the seasonal motion of Terrat’s climate impinges powerfully upon 
peoples’ day-to-day activities and their physical and social well-being, as well as upon the 
environment and the ways they perceive and relate to it.152 I found it remarkable that mainly 
among elderly villagers an explanatory pattern existed, in which they did not give testimony to 
(conspicuous) changes in the weather and the climate. It was also this group of people who were 
overall not “climate change-cognizant”. In other words, since they had never heard about the 
term climate change (either in Swahili nor in Maa) their accounts principally relied on the experience 
of sensory observations and (social) memory. By social memory I mean the whole body of 
customary climate knowledge and environmental lore (cf. Oba 2014). The ways in which social 
memory is maintained in Terrat include for example warrior songs, in which illmuran sing about 
past hardships and adaptation strategies, or the names that are given to climate-eventful years (see 
box 8.3).  
One of the questions that we asked during interviews was whether people had observed changes 
in the weather, rainfall, or seasons compared to when they were young. It became clear that their 
social memory echoed many dry spells, climate fluctuations and variability, years of hardships, 
environmental catastrophes, hunger, and events that were also remembered by their own parents. 
                                                             
152 Whereas the climate obviously consists of many more components than rainfall alone, its vital role in 
shaping and maintaining pastoralists’ livelihoods (and religious convictions), legitimizes the overall focus 
on rain. 
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Some elders recalled the years when they suffered from hunger. For instance, they mentioned 
years in which they were forced to eat the skin of their animals in order not to starve. It was the 
time when they were still nomadic and did not use maize or other crops to supplement their diet. 
To cope with these climatic difficulties they pointed out two crucial coping strategies that enabled 
them to survive the dry season: mobility, and drinking blood. Many elders referred to the period 
in which drinking blood was still a common practice, some with nostalgia but others with God-
fearing disdain. But consensus existed about the importance of both these behaviours as a 
survival strategy in the past. In brief, flexible adaptation mechanisms formed the lifeblood of a 
nomadic way of life in Maasailand, as hardships, environmental hazards and catastrophes have 
been part and parcel of the highly variable climate. 
Box 8.3 Climate-eventful years that have been given special names (Olari means year) 
 
2005 [Olari leunoto oorkoryanga] Eunoto is the ceremony that is carried out to hand over the authority 
from one age set of warriors [illmuran] to the next. The irkoryanga is the 
age group that was in power during my fieldwork. 2005 was the year 
when this age group underwent the ceremony. It was a very bad year 
since there was no rainfall. 
1997 [Olari lengolong] Engolong means sun. It was a year of excessive heat in which the sun was 
very hot. The pastoralists shifted to different areas in search of water and 
pasture. Most water sources and grasses dried out. 
1993 [Olari Lolodoendolit] –  Lolodoendolit means red bone marrows. It was a year in which livestock 
was attacked by a disease that converted bone marrows into a red colour. 
The mystery was that there was enough rainfall during this year but the 
grasses did not grow, hence the weakness of the cattle. According to the 
elders this situation was caused by the late appearance of a star called 
Alakira. This is the star that is said to make pastures grow. 
1990 [Olari Lengare] Lengare means water. It was a year of extremely heavy rainfall and 
resulted in floods. 
198? [Olari laambaalon] Imbaalon means lambs. People could not recall the year, only the name 
but it was said to be around the 1980s. It was the year in which the rains 
came very late so people started to sacrifice a lot of lambs as a traditional 
way of praying to God. 
198? [Olari lolodongujit] Lolonogujit means a time in which the grasses were red. Ingujit means 
grasses and edo means red. Even though the grasses were red in this year, 
the colour had no effect on both people and cattle; they just had a 
different colour. 
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Against this background, the first question in relation to pollution beliefs arises. If pollution 
indeed denotes an abnormal state, how does one under such stochastic conditions define the 
“normal” condition that is breached? In order to understand the reasons why climate change as a 
new discourse enters as an alien idea, and is somewhat at odds with local realities, we need to 
make sense of the climate in Terrat and in the wider Simanjiro Plains, which is spatially and 
temporally highly variable (McCabe & Leslie 2013: 120). This semi-arid environment can be 
characterized by inherent pronounced climate variability, and is to a large extent unpredictable. 
To recall Leboi, “[…] in our locality the climate knows a lot of fluctuations. One year you might 
expect rain and there will be no rain, in another year you expect drought and there is enough 
rainfall”. Some informants found my question incomprehensible and referred to this variability as 
being the norm, such as one who responded: “of course the rains have changed, they have never 
been the same in this locality.” Also telling was the answer given by a very old woman 
(approximately 100 years old)153, “There are no changes. The weather was like this from the very 
beginning. Sometimes there is less rain, sometimes there is more”. The climate follows a bi-
modal rainfall pattern, consisting of short rains (November – December) and a long rainy season 
(March – May/ June). Also the fact that many people gave account to different periods for the 
long and short rains, attests to an inherently variable climate.  
Moreover, my informants have pointed out the unpredictable climate of this area as a great 
obstacle for cultivation, which was characterized as random trial and error. For example, one man 
told me that, “farming is some sort of gambling game, sometimes you win but more often you 
lose”. Yet, despite frequent crop failures many villagers continue to cultivate, as the benefits of 
one successful harvest may outweigh the costs of many failed attempts. This is also pointed out 
by Leslie and McCabe, who have shown that cultivation is inherently risky, which is due to the 
limited and highly variable precipitation in Simanjiro. Complete or partial crop failure is common. 
On the other hand, there are years in which both cultivation is productive and livestock thrive, or 
other years when livestock die and crops fail, or periods in which only one of the two does well 
(Leslie & McCabe 2013: 120). There was consensus among villagers that cattle are more suitable 
for the drylands as they are more resistant to drought than cultivation, and the people can always 
decide to move their herds to other localities. Furthermore, what I found remarkable is that 
villagers of Terrat seem to take hazards rather lightly; in the sense that to me it appeared to be a 
complete opposite of the industrialized, modern “risk society”, in which security has become 
                                                             
153 For more information about the informants and their responses, see the appendix to this chapter. 
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sacrosanct (Beck 1992; 2009).154 For example, common answers that surprised me when asking 
informants whether the previous year had been a good or a bad year for them, were in line with 
what mama Eliya said: “Last year was not bad, we only lost young goats so we thank God that we 
didn’t lose cows”. Or as Petro’s brother Kalaya said, “In 2009 there was a severe drought, but I 
only lost a few cows, and the ones who remained recovered fast. We are used to losing cows. It 
becomes normal. We are not afraid like farmers”. Loserian, a very wealthy neighbour who owned 
a large herd, talked about the losses he had suffered the previous year: “Last year was very dry. 
The small rain came very late, but for a short time so we decided to cultivate only beans. The 
goats were affected. We had 990 goats together [three homesteads] and 500 died, but 490 
remained. Only 20 cows died”. Another answer from Leboi was also telling: “Last year was a 
normal year. Only three cows died and I only had to sell five, but five were born also”. Put 
differently, to speak about a “normal” or even a good year in terms of loss, or minimized loss, is 
in stark contrast to the securitized “global risk society” (Beck 2009). 
Box 8.4 Seasonal variations of the drylands in Terrat according to local accounts155  
 
1. Irkisirat [Swahili: Vuli] First rains, or short rainy season. This seasonal rain can be characterized 
by a very strong temporal and spatial variability. In some years these 
rains do not appear at all; in other years the rainfall is very sparse. Since 
the rain can fall in only one particular place the illmuran generally move 
with their cattle during this period. (November – December). 
2. Olari [Swahili: Masika] The period of heavy rainfall, or long rainy season. When it rains the 
rainfall is widespread throughout the country and generally the 
pastoralists do not need to look for greener pastures elsewhere. Both 
people and cattle remain in the area. (March – May/ June). 
3. Kurumari [Swahili: Kipupwe]  During this period the temperatures drop, it is much colder and only 
short rain showers can occur. It is a short dry season. (January - 
February). 
4. Olamei [Swahili: Kiangazi] This is the long dry season, and clearly the most challenging season for 
people and cattle to survive. Both water sources and grasses are gradually 
drying up. At times the illmuran need to shift to other places very far 
away in order to keep the cattle healthy. Only a few milking cows are left 
                                                             
154 Here I am referring to two particular features of what Ulrich Beck defined as being part of the “risk 
society”. Firstly, the fact that fear determines our attitude towards life and that security is replacing 
freedom and equality as the highest value. Secondly, the idea that more science does not translate into less 
risk but rather makes its perception more acute (Beck 2007: 8). 
155 This overview should be seen as an approximation, since most people gave a fairly different indication 
of when the seasons occur, precisely because it is also inherently variable. 
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behind for the women and children. Otherwise people sell cows and buy 
milk and food. (June-August is the “cold” dry period and September – 
October is the hot dry period). 
 
Depending on the altitude, rainfall in the semi-arid rangelands of Simanjiro averages around 500-
800 mm (Igoe and Brockington 1999: 4) or 650-700 mm annually (Sachedina and Trench 2009: 
265). Statistics from the Tanzania Meteorological Agency (TMA) show that in the period 1980-
2010 the annual average rainfall in Simanjiro District was 500 mm (TMA 2012, in Bwagalilo & 
Mwakipesile 2012: 17). Moreover, it is said that this drought-prone region is among the most 
diverse and complex grassland savannah ecosystems in the world (Olson and Dinerstein 1998, in 
Baird 2014: 4). Due to the spatial variability of rainfall, I was eager to find climate data for Terrat 
in particular. However, in my quest for rainfall data I was once again confronted with a severe 
lack of information. At the governmental level, there are hardly any data available for Maasailand. 
At the TMA in Dar es Salaam they could only provide me with temperature and rainfall data 
from Loiborsoit and Naberera from 1940-1970.  I was told, “there was no regular inspection to 
these stations as the area was not accessible and communication very difficult, thus the observers 
could also abandon the stations” (personal communication TMA 2013). In Arusha they explained 
to me that the British had installed some stations but these were abandoned after independence 
due to lack of volunteers. At the District in Orkesumet the weather station was also out of order, 
because nobody knew how to use the instruments. Moreover, the rain gauge was broken and they 
lacked funding to replace it. The most reliable rainfall data come from the large private farms that 
are found in the area. In Terrat I found rainfall data that were collected daily by a primary school 
teacher since 2007.156 The measuring of rainfall was an initiative of a ward educational officer, 
who upon the beginning of his employment in Terrat, found the rain gauge unused. He 
exclaimed, “it is important to know how much rain is falling in this area!” He sends his 
information to the districts where it is used for wider predictions. While the data from such a 
short period are clearly far from representative, I have visualized the information in the graph 
below (figure 8.1). It gives at best an indication of the extent to which inter-annual rainfall 
variation can occur. 
 
   
 
                                                             
156 The yearly average was 490 mm for over four years. However, data from 2010 was missing. 
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Figure 8.1 Terrat total monthly rainfall 2007-2011 
 
Figure 8.2 Monthly total rainfall Terrat (2007-2011) compared with Loiborsoit (1940-1970)157  
 
Despite the lack of meteorological data for the wider area, and even the disagreement about 
whether these semi-arid lands form part of an equilibrium or non-equilibrium ecosystem, or 
                                                             
157 The monthly average was taken over all measured years (4 years in Terrat because 2010 was missing, 
and 31 years in Loiborsoit, although measurements were incomplete for 10 years, missing between 1 and 7 
monthly totals). Unfortunately the effect of location could not be separated from the temporal effect, 
because measurements were done in different periods. 
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rather encompass elements of both (see chapter 2), the defining characteristics of unpredictability 
and fluctuation stand out. My informants underlined the extreme spatial rainfall variability in the 
area. Meshack, the traditional leader said as an example, “It can rain here in this boma, but look at 
that boma over there and you see, there is no rain at all!” Ian Scoones comes up with an 
interesting approach about these environments in relation to climate change: 
Highlighting complexity, non-linearity and non-equilibrium dynamics has major 
consequences for thinking about responses to climate change. We can learn a lot from 
settings where uncertainty has always been part of day-to-day life and survival: where 
systems are not at equilibrium, where sometimes chaotic, often stochastic, dynamics 
prevail and where predictability and control are false hopes. The pastoral rangelands of 
the world are such places (Scoones 2009: 114). 
So how does one define a norm, and consequently, a deviation from the norm within such a 
hazard-prone and unstable climate? As these sketchy figures above also show, in spite of the 
fluctuations there is of course an approximation of regular seasonal patterns within the 
irregularity itself. Yet, while a clear dry season can be discerned, the rains differ greatly from year 
to year and place to place (even though we cannot compare Loiborsoit directly with Terrat 
because this graph shows a different time scale). Hence, some of the climate-cognizant 
informants found this notion of climate change challenging and for them it rather echoed 
something that the Maasai have already experienced in the past, as the following interview 
fragment with the traditional ruler (olaigwanani) of Terrat shows: 
Olaigwanani: The first time I heard about climate change was in 2009, when some people 
who were sent by the government were going around telling about climate change. And 
also there were some people who came for observation of climate change [researchers] 
and I was taken to ewas. I tried to ask them many questions, and they told me that it is the 
industries destroying the ozone layer. That is what these white men told me. […] So when 
I heard about these changes I went to Dar es Salaam, talking about climate change 
[together with Leboi]. […] So now I really observed the changes because the Maasai have 
their own way of predicting rainfall, but nowadays it is very complicated. It is difficult to 
apply. You may apply but the answer may come wrong, wrong direction. 
Researcher: And what did you think when you heard about it for the first time? 
Olaigwanani: So when I heard about this climate change for the first time I thought it is 
just a repetition of the past. Because many years ago you may find five good years and 
then again seven not so good years. So this is what I thought when I heard about climate 
change, that it is about these old changes of 5 good years, and 7 bad years. But by then, I 
did not know about the industries yet. Because I am saying only what I know. Here in 
Tanzania there are no big industries, which could maybe destroy the ozone layer or 
change the climate of the earth. 
Researcher: Do you understand now what it means? 
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Olaigwanani: I don’t understand it very well because I did not carry on with those 
researchers. The government is not serving to educate people here in the village about 
climate change anymore. But I think that these changes are maybe those changes of 5 
good years and 7 not very much good years. We had many drought spells in our history. 
Researcher : When were those years taking place, of 5 bad and 7 not so good years? 
Olaigwanani: For example those bad years started in 1972, ‘73, ‘74 up till 7 years were not 
very good, although not very bad compared to three years ago (2009). 1977, or ‘76 and 
eh.. ‘78 until ‘81 there was a period of 5 years that was nice. And also other not very many 
good years followed there. And also another year that was good was 1998. After that very 
bad years again started. And a year that is very good again is this year of 2013. 
Researcher : And what about the time of your parents, was this similar when your parents 
were young? 
Olaigwanani: I have asked my parents and they said that these are old habits. But the 
period of bad years was not long. It was not about 7 years as our period. So it seems that 
with our generation the situation is going in a bad direction. Also the life expectancy of 
people. In the past people could live for 100 years up till 150 years sometimes. But 
nowadays a person can live only 70 years and we say “the man is too old, he has 70 
years”.  
 
Notwithstanding the manifold statements about the lack of rain and increasing unpredictability 
within an already variable climate, translating the notion of climate change appears to be a 
challenging undertaking, for climate-change discourses construct an unstable climate as a 
deviation from normality. A very similar answer was given by the father of Mama Eliya 
(Kitimanga, 85 years old) who recalled the droughts of the past, and the years in which they were 
hungry. He had never heard about climate change and when we tried to explain it to him he 
replied, “These are the same changes that we had in the past. First there are 7 good years, and 
then 3 bad years”. In other words, in Terrat’s fluctuating climate the norm of a constant climate – 
which is inherent to climate-change discourses that consider changes in the climate as an 
abnormal state – enters as an alien notion. Finally, if we look at the last part of the fragment 
above, another important dimension comes to the fore. As mentioned already before, talking 
about changes in the weather and rainfall patterns cannot be detached from societal changes, and 
goes hand in hand with accounts about people’s general wellbeing, altered lifestyle and customs, 
and eroding values and morals. This finding is in line with Fleming and Jankovic, who have 
argued for a less reductionist view on the climate, and have come to apprehend it “as a framing 
device in which the verities of life such as food, health, wars, housing, economy, social 
movement, or local identity change synchronically with Klima” (Fleming & Jankovic 2011: 9). 
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What is crucial to bear in mind here is the fact that the villagers of Terrat have abandoned their 
nomadic lives based solely on pastoralism and complemented them with cultivation and 
permanent settlements. This has inevitably changed peoples’ understanding of and relation to the 
climate. Mobility restriction and loss of grazing areas have not only resulted in changing 
livelihoods, and in diversification strategies such as cultivation, but also in a deeply altered 
identity about what it means to be Maasai. The answer of a middle-aged man illustrates well how 
shifting human-environment relations and changing perceptions of the climate go hand in hand: 
It could be that the rains are less nowadays, but it is hard to tell because we are also more 
dependent on rain because we live and eat differently. Our mentality has changed. 
In a similar vein, a middle-aged woman explained how she perceived change in relation to ritual 
prayer, as opposed to the church:  
The years have changed, and people have changed. Nowadays people are eating a lot. In 
the past you could have one bag of maize, but now you buy a lot of bags and put them in 
store and you finish all of them. Families are big now. Now we also don’t take blood 
because the church has prohibited drinking of blood. And when there was no rain, we 
would just take a goat and women prayed to God and sacrificed a goat, then it would rain 
again. During the days of sacrifice it rained a lot.  
The mother of Petro (approximately 90-93 years old) spoke about land use and the difference in 
individual property as opposed to open access: 
There was one year without rain when I was a child that I cannot forget. Nowadays it 
happens more often. But in the past land didn’t belong to anybody, so we moved until we 
found grass. Now everybody has his or her own land, so you have to stay in your own 
land. 
Another very old woman remarked about changes in the weather [engijape]: 
Perhaps the weather has changed, but we have changed too. We used to follow the 
clouds, nowadays we have settled.  
Thus while “following the clouds” guided the relationship the Maasai had to their environment 
and the climate, due to drastic changes in their ways of living it is not fruitful to disentangle 
climatic and societal changes. What can we learn from these stories about change in relation to 
pollution beliefs? Following Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), since pollution beliefs carry the idea 
of moral defect, they come in handy as a political argument as they trace causal chains from 
actions to disasters. Furthermore, as will become clear below, these ideas about pollution are also 
the product of an ongoing political debate about the ideal society (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 
36). Talking about the climate is more than just a discussion about an atmospheric materiality; it 
permeates the social, political and even the religious realms of society. While this section has 
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shown that ways of knowing are fundamentally inseparable from ways of being, we shall now 
make a move from an epistemologically based discussion towards a more ontologically oriented 
understanding of the climate. 
On the climate-morality-religion nexus 
In the course of my fieldwork it increasingly became clear to me that what I perceived to be a 
climate change “void”, in the sense that the climate was not prominently on the lips of people, 
was in fact revealing something very crucial, even existential.158 While I was interested in knowing 
about peoples’ climate-change understanding and observations, our conversations by and large 
prompted stories about loss of culture and respect, society, love, money, globalization, church, 
traditional religion versus Christianity; almost everything that encompasses Maasai culture and 
ways of being and believing. In order to make sense of local climate accounts, it was 
indispensable to broaden my “environmental horizon” and be sensitive to the lifeworlds, 
practices and ontologies that people attached to their “rain tales”. For example, many elder 
informants whom we talked to recalled the fact that they and their forefathers have adapted to 
the climate by “following the clouds as long as we can remember”, and deplored its current 
impossibility. And while pondering the climate and environment of the past, their nomadic 
lifestyle was often invoked, but so was their cultural identity and what it once meant to be a 
“true” Maasai. I argue that an understanding of these stories of cultural and environmental 
decline is key for making sense of how climate change is interpreted and translated. As many 
scholars have already demonstrated, these prior commitments (Jasanoff 2010) or pre-eixsting 
political norms (Cass 2007: 46) are profoundly influential in shaping the way in which people 
assess, respond to and render anthropogenic climate change meaningful, or inform notions of 
responsibility and blame (Rudiak-Gould 2013b: 10; 2014b; Eguavoen 2013). In Terrat people’s 
stories of cultural and moral decline were foundational and of invaluable significance for the way 
in which climate change was translated. These stories have been framed by Rudiak-Gould as 
“trajectory narratives”, which he defined as discourses about the moral outlook of a society and 
                                                             
158 An important difference between the ways in which the climate or the weather feature in daily 
conversation in Terrat, as compared to for example The Netherlands, is that the Dutch people are 
obsessed with the weather, for it is among the few things that is beyond their control and is extremely 
variable from day to day. It is said to be even subject of conversation number one, a common way to 
begin a conversation. But while complaints about the weather serve as entrance for sociality, the climate is 
considered to be part of the society’s shared identity (Van Beek 1999). This is in contrast to Terrat where 
the weather does not differ much from day to day, and is as such also not part of people’s conversations. 
It is instead the climate, the changing seasons and the timing of the rainfall that form the subject of 
discussion.   
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how blame and responsibility are associated with that trend (ibid). Let’s have a look at Terrat’s 
trajectory narratives and their temporal dimenions. 
On temporality and degradation 
While the older group of informants often emphasized the physical hardships of the past and 
were not romanticizing the nomadic way of life per se, their social memory spoke of ecological 
abundance, and at the same time echoed the vigour of cultural norms and values that they 
perceived to be prevalent in those days. More rain, sufficient grasses, abundant trees, plenty of 
water, animals and flowing streams were all imagined as part of the ideal past, and mentioned on 
a par with the rootedness of cultural values, such as respect, love, reciprocity, faithfulness and 
solidarity. In early ethnographies it already becomes clear that mutual respect, enkanyit, formed 
the heart of Maasai culture and sociality. Enkanyit has been the lifeblood that sustained 
relationships, and was expressed through appropriate greetings, forms of address and certain 
behavioural codes that differed according to age, gender, and kinship relations (Hodgson 2005: 
9). The themes of love and respect were very prominent during interviews, and referred to 
principles of solidarity and reciprocity that now seem to be disappearing from society. Male 
informants often attributed this to the encounter with other cultures, and processes of 
globalization and modernization, as Petro explained: 
People were spreading love a lot. So they were visiting each other during the night and 
during the day, to exchange ideas and to spread love. But this is now disappearing. These 
things are changing because of the introduction of other cultures. We used to share 
everything before, like everything. If I have tea in my cup I can drink half a cup and give 
you the other half. We used to share milk from a calabash. We even used to share the 
knives with which we shave our hair. But since the introduction [of other cultures] comes, 
other tribes used to tell us “don’t do that” because you can spread diseases to each other. 
So now we don’t share the same cup and knives anymore. 
A very old man related the changes of culture and rain in society to the introduction of industrial 
oil, which can be understood as a symbol of a monetary economy: 
Rain is a big problem. Things have totally changed and the one who changes these things 
is God. A big problem is lack of rain and human diseases. Increasing of diseases and this 
is due to industry oil that nowadays people prefer rather than cattle oil. And also during 
the dry season – during hunger year – we took blood from the cow and cook for kids, but 
nowadays you cannot do something like that. […] If there is the possibility to stop the oil 
from the industry, the oil must be stopped. Because all source of problems is because of 
industry oil. Everything is money nowadays. You could die with your cattle because of 
money. 
While men by and large spoke about money, modernization and globalization at large, or a 
change in oregie (culture and customs); fascinatingly enough, it was the group of elder women who 
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unequivocally deplored more specifically the eroding of enkanyit and enyorotto – the disappearance 
of respect and love – from society, which was often brought up in relation to lack of rainfall. This 
female preoccupation with respect can be explained by a gendered conception of morality, as 
historically women were considered to be naturally more religious and closer to Eng’ai (see 
below). As such they saw it as their responsibility to ensure the moral order of the daily world 
(Hodgson 2005: ix-x); a role that they continue to assume and fulfil today (cf. Hodgson 2011b). A 
widely shared explanation given by female informants for the decreased rainfall was indeed to be 
found in the moral conduct of society, and lack of enkanyit. The following quotes from female 
informants illustrate the interconnection between rain, morality and (more implicitly) gender: 
The rains are bad nowadays because we are behaving badly, nobody is respecting each 
other any longer. 
People nowadays cannot even greet you properly any longer. Our society is losing their 
culture, and people do not love each other anymore. This is what is causing climate 
change to happen. 
When God decided to give us no rain, it is because we have sinned. People only want 
money nowadays. So they kill each other, do abortion and go to the mines. 
When I hear that there are changes in the weather this is maybe because of wrongdoings 
like homosexuality.  
What we learn from pollution beliefs is that attributing responsibility for natural disasters (or 
climate anomalies) to society is a common way to protect a particular set of values, which belong 
to a particular way of life (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 6). Sufficient rainfall denotes a condition 
in which a stable world is imagined, and things as they ought to be. God is content and expresses 
Her satisfaction by blessing people with rainfall. In a year of severe drought, pollution beliefs 
speak about chaos and instability or society’s moral defect, and invoke Maasai’s cultural loyalty 
and religious faithfulness of the past. For the Maasai, in the face of past and ongoing pressures 
from the forces of “modernization” and political economy, it is unsurprising that values that 
deserve protection are, in part, a question of culture that in many ways are treated as sacrosanct. 
In other words, discussions about the climate also have a temporal dimension in which a 
somewhat utopian and timeless culture of the past is imagined, mirroring ecologies of abundance.  
Two questions arise in this context. Firstly, what can we learn from an imagined pristine past and 
a perceived-to-be eroding present? And secondly, how do we give meaning to a relationship 
between nature and morality that has been – and to a large extent still is – inextricably 
intertwined? I shall first briefly explore the temporal dimension before probing the question of 
morality and the climate in more detail. As mentioned before, rain tales about the past are a 
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commentary upon an ideal present. To paraphrase anthropologist Van Beek (1999; 2000), there 
exists a strong identification between society and the climate, as the latter forms part of a shared 
identity. What follows from this observation is that “we are the climate”, and conversations about 
the climate can be seen as meta-commentaries upon society. As such, the author has argued that 
climate-change discourses are a critique of society in which worries about the future are 
expressed, and can be treated as a (secular) end-of-time tale (Van Beek 2000; cf. De Wit 2015). 
Moreover, what has been relevant in the past is still important today and has its bearing on the 
future (Van Beek 2000: 31). To find an answer to the question of whether environmental 
degradation has repercussions on oral traditions (myths and other stories reflecting on the 
relation between humans with their source of existence), Van Beek explores projected futures in 
various cultures, and interrogates tales about end times.159 In his original eschatological 
excavation he comes up with a remarkable thesis. Apart from the fact that worldwide end-of-time 
stories are rare, much rarer than creation myths, he identifies only three major culture areas that 
know of an abrupt apocalyptic future. These are Scandinavia, the Judeo-Christian (and Persian) 
Middle East, and Meso-America.160 Contrary to this, the majority of cultures around the world, he 
states, including most African groups, do not envisage cataclysmic endings but instead a gradual 
fading away, Ablauf in German, which represents a slow degradation of life. In other words, we 
can speak of a “gentle eschatology” in which time is running down, but slowly and almost 
imperceptibly (Van Beek 2000: 37, 46).  
Furthermore, the author argues that inherent to this message of decay, in which the present is 
less than the past and the future again less than the present, is the notion not only of diminished 
resources but also of loss of power and knowledge.161 And based on my own findings we could 
meaningfully add faith, culture, love and all its constituents. Finally, according to Van Beek the 
explanation for this sense of gradual loss in tradition and ecology over time stems from the 
dynamics of orality. So in the rituals and local discourse, tradition is considered to be the wisdom 
and practices that are passed on from past generations, which is seen as a weak reflection of the 
past and leads to an even bleaker future (Van Beek 2000). This observation indeed resonates with 
the ways in which my informants spoke about the current generation, and the fears they 
                                                             
159 Van Beek mentions that while normally one might treat religion with a written script differently from 
oral traditions, he takes them in his analysis as being on a par, for the processes sought about projected 
futures and the intensity of change seem to differ little in both types of religions (Van Beek 2000: 33). 
160 At the same time, most end-of-time tales speak of a new beginning (ibid). 
161 The discourses on tradition are different from the dynamics of tradition itself, which are flexible and 
adaptive (ibid). Also Horton states that many African people see their cosmologies as timeless, but that 
certainly does not mean that they really are frozen (Horton 1975: 222). 
 230 
expressed about “the direction of the bad changes for the future”, with rain as the tangible locus 
for contemplation, as the following quote from Rehema, a female elder, illustrates: 
Our culture is changing a lot because when we were young the children used to have 
respect for their parents. But this generation does not listen to their parents. These 
changes, the direction in which we are going is bad. Today there is no love among the 
people that is why life has changed. Today you can identify somebody who is poor, but in 
the past you could not because of love among people. We used to help the poor. […] 
There are also changes in rainfall. In the past there was enough rainfall but currently there 
is not enough rain, which puts people in trouble. These changes in rainfall are caused by 
the church. Because in the past we used to sing in case of a bad year. We sang, gathered 
together with the women and sang to God “give us the rain”. We were also going to 
Oloiboni. He told us “do this and do that” and the rain came. But today people are not 
visiting Oloiboni any longer that is why it is not raining as usual. 
Here too temporality plays a role, which goes back not only to the Maasai tradition but to the 
more recent establishment of the first Christian churches. The point of attention that is 
remarkable in Rehema’s account is the fact that she attributes society’s moral failure and lack of 
rain to the introduction of the church, while at the same time being a Christian herself. When I 
asked her about this she explained to me that the Christians of the beginning were very different 
from the Christians of today. She is a member of the first Lutheran church that was established in 
Terrat in 1972: 
The Christianity of that period was not prohibiting practices of the Maasai like blood 
drinking and the circumcision of girls. […] I was in the group of people who were the 
first to enter the church, and at that time there was no prohibition of our practices. So we 
didn’t change and so I am still wearing these beads. But there are people who say that we 
cannot wear these beads in church. 
Her account also touches upon other dimensions that bring me to the second question posed 
above. In order to make sense of climate change “realities” (both observation and reception) in 
Terrat we need to gain insight into the complex interconnection between the climate, morality 
and religiosity, which is in turn vested in systems of power. This is important for my analysis as it 
challenges the alleged “secular” versus “sacred” dichotomy on which (scientific) global climate 
change discourses are premised. It is important to note that, as much as we owe many conceptual 
polarities (e.g. nature/ culture; body/ mind; fact/ value; subject/ object) to Enlightenment 
thought and practice, so too is the contrast between the “sacred”, “religious” and “spiritual” as 
opposed to the “secular” realm a residue of the same purification process (Latour 1993; Hodgson 
2005: 14; Armstrong 2009: 285; Taylor 2007). Nevertheless, as Hodgson argues, while this 
opposition might hold for some societies, the case of the Maasai reveals that until the twentieth 
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century the secular and the sacred were one and the same.162 This becomes clear through the 
absence of a word for religion in Maa, but for which they have adopted the Swahili term dini 
(from Arabic) (Hodgson 2005: 14).163 Therefore, in line with Hodgson I will use “religion” as an 
analytic term to probe and discuss those beliefs, convictions, (ritual) practices and experiences 
that express a relationship to some powerful divine being(s) or essence(s) (see Hodgson 2005: 
14); and to explore the stories that reflect on the Maasai’s relation to their source of existence 
(Van Beek 2000). 
On Continuity: Eng’ai ai! 
God is God. Who enables the sun to shine and the rains to fall. Eng’ai means three things: 
God, sky [or heaven] and all its contents, and rain. (Koko Theresia) 
 
“I don’t know”, “Only God knows”, “We cannot know God’s secret”, “God brings us the rain”, 
“God decides”, “It is God’s plan and She changed a lot”. “Nobody can change the years but God 
and we can receive the changes from God”, “Nobody but God is causing this, so nobody is 
causing it. Just the condition of the weather by God Himself is causing these changes”; these 
were among the most widely heard answers to the question of what could possibly cause these 
changes in rainfall. Thus while the former section revealed how people are seeking an explanation 
within society – the climate as a mirror of society’s behaviour – the realm of rain ultimately and 
exclusively belongs to the sole supreme entity, Eng’ai. And it should be emphasized that in 
addition to the gentle eschatology as mentioned above – in which time might be running down 
and fading away gradually, an idea in which the present is a weak echo of the past – for the 
Maasai the future remains an inaccessible domain shrouded in obscurity. Considering the 
precarious bond that has existed between Maasai pastoralists and rain it comes as no surprise that 
the nature-culture connection is engrained with religious and symbolic meaning and ritual 
                                                             
162 Philosopher Charles Taylor (2007) in his seminal book “A Secular Age” has also stated that it does not 
make sense to distinguish between the whole set of aspects of society that we make in the West, such as 
the political, economic, religious etc. Hence, the role of religion in “early” societies should be rather 
treated as interwoven with everything else and in no sense constituted a separate “sphere” of its own 
(Taylor 2007: 2).  
163 In fact, as theologian Karen Armstrong fervently put forward in her historical work on God and 
religion, since the Enlightenment in the Western world – with the separation of church and state in the 
eighteenth century – a very peculiar view of religion has developed as something that is separate from 
other activities, or a private quest that deals with a supernatural God and should not interfere with public 
life. It is peculiar because it was an entirely new invention, no other culture knows anything like that and 
words we translate religion into, like “din”, or “dharma” (Sanskrit) mean a whole way of life. This is not 
because people were too stupid to see that there is a distinction between the two, but because religion 
permeated all aspects of life, including political life. This can be related to the fact that we are meaning-
seeking creatures so we need to infuse everything we do with significance (Armstrong 2009). 
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interaction. From my conversations with people it became clear that an intrinsic transcendental 
and moral connection exists between God, society and the climate. This bond is indeed revealed 
by the most significant word in Maa, Eng’ai – which simultaneously means God, rain and the sky 
(or heaven, see box 8.6). The weather is a tangible manifestation of Eng’ai, a way to communicate 
Her satisfaction as well as discontent with the people. Sufficient rain is received as God’s grace, 
while prolonged droughts are understood as a curse. Drawing on early ethnographies (such as 
Merker 1910; Hollis 1905; Johnston 1902), Hodgson describes the Maasai and their relationship 
to the environment and religious practices as follows: 
As pastoralists, Maasai had a close customary relationship to and dependence on the 
environment for their sustenance and social reproduction. Nature and its elements were 
understood as manifestations of Eng’ai or expressions of Her will, and were therefore 
central to Maasai religious beliefs and practices. The symbolic meanings of these aspects 
of nature were dynamic and contextual; they were shaped (and reshaped) through their 
use in ritual practice, and, in turn, shaped the form and content of these practices 
(Hodgson 2005: 25). 
It is important to bear in mind that, despite the fact that Eng’ai manifests itself in different forms 
and goes by many different names, the Maasai religion is a monotheistic belief system, (see box 
8.6). Despite the mass conversion to Christianity that took place in Maasailand relatively 
recently,164 tales about the weather in relation to God and society form a testimony to this 
persistent and intricate relationship. Remarkably enough, while the Maasai’s adoption of 
Christianity (or Christianity’s adaptation to the Maasai) has entailed ruptures in certain cultural 
and religious forms and practices, at the same time a particular continuity in religious conviction 
and belief can be observed that continues to play a role in climate-society interactions. Put more 
precisely, I argue that the continuity of an entrenched faith in Eng’ai, which in part smoothed the 
conversion to Christianity, for the very same reason makes climate change and the ways it is 
translated difficult to accept.  
In addition to the notion of Eng’ai that is central in Maasai ideas of religion, faith and conversion 
is the notion of an inner spirit or soul, called oltau. And as Hodgson demonstrates, conversion 
itself was seen as a process that took place outside of somebody’s individual will, but was rather 
to be found in the readiness of a person’s oltau (Hodgson 2005: 222). A tricky point in my 
analysis is the question of what can be identified as “Maasai religion” or cosmology, and what can 
be labelled as Christian. My basic point of departure is that we should not try to disentangle them 
in the first place. For, just like Maasai culture, religious beliefs and practices – as in any other 
                                                             
164 For example, as late as 1969 it was estimated that there were not more than 300 practising Maasai 
Christians in the Evangelical Lutheran Church, even though many more had been baptised (Groop 2006).   
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tradition and culture – have also always been in flux, highly diverse and dynamic (cf. Spear and 
Waller 1993); which makes any attempt at grasping a fixed and delineated essence futile. 
Furthermore, it is likely that what is currently categorized as “Maasai” practices and beliefs are 
amalgamations that resulted from earlier encounters with other ethnic groups. In a similar vein, 
Christianity itself is as dynamic and idiosyncratic as Maasai religion and this must thus be 
understood in its local expressions and manifestations (Hodgson 2005: 14-15). For example, in 
Terrat alone there is a highly diverse proliferation of churches, with different denominations all 
having their own prescriptions, convictions, values, prayers, doctrine, (ritual) practices, (sacred) 
symbols, media and material forms etc.165 My intention is certainly not to map out the 
complexities that are encompassed by these varying cults. But my point here is rather that we 
need to understand the encounter between Christianity and Maasai religion as the ontological and 
epistemological windows through which climate change is translated. While it is clearly 
impossible to exhaust all its constituents, we can distil some basic patterns, and describe the most 
pronounced contours of the pre-existing norms and commitments. As such, my take on Maasai 
“tradition” or culture aligns with a “coproduction theory”, which treats it as the “result of 
creative friction between past lifeways and newer influences during the intensive cultural contact 
of colonialism and its aftermath” (Rudiak-Gould 2013b: 11). 
Furthermore, even though a break with past traditions might be claimed (particularly in 
Pentecostal denominations), it is likely that the new is also an amalgam of old and incoming 
traditions. In other words, the fact that most villagers are Christians and go to church (among the 
females there was no exception, but quite a few males have not converted to Christianity or do 
not go to church), does not exclude the continued existence or transformation of certain 
elements and lived experiences of Maasai customary forms and practices of religion and faith. 
This approach to religious encounter is encapsulated by the notion of a “double model” of local 
and Christian tradition on which most new messianic traditions, including the indigenous 
churches in Africa, are based (Lanternari 1963 in Van Beek 2000: 41). For instance, Lutheran 
messengers in northern Tanzania, due to “cultural problems” that they encountered in their 
missionary work, tried to make their work “fit” into local customs by accepting cultural elements 
that were considered harmless from a Christian perspective. In the course of time there was an 
                                                             
165 While there are some commonalities between the churches in terms of which Maasai practices are 
forbidden, such as drinking blood, female circumcision, polygyny and visiting the Oloiboni, there are also 
many differences. Overall the Catholic church in Terrat is seen as most tolerant of “indigenous” elements 
and practices, while the Pentecostal churches are more strict, and prohibit a considerable number of old 
practices like drinking alcohol, use of tobacco, certain forms of ritual slaughtering, and eating meat from 
cows that died a natural death and were not ritually slaughtered. And also certain Maasai aesthetics and 
bodily incisions are forbidden (wearing certain beads, pierced ears, the removal of one front tooth etc.).    
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increasing interest in indigenization, a process that in the 1970s became known as inculturation 
and contextualization (Groop 2006: 16-17). The Catholic Church was even more renowned for 
its inculturation approach, and many church attendants told me that the reason for them to “go 
to the Catholics”, was that they did not see it as a threat to their culture. 
As a “thought-pattern” and belief system that has previously “travelled” to Maasailand and set 
new conditions of belief, we might very well draw lessons from the ways in which Christianity 
has taken root in the African context in general and in Maasailand in particular. In his instructive 
article “on the rationality of conversion”, which deals with comparative African pathways of 
conversion, anthropologist and philosopher Robin Horton (1975) has put forward the thesis that 
the acceptance of Islam or Christianity has been highly selective, and that what is accepted and 
rejected is determined by the structure of the “basic” cosmology. He argued that crucial variables 
in this process are not the external influences (Islam or Christianity), but the pre-existing 
thought-patterns and values as well as the socio-economic structure (Horton 1975: 221).166 Even 
though we cannot speak of the existence of a “basic cosmology” as Horton meant it (as pre-
Islamic or pre-Christian), for my analysis I deem it meaningful to take local “religious horizons 
and practices” that I encountered as the basic locus of thought-patterns and explore climate-
change discourses as the external influence. However, instead of seeking to find selection 
principles in either the basic cosmology or in the external variables, I believe that it is more 
fruitful to lay bare the relationship and interaction between these two realms. In order to do so 
we shall move on to a discussion of continuities and ruptures, with a focus on Eng’ai (supreme 
being) and the oloiboni (the local diviner and spiritual healer), two points of attention that featured 
prominently in local “rain tales”. 
According to my informants, the major difference between the Maasai religion and Christianity 
lies in the ways of worshipping and not in the “essence” of faith or believing itself.167 It appeared 
                                                             
166 Even though taking a much more dialectical approach, Horton’s thesis is to some extent supported by 
Hodgson’s fascinating historical account of the dynamics that triggered Maasai women to convert to 
Christianity, despite the long-term concerted missionary efforts to convert men. She puts forward two 
basic factors that indeed speak of the internal “basic cosmology” and socio-economic matrix, rather than 
Christianity alone. Firstly, it was a matter of timing as women were gradually losing political authority, 
were also disenfranchised from their basic economic rights and had to cope with an increased workload. 
Secondly, as I mentioned earlier, women were considered to have greater spirituality and hence embraced 
Christianity as an extension of their connection with Eng’ai (Hodgson 2005).   
167 However, a different way of worshipping possibly installs a different transcendental configuration, or 
allegiance, through an altered mediation process. I am aware that I am not paying sufficient attention to 
the role of materiality and media in this discussion, but this is beyond my scope of analysis as climate 
change has not yet been translated so much through material forms in Terrat. It is important to 
acknowledge however, that apart from belief and personal experience with the divine, media – broadly 
understood as central to practices of mediation through which the ‘sacred’ becomes manifest in “this 
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that in their conversion process their image of the divine being had largely remained unaltered, 
Eng’ai is still Eng’ai. As these quotes attest:  
There are no two gods, there is only a single god. The only difference is the way of 
worshipping. That is why people used to surround a tree called oreteti. That is a tree that 
they believed when you surround it and sing God can listen to your prayers. […] And 
normally they went to Oloiboni and tried to make him their God. But actually there is only 
one God. 
There is only one supreme being and that is Eng’ai. 
God is for everybody. Not just for the Maasai. It is not a special God for Maasai only, it is 
a God for everybody under the blue sky. 
The same God as we are worshipping today [is the one from the past]. […] There is no 
difference, it is the same God. Although the way of worshipping is different. Because 
there were times when we worshipped under big trees. Quite different from now when 
we go to church and we see something like a cross, which we didn’t know before. So the 
God is the same, but the way of worshipping is different. The worshipping of the past 
was through the Oloiboni. 
However, there is a difference between former Maasai notions of Eng’ai and their newly espoused 
Christian approach, which relates to where she is localized. Whereas Eng’ai used to be above all 
located in the sky (and sometimes apparent or embodied in the sacred tree), for it was considered 
to be one and the same (“everything that is found in the sky belongs to Eng’ai”); in church they 
have been taught that God is everywhere. As Leboi explained: 
When we were growing up we thought that God was maybe found in that blue place 
there. But after we have grown up we have been told that God is not found there but that 
that is just the place where your eyes can reach. Now we think that God is found 
everywhere, which is what we learn in the church. So that is the difference that exists.  
The supreme being played and continues to play the quintessential role of provider of rain, and 
all natural phenomena – particularly related to the weather – were understood as a manifestation 
of Her divine powers. The weather thus echoed God’s judgement; a theme that is well known 
within various religious traditions worldwide. In Maasai society, while praying and asking for rain 
needed mediation through authorized practices and ritual forms of purification, guided by the 
spiritual diviner and prophet, the realm of God (and thus the climate) could not be known. 
Anthropologist Paul Spencer (2003) has argued that for the Maasai, God was seen as an all-
powerful and arbitrary force of providence whose intentions could impossibly be known, not 
even by the prophets “who have no more than a dim notion of the cosmos” (Spencer 2003: 6). 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
world” – are central to religious experience as it renders the transcendental accessible (Meyer 2011). And I 
believe the same holds true for climate change, as it can be rendered “real” through tangible objects, 
pictures, atmospheric materialities etc. 
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As mentioned before, this notion of God (and the transcendental) as an undisclosed sphere 
inevitably has its bearing on ideas of the future. Spencer goes even further, to argue that “The 
flamboyance of Maasai ceremony and self-regard is offset by a sense of resignation to an 
unknown and unknowable future. They see themselves rather like Plato’s prisoners in a cave, ill 
equipped to delve into ultimate truths” (ibid). While I am more hesitant to speak about “ultimate 
truths”, the notion of an unknowable future was underpinned by my informants, who refuted any 
attempt to probe future climate scenarios or ideas of the future in any sense. Questions related to 
futurology were always cast away with laughter, followed by “we cannot know”, or “only God 
knows”. Yet mediation with God was common and necessary as it was through sacrifices and 
(communal) prayers that the Maasai tried to repent of their sins, re-establish social and moral 
order and reinforce their bond with Eng’ai. Women served as the midwives between Eng’ai and 
her people, for women were given the power to create new life (Hodgson 2005: 64, 213). The 
forms of mediation and intercession with Eng’ai have taken a different turn since Christianity has 
made its way to Terrat, which has impinged upon local perceptions on power, faith and the 
climate. 
Box 8.6 Different names for Eng’ai which are different manifestations of God’s nature168  
“Traditional” names 
Naomoni ai  The One to Whom one prayed and begged for something 
Endapesh Wide God, Who is covering the whole earth 
Engai Narok Black God – Gentle, respectful and moral God. When somebody observes 
something unusual; especially something terrible. People want God to forgive 
them for the bad condition they are in. It often refers to a severe weather 
condition, and also signifies the black clouds that carry rain 
Engai Naborr  White God (signifies the white clouds that carry rain) 
Engai Nanyokie  Reddish brown God (referring to a harmful state, fire, heat of the dry season) 
Noongipa The wet One, which signifies fertility. Also signifies the amniotic water that is 
released when women give birth. So women call God Noongipa to ask for 
strength. 
Engaretoni  Helper, or The One Who helps 
                                                             
168 Also written as Engai, Ng’ai, Enkai or Nkai. However, there is only one supreme being. Eng’ai  itself 
can mean three things: God, rain and the sky (or heaven), while in turn, there are many words to describe 
Eng’ai. Note that Eng’ai largely goes by feminine pronouns, except for those two names that denote ruler, 
which are male, and the “modern” name referring to the Father of Heaven. Source: Lemburis Justo 2015, 
Voshaar 1998: 135 in Hodgson 2005, in addition to my own findings. 
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Noompees My One of newly formed grass (referring also to the cows which are a source of 
life) 
Nendaran’ai  My red light of dawn (God brings each day into existence) 
Nalakua- natana  The far and near One 
Pars’ai   Ruler 
Alaitoriani  Ruler 
Nolkila orok   She of the black garment 
Yieyio nashal inkilani My mother of wet clothes (referring to wetness, darkness, motherhood) 
“Modern” names: 
Armagilani  Powerful God 
Papa leshumata The Father of Heaven 
Osinyati Holy, the Holy One 
Eng’ai ekeper God from Heaven 
 
On Rupture: Oloiboni 
A few informants, however, expressed their disdain towards the Maasai God of the past by 
stating that “he was a big liar”, or “we hate him so much” and referred to him as the oloiboni (pl. 
iloibonok) – the traditional spiritual healer, ritual expert and diviner. In the past people – and some 
elders still do so – also referred to the spiritual diviner as Eng’ai. According to Maasai myths the 
iloibonok were direct descendants of Eng’ai, with a distinction between major iloibonok with 
superior powers of prophecy leading people in times of crisis (“public prophets”), and minor 
ones that performed more mundane divinations (“individual practitioners”) that operated on 
individual demand (Berntsen 1979: 137).169 Furthermore, they were believed to have a unique 
close relation to Eng’ai, who had given them special power. Their powers were looked upon with 
a mixture of fear and fascination for they could do both good and harm (Hodgson 2005: 41). 
And Spencer notes that as intermediaries of the unkown, the major diviners (Loonkidongi dynasty 
                                                             
169 One version of the story goes that a warrior found the “first prophet” on a hill near Nairobi. 
Eventually the warrior adopted this young man, called Kidongoi, who possessed strange powers. This 
man had prophetic powers through the interpretation of dreams and natural phenomena. And he had the 
ability to divine with his enkidong, which is a calabash full of stones. The prophetic dreams were said to 
come from God, whereas the divination was an acquired skill (Berntsen 1979: 135). There are other 
version of this story, but all based on the idea that they were always seen as outsiders who later 
intermingled with Maasai.  
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of prophets), had a “shadowy, double-edged reputation and deep respect was edged with fear”. 
They saw themselves as having superior knowledge, higher standards of behaviour and as being 
members of a class above ordinary Maasai (Spencer 2003: 7). This ambivalent attitude towards 
the diviner could still be sensed and observed in Terrat, despite people’s claim that they no longer 
considered them to be endowed with spiritual powers. While the oloiboni was not one and the 
same as God, the idea that he embodied God’s divine powers or that he was Her personification 
were now looked upon with great disdain. As the following statements makes clear:  
We found that, we found out that this god lied to us. Because oloiboni they pretend to be 
god, but they are not really god because they die as normal people. 
Oloiboni is the same person as us so it is not fair to go and worship him. To tell him that 
there is no rainfall and so bring us the rainfall. 
Since we go to church we found that there is no difference between us and oloiboni. We 
came to realize that he was just lying to us. 
I don’t believe that oloiboni can bring rain. But there are different people and some might 
visit him and come back with rain. But I don’t believe he can bring rain. The pastor can 
bring rainfall because he is praying to God and not to a human being himself. 
Thus a basic ontological rupture with the Maasai religious “configuration” that was explicit in the 
conditions of belief in the conversion to Christianity was the dismantling of the oloiboni’s godlike 
status; from a deification he was relegated to the status of a normal human being, or even worse, 
a liar. However, as we shall see below, the implicit processes involved in conversion might work 
in a subtler way, and reach beyond mere doctrine. Another reason for the iloibonok’s disgrace was 
the fact that they were said to misuse their power for self-enrichment:  
The church came to tell people the truth because in the past years oloiboni can see a good 
bull and say “I want this bull”, and he really will take it. Nobody can prohibit him from 
taking it. Or he can see a beautiful girl and say “I should marry her”, and no bride price 
and no discussion. And he will marry her. And then the preachers came and told us the 
truth. 
Also here a “gentle eschatology” was echoed in the ways people talked about the oloiboni of the 
past. The very first oloiboni were considered to be more sincere, more powerful, more honest, and 
“real”; while the oloiboni of today are said to be useless, “fake” drunkards who use their religiosity 
for business. Intriguingly enough, while almost all of my informants said that they no longer 
visited oloiboni – as the church strictly prohibits it – through my own experience of paying oloiboni 
a visit, a fairly different picture emerged.170 As a figure shrouded in mystery, due to peoples’ 
                                                             
170 There are usually several Oloiboni in a village. To my knowledge, in Terrat there are currently two. Their 
power is passed on genealogically, and all the sons of one diviner are said to inherit his spiritual powers. 
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stories about the spiritual diviner, my curiosity rose and I decided to try to arrange an interview 
with this person, who once had the aura of an “infallible godfather” (Spencer 2003: 7). This was 
easier said than done. The first challenge was finding another research assistant because my first 
assistant, a faithful (female) Christian, refused to assist me in this task. Fortunately, I soon 
encountered another (male) research partner who was willing to come along with me. And off we 
went carrying a container of Konyagi pouches (strong locally brewed liquor). While my intention 
was to ask oloiboni a few questions, before I could reverse the situation we slipped into an intense 
divination session. After taking a piece of my clothing and throwing some stones from his 
calabash, his first remark already sparked both our laughter and admiration, “I know that Leboi 
told you not to bring Konyagi, but I know that you did”. 
 
A divination session with Oloiboni. 
I don’t know whether it was due to the Konyagi that he had finished in barely ten minutes, or that 
he had invoked his divine spiritual powers (or a combination thereof); but an ecstatic force 
overpowered him, leaving us caught between an increasing fascination and frustration. Not only 
due to the mundane interruption of his mobile phone and the fact that he was stuttering, which 
created an absurd sensation that did not bring to mind a man of power; but also because he 
continued to insist that we paid him an excessive high “consultation” fee. Interestingly enough, 
when I asked him whether he considered the church to be a threat to his work or authority – 
since I assumed that he had lost some of his “clientele” – he calmly said: “No. The only problem 
is that since the establishment of the church, I also have to work more during the night.” He 
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referred to the fact that many people still visit him, and many do so secretly, not only the non-
Christians.171 And when we left the session, indeed there were at least three people queued up 
waiting outside to have their own consultation with the oloiboni. The primary reasons for people 
to visit him are cattle-related problems, conflicts, diseases, economic problems, women having 
difficulties with conceiving, or lack of rainfall. But to my knowledge the collective, ritual rain 
prayers of the past no longer (or rarely) take place in Terrat.172 There appears to be a very 
pragmatic element to spiritual and religious experience that follows a principle that simply 
“works”. Many people converted to Christianity because they were healed from a particular 
disease by the missionaries or in church, and in turn, if in church people find no success they 
have recourse to oloiboni. Put in another way, in addition to the explicitly formulated matters that 
are part of a doctrine (visiting oloiboni is preached as a diabolical act), these secret practices attest 
to more implicit notions that drive belief and faith which touch upon deeper layers of existence, 
to which I will now turn.     
In the past, the mediation of rain took place through the ritual prayer under a sacred tree (oreteti) 
or close to a water source, by sacrificing a black sheep or a goat.173 As women were considered to 
be more religious than men, have a greater sense of spirituality and to be closer to Eng’ai 
(Hodgson 2005) this ritual was carried out by several women (in different stages of fertility) who 
prayed and sang naked while surrounding a dam. This ceremony was guided by the oloiboni, who 
was responsible for the timing and also for giving instructions to the participants. Nowadays the 
rain prayer in church, under the charge of the pastor, has replaced this practice. Yet the timing of 
the rain prayer was not only instigated by the pastor, but could be demanded by any member of 
the church. Whereas many elder women did not rejoice in this Christian democratic principle of 
praying for rain, others argued that the God of the church is still capable of bringing rain, 
“perhaps a little bit slower though” and “less powerful than in the past”. Overall, there is a 
decreased sense of the bond between God, society and rainfall, for which people sought an 
explanation in either the lack of ritual or the loss of faith.  
Mediating rainfall has always occurred through the dominant (religious) authorities, and was 
brought about in connection to a transcendental force, Eng’ai. Here we inevitably touch upon 
notions of power, for the question emerges: who has the authority to mediate (the epistemics of) 
                                                             
171 Even though I think that only a minority of the people still attend Oloiboni, certainly not the same 
number as in the past. 
172 I only heard of a rain prayer that took place in 2006. In other places like at the volcanic mountain 
Oldonyo Lengai it is said that rain prayers are still carried out, for this was (and by some still is) considered 
by the Maasai to be the holy mountain of God. 
173 It must be a black one because this relates to morality and signifies a gentle God. 
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the climate and rain? Particularly female informants have attributed the lack of rain in society to 
the fact that this ritual prayer through sacrifice has ceased to exist, and blamed the church for 
prohibiting this practice. For example, these three Kokos (older women) remembered the 
effectiveness and power of this prayer:  
After we carried out this practice by surrounding a dam, the rain occurred the same day 
and not any other day. The same day the rain fell down. But nowadays the church is not 
allowing us to go. 
In former days when there was no rain we just took a goat and we made a sacrifice, and 
women sang to God and pray for some days and we got rain again. […] During the day of 
sacrifice the rain rained a lot. Nowadays we start going to church and that is why the rains 
do not come. The church is not bad but what we can say is that years changed a lot. 
When we were young the water was flowing. There were water sources, if you compare 
now the river is dry. But also there used to be an organization that came to oloiboni and 
people came to sacrifice to that river so that the water will not be finished. That it will not 
be dry, we slaughtered a black sheep in the river or a black bull in those years. That is 
how we tried to protect the river from becoming dry. But for these years now, something 
like that cannot be done. Maybe that is why the river is dry. 
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Picture 1 Koko Rehema; picture 2 Babu Langona; picture 3 Women dressed for circumcision ceremony in 
Sukuro 
The ritual prayer guided by the power of the oloiboni was important to bring rain, but faith also 
played a vital role. As one old man (non-Christian) put it: 
When I was young people went to pray for rain with oloiboni. Praying for rain is about 
faith. When people went they had very strong faith, they were very faithful to him. 
Nowadays people go to church because they love church. It is difficult to know if they are 
truly faithful. The oloiboni  is not remembered because they pray for Jesus. But the 
difference was that people were faithful and he gave the instruction of what to do. Now 
in church there are no sacrifices. In church there is only preaching. 
Or another middle-aged man who was quite happy in church: 
We do not longer believe in the power of oloiboni so we directly pray to God. Sometimes 
we make a special prayer for rain in church so that the rain may come. God normally 
listens to our prayers. When we realized that the rains came when we prayed to God, we 
left the oloiboni. 
However, many women came with opposite claims. While generally being content with the 
church, they regretted that the ritual rain prayer – and their own role as moral mediators thereof 
– no longer existed. While expressing their disdain about the contemporary oloiboni, in terms of 
channelling rainfall they found them good ritual leaders in the past, as they gave precise 
instructions of what to do. It is crucial to note that the oloiboni was not the one empowered to 
bring rain himself, but he was rather endowed with the power to mediate rain through Eng’ai. As 
a koko explained: “We visited the oloiboni and he tried to do something. Sometimes it would rain 
but not because of the oloiboni but only because God decided to give us rain”. Rain and power are 
 243 
intrinsically connected, particularly in a context where rain sustains all forms of life (for studies 
on rain and power in Tanzania see also: Sheridan 2012; Sanders 2008). Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that rain is seen as a sacred matter that, in part, both conceptually as well as linguistically 
coalesces with the supreme being. For when it rains people exclaim, “There is Eng’ai!”. The 
disappearance of the ritual rain prayer – accompanied by the collective sacrificing of a black 
animal as a gift for Eng’ai – has entailed a weakening of the ways in which people (mainly 
women) sought redress for society’s behaviour, and maintained a relationship with Eng’ai.  
Hence, they also find the explanation for lack of rainfall in the eroding power of the oloiboni. 
Apart from the church, there is a more intrinsic reason for the oloiboni’s loss of ritual authority. 
When I asked people whether they still believed in the power of the oloiboni, many replied that 
this depends on the faith of the people. As Leboi explained: 
God also depends on the faith of people. If somebody believes in the church he may 
succeed there, if they pray to the Maasai God they may also succeed there. It depends on 
the faith of the people. 
Or put in the words of Petro, who was deeply engaged in (Pentecostal) church-life but used to 
attend the oloiboni regularly in the past: 
In the past we believed that he [oloiboni] could do that [bring rain]. But since things are 
changing, his power is also becoming less. In previous times, the oloiboni did not eat sheep 
meat but now they do. And they did not drink alcohol in public and now they go and 
drink with other people. […] So in that way their spirit is also becoming less. […] In the 
past they had the power to bring rain but now they lost that power, because there are few 
people who believe in that. But also some things work in faith. If you trust that something 
will happen, it will happen. So even for people who still trust that oloiboni can help them, 
they are still helping them. But if people do not believe in that, it is not going to work. 
Because of people’s strong resentment towards the diviner, I had assumed that this attitude 
entailed at the same time a new and exclusive ontology that relegated his powers to the margins. 
However, it appeared that the oloiboni’s powers are not necessarily “unreal” or that they cease to 
exist, but rather that to get in touch with him or establishing a bond is to engage with ungodly 
spirits, and part of the realm of the “occult”. Furthermore, just as one’s spirit or soul (oltau) 
operates like another inside oneself, who decides for you what to believe – the power of the 
oloiboni is not an intrinsic agentive force that exclusively belongs to him which he can exert over 
the people. Put otherwise, in addition to his own “derogatory” practices (or what have been 
downgraded as such) that in part corroded his power, in order for the oloiboni’s power to “work” 
he needed the dialectical enforcement from below that came to fruition by people’s faith. As the 
following (Lutheran) man recalled:  
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When I was young others went to pray for rain with the oloiboni. It is about faith. When 
people went there they had strong faith, they were very faithful to him. Nowadays people 
go to church, because they love church it is difficult to know whether they are really 
faithful. The oloiboni is not remembered, because they pray to Jesus. The difference was 
that people were very faithful, and he [oloiboni] gave directions for what to do in case of 
diseases. Now in church there are no sacrifices. In church there is only preaching. 
In sum, less ritual, less faith, less power, less rain. In this section I have tried to show the 
historically complex and intricate relationship that has existed between society, rain and God, in 
which morality featured prominently and was sustained through ritual prayer. Furthermore, 
whatever the external influences that brought about new cosmological configurations, and 
institutional or ritual ruptures, the deeply entrenched notion of Eng’ai remained and continues to 
be the quintessential lifeblood that runs through this bond. 
Climate Change as Disenchantment 
One of the primary sources through which people have access to transnational discourses in 
Terrat is the radio. The reach of the radio for Maasailand makes it the only platform in their own 
language that weaves connections to international and national concerns and imaginaries. As 
already mentioned, Orkonerei Radio Service (ORS community radio) is headquartered in 
Terrat.174 The main vision of the radio has been to enhance knowledge and educate the pastoralist 
community for the purposes of development, by promoting accountability, equality, peace and 
unity. Also a particular point of attention is to empower the Maasai women by establishing radio 
community groups and donating radios to women. 175 However, I found that while the majority 
of men own a radio and listen regularly to radio programmes, women do so to a much lesser 
extent. Moreover, when women are at home they have less time than men to just sit and listen 
because they are burdened with an array of time-consuming household tasks. Hence, among my 
informants there were more climate-cognizant men than women, and often they had received 
information through the radio. What makes ORS such an important source of information for 
the Maasai is that it is the only radio station that broadcasts in the Maa language. While it 
connects the Maasai to global concerns, at the same time it operates as a mediator of culture and 
tradition. In a sense it thus invokes and remediates notions of Maasai identity. Let me illustrate 
this by telling the story of Babu Philipo (73 years old). Many years ago Babu worked as a guard 
for the local NGO llaramatak. After a few years he resigned. Some years later the radio station 
                                                             
174 The radio station was initially owned by the Institute of the Orkonerei Pastoralist Advancement 
(IOPA), which is a voluntary community membership organization that started in 1991. From 2009 the 
ownership of the radio station was transferred to Orkonerei Mass Media (ORMAME). 
175 See link: http://www.cto.int/media/events/pst-ev/2014/DBSF/Lukas%20Kariongi.pdf. Accessed 1 
December 2016. 
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was established and the programme makers were looking for somebody who had very detailed 
knowledge about the Maasai language. Then they remembered Babu and asked him to come and 
work for the radio station. For more than ten years Babu has been presenting a programme called 
“Orngara le Maa” (which means “to unite the Maasai”) about the Maasai language and culture. The 
programme seeks to unite all the Maasai throughout Tanzania and even Kenya in informing 
people about their language and traditions. During the program Babu receives phonecalls from 
Maasai from many different regions and they ask him questions about particular Maa words, 
ceremonies and habits etc. According to Babu this radio program is very important because he 
has observed many cultural changes that are eroding important values such as enkanyit. Babu 
explained: 
People are not following the Maasai tradition as in the past. For example, to make holes 
in the ears. Also when there was no milk they could drink the blood from the cow but 
nowadays people are no longer doing that. The major effect is that people are leaving the 
culture and some people are dying. Like drinking blood. Nowadays because of the church 
we are not doing that again. Even when people are in pain and are not using the 
traditional medicine anymore, while it was renowned. 
Thus, following Babu, his role as a radio programme maker has fundamental significance in 
keeping Maasai traditions alive. And to remind the Maasai of their own traditions and language 
even has life-and-death importance. However, while remediating tradition and cultural values, the 
radio also plays into the complex relationship between Maasai traditions and all the 
disenchantments entailed by modernity. As Harri Englund (2011) has compellingly demonstrated 
in his study on the role of the radio (and the hundreds of mundane stories that radio listeners 
shared) in Malawi, “insights emerge into how Africans pursue their desires under the condition of 
globalisation”.176  
But in Terrat the radio also leads to a particular disenchantment of the world, and informs people 
about the dangers of globalization. For example, people hear about scientists who reject the 
existence of God, about nuclear wars, environmental destruction, industries, explosive weapons, 
air pollution, cancer, and climate change. When babu heard of climate change on the radio he 
thought that it was a change in culture and lack of respect in society. In one of the radio 
                                                             
176 The role of the radio in Maasailand deserves a whole ethnographic study on its own. By analyzing the 
stories that people shared on the radio, Harri Englund found that radio listeners’ understandings of 
human rights differed considerably from the language used by NGOs. As such he presents an alternative 
to liberal thought on notions of equality and obligation. He concludes that “In their rush to appreciate the 
new media, social scientists may confuse what is technologically cutting-edge with what is theoretically 
innovative. The mundane battery-powered radio can broadcast claims that go through the heart of the 
intellectual challenges confronting contemporary debates about liberalism and equality” (Englund 2011: 
11). 
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programmes “Mazungumzo ya Mazingira” (in Swahili: “talk about the environment”) produced by 
ORS, a special edition was fully devoted to the topic of climate change. A special guest was 
invited, called Hassan, to explain climate change to the people. Here is a fragment: 
Hassan: It is the change based on environment, e.g. temperature, moving winds and rainfall. These 
changes are repeating all the time. […] Scientific investigation found that changes are occurring […] . 
Climate change can be human-induced and it is also naturally occurring. This is because human activities 
pollute the atmosphere. Human activities like burning charcoal and burning forests increases the level of 
Co2 in the atmosphere and causes global warming. The industrial revolution which began in 1730 caused 
emission of poisonous gases that made a layer of thick gases, and allow rays to penetrate, but prevented 
gases from escaping. These poisonous gases come from different places such as industries, volcanic eruption, 
burning charcoal or forest, explosion of weapons used in wars. […] Trees that normally absorb carbon 
dioxide are being cut and this is very dangerous. 
His advice to the people was to minimize industries and the burning of forests, and motivate 
people to plant trees to reduce gases like CO2. This explanation seems rather complicated for 
people who have never heard of CO2, the atmosphere, the industrial revolution, or even science. 
Moreover, a giant leap is made between the global causes (industries) and local responsibility 
(planting trees). Another guest was invited to the studio and got the time to explain his ideas 
about climate change: 
Frederik: This is caused directly by human activities. How does this climate change take place? Like I 
said. Directly by human activities. A human being because of her poverty can go into the forest and cut 
down trees for different purposes. For example for charcoal burning and the smoke that is produced in this 
process is directly released into the atmosphere and causes climate change. This ozone layer is destroyed and 
some holes are appearing, ozone layer depletion. […] We are also the causes of this thing, since we are 
cutting many trees, burning charcoal […]. 
The rest of the programme was concerned with tree talk, and how to sensitize people about tree 
planting and prevent people from cutting down trees. My interest in this context lies in the 
confrontation between the scientific perspective on nature and the climate on the one hand, and 
the Maasai ontologies as described above on the other. What features prominently in climate- 
change discourses is the anthropogenic approach to the climate. The NGO in “Leboi’s 
revelation” also explained to the group of actors that they should “stop praying to God for it is 
not God’s fault”, and that they have to plant trees instead, since humans themselves are 
responsible. While in the educational movie the actors obviously swallowed this scientific 
explanation, as much as Leboi has been perfectly able to reproduce it in different public fora 
(including in his accounts to me), reality proved much more subtle, stubborn and complicated 
than this. In one of the many conversations that I had with Leboi he asked me a question that I 
had grown familiar with in the course of my stay in Terrat, and it evoked a fascinating and 
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controversial point in the translation of climate change: “Is it true that there are people in Europe 
who call themselves scientists and who don’t believe in God?” 
Researcher: Yes, that is why many people in Europe maybe don’t believe in God because 
they cannot find a proof that God exists, because science is all about proving things and if 
you believe that you have to prove something before it can exist you might lose faith in 
God. And instead you focus on science and technology. What do you think about science 
Leboi? 
Leboi: I do not know the meaning of science. Probably you learn about that when you get 
education. 
Researcher: Okay, well for example this climate change is based on scientific findings by 
measuring the temperature and rainfall. 
Leboi: If these scientists are saying that climate change is happening, I can say it is true, 
these men may be correct in some things maybe. But if those scientists are saying there is 
no God, they are wrong. Because when I was growing up my parents never told me that 
God was present. But one day when I was still very young I was walking in the forest. I 
was alone. Suddenly, a very big and dangerous snake appeared and then I screamed: 
“Eng’ai ai! Oh my God”. I just mentioned it. So I questioned myself and wondered: if my 
soul [oltau] itself seems to know about God, then really He must be present. 
Leboi: So if these scientists say that God does not exist, do they have a different God? 
 
After a while I finally began to see the advantage of my methodological trial in which the roles 
my informants and I played were reversed. Leboi’s confusion about science was not rare, and 
quite some others had inquired about it too. And whatever the scientific rationale behind climate 
change that was propagated by educators, according to my informants it was not only impossible 
to reduce the narrative solely to a secular causality, but completely senseless. The sheer idea of 
having no God (as those scientists claim), must mean that they have at least a different god, as 
Leboi’s oltau has revealed to him. Climate science can be characterized by an “hermetically sealed 
ontology”, in which human-induced climate change has relegated God to the margins (at least in 
the way it reaches Terrat). This does not resonate with the ways in which the villagers of Terrat 
perceive and relate to the climate, which is a cosmology based on inclusivity and continued 
transcendence. While for some it seemed possible to embrace (at least parts of) the new 
“cosmological configuration” called climate change – including a new vocabulary that speaks of 
industries, CO2 and the atmosphere – nature’s entanglements remain characterized by inclusivity, 
with Eng’ai as the seat of life and rain. The translation of climate change seeks to dislodge the weight 
of a relationship between rain, God and society, with a profane worldview emptied of God and 
purified of “superstition”. In addition to this, the scientific complexity of the story played a part 
in the “demystification” of nature. 
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The example of Rehema, a middle-aged Maasai woman living in Terrat, is also telling. We met 
Rehema in Arusha during one of the many climate change workshops in which my research 
partner and I participated. Several Maasai villagers attended this workshop from different regions, 
along with a few researchers and NGO workers, and the aim was to sensitize grassroots people. 
During the meeting I was wondering what villagers from a village like Terrat would possibly 
make of these graphs, models, statistics as presented to them in PowerPoint? After we realized 
that one of the participants was living in Terrat, we got the chance to ask her these questions 
once we were back home. She explained that she was invited by PINGOs, the organizing NGO, 
after attending a village meeting in Terrat. When we asked her what she thought about climate 
change she replied:  
It was very tough to learn about climate change because it was my first time and it was 
very complicated. But I myself cannot know what causes these changes. Only God 
knows. Only God is the One Who changes everything. 
Whatever the explanations given for the changes in the climate, for Rehema Eng’ai remains 
axiomatic in the ultimate judgment of the world, manifested in the weather. Similarly to the 
process of embracing Christianity, with the arrival of climate change as a new discourse, there are 
several roads of belief and understanding to travel that do not necessarily work as exclusive 
options. As much as Leboi sees changes in the climate happening, he contends that the realm of 
rain is bound to Eng’ai and cannot be explained by science (alone). Put otherwise, human beings 
or industries might play a role in the destruction of the environment, but it is up to God to 
decide if rain should fall or not. In a similar vein, villagers perceived the role of scientists – who 
not only claim to be able to predict the weather, but also discard the existence of God – as some 
sort of self-declared apotheosis, the ultimate form of hubris. For, indeed nobody but God can 
decide about the climate. Dora, the school teacher who measures rainfall in Terrat, explained to 
us that “People do not trust the information from the weather forecast on the radio because they 
do not know where they get the information from. Because there is no communication with 
God. Only if they communicate with God they will trust it.” The following questions asked to me 
by a middle-aged man (here mzee, Swahili for older man), who seriously questioned the notion of 
climate change, are also revealing: 
 Mzee: We hear nowadays that scientists say there is no God, is it true? 
 Researcher: Yes. […] 
Mzee: I think there is a God because She is the one who created us. Do you have an 
oloiboni in your country? […] 
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Researcher: No. Not really […] 
Mzee: In your country there is no rainfall? Because in our country we say the rain comes 
from God. How do you explain rain? What about a thunderstorm? We say that it is God 
talking. What about in your country? 
Researcher: We say that it is just friction between hot and cold air.  
Mzee: Ai, ai, ai, it seems that science is really trying to say there is no God at all! 
The role of the scientist is perceived as self-declared “weather prophet” and is as such critically 
rejected, for he assumes to be able to unearth God’s secret and as such incorporate His power. It 
appeared that some cognizant informants were (in their own ways) able to relate to the scientific 
rationale underpinning climate change and its anthropogenic origin, and also take it seriously. But 
the fact that science could develop models for the future was irreconcilable with their own 
worldview. Such an opinion was given testimony to by Elijah, a 40 year-old-man: 
I have heard about climate change on the radio. First of all, temperatures have increased. 
And also rainfall has declined. Industries which emit fumes in the atmosphere are causing 
this climate change to occur. And also the application of weapons, explosive weapons 
during the war which turn the ground soil to come up. And also cutting down of trees. 
[…] But nobody can answer the question how it will be in the future, because nobody can 
predict. 
It is the church leader who has taken over the ritual power to pray for rain from the oloiboni, yet 
the deification of the latter ultimately led to his own symbolic (and institutional) downgrading. 
Thus whereas the pastor nowadays only assumes a mediating role, the oloiboni has been taken to 
task for claiming to posses prophetic qualities. And the fate of the scientist – who not only 
intervenes in the realm of Eng’ai by assuming forecasting skills, but even denies the existence of 
God altogether – seems to be governed by the same principles of (dis)qualification. However, 
that people did not express “trust” in science and scientists does not mean that all anthropogenic 
causes of climate change were discarded. As mentioned before, there always existed a strong 
bond between society, morals and nature, which means that humans do have agency in bringing 
about cosmological harmony. From historical sources we learn that Eng’ai (as in God, sky and 
rain) had a dialectical relation of mutual dependency with enkop (the land or earth). So there 
existed a complementarity between Eng’ai and enkop, between heaven and earth. The agency to 
alter and maintain the relationship resided in both hands, for both humans and Eng’ai created and 
nurtured life (Hodgson 2005). So to bring deforestation, population growth, even industries and 
CO2 into the causal chain of blame and pollution beliefs, were for some informants acceptable 
and reconcilable with their own “prior commitments”. But to discard Eng’ai as an agentive force 
was considered to be a true disenchantment of the world. Interestingly enough, the initial Maa 
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translation as proposed by the radio station workers, engibelekenyata engijape engop, which means a 
change of air and earth, was contested by the traditional leader. He proposed a remarkable 
alternative instead: engibelekenyata (change) Eng’ai (of God, rain and the sky). He explained: “You 
talk about rainfall, plants, temperature. Is there anybody who can change these things? No! Only 
God!” He contended also that we should not make a literal translation from the official Swahili 
translation (mabadiliko ya tabia nchi). As he stated: “Nchi [meaning country, earth or ground] is 
referring to us, but it is not us. We should not try to translate directly, because it will be 
misleading. You should look at what does this mean for us”. According to the traditional leader, 
while explaining about the industries as the principle cause of climate change, the domain of rain, 
air and sky [or heaven] is, ultimately, in the hands of God.  
I shall conclude by taking the traditional leader’s words to heart, and treat them as the Maasai’s 
prerogative for translating climate change: “you should look at what does this mean for us”. In 
this chapter I have argued that in order to understand the translation of climate change, we need 
to bring to light the complex set of pre-existing norms and prior commitments that consists of 
entanglements, ruptures and continuities that will ultimately define the conditions for accepting 
or rejecting a new narrative. I have sought to embed the reasons for the Maasai villagers of Terrat 
in the broader historical and political “interpretive context”, as well as epistemological and 
ontological principles that account for the possible incompatibilities between global discourses 
and local realities. Against the background of longstanding marginalization of the Maasai and 
increasing pressure from a globalizing world, their (initial) rejection of climate change as an 
incipient new doomsday scenario about the world, should be taken as a form of agency and 
resistance. First of all, global climate narratives do not resonate with local concerns as people 
have other pressing issues to deal with, for they lack the most basic access to health care, 
education, water, land, pastures, infrastructure, medication, vaccination and so on. Secondly, the 
longstanding precarious bond that they have cherished between nature and themselves in a highly 
variable climate, and the array of livelihood diversification strategies that they have developed 
over time, have made them overall robust adapters to a changing climate. In other words, it is not 
the climate that they fear, but rather the possibility of losing their land and rights to access land. 
Finally, I have demonstrated that the relationship of the Maasai to the climate – as an element of 
the complex entanglements between Christianity and Maasai cosmology – remains embedded in 
an inclusive ontology in which society, morals and nature are interwoven; a way of living that 
ceases to make sense when purged of Eng’ai. 
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Appendix to Chapter 8, interview results 
 
Name/ Age/ Sex 
Cognizant/ Source 
of reception 
Observation Cause Remarks 
Leboi (m) 
47 
 
Yes, highly 
NGOs 
Changes in rainfall, cattle 
diseases, drought, 
unpredictable climate, 
Sun is hotter 
But climate fluctuates a lot 
in general. 
God’s secret! 
Industries from 
those developed 
countries. 
Ultimately rejects 
science. 
Israel (m) 
Middle aged 
Yes 
In the past the rains started 
earlier. 
Prices of maize are high 
now. 
Because of cutting 
of trees for 
cultivation and 
charcoal. 
Population 
growth, 
destruction of 
environment. 
 
Petro (m) 
50 
No   
People were 
spreading love a 
lot. Now it is over. 
Loserian (m) 
Middle aged 
Yes he heard about it, 
But it is all done by 
God and not by 
industries. 
Cattle diseases are 
increasing. 
Not enough rain compared 
to the past. But his parents 
faced similar challenges. 
Changes come 
from God, who is 
controlling 
everything. 
 
Olaigwanani 
(m) 
Traditional leader 
Middle aged 
Yes 
Government in 2009/ 
white men & NGOs 
Irregularity but sees this as 
a repetition of past; 
Lack of rain; 
Heat, lack of grasses. Type 
of grass perishes fast; 
Animals are born in dry 
season, because you can’t 
plan properly 
Not sure because 
in Tanzania there 
are no industries; 
Also no clear 
understanding, 
even after 
explanation. 
Because 
government never 
explained. 
Ozone layer and 
gasses. 
God is in charge 
of the rain. 
Edward Philipo 
Junior (m) thirties 
Radio Station 
 
Yes, highly 
Education 
Droughts are on the rise. 
Co2 caused by the 
industries from 
industrialized 
countries. 
 
William (m) 
Middle aged 
Yes Lack of rain and grasses 
Population growth 
Climate change 
 
Kalaya Lesindi (m) 
47 
Petro’s brother 
Yes 
Radio and other 
people 
Different weather 
conditions 
Too hot, too much sun 
But for Maasai it is normal 
to lose cows. 
God brings the 
rain; 
Factories in your 
country that make 
nuclear bombs. 
We are not afraid a 
lot, like farmers 
because we can 
take cows far 
away. Serious 
droughts 1997, 
2009. 
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Babu Kureso (m) 
100 
No, not really 
Only heard people 
talking about it 
Less rainfall, too hot, 
diseases. 
Things have changed 
nowadays, due to industry 
oil 
Only God knows, 
He brings us the 
rain 
The God from 
church does not 
have rain. 
When we 
sacrificed a black 
sheep, rain came 
directly. 
Koko – Rehema 
Lindimayo (f) 80 
traditional healer 
No 
These years are bad, worse 
compared to before. 
Shorter rainy season, can 
end already in April or 
May, which leads to a 
shortage of grasses. 
River is drying up 
No more 
traditional 
sacrifices like a 
black sheep or 
visiting Oloiboni, 
maybe that is the 
reason for lack of 
water. 
Also loss of 
tradition, love and 
respect. 
She says that 
people are eating 
flower because 
there is not 
enough rain & 
milk. 
Koko mama Eliya 
(f) 
100 
No 
No changes, the weather 
was like this from the very 
beginning. 
Sometimes there is less 
rain, sometimes more. No 
changes. 
  
Babu Langona 
Milei (m) 
79 
 
Yes 
Heard it on the radio. 
People talked about 
Mt. Kilimanjaro and 
the snow that is 
disappearing, and 
water is drying up. 
Rains are not good 
nowadays, even though 
2013 is good. 
Air is not good because 
people are sick. 
God is punishing 
us. 
 
Theresia (f) 
29 
No 
Not observed so much 
changes. Grasses are the 
same. 
Perhaps less rain. 
God brings the 
rain. 
 
Mama Theresia (f) 
50 
No 
There were also bad years 
when she was young; 
There are generally more 
good years than bad years 
in this area. 
  
Neighbour (m) 
Middle aged 
No   
We hear that 
scientists want to 
disapprove the 
existence of God! 
Older lady – 
neighbour (f) 
Somehow 
People in church are 
talking about it, but 
speak about immoral 
behaviour like 
homosexuality 
Not many changes. 
Rains of short season 
come late. 
Dry season is thus longer. 
But rains are irregular, 
sometimes good and 
sometimes bad years. 
  
Koko mama Saruni 
(f) 74 
No 
Bad years also occurred in 
the past, so nothing new 
God is in charge 
She wonders 
whether the 
traditional way of 
praying was more 
efficient for 
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rainfall. Because 
when we prayed to 
Oloiboni, rain came 
the same day. 
Oloiboni (m) 
Spiritual healer 
Middle aged 
No 
Talks about changes in 
behaviour and religion and 
slaughtering/ sacrificing. 
 
Does not see the 
church as a threat, 
people still come 
to him but during 
the night. 
Mama Eliya (f) 
48 
No Less rain than in the past Doesn’t know 
Did not mention 
lack of rain at first 
sight. Only after 
asking about it. 
Mama Nasinyari (f) 
30 
No 
Zebras and wildebeest are 
biggest challenge for 
cultivation. 
Sometimes we plant seeds, 
but after heavy rainfall it 
suddenly stops so the 
harvest fails. 
We can only pray 
to God 
 
Babu Philipo (m) 
73 
Works for radio as 
a Maa language 
expert 
Yes 
He just heard it in 
Swahili and thought 
about changes of 
Maasai culture 
When he was young there 
was enough rainfall, grass 
and water sources. 
We cannot predict 
anymore. Years are bad 
now, but 2013 is like when 
I was young. 
God 
Bombs and 
explosive weapons 
that are used in 
war. 
2009 and 2010 
were bad years. 
Kitimanga (m) 
85 
Baba mama Eliya 
 
No 
only heard people 
complaining about 
lack of rain 
Bad years part of normality 
and the past. Remembers 
very bad years of the past 
without rain, with hunger. 
Some years enough rain, 
others not. 
No more water in the 
river. 
 
He thinks that it 
are normal 
changes like 7 bad 
years and 3 good 
years. 
Cultivate when 
bad years came, 
already in 1977. 
Also speaks about 
7 bad years since 
1975 (see 
traditional leader). 
Then 3 good years 
followed. 
Pastor of Free 
Pentecostal church 
(m) 
Middle aged 
Yes 
Radio and television, 
he knows it is about 
destruction of 
environment but he 
forgot what it is about. 
Great changes in rainfall. 
When he was young 
rainfall was heavy and 
came early, now they are 
late and only short period. 
Perhaps cutting of 
trees. 
Maybe just 
another period 
without rain 
He comes from 
another area 
(Monduli), that 
receives more rain. 
Church sees it as 
their responsibility 
to pray for rain 
Koko Theresia (f) 
75 
No 
Weather is always irregular. 
Sometimes high rainfall, 
sometimes no rainfall at 
all. 
No changes 
God is God who 
enables the sun to 
shine, and the 
rains to fall. 
 
God means three 
things: sky and all 
its contents, God 
and rainfall 
Koko (f) 
Mama Petro 
90-93 
No 
Rain is less nowadays. 
But in the past land 
belonged to everybody, so 
we moved a lot. Now 
everybody has his own 
land. 
She experienced 1 year 
without rain when she was 
Only God knows. 
Since we go to 
church no more 
rain. 
 
We depended on 
milk, blood, honey 
and meat. So in 
the past there was 
enough food. 
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a young girl. Now more of 
those years. 
Mama (f) – 
neighbour of Koko 
No 
We did not have long dry 
seasons like now. 
The years have changed, 
but people have also 
changed. We drank blood 
and nowadays people are 
eating a lot. 
When there was 
no rain we used to 
sacrifice a goat and 
it would rain again. 
God’s plan and He 
changed a lot. We 
receive the 
changes from 
God. 
Punishment from 
God because of 
our sins. 
Relates sacrifice 
and eroding 
customary 
practices to lack of 
rain 
Loserian (m) 1953 
brother of Petro 
No 
They had enough rain 
before. 
Maybe because of 
environment 
1997 worst year 
Rafael Ngaibata 
(m) 88 
 
No 
Some bad years, some 
good years. 
World has changed 
drastically, because we 
depended on milk only. 
Only challenge is rain. 
In the past also many bad 
years. 
We can’t say to 
God ‘give us rain’. 
If he gives us rain 
we say ‘thank you’. 
 
Logolie (m) 
34 
 
Yes 
A long time ago in 
1990 when he was in 
primary school, 
through the radio 
(He understood it was 
the result of research 
that was presented) 
The fluctuation of rainfall 
is recent. In the past there 
was enough rainfall. His 
father explained that rains 
may come in February, or 
March. And not in April or 
May. Now in some years it 
may come in May and that 
is the end. 
Water sources are drying 
up, despite rainfall. Some 
grasses are disappearing. 
Population 
increase, man-
made machines 
(e.g. industries that 
destroy the air 
from developed 
countries), roads 
cause fractures and 
floods. 
Human beings are 
causing this. 
Harvest is 
generally poor. 
Rainfall is not 
reliable and 
animals destroy 
crops. 
1997 and 1999 
bad, 2009 very 
bad; 2010 good. 
 
Lakanet Matinda 
(m) 55 
 
Yes 
Through the radio 
they said that ‘world 
climate change is 
taking place’. 
Recently very bad rainfall. 
Only this year 2013 was 
good again, so maybe the 
good years are coming 
back. 
Industries 
producing gasses 
which mixes with 
air, but take place 
in developed 
countries where 
they make 
weapons, and 
nucleair bombs. 
Often poor 
harvest, only few 
good ones. Maize 
is too expensive so 
they cannot buy 
every year. 
Therefore they 
keep on 
cultivating. Serious 
problem of lack of 
water and grasses. 
Godson (m) 
Middle aged 
(We met him at a 
climate change 
meeting in Arusha) 
Yes, highly 
Attended several 
meetings in Arusha 
and met with several 
researchers. 
But before he read it 
in newspaper and 
heard it on radio. 
Cattle diseases are 
increasing due to climate 
change, lack of rainfall and 
grass species are 
disappearing. Drying up of 
water sources. 
Lack of crops, heat 
increased a lot. Long dry 
First he thought it 
was just God. 
Then later he 
understood it is us 
humans who are 
doing this. People 
build around water 
sources, cut down 
1964, 1977, 1978  
drought. And 2009 
was a crazy year, 
but Terrat was not 
bad. People from 
Kenya came. 
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season. trees and too many 
industries. People 
want to become 
rich too fast (and 
cut trees to sell). 
Dora (f) 
Teacher primary 
school who 
measures rain 
 
Rainfall is very different 
every year, and in every 
place. 
 
Weather forecast 
is spatially too 
large, so not useful 
for people. And 
people do not 
trust the 
information on the 
radio because no 
direct 
communication 
with God. 
Lesian (m) 64 
Sukuro 
Just from talk in the 
street 
 
 
People are talking 
that the people 
from developed 
countries said that 
the sun is very 
near to the Earth 
 
Nemburis (f) 72 
Sukuro 
No 
There is complication in 
weather patterns. 
Especially in rainfall. 
It is leading to hunger 
nowadays. Also higher 
temperatures nowadays. 
  
Rebeka (f) 50 
Sukuro 
No  
When she hears 
about that there 
are changes in the 
weather this is 
maybe because of 
wrong-doings like 
homosexuality 
 
Mathayo (m) 62 
Sukuro 
Yes 
Church 
He sees a change in the 
culture as old people are 
complaining about these 
changes. 
People told us 
about the 
importance of 
planting trees to 
avoid 
desertification. 
 
Noyoyo (m) 26 
Sukuro 
No 
Only observed 
disappearance of certain 
type of grasses called 
Orkujita Onyokie 
  
Sembeyan (f) 20 No 
Normally it is changing. 
There is no fixed period 
for the long rains to come, 
long rains could be in 
November and short rain 
in July. 
Sun is very hot nowadays 
No explanation 
 
Her parents told 
her that when they 
were young there 
was enough rain. 
Rehema (f) 56 
Sukuro 
No Deforestation 
When she hears 
about this change 
it might be 
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because of our 
wrong-doings and 
deforestation. 
Sanya (m) 51 
Yes, somehow 
People are talking 
But I thought maybe 
the air has changed. 
Irregular rainfall is 
increasing. In the past 
heavy rainfall, and light 
rain until June. Now you 
may find no light rainfall 
and rains can end already 
in May or June. 
2013 is a good year so 
good years seem to come 
back! It is a challenge to 
find water in this area, but 
part of life. 
Sun is hot. 
We don’t know 
the secret of God. 
Maybe because we 
are doing bad 
things. Like in 
Mererani (mining 
site) where people 
get money through 
minerals. People 
can kill each other 
for money, or 
bewitch each 
other. 
Combination of 
factors contribute 
to failure of crops: 
unreliable rainfall 
of the area, some 
seeds variety take 
too long. 
Government has 
distributed very 
bad seeds! 
Netapuake (f) old No 
Rainfall in this 
environment has always 
been irregular. 
Lack of pastures is also not 
something new. This 
happened in the past. 
But in the past there was 
heavy rainfall, now not 
anymore. And it comes 
late. 
It is God who 
created everything 
and who we 
worship. 
 
Tumokinoi (m) 58 
Sukuro 
No 
Changes in rainfall, 
Rains come late 
Cultivation and 
deforestation. 
Not sure if these 
industries are 
causing it. God 
can help. 
Focus group, so 
this was a 
consensus answer 
Mwarusha (m) 40 
Sukuro 
No 
Changes in rainfall, 
Rains come late 
Cultivation and 
deforestation 
Not sure if these 
industries are 
causing it. God 
can help. 
Focus group, so 
this was a 
consensus answer 
Lucas (m) 45 
 
No 
Changes in rainfall, 
Rains come late 
Cultivation and 
deforestation 
Not sure if these 
industries are 
causing it. God 
can help. 
Focus group, so 
this was a 
consensus answer 
Supuk (m) 40 No 
Changes in rainfall, 
Rains come late 
Cultivation and 
deforestation 
Not sure if these 
industries are 
causing it. God 
can help. 
Focus group, so 
this was a 
consensus answer 
Saning’o (m) 60 
Yes, a little bit but 
does not know what it 
means 
Changes in rainfall, 
Rains come late 
Cultivation and 
deforestation 
Not sure if these 
industries are 
causing it. God 
Focus group, so 
this was a 
consensus answer 
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can help. 
Elisha (m) 42 
Pentecostal church 
(Also part of the 
focus group, the 
only one who was 
climate-cognisant) 
Yes 
Thought that this was 
a name given to those 
years without rain, to 
drought 
Changes in rainfall 
Rains come late. This 
started in 1983 or 1984 
Industries that 
emit fumes, 
application of 
weapons, 
deforestation 
1997 very bad year 
for cattle and 
crops. No rain. 
Diseases are 
biggest difference 
with the past. 
Naomi (f) 29 No Rainfall has decreased. 
Because of our 
sins. People 
bewitch each other 
because of money. 
There is no love in 
society anymore. 
 
Moses (m) 44 
Pentecostal church 
No 
Rainfall is irregular. But 
nowadays more irregular 
than before. 
Dry season is too long 
nowadays. 
No explanation. 
Very bad years 
that he remembers 
are 1993. And 
2009 when Maasai 
came from Kenya. 
Chairman Terrat 
(m) 1963 
No 
We are not harvesting 
anymore like in the past. 
Lack of rain nowadays. 
No explanation. In 
the past there were 
no trees but 
enough rain, now 
there are enough 
trees but no rain. 
It is more normal 
not to harvest than 
to harvest. 
But we cannot 
lose hope and we 
keep trying. 
Babu Lonyokie (m) 
Old 
Yes, through the radio 
but he does not 
understand it. 
They say that 
development brings 
these changes. 
Biggest challenge is water. 
Rain is a challenge, but out 
of our power. In God’s 
hands. It used to rain a lot. 
God. Nobody 
knows God’s 
secret, not even 
the oldest man. 
 
Decided to stay 
with Maasai belief. 
A very bad year 
that he remembers 
is a very long time 
ago. 
3 Illmuran (m) 
korianga age set 
Never heard about 
climate change, while 
they listen to the radio 
Years are not similar. Each 
year is different. Some 
years are good and others 
are bad. But the years were 
better in the past. 
No explanation. 
Just a period of 
bad years. 
 
Rehema (f) middle 
aged 
(We met her in 
Arusha at a climate 
change meeting) 
Yes 
She attended several 
climate change 
meetings in Terrat and 
Arusha 
There is not enough rain. 
She said that only 
God knows. 
She thought that 
they were talking 
about 
development at 
that meeting. 
Despite the fact 
that she attended 
several meetings, 
she does not 
understand climate 
change, and argues 
that only God can 
bring about these 
changes. 
Jacob (m) thirties 
Veterinary at NGO 
No 
Speaks about ‘technical 
pollution’, like lack of 
water sources, grasses, 
trees. But also mentioned 
lack of rainfall, and too 
heavy rain, and strong 
winds. 
  
Yeye (f) old No 
Rainfall is irregular. There 
are no changes. Always 
changes. Two good years, 
two bad years maybe. 
Sometimes heavy rainfall 
God is the One 
who makes rain to 
fall and the sun to 
shine. 
Recalled the time 
when people were 
starving and 
exchanged 
children for food. 
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and sometimes no rainfall. 
Speaks a lot about hunger 
in the past. 
Daudi (m) 41 
Bone doctor – 
Changed from 
Lutheran to 
Kilakuno 
No 
Rainfall has decreased. 
River is not flowing 
throughout the year and 
trees have changed. 
Temperature is higher. 
No explanation. 
2004, 2005 and 
2006 were very 
bad years. Greatest 
challenge is lack of 
grasses and cattle 
diseases. 
Meshak (m) 71 
Lutheran 
No 
River has dried up, rains 
have declined. But bad 
years were normal in the 
past too. 
Deforestation, 
cutting down of 
trees and burning 
the forest. 
His parents were 
facing the same 
challenges. Only 
difference is that 
the population was 
very small. 
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9 
Concluding reflections 
 
Relevance and theoretical contribution of this study 
 
“There are two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish 
swimming the other way, who nods at them and says “Morning, boys. How’s the water?” 
And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at 
the other and goes “What the hell is water?” 
David Foster Wallace 2005 
 
In 2005 author David Foster Wallace was asked to address a crowd of young, liberal arts students 
in a commencement speech. What followed was an awe-inspiring and beautiful talk in which 
Foster Wallace outlined – what he deemed to be – the fundamental value of a liberal arts 
education. Having arrived at the end of my own journey, during which I have dwelled for some 
years on a topic with a history of being dominated by the natural sciences; the question of 
relevance naturally emerges. When I try to explain my research to a lay audience, during family 
gatherings for instance, I simply state that I have been exploring climate-change realities among 
the Maasai in Tanzania (which is of course far from representative, but also not untrue). The first 
question that always follows is, “And, how bad is it for the Maasai?” My reply that I am not really 
sure either evokes disbelief or laughter. “So what is your solution then?” is another frequently 
asked question. I have come to learn that not only lay people but also (social) scientists and 
anthropologists dealing with climate change are endowed with a great dose of solution-oriented 
aspirations. It is very likely that a solution-minded gaze and research agenda are so inherent to 
contemporary societies’ default setting that we – as Roitman (2014) so lucidly reminds us – 
narrate the world around us, predominantly and constantly, in terms of crisis. Crisis and critique 
are cognates, as we now know. And in its most basic form, speaking of crisis is a way to imagine 
a new future for humanity. Concluding a study on climate change carried out among a vulnerable 
community like the Maasai without a solution therefore necessitates a great deal of explanatory 
power. And so I felt encouraged, even elevated, by Foster Wallace’s words.  
The so-called “hard sciences” have unmistakably left profound traces on the contemporary ways 
in which climate-change adaptation is talked about and approached from a variety of different 
disciplines. More importantly, the international climate change regime (UNFCCC), underpinned 
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by leading scientific assessments (by the IPCC) has adopted a true “adaptation science” (Pittock 
and Jones 2009), which is guiding policymaking all around the world – most notably in the 
developing nations. While adapting to environmental and climatic changes is as old as life on 
earth itself, in face of irreversible anthropogenic climate change, only the last two decades 
scientists and policymakers are increasingly grappling with “how humanity can actually adapt in a 
planned and strategic way as the climate that life depends on changes” (Schipper & Burton 2009: 
2). This is in a nutshell the basic storyline of the Adaptation paradigm. The scientific assessments 
that are informing adaptation strategies can by and large be characterized by technocratic 
solutions, which need to develop into highly planned ways with “toolboxes of best practices” that 
ultimately will need to work as blueprints for development. 
The prelude about Easter Island has served as an entry point to challenge technocratic and 
reductionist approaches to human-environment relations. This story is exemplary of the close 
link between the physical or natural environment on the one hand, and the symbolic or cultural 
system on the other. It tells us that the environment does not determine societies, and that such a 
mono-causal view does not offer a full comprehension of the relationship between humans and 
their natural environment. Put otherwise, environmental change often coincides with societal and 
ontological changes. Furthermore, the historiography of Easter Island gives us insight into the 
role of circulating knowledge and dominant paradigms in shaping our perceptions, without 
adequately questioning the claims to such thinking. Largely informed by environmental 
deterministic thinking, in the former collapse theories, societies’ cultural adaptive processes (the 
birdmen culture) have largely been overlooked and disregarded. Finally, and crucially, the single-
minded focus on environmental issues has occluded the external political force (arrival of the 
Europeans) that ultimately brought about the real societal collapse. Perhaps it is superfluous to 
say, but it should be noted that the alternative interpretation as presented above should not serve 
to legitimize the continuing depletion of natural resources and the ozone layer, or to state that 
cultural adaptation always occurs “naturally” so that we can discard any pre-emptive tactic 
altogether. But it rather challenges us to think differently about the many ways in which human 
adaptation to a changing natural environment occurs; yet always as part of a continuous mutually 
constitutive relationship. In this research I have argued that adaptation can be seen as a process 
that encompasses all aspects of human life, taking place concomitantly with socio-cultural, 
political, and also with ontological and ideological “adaptations”. In other words, while we are 
living in times of a changing climate our societies are similarly adapting to a new way of seeing 
and talking about these changes. 
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By following the manifold and intricate translations of the idea of Adaptation in northern 
Tanzania, I have been witnessing a continuously changing storyline in which the alleged universal 
value of science has not only been met with friction, but also with the utmost resistance. It is 
against this background, that I have been preoccupied with articulating the value and the possible 
contribution of the social sciences and humanities within the comprehensive debate and urgent 
issue of climate change. As my research ensued I was increasingly confronted with an absence of 
“crisis convictions” among the Maasai pastoralists of northern Tanzania. This was remarkable, 
not only considering the fact that crisis forms one of the cornerstones of climate-change 
discourses; but all the more so because the Adaptation paradigm is intended to serve the most 
vulnerable communities (such as the Maasai), at the end of the translation chain. It was at the 
“grassroots” level where most resistance could be felt. What do we do when we are faced with 
such discordances between transnational and local discourses? As such, I naturally felt the need 
to explore the stakes involved in positing the term crisis itself. And I believe that it is at this point 
that the relevance of the humanities and social sciences (here more specifically anthropology) 
within my research deserves most merit.  
As laid out in my introduction, what has followed from the urgency with which adaptation and 
climate-change discourses are permeated is a global recognition that for many people in the 
Global South adaptation is not just an option but a sheer necessity. The alarmism pertains 
particularly to the small island states and sub-Saharan Africa. Considered to be the most 
vulnerable continent, Africa is said to be facing a large “Adaptation Deficit” (IPCC 2014a). Put in 
very basic terms, what follows from the idea that Africa is suffering from an Adaptation Deficit, 
is the need for – what some policymakers have called – an “Adaptation Imperative” (WRI 2010-
2011). Furthermore, due to the historical greenhouse gas emissions of the industrialized nations 
as well as the lack of “adequate adaptive capacity” of the developing countries, the technical and 
financial assistance are expected to flow from the rich to the poor. The similarities between older 
development narratives and the adaptation imperative are obvious. Inspired by Roitman’s work, 
one of the consequences of the preoccupation with crisis is that we tend to lose sight of the 
stakes that are involved when positing the very term crisis itself. In other words, claims to crisis 
and the overweening concerns that are entailed by it engender blind spots and politicizes certain 
interest groups. Whereas Roitman has built her work on the financial crisis that held the world in 
sway in 2008, I believe that her historico-philosophical excavation can meaningfully be 
extrapolated and provide insight into the discursive framings of the global climate-change crisis. I 
have demonstrated in my work that while the international climate change community (through 
the UNFCCC regime) is concerned with finding ways to support Africa in its quest for 
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adaptation, the discourse on Adaptation is running its own course. Without discrediting the large 
body of adaptation literature that is dealing with the question how people are and should adapt to 
the biophysical consequences of climate change, I believe that there are also other reasons for 
concern. What is worrisome, for instance, is the reinforcement of a dependency relation and the 
victimization within which sub-Saharan Africa (and other developing countries) are cast.  
The basic critique that I postulate in this work should be understood in this broad line of 
thought, which can be framed as an attempt to denaturalize “Adaptation” (see also Gesing et al. 
2014). I perceive this move as a general quest to develop ways to recalibrate the hubris of 
Western epistemologies (that Africa has an Adaptation deficit that can only be overcome by 
experts and money from the developed world) and as a counter-voice to programmatic solutions 
to tackle climate change. This overall pursuit can perhaps best be described as a re-humanization 
of the climate’s dominant “episteme”, and seeks to deprive the scientific hegemony of its 
universal truth pretensions and of its inherent detachment of situated stories, local particularities 
and socio-cultural entanglements. I have argued that the notion of climate change as a travelling 
idea is well equipped to reveal the discrepancy between global discourses (or what happens in the 
process of translation), and what people experience and narrate on the other. A narrative 
approach has helped us to grasp these locally embedded virtues, situated knowledge and politics, 
values and intimacies by seeking to understand how epistemologies and ontologies respectively 
shape, and are shaped by, the story of climate change. As Fleming and Jankovic among other 
social scientists have argued in their attempt to find a more inclusive understanding of climate 
“The modern sense of “climate” has been eroded to an abstract three dimensional geophysical 
system, rather than an intimate ground-level experience” (Fleming and Jankovic 2011: 4; cf. 
Jasanoff 2010). As such, as has been addressed in chapter six, the increasing epistemic power of 
the “hard sciences” prompts us to reconsider and reformulate the contribution of the “softer 
disciplines” to the climate change debate. It has been argued that the value of the social sciences 
and the humanities lies in exploring “second-order observations”, and thus with an 
understanding of the visible, rather than the invisible. 
One of the basic arguments that I have put forward in this thesis, is that instead of focusing on 
how communities are adapting to the biophysical effects of climate change, we should not lose 
sight of the ways in which people adapt to the idea of Adaptation. I could not have wished for a 
better approximation that voiced my concern about relevance (or rather apparent lack thereof), 
than that captured by Foster Wallace’s take on the value of liberal arts. He writes: “The point of 
the fish story is merely that the most obvious, important realities are often the ones that are 
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hardest to see and talk about”. He concluded his address to the young students with the 
following words:  
It is about the real value of a real education, which has almost nothing to do with grades 
or titles, but everything to do with simple awareness; awareness of what is so real and 
essential, so hidden in plain sight all around us, all the time, that we have to keep 
reminding ourselves over and over:  
“This is water.” 
“This is water.”  
Foster Wallace 2005. 
Towards an anthropology of travelling ideas 
Beyond this very general and disciplinary relevance as described above, I hope that this study has 
also fostered insights into the anthropology of “travelling ideas”. As such, my work has pursued a 
critical engagement with the climate-change research agenda by bringing into view the political 
aspects of translating Adaptation in the postcolonial context of Maasailand in Tanzania. On a 
theoretical and methodological level I have done so by adhering to a material-semiotic approach 
in which it is assumed that “reality is permanently in the making, that humans are involved in the 
enactment of realities, and finally, that they do so not under conditions of their own choosing” 
(Riedke & Rottenburg 2016: 5). More concretely, in this thesis I have traced the manifold ways in 
which the idea of Adaptation to Climate Change travels to and is translated in northern Tanzania. 
This occurs in complex networks and assemblages that are formed by things and people, and 
thus draws together the material world and the ideological realms of social life. The basic 
questions that have been addressed throughout my work are: what are the consequences of 
translating Adaptation to Climate Change for different social groups? Who can benefit from 
these emerging discourses and who cannot? What makes the idea of Adaptation travel, or in the 
case of Maasailand, what are the conditions under which the idea does not travel or is by and large 
rejected? And finally, what happens in the encounter between different “truth regimes” or 
“climate horizons”?  
 
In order to address these questions this study has drawn both on STS approaches and the general 
cultural theory of risk as advanced by Mary Douglas and others. While STS (i.e. ANT or, more 
general, material-semiotics) have served as descriptive tools to gain insight into how ideas are 
translated – in the sense that semantics always need material infrastructures to be translated – 
cultural theory has been better equipped to provide answers about why certain ideas travel or are 
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translated in particular ways. We owe a great deal of our understanding of risk perceptions to 
cultural theory, which is premised upon the idea that evaluating the likelihood of a particular 
danger can never be value-free. This body of theory has thus enriched our knowledge about how 
prior commitments, entrenched narratives and existing norms and values shape our risk 
assessments. It was Mary Douglas who reminded us of the fact that risks are always selected, not 
just among “the primitives” but also in the modern world in which a utopian horizon of 
omniscience is hold dear. In a similar vein, Ulrich Beck has compellingly argued that more 
science and technology do not render our modern “risk society” less crisis-prone, but rather 
make the perceptions of risk more acute. Following the idea of climate change along its 
translation chain has brought the contrasts to the fore between the risk society in which fear, 
security, prediction and control have become dominant markers of life, as opposed to the 
lifeworlds of the Maasai in which unpredictability and the unknown manifestations of nature are 
accepted dimensions of “being in this world”. 
 
The very basic pursuit of following a travelling idea along its itinerary has been to understand 
processes inherent to globalization in which developments in one place shape developments 
elsewhere (cf. Behrends et al. 2014). I will summarise a few of the most important lessons that 
can be drawn from tracing this complex chain of translations. Chapter two has set the stage by 
introducing all the actors that became part of the process of the expansion of a network, which I 
have come to see as an “Adaptation Community”. A first observation has been that the way in 
which ideas travel is not so much in a unilinear way from the Global North to the Global South, 
or from the “global” to the “local”, but is rather enmeshed in complex webs and networks. 
However, I align with criticisms of earlier ANT approaches that contest the idea that all 
translations are in principle possible and that there are no borders or structural inequalities (cf. 
Barry 2013). In other words, some actors and entities are more powerful than others and there 
are borders and political structures that make some translations impossible or controversial. For 
instance, for many stakeholders in political arenas climate change has become the new 
bandwagon, whereas for the Maasai at the grassroots level the key issue at stake is about the 
politics of land. In other words, it is not the climate that they fear but their own government that 
continues to fail to protect their land rights. Therefore, Barry has rightfully argued that in 
analysing the relation between actor-network theory and international relations we have to pay 
attention to the political, geographical and literary aspects of translation (Barry 2013: 4). 
Furthermore, my study brought to the fore that a thorough understanding of historical processes 
was needed to make sense of why and how certain translations take place. It became clear that 
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much of the travelling idea of Adaptation is translated through “sedimented practices” and 
entangles existing webs of knowledge, institutions and paradigms. For instance, by analyzing the 
public hearing in detail I have demonstrated how climate change has the power to revitalise old 
tensions that have existed for a long time between the agro-pastoral Maasai and the Tanzanian 
government. Also archaic scientific concepts such as the “carrying capacity” of the land, and the 
pastoralists’ alleged unsustainable relationship to their environment are given new life by this 
nascent idea of climate change. As such, social issues are “incarnated as natural threats” (Fleming 
and Jankovic 2011: 10).  
Leboi’s testimony was a case in point, as he used this public hearing as a platform to voice his 
concerns about Tarangire National Park, a concern that is in turn sedimented upon older 
travelling ideas about nature and conservation. It turned out that Leboi did not necessarily travel 
for the purpose of talking about climate change; he simply liked his role and he was given the 
chance to travel all the way to Dar es Salaam. Moreover, he had become a well-known climate- 
change ambassador by that point. Like many other actors in the “game” he had become 
acquainted with the rhetoric. By bringing to life the different actors and their takes on climate 
change, I have furthermore sought to demonstrate that narratives are not only guiding our 
practices but are co-constitutive of social life itself. Thus it is the enactment of a new narrative 
through which new configurations of power emerge or old ones are perpetuated. In this sense, 
drawing in part on science and technology studies, the analytic concept of a travelling idea is both 
practice- and actor-oriented. From a methodological point of view, I have tried to show how 
‘ideas’ can be followed in real time and space at the moment they becomes tangible and translated 
into things and objects, or by people. From the public hearing onwards, therefore, I was able to 
trace the threads and actors that initially came together in Dar es Salaam. And so I followed 
Leboi to Terrat, Joseph and many others to Arusha, and the documents and policies to the 
various government offices where they were used and drafted in subsequent fields and networks 
of power. I also traced the translation practices and the emergence of the Adaptation Community 
in the northern part of Tanzania, mainly in Arusha where most of the NGOs and CSOs have 
their offices.  
My exploration into the enactment of this new narrative was a timely exercise, for it was the 
beginning of a mushrooming of Adaptation projects and workshops. In these so-called interstitial 
spaces – i.e. between global discourses and their local implementation – I found the explicit 
emergence of a counternarrative that was espoused by the NGOs that seek to represent the 
Maasai. Thus while transnational and national discourses on climate change discursively render 
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the Maasai as vulnerable victims, these development organizations oppose this rather old-
fashioned approach with an explicit take on pastoralists as masters of adaptation. Drawing on the 
detailed historical work of Hodgson on identity politics among the Maasai in which she explores 
how older transnational ideas have travelled to northern Tanzania (Hodgson 2002a; 2002b; 
2011a; 2011b), it has been demonstrated that experienced development brokers in the interstitial 
space are building upon their long-term experiences as “masters of role ambivalence”. In other 
words, they make use of their “skilled practices” in translating Adaptation. In the course of time 
they have come to learn which forms of rhetoric “work” on transnational platforms such as the 
UN, and what vocabulary does not work back home within their respective nation-states. 
Moreover, the idea of climate change has become a new resource through which transnational 
ties are made possible. Also visionary actors are crucial translators that masterfully navigate their 
way through the expectations of transnational donors on the one hand, and the more hostile 
environment of the nation-state on the other. I have shown that due to Adaptation’s 
comprehensive nature, existing development projects are undergoing a relabelling of old fashions 
that inevitably prompt questions about the very nature of the Adaptation paradigm. Without 
questioning the well-intended motives, or resorting to any sort of strategic thinking that explains 
discourses merely as a way to dominate others, it may be stated that The Adaption Imperative is 
driven by a hegemonic managerial worldview that is grounded upon scientistic principles that 
only rarely resonate with local climate-change realities. 
My observations about the ways in which this paradigm is advanced – particularly as far as 
North-South relations is concerned – bear similarities to the critique that has been directed at the 
world of development aid before. For instance, in his work on development experts, Rottenburg 
has pointed towards a fundamental paradox that is running through the world of development 
aid. Based on his own experiences working for a development bank, he demonstrates how a 
failed attempt at reorganizing a project by foreign experts is due to the structural denial of (1) the 
existing power relation between “developed” and “underdeveloped” societies; and (2) the 
political nature of aid itself (cf. Ferguson 1990; Li 2007). The denial of these two cornerstones 
and paradoxes of development is sustained by the rhetoric that is used by the all the players in the 
game (Rottenburg 2009). While James Ferguson has also put forward the same critique in his 
seminal book “the Anti-politics Machine” (Ferguson 1990), Rottenburg (among others) has 
argued that Ferguson overlooked the fact rendering development technical is beneficial for all 
actors, not just for the donors but also for the organisations that are receivers of aid (ibid). 
Rendering adaptation technical appears to serve the national government of Tanzania well, for it 
enables officials to draw attention away from the politics of land use, and the large-scale land 
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alienations that continue to take place under the name of conservation.177 While my research 
findings support the idea that adaptation is rendered technical and thus denies the wider 
structural problems related to the political economy, I have also observed that the receivers of aid 
(i.e. NGOs) at least try to nuance the technical foundation underpinning the problem of 
adaptation. The counternarrative of “masters of adaptation” is a testimony to this point. In line 
with Tania Li (who draws on Foucault), I have come to see the translation of Adaptation at the 
interstices as a more subtle form of power, or as The Will to Adapt. 
By employing a microscopic analysis of translation – based on my participation in several 
Adaptation workshops – it became vividly clear to me that grassroots communities have 
something else on their minds other than climate change. Put in Adam’s words: “to me the issue 
is not climate change; to me the issue is about our government taking away our land.” While 
some people from the grassroots were invited and also spoke out during the workshops, the 
question remains whether their voices are actually being heard (compare with Hodgson’s work on 
FGM). What stands out is that climate change is used as an opportunistic resource by the 
government to cast the political source of the problems away, obscure the politics of land use and 
land alienation, and even espouse it as a scapegoat to explain why the Maasai are dwelling in 
poverty. As former president Kikwete exclaimed during an international conference on the 
environment about the 2009 drought that hit Maasailand: “The Maasai became suddenly poor!” 
Against the highly politicized issue of land politics, it comes as no surprise that grassroots people 
like Adam are more concerned with their land security than with a changing climate. Hence, the 
translation of the Adaptation to Climate Change paradigm has to be understood in the context of 
a neoliberal political landscape, in which ongoing land evictions continue to take place that 
exclude many Maasai pastoralists from their most basic source of existence. Therefore, against 
Adaptation’s highly political journey, perhaps a more critical question to be asked in the 
Adaptation debate is not only how to adapt, but rather how the ideological underpinnings of this 
question can be brought to light. 
A climate-change scholar might argue that while Adam’s point above is well taken, perhaps Adam 
is not sufficiently knowledgeable about climate change, so he is not aware of the looming crisis; 
hence his reluctance to embrace it. Here we touch upon an important political point that goes 
back to the history of pastoralism. But it also brings into view important epistemological 
                                                             
177 My research took place when president Kikwete was still the head of state, and was reaping the full 
fruits of neoliberalism. The political landscape might look very different under the presidency of John 
Magufuli, who has already been nicknamed “the bulldozer”, as a result of a programme to build roads 
across the country. Moreover he began his presidential career with a radical move against corruption.  
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questions that I have addressed in chapters six, seven and eight, to which I will turn in the final 
section. First some notes on pastoralism. One of the paradoxes of the Adaptation paradigm is 
that on the one hand there exists overwhelming archaeological evidence that suggests that 
pastoralism in Africa emerged and spread in a time of major climatic changes in the earlier part of 
the Holocene (Kuper and Kröpelin 2006, in Bollig and Schnegg 2013: 1); while it is predicted that 
they are bound to suffer more than other groups when future climate change sets in on the other 
(Oba 2014: xi). As has become clear in my research, the scientific foundation upon which local 
experts base their understanding of climate change in Maasailand is very uncertain. As Scoones 
has pointed out, “while the striving for increased predictive power over the effects of climate 
change has yielded some results in the past; it is also very likely that climate science will improve 
in the future”. However, crucial for understanding the role of science and technology in my 
study, “the nature of climate-ecosystems interactions is such that non-linearity and the 
complexity of dynamic interactions means that uncertainty will always be present” (Scoones 2009: 
114). As I have tried to show in the final chapters, uncertainty indeed forms part and parcel of 
the environmental and spiritual configuration that inform the lifeworlds of the Maasai in Terrat, 
most notably of their understanding of Eng’ai. 
Climate Change and Anthropology 
The contribution of my work to the anthropology of climate change easily deserves a whole study 
in itself. Yet I see my attempt to grasp the encounter between Maasai “climate horizons” and the 
scientific notion as it is currently travelling only as a tentative beginning and invitation to a more 
thorough probing of this issue. The case of Leboi, and his revelation that he in fact does not 
believe in climate change as a scientific notion, has prompted me to explore some of the older 
debates on representation and epistemology that pervaded anthropology in the 1980s. I have 
pointed out that we at least need to be wary of not contributing to the process that I have come 
to understand as a “positive-feedback cycle”. The caution is here directed to the ways in which 
anthropologists (as well as other translators) use their informants’ accounts as a direct “proof” of 
climate change. Inspired by the work of Rudiak-Gould, a more critical approach therefore needs 
to take both observation studies and reception dynamics into account. One of the limitations of 
my study has certainly been that it has been mainly a qualitative inquiry, and more quantitative 
data could have enriched my analysis. Yet, the wider interpretive context of Terrat has informed 
my argument, for I encountered many people who refuted the idea of anthropogenic climate 
change, while others framed the unpredictability of the climate as part of normality. That being 
said, it has to be made explicit that many villagers also mentioned the increasing lack of rainfall 
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that they experience nowadays. Nevertheless, instead of taking these accounts to attest to the 
worldwide devastating effects caused by global warming, my guess is that it is more fruitful to 
consider the question of, what climate change means for the Maasai in Terrat? It appeared that 
climate change – as a new explanatory framework for a changing world – did not find resonance 
among many villagers. Crucially, I believe that the fact that the Maasai in Terrat and at the 
grassroots are refuting the climate change prophecy should not be understood as a sign of 
ignorance, but as an act of resistance. In other words, their rejection should be explained in terms 
of agency rather than ignorance or victimhood. This means that their stance should be taken 
seriously, and prompts us to explore the underlying rationales and ontologies. As such, this study 
has tried to give insight into the intertwinement of environmental, political and cultural 
dimensions that underpin the reluctance to accept this nascent discourse. 
It has been demonstrated that a complex relationship exists between morality, the environment 
and religion, which can best be described as an inclusive weave of the world in which these 
notions are intricately linked. As scholars of the ontological turn are very well aware, for many 
cultures in the world ways of being (ontology) are inseparable from ways of knowing 
(epistemology). Also for the Maasai, it has been argued that a different approach to dealing with 
the climate – as opposed to scientific accounts – have to be understood not so much in 
epistemological, but rather in ontological terms. For instance, when a drought hits the region 
systems of reciprocity, networks and mobilising strategies – or the enactment of drought – are key 
in how the drought is experienced (Goldman et al. 2015). The enactment of the climate and the 
weather is sustained by Eng’ai and forms the lifeblood of the general cosmological configuration 
that enhances morality and social cohesion in society. Discourses about the weather are inevitably 
a way of probing morality within society. In the translation of climate-change discourses an 
explicit move is made (by NGOs) to purify the Maasai’s ontological-epistemological weave from 
Eng’ai, for climate change is translated as an alleged “secular” discourse that has nothing to do 
with God, but everything to do with industries and planting trees. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated that making sense of climate-change discourses in Terrat occurs through a complex 
blend (or creative “coproduction”) of local cosmologies and more recently embraced Christianity. 
Much of the moral power of the traditional diviner and spiritual leader Oloiboni has shifted onto 
the church leaders, who hold a different set of ideas and ritual prescriptions on how to bring 
rainfall. Yet, despite the many cultural and religious ruptures or transformations that have been 
brought about by Christianity, an unmistakable continuity can be observed in the faith of the 
Supreme Being Eng’ai. 
 271 
The case of Terrat is telling as this nascent prophecy of climate change as caused by humans (in 
which Eng’ai is relegated to the margins) is met with great hesitation, pointing not only to the 
“incompatible ontologies” between what is drafted globally and experienced locally; but it also 
reveals that along the translation chain a “clash of adaptations” occurs between the sacred and 
the secular. However, it should be noted that I have argued at the beginning of this study that 
climate change as merely a secular notion needs to be reconsidered. It is a highly moral discourse 
that is increasingly demanding that humanity rethink its own place on earth. As Mike Hulme has 
recently suggested in his apologetic to “a reacquantaince with the ancient and religious ideas of 
virtue”: 
But listen carefully to the new voices speaking in the desert […] and one will hear a new 
language emerging around the fringes of climate change research, discourse and action… 
the language of empathy, story-telling, trust, wisdom, humility, integrity, faith, hope and 
love. I want to suggest that this is a vocabulary which, carefully deployed and realized, 
constitutes a re-discovery of virtue (Hulme 2014: 303). 
When probing issues around the weather and the climate among the Maasai in Terrat, these are 
exactly the notions that are evoked. The Maasai are all too aware of the fact that talking about the 
climate is a way of questioning morality, which relates to the ways in which love features 
throughout social life. Perhaps it is time therefore, that ideas not only travel from international 
platforms to places such as Maasailand, but that ideas also travel up from these fringes of the 
world – from communities that did not contribute to the causes of climate change – to those 
places where a reacquantaince with virtue appear more pressing. I cherish the hope that my study 
can contribute to such a journey.  
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